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Abstract 
 
During the Cold War, approximately 36,000 persons claimed Czechoslovakia as their country of 
citizenship upon entering Canada. A defining characteristic of this postwar migration of 
predominantly ethnic Czechs and Slovaks was the prevalence of anti-communist and democratic 
values. This dissertation follows Czech and Slovak refugees through the German invasion of the 
Czech lands and Slovakia‟s independence in 1939, the Second World War, the Communist 
takeover of Czechoslovakia in 1948, and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of 1968. Diplomats, 
industrialists, workers, democratic politicians, professionals, and students fled to the West in 
search of freedom, security, and economic opportunity. Many of these individuals sought to 
return home after Czechoslovakia was liberated from communism. This dissertation examines 
the interwar, wartime, and postwar immigration experiences of Czech and Slovak refugees 
through the lens of Canadian Czechoslovak institutions. In Canada, Czechs and Slovaks who 
professed a belief in a Czechoslovak identity formed their own organizations. In the Cold War 
era, the two most prominent Canadian Czechoslovak institutions were the Czechoslovak 
National Alliance and the Masaryk Hall. Both were later incorporated and renamed as the 
Czechoslovak National Association of Canada and the Masaryk Memorial Institute. 
Czechoslovak institutions in Canada faced opposition from nationalist Slovaks who opposed a 
common Czechoslovak identity. By focusing on political and institutional history, this study 
contributes to our understanding of Cold War immigration, and its influence on ethnic 
organizations and Canadian society. Although the admission, settlement, and integration of Cold 
War refugees was heavily influenced by federal and provincial authorities, Czech and Slovak 
newcomers joined Czechoslovak organizations and continued in their attempts to affect 
developments in Communist Czechoslovakia and Canadian foreign policy towards their 
homeland. During the Cold War, Canadian authorities further legitimized the Czech and Slovak 
refugees‟ anti-communist agenda and increased their influence in Czechoslovak institutions. 
Similarly, Canadian Czechoslovak organizations supported Canada‟s Cold War agenda of 
securing the state from Communist infiltration. Ultimately, an adherence to anti-communism, the 
promotion of Canadian citizenship, and the preservation of a Czechoslovak ethnocultural 
heritage accelerated Czech and Slovak refugees‟ socioeconomic and political integration in Cold 
War Canada. As a result, Canadian Czechoslovak organizations were instrumental in helping to 
shape a democratic culture in Cold War Canada. 
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Introduction 
 
In 1949, František Braun and his wife arrived in Canada with only $300 and some 
clothing. The Brauns left their home in Czechoslovakia and arrived in Canada as contract farm 
labourers with the help of a Czech Canadian farmer who sponsored them. Although unsure of 
what their new lives would bring amid feelings of returning home, the Brauns‟ first impression 
of Canada was that of happiness. During the Second World War, Braun fought for the 
Czechoslovak forces and believed in defending democracy. Although his homeland was a small 
European state, Braun believed that his fellow compatriots – individuals who fled the 
Communist takeover after February 1948 – could assist in fighting Communist aggression from 
abroad and succeed in liberating their homeland. After deciding to settle in Hamilton, Ontario 
without speaking a word of English, Braun acquired employment as a labourer working seven 
days a week while his wife began working in a chocolate factory. The couple were able to bring 
home $51 per week in wages. On Sundays, Braun picked fruit to make another $3-4. The Brauns 
believed that early struggles in a new land were reasonable since after all, they still had their 
freedom. As one of thousands of Displaced Persons (DPs) and labelled by the existing 
Czechoslovak community in Canada as a „1948er,‟ for arriving in the years after the Communist 
seizure of power, Braun recalled that “if you were honest and you did the work, then people 
treated you well.” He noted that Canadian society did not understand the hardships of 
newcomers. According to him, the DP experience was difficult because Canadians did not 
recognize that newcomers like him were “going to help build-up the country.” Over time, the 
Brauns worked hard, saved their earnings, and eventually sold their business to their son.
1
 
                                                 
1
 Frank Braun, interview by Jana Cipris, 5 September 1978, interview CZE-5163-BRA, Czech Oral History 
Collection, Multicultural History Society of Ontario (hereafter MHSO), John M. Kelly Library, University of 
Toronto. 
 2 
Political refugees like the Brauns left Czechoslovakia out of a genuine fear of persecution 
for their democratic beliefs, a lack of economic opportunity, social mobility, and even out of a 
sense of adventure. Initially, many postwar Czech and Slovak DPs like the Brauns arrived in 
Canada with hopes of returning to their European homeland once it was freed from the clutches 
of Communism. Whether labelled as DPs as per government policy or later recognized as 
political refugees by Canadian and international law, ethnic Czechs and Slovaks comprised three 
percent of the 165,000 DPs that arrived in Canada between 1947 and 1953. In the first decade 
after the Second World War, newcomers from Czechoslovakia constituted one percent of all 
postwar immigration from 1946 to 1955.
2
 In those years, many of the 13,211 immigrants from 
Czechoslovakia who claimed Czechoslovakian citizenship carried out daring escapes to the West 
only to later languish in Austrian, German, and Italian camps waiting for their opportunity to 
come to Canada. This group of postwar immigrants represents a unique experience in the history 
of postwar immigration to Canada and their involvement in Canadian society during the Cold 
War.  
This study focuses on the movement of refugees from Czechoslovakia within a specific 
geographic and historical space. In examining the history of Czechoslovak sociopolitical 
institutions in Canada, we can better understand their impact on the immigration and settlement 
experience of Czech and Slovak newcomers to Canada. This study also sheds light on how Cold 
War refugees influenced the promotion of a Czechoslovak identity between ethnic Czechs and 
Slovaks in Canada. In the wake of the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia in February 1948, 
thousands of individuals fled the country due to a fear of persecution at the hands of the 
Communists due to their membership and participation in democratic political parties. Anti-
                                                 
2
 Canada, Department of Manpower and Immigration, 1967 Immigration Statistics (Ottawa: Queen‟s Printer and 
Controller for Stationery, 1968), 21. 
 3 
communist academics, clergy, politicians, professionals, students, and tradespeople were 
admitted to Canada after spending several months or years in refugee camps in Austria, Italy, 
and Occupied Germany – and later West Germany. Commonly referred to as the „1948ers‟ or 
„48ers‟ by the existing Czechoslovak community in the West, many 1948ers immediately joined 
or established organizations intent on promoting democracy in their old homeland in the hopes of 
returning home, while also instilling democratic values in successive generations of their 
community. In some cases, Czechs in Canada attempted to represent nationalist Canadian 
Slovaks regardless of their separate ethnic identities, thus furthering mistrust and division 
between both groups in Canada.
3
 
In August 1968, Warsaw Pact forces invaded Czechoslovakia to suppress attempts at 
reforming and liberalizing Communist rule in the country during the Prague Spring movement. 
In the early years after the invasion, over 150,000 individuals fled the state seeking refuge in the 
West.
4
 Many of those who left were young, well-educated, and trained professionals. In a special 
program, Canada accepted nearly 12,000 Czechoslovakian refugees. Previous generations of 
immigrants from Czechoslovakia along with the existing Czechoslovak community in Canada 
referred to the refugees as the „1968ers‟ or „68ers.‟ In essence, the 1948ers first arrived in 
Canada from refugee camps scattered across Europe, and included individuals who were able to 
flee the brutal repression of individual freedoms and civil rights through torture, imprisonment, 
and even death at the hands of the Communist regime in the late 1940s and 1950s. Conversely, 
                                                 
3
 Elena Jakešová and M. Mark Stolárik, “Slovaks,” In Encyclopedia of Canada’s Peoples, ed. Paul Robert 
Magocsi, 1168-1179 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 1178. The problem of ideological divisions 
between Czechs and Slovaks remains an issue between both ethnic groups in Canada. 
4
 Madelaine Hron, “The Czech Émigré Experience of Return after 1989,” Slavonic and East European Review 85.1 
(2007): 54; Dinah A. Spritzer, “Children of ‟68: Émigrés' Kids Sound Off about Sexism, Their Countrymen's Self-
Esteem, and the Liabilities of a Czech Passport,” Prague Post, May 19, 2005, accessed 1 February 2010, 
http://www.praguepost.cz/archivescontent/41029-children-of-68.html. Until the early 1970s, approximately 225,000 
Czechoslovakians permanently resettled in the West. 
 4 
the 1968ers fled a country in the midst of a sociopolitical upheaval in which the Communist 
system was in the process of change. In hopes of getting rid of the proponents of Communist 
reform, Czechoslovakia‟s borders remained open in the early hours, weeks, and months after the 
invasion. Meanwhile, many 1968ers were already outside of the country when the Warsaw Pact 
invasion occurred and therefore avoided the brutal Soviet-inspired normalization of their 
country. As the 1948ers experienced the effects of persecution during the Communist takeover of 
Czechoslovakia and the initial period of Stalinization, the 1968 wave of refugees lived through 
two decades of Communism and totalitarianism. Both refugee movements from Czechoslovakia 
consisted of educated and established professionals including: academics, clergy, doctors, 
intellectuals, lawyers, politicians, alongside students and tradespeople. The 1948ers initially 
struggled to integrate into Canadian society and to find suitable employment according to their 
academic training and professional experience. Many of the individuals who arrived in 1968 and 
after were often underemployed in their first few years in Canada. In comparison to the 1948ers, 
the 1968ers rapidly integrated into Canadian society and assumed positions in their respective 
fields. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, Czechs and Slovaks continued to permanently settle in the 
West. This third wave of postwar immigration from Czechoslovakia did not flee their homeland 
in response to an immediate crisis, but chose to leave during the period of normalization. This 
wave consisted of academics, professionals, students, and skilled tradesmen in construction, 
manufacturing, and the service industries. These newcomers reinvigorated the anti-communist 
and pro-democracy identity of the Canadian Czechoslovak community and its organizations. 
The role of Canadian Czechoslovak institutions in espousing a pro-Czechoslovak identity 
is of particular interest to this study because these organizations attempted to bring two distinct 
 5 
ethnic groups together as part of a Czechoslovak civic nationalism. The promotion of a 
Czechoslovak identity in Canada followed in the footsteps of political events in Czecho-Slovakia 
after the First World War. In February 1920, Prague introduced a pro-Czechoslovak constitution 
which removed the hypen that embodied a federation between the Czech and Slovak nations. 
The new constitution promoted a Czechoslovak civic nation and a Czechoslovak language.
5
  
The history of Czech and Slovak immigration to Canada during the Cold War presents us 
with a unique opportunity to assess the similarities and differences, and continuities and changes 
between successive waves of immigrants from the same country through the lens of Canadian 
Czechoslovak community institutions such as the Czechoslovak National Alliance (CNA) 
founded in 1939, and the Masaryk Hall (MH) founded in 1944. Both community institutions 
remain in existence today serving Canadian Czech and Slovak interests, albeit under different 
names. 
Building on previous works by immigration historians and those with a particular interest 
in the Czech and Slovak experiences in Canada, this study will facilitate a greater understanding 
of Czechoslovak identity and its promulgation within the context of the Czech and Slovak 
immigration experience in Canada by constructing a broad-based institutional and political 
history that also incorporates an examination of the evolution of government action and other 
institutional gatekeeping throughout the Cold War period. This study explores the history of 
immigration from Czechoslovakia to Canada during the twentieth century and will make an 
                                                 
5
 Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, “Whither Slovak Historiography after 1993?” Canadian Slavonic Papers 53.1 (March 
2011): 45-46; Dušan Kováč, “Czechs and Slovaks in Modern History,” In Bohemia in History, ed. Mikuláš Teich, 
364-379 (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 371-376; Elizabeth Bakke, “Czechoslovakism in Slovak History,” In 
Slovakia in History, eds. Mikuláš Teich, Dušan Kováč and Martin D. Brown, 247-268 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), 252-262. The objective of establishing a Czechoslovak civic nationalism was constructed 
from two fabricated principles. First, the newly fabricated Czechoslovak nation-state was the “historical 
culmination” of earlier contact and collaboration between the Czech and Slovak nations who maintained similar 
languages and second, that the smaller Slovak nation would accept being merged with a larger Czech population to 
form a Czechoslovak nation. 
 6 
original contribution to the field of Canadian immigration history by using a research 
methodology that spans both political and institutional history, thereby producing a work that is 
transnational in focus. In examining the impact of sociopolitical events in Czechoslovakia on the 
Czechs and Slovaks in Canada, an analysis of how successive waves of Cold War refugees from 
Czechoslovakia attempted to influence the Canadian government‟s response towards global 
communism will also be assessed. This dissertation also considers the role of federal and 
provincial authorities in the maintenance and preservation of ethnic heritage among Canadian 
Czechs and Slovaks who supported a Czechoslovak identity during the Cold War. 
Guiding the enquiry is the question: what role did the immigration of anti-communist 
Czech and Slovak refugees play in defining Canadian Czechoslovak identity and Canadian 
foreign policy towards Czechoslovakia during the Cold War? This dissertation argues that the 
immigration of ethnic Czech and Slovak refugees to Canada was directly a consequence of Cold 
War politics. Czech and Slovak refugees transplanted their Old World ethnic and ideological 
divisions to Canada, whereby through contact with Canadian-born Czechs and Slovaks, 
successive waves of newcomers from Czechoslovakia, and the broader Canadian society, these 
same individuals successfully entrenched their anti-communism in Canadian Czechoslovak 
institutions where it also became an integral component of the Czechoslovak community‟s 
identity. As an essential part of the community, anti-communist refugees actively attempted to 
influence Canadian foreign policy towards Communist Czechoslovakia.  
Although anti-communist newcomers were heavily influenced by federal and provincial 
authorities during their resettlement in Canada, they continued to actively protest against 
communism in Czechoslovakia, only to later integrate into Canadian society as citizens. In 
opposing the interwar ethnic left within Czechoslovak community institutions, anti-communist 
 7 
refugees were able to promote what they believed were their community‟s interests including 
ethnic consciousness during the Cold War. These newcomers influenced the degree to which 
authorities were successful in undermining the old ethnic left in Canada and Soviet-led 
espionage in Canada. In Czechoslovakia, Communist authorities were successfully thwarted 
from manipulating Canadian Czechs and Slovaks into becoming agents for their old homeland. 
The term “Cold War” was first used by British novelist George Orwell in October 1945, 
to condemn the war-like state of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union 
following the end of the Second World War. Orwell criticized American imperialism and Soviet 
Communism and their respective influence in international affairs.
6
 In North America, the term 
“Cold War” was first used by American scholars in the late 1940s in an attempt to examine the 
postwar relationship between Moscow and Washington. As a result, the study of the Cold War in 
North America was initially led by American historians.
7
 Since the 1950s, three dominant 
interpretations on the origins of the Cold War have influenced scholars. Beginning in the late 
1950s, scholars who supported an orthodox interpretation argued that the Soviet Union was 
responsible for the Cold War. During this period, historians‟ approach to the Cold War was 
swayed by the demise of the Allied wartime alliance, the expansion of Soviet hegemony in 
Eastern Europe and around the world, and the growth of McCarthyism in the United States. As a 
result, a majority of scholars believed that the Cold War was a direct result of a breakdown in 
relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.
8
 In Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin: The 
War They Waged and the Peace They Sought (1957), historian Herbert Feis argued that after the 
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 Odd Arne Westad, “The Cold War and the International History of the Twentieth Century,” In Cambridge History 
of the Cold War, Volume I: Origins, eds. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, 1-19 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 3. See also George Orwell, “You and the Atomic Bomb,” Tribune, 19 October 1945. 
7
 For a historiographical overview see Thomas G. Paterson, “Origins of the Cold War,” OAH Magazine of History 
2.1 (Summer 1986): 5-9, 18. 
8
 Peter Bastian, “Origins of the Cold War: Historiography,” accessed 31 May 2013, http://www.anzasa.arts.usyd. 
edu.au/ahas/cworigins_historiography.html. 
 8 
Second World War, the Soviet Union attempted to broaden its sphere of influence over 
neighbouring countries by extending its boundaries. According to Feis, the Soviet Union would 
also “…revert to their revolutionary effort throughout the world,” and concluded that the Soviet 
Union was responsible for the “turbulence” of the early Cold War period.9 Thirteen years later, 
Feis published From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1950 (1970) in which he 
determined that the Soviet Union‟s refusal to join other states towards a “thoroughgoing system 
of international control” and its antipathy towards the West would establish a nuclear rival to the 
United States around the world.
10
 
In the 1960s, many scholars began to question the established interpretation of the Cold 
War. They criticized American involvement in the Vietnam War, and the role of industry and 
capital in warmongering. Influenced by the emergence of the New Left movement, scholars who 
supported a revisionist approach argued that the Soviet Union was reacting to American 
expansionism in democracy and trade in Western Europe and other parts of the world. Many 
revisionist works portrayed the United States as imperialistic and driven by American capitalism. 
As a result, American foreign policy was led primarily by economic interests that sought to align 
Washington with states that could support its political and economic agenda. The confrontation 
with Moscow was not simply a reaction to Soviet aggression, but rather an attempt to promote 
capitalist trade and democratic values.  
                                                 
9
 Herbert Feis, Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1957), 655. 
10
 Herbert Feis, From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York: Norton, 1970), 412. Feis 
argued in his introduction that “to the Americans, their ability to raise, equip, and transport such great combat forces 
as they had and to provide Lend-Lease supplies to the allies was proof of the potentiality of the system of private 
capitalism and free enterprise. Our valor in combat was deemed proud proof of the vitality and capacity of the spirit 
of free men and women. Despite what the Russians did during the war, communism, in contrast, was judged to be an 
oppressive and less productive system.” See page 5. 
 9 
In The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (1959), historian William Appleman Williams 
challenged the excepted orthodox interpretation of the Cold War by arguing that “for in the most 
fundamental sense, the present crisis in American diplomacy is defined by the conflict within 
and between America‟s ideals and practice.” According to Williams, the crucial point to be made 
was that “the idea that other people ought to copy America contradicts the humanitarian urge to 
help them and the idea that they have the right to make such key decisions for themselves. In 
some cases, the American way of doing things simply does not work for other people.” As a 
result, Williams believed that other states viewed American policy negatively since they could 
lose their economic and political self-determination.
11
 Appleman concluded that the United 
States‟ political and economic well-being was largely dependent on “human and material 
resources at home and in interdependent co-operation with all other peoples of the world.” 
Williams hoped that détente and rapprochement could one day occur between the world‟s two 
superpowers.
12
  
In Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima, Potsdam, the Use of the Atomic Bomb and the 
American Confrontation with Soviet Power (1965), historian Gar Alperovitz asserted that 
American President Harry Truman implemented a foreign policy directive that aimed to diminish 
or end Soviet influence in Europe. According to Alperovitz, the introduction of the first atomic 
bomb by the United States in 1945 influenced its diplomacy with other states, and was directly 
                                                 
11
 William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 
1959), 13-15. Williams wrote that “other societies come to feel that American policy causes them to lose their 
economic as well as their political right of self-determination. Feeling that they are being harmed rather than helped, 
they are inclined to resort to political and economic measures in retaliation, which only intensify a problem that is 
very complex to begin with.” 
12
 See William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 
1959), 209-210. See also Williams, The Roots of the Modern American Empire: A study of the Growth and Shaping 
of Social Consciousness in a Marketplace Society (New York: Random House, 1969). 
 10 
tied to forcing Moscow‟s acceptance of American plans for Europe.13 Seven years later, 
historians Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko argued in The Limits of Power: the World and United 
States Policy, 1945-1954 (1972) that Washington sought to restructure the world according to 
American economic and political needs so that American business could trade and profit without 
any restrictions or influence imposed by the Soviet Union. Essentially, American leaders 
assumed that they could establish a world of stable capitalist states with which to trade goods and 
import raw materials. By prohibiting leftists from government, conservative elites were able to 
establish “subservient, political control throughout the globe.” As a result, the United States 
actively thwarted Third World development and independence when it conflicted with its own 
economic and political interests.
14
  
A year later, historian Thomas G. Paterson published Soviet-American Confrontation: 
Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War (1973) in which he argued that the 
United States‟ failure to establish a world of peace and prosperity with the Soviet Union was due 
to Washington‟s ambition to use its influence to reconstruct the world according to its own 
needs. Paterson noted that in the spring of 1948, the United States and the Soviet Union were 
firmly entrenched in their spheres of influence and the world was “following the scenario 
Americans had wanted so much to avoid.”15 
In an attempt to demonstrate that the orthodox and revisionist interpretations were both 
partly accurate, but ultimately flawed, Cold War scholars began to advocate for a postrevisionist 
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 Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima, Potsdam, the Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American 
Confrontation with Soviet Power (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965), 13. 
14
 Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 2, 709, 712-713. 
15
 Thomas G. Paterson, Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 29. See also Thomas G. Paterson, “Introduction: American 
Critics of the Cold War and Their Alternatives,” In Cold War Critics: Alternatives to American Foreign Policy in 
the Truman Years, ed. Thomas G. Paterson, 3-15 (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971). 
 11 
approach arguing that the United States and the Soviet Union pursued their own agendas, often 
misunderstanding each other‟s policies during the Cold War. In the 1970s, postrevisionist 
scholarship attempted to demonstrate that the Soviet Union was predominantly occupied with its 
own security and protecting its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Although these scholars 
could not rule out Soviet aggression towards the West, they maintained that the United States 
remained unsure of Soviet intentions, and therefore, held legitimate concerns regarding the 
Soviet Union. In The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (1972), historian 
John Lewis Gaddis acknowledged revisionist historians for stressing the role of economic 
interests in American diplomacy, but claimed their focus was too narrow. According to Gaddis, 
issues such as bureaucratic inertia, domestic and foreign politics, individual personalities, and 
American perceptions of Soviet policies and intentions ultimately influenced the course that 
Washington officials followed.
16
  
Two decades later, historian Melvyn Leffler‟s Preponderance of Power: National 
Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (1992) illustrated that Washington‟s 
foreign economic policy was based on the self-perception that it was a global “financial 
hegemon.” Washington‟s multilateral trade with other states had brought about “unprecedented 
economic growth” and reinforced its own image as a global superpower. Leffler went on to 
assert that during the Cold War, American officials believed that economic success in industrial 
sectors of the global economy would further separate Moscow from its Eastern European 
satellite states and bring about freedom in these countries. According to Leffler, American 
officials also believed that Moscow would be forced to cooperate closely with the United States 
                                                 
16
 John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1972), viii, 358-361. See also Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1997), and Gaddis, Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin Press, 2005). See also Walter 
Lafeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1975 (New York: Wiley, 1976), 285-291. 
 12 
and other countries on the world stage. When it came to the Third World, Leffler concluded that 
American officials “exaggerated the importance of the periphery, misconstrued the relationships 
between the Kremlin and revolutionary nationalist leaders, and overestimated the gains that the 
Kremlin could derive from developments in the Third World.”17  
In The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times 
(2005), historian Odd Arne Westad asserted that the United States and the Soviet Union 
intervened in the Third World because of ideologies inherent in their politics. Westad viewed the 
Cold War in the global south as a continuation of European imperialism and was often an 
extension of indigenous civil wars.
18
 Westad later asserted that the study of the Cold War would 
have to be situated within a broader history of the twentieth century. Future scholarship will need 
to turn away from exceptionalist studies of the Cold War, and focus on contextualizing Cold War 
history within larger sociocultural and political trends.
19
 
In the first decade after the Second World War, a group of interdisciplinary scholars in 
the West including historians, political scientists, and sociologists began to study Czechoslovakia 
through the lens of the Cold War. Initially, many early works were published by former 
Czechoslovakian politicians and diplomats who sought to promote their opposition to 
Communism in their homeland. After the Communist takeover in February 1948, scholarship in 
Czechoslovakia supported a Marxist perspective emphasizing class struggle as dictated by the 
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Communist regime.
20
 During the early Cold War period, studies pertaining to Communist 
Czechoslovakia broadly focused their attention on the establishment of the Communist regime in 
February 1948 and the emergence of the Prague Spring movement and subsequent Soviet-led 
invasion in August 1968. 
Early works argued that Soviet foreign policy and the Communist movement in 
Czechoslovakia were responsible for the Sovietization of Czechoslovakia in 1948. An example 
of this early scholarship was Hubert Ripka‟s Czechoslovakia Enslaved (1950). As a former 
Czechoslovak government-in-exile official, Ripka dismissed the notion that postwar 
Czechoslovakia held a “pro-Russian attitude” after the Communists won the most seats in the 
May 1946 general election. Ripka argued that the “communization” of Czechoslovakia 
constituted an example of expanding Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. Integral to the 
emergence of state communism in Czechoslovakia was the country‟s geographic proximity to 
Moscow and Prague‟s “traditional friendship” with the Soviets. This led many Czechoslovakians 
to view their eastern neighbour as a defender against German fascism. Ripka concluded that the 
heightened Cold War tensions between the West and the Soviet Union, and the “dynamism of 
Soviet imperialism” led to the events of February 1948. The Communist takeover of power was 
an example of Soviet aggression and forced the West to oppose Soviet expansion in Europe and 
elsewhere.
21
  
Nearly a decade later, former interwar Czechoslovakian diplomat and political scientist 
Josef Korbel argued in The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia (1959) that the 
Communists in Czechoslovakia rapidly exploited the socioeconomic and political situation to 
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their benefit. According to Korbel, the Communists used the Munich Agreement of 1938, the 
German occupation during the Second World War, and the Soviet liberation in 1945 to rally 
support for their cause against Czechoslovakia‟s right-wing parties. As a result, homegrown 
Communists were able to undermine democracy in Czechoslovakia and install a Moscow-
oriented Communist regime.
22
 Two years later, former secretary to the last democratic 
Czechoslovakian president Edvard Beneš and Professor of Government Edward Táborský 
published Communism in Czechoslovakia, 1948-1960 (1961). Similar to Ripka and Korbel, 
Táborský believed that the study of postwar Czechoslovakia was significant in relation to other 
Communist satellite-states. According to Táborský, Czechoslovakia was the most industrialized 
and urbanized country in the region when compared to other Eastern European states which were 
largely agrarian and lacked industry. Táborský noted that after the Second World War the 
population‟s “pro-Russian” attitude was superficial given that Czechs and Slovaks were 
historically Western-oriented. As the last standing democracy in Eastern Europe on the eve of 
the Second World War, Czechoslovakia served as a unique example of how a “Western-oriented 
democratic community succumbs to Marxist-Leninist totalitarianism.”23 
In The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (1969), sociologist Zdeněk Suda viewed the 
Communist experiment in Czechoslovakia as a “validity test” of state Marxism. For other Soviet 
satellite-states in Eastern Europe, Communism was seen as a mechanism for rapid 
industrialization and modernization. For an industrialized Czechoslovakia, Suda concluded that 
Communism had failed to address the problems of an industrialized state, and as a result would 
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fail as a mechanism for change and modernity on the international stage.
24
 In Czechoslovakia: A 
Short History (1971), historian John Francis Nejez Bradley concluded that as nations, the Czechs 
and Slovaks were too small to exact influence on their much larger European neighbours. As a 
result, German and Soviet foreign policy easily imposed their political objectives in Central 
Europe during the Second World War and the initial stages of the Cold War. After February 
1948, the Czechs and Slovaks were left to “…derive whatever benefits they could.”25 A decade 
later in Socialism and Democracy in Czechoslovakia (1981), economist Martin Myant 
questioned whether the Communist takeover of power was the result of a political offensive on 
the part of the right-wing in Czechoslovakia or a long-term objective of the Communists as 
dictated by Moscow‟s Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers‟ Parties (Cominform). 
Myant placed the events of February 1948 in a Cold War context arguing that Soviet foreign 
policy and the strategy of the Communist Party were responsible for the fall of democracy and 
the Sovietization of Czechoslovakia.
26
  
With the publication of the first history of Slovakia in the English language, Slovakia: 
The Struggle for Survival (1995), political scientist Stanislav J. Kirschbaum noted that in the 
May 1946 elections which were won by the Communists with 38 percent of the total votes cast, 
Slovakia rejected Marxism as a solution to its lack of industrialization. Only 6.9 percent of 
Slovak voters supported the Communists. In his study of the Slovaks and Slovakia, Kirschbaum 
argued that they had become trapped in the struggle between Western democratic values and 
Soviet socialism. Unfortunately, the Second World War had placed Slovaks and Czechoslovakia 
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in the Soviet sphere of influence.
27
 In Slovakia: From Samo to Dzurinda (2001), political 
scientist Peter A. Toma and historian Dušan Kováč illustrated that while a majority of Slovakia 
did not support the Communists in the May 1946 general election, Slovak citizens were 
economically better off under Communist-led industrialization than in the interwar period in 
which Prague sought to maintain Slovakia as an agricultural province. Modernization continued 
regardless of the effects of a centralized economy.
28
 In The Czechs and the Lands of the 
Bohemian Crown (2004), historian Hugh LeCaine Agnew noted that the struggle to preserve 
democracy in Czechoslovakia as it was incorporated into the Soviet sphere of influence 
ultimately failed. Agnew concluded that both internal and external factors such as the popularity 
of the Communist Party at home and Soviet foreign policy were responsible for the demise of the 
democratic system.
29
 
Following the events of the Prague Spring movement and the Soviet-led invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in August 1968, scholars turned their focus from the influence of Soviet foreign 
policy and domestic Communism in Czechoslovakia towards the events of 1968. In the spring of 
1970, hardline Communists purged liberal-minded historians from institutions of higher learning 
and the Academy of Sciences due to their support of the Prague Spring movement two years 
earlier. Many of these same individuals were banned from publishing for years and forced into 
underemployment as labourers, drivers, janitors, and bookkeepers.
30
 In the West, scholars 
continued to debate whether the Prague Spring movement was a revolution or a movement for 
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reform. In The Intellectual Origins of the Prague Spring (1971), political scientist Vladimír 
Kusin
 
argued that the Prague Spring movement was not a revolution, but was simply reform-
minded. The movement for reform of the Communist system in Czechoslovakia was led by the 
intelligentsia who sought gradual changes. According to Kusin, the Prague Spring movement 
held support from all sectors of Czechoslovakian society including from within the ruling 
Communist party structure. A broad coalition of support for reform produced national unity 
which later became a political force. Kusin concluded that the Prague Spring movement‟s 
objective was not to destroy the Communist system, but to implement a new model of 
socialism.
31
  
In The Czechoslovak Reform Movement (1971), political scientist Galia Golan claimed 
that the Communist regime‟s delay in de-Stalinizing Czechoslovakia was due in part to its 
disinterest in attacking Stalinism. As a hardline Communist satellite-state, Prague was slow to 
discredit Stalinism in the 1960s. Golan agreed with Kusin that the Prague Spring movement was 
reform-minded. The Communist regime sought to alter the political system because it failed to 
“provide the proper framework for socialist society…” The Prague Spring movement sought to 
adjust Communism to the realities of an industrialized state. As a result, reformers in Prague 
believed state socialism could be joined with democracy. Golan concluded that the reform 
movement in Czechoslovakia was not anti-Soviet in its outlook, but sought to deal with the 
socioeconomic and political problems brought upon by the Soviet model of communism installed 
in 1948.
32
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In Politics in Czechoslovakia (1974), political scientist Otto Ulč claimed that following 
the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia to suppress the Prague Spring movement, the neo-
Stalinist restoration of hardline rule would fail to materialize since a broad coalition of society 
supported reform of the Communist system. By the 1970s, the Communist regime would become 
a “…weakened, exhausted system…possessing the characteristic of what may be termed a “post-
totalitarian system…” Ulč agreed with previous scholars and concluded that Czechoslovakia‟s 
future would continue to be determined by external forces.
33
 Political scientist Zdeněk Křýštufek 
went further by arguing in The Soviet Regime in Czechoslovakia (1981) that the reform 
movement demonstrated how “deep and pervasive was the aversion to the existent political 
organization.” The reintroduction of freedom of the press, civil rights, and the elimination of 
censorship allowed Czechoslovakians to see their state without communist propaganda.
34
  
 In Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution (1976), historian Harold Gordon Skilling 
viewed the Prague Spring movement differently than previous scholars. According to Skilling, 
the events of 1968 were more closely linked to revolution than reform. The Communist regime‟s 
ability to govern had broken down. Skilling noted that “rulers could not rule and the ruled did not 
want to be ruled.” The Prague Spring movement‟s attempt to increase civic freedoms and limit 
press censorship was in stark contrast to Soviet rule. Skilling concluded that in 1968, the 
Communist regime in Czechoslovakia was undergoing a revolution supported by liberal 
members within the Communist party and by a cross-section of society eager for change.
35
 Two 
years later, political scientist Vladimír Kusin published From Dubcek to Charter 77 (1978) in 
which he countered Skilling and argued that the Prague Spring movement was not a revolution 
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since individuals within and outside of the Communist Party initiated a “reformist alliance” to 
exact socioeconomic change within society. According to Kusin, reform Communists did not 
seek to end Communist rule and would have required more time before the Soviet invasion to 
establish a revolution.
36
  
In Passive Revolution (1979), scholar Jon Bloomfield argued that the Prague Spring 
movement was at best a “passive revolution” in which individuals outside of the Communist 
Party willingly participated in changing Communist rule, but were “…not its driving force.” 
Although Bloomfield took a middle approach to the objectives of the Prague Spring movement, 
he joined previous scholars in claiming that Czechoslovakia‟s socioeconomic and political 
development remained largely dependent on external forces. As a Communist satellite-state, 
Czechoslovakia remained in the Soviet sphere of influence. Bloomfield argued that the events of 
1968 signalled that Communist Party officials, intellectuals, students, and workers sought to 
implement policies that would not upset Moscow and were in accordance with its strategic 
requirements. As a result, the Prague Spring movement was no more than a passive attempt at 
revolution. Officials from within the Communist Party and ordinary citizens who sought change 
did not craft a strategy for the implementation of a new socialist system. Bloomfield concluded 
that the motivation for revolution “came from above and from abroad, and this had enormous 
implications for democracy in the future socialist state.”37 
With the fall of Communism in 1989, scholarship on Communist Czechoslovakia 
continued to use earlier works as “templates” while including newly accessible archival records. 
In The Prague Spring and its Aftermath (1997), political scientist Kieran Williams noted that 
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after 1989 the concept of reform communism was all but dismissed due to the failure of 
perestroika (economic reform) in the Soviet Union.
38
 With the release of Cold War archival 
materials in the West and in Eastern Europe, scholars have increasingly contextualized events in 
Czechoslovakia as part of a broader international Cold War history. In The Prague Spring and 
the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 (2010), historian Gunter Bischof, historian 
Stefan Karner, and researcher Peter Ruggenthaler claimed that the Warsaw Pact invasion of 1968 
challenged governmental authority in the West and the East and ultimately led to the 
establishment of the policy of détente which restructured international order. Bischoff, Karner, 
and Ruggenthaler supported a revisionist interpretation by arguing that the Warsaw Pact invasion 
stabilized Eastern Europe and permitted for the politics of détente to take root. Another effect of 
the events of 1968 was Moscow‟s imposition of the Brezhnev Doctrine which claimed that the 
Soviet Union had permission to defend socialism in its own sphere of influence.
39
 During the 
Cold War, independent scholarship in Czechoslovakia was heavily undermined by Communist 
authorities who promoted Marxist thought in an attempt to establish an “official historiography.” 
After February 1948, research institutions that did not support the regime‟s ideological values 
were purged of scholars who opposed a Marxist interpretation of the past.
40
 Many of these 
individuals fled to the West where they could freely publish their works and actively oppose the 
Communist regime‟s “official” interpretation of the past. Many of these scholars were ardent 
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democrats and anti-communists who influenced Western understanding of the Cold War in 
Czechoslovakia.  
In Canada, the Cold War is thought to have begun with Igor Gouzenko, a Soviet cipher 
clerk in the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa. On 5 September 1945, Gouzenko fled from the Soviet 
authorities with 109 documents which he later turned over to the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police (RCMP). The highly sensitive documents proved the existence of a Soviet spy ring in 
Canada. The Soviet cipher clerk‟s claim that Canadian Communists were handing over secret 
documents to Moscow was followed by national outrage.  On 5 February 1946, under Order-in-
Council P.C. 411, the Canadian government established the Royal Commission to Investigate the 
Facts Relating to and the Circumstances Surrounding the Communication, by Public Officials 
and Other Persons in Positions of Trust, of Secret and Confidential Information to Agents of a 
Foreign Power, commonly referred to as the Kellock-Taschereau Commission.
41
 Between 
October 1950 and June 1951, the RCMP handled 54,000 requests to screen civil servants and 
private-sector workers. Any deviance from postwar cultural norms of God, family, country, and 
democracy were immediately viewed as suspicious and often put under surveillance.
42
 
In Double Standard: The Secret History of Canadian Immigration (1987), political 
scientist Reginald Whitaker argued that the American and Canadian governments prevented 
Soviet spies and leftists from entering their countries while remaining passive to the admission of 
fascists and their sympathizers.
43
 Leftists who fled conservative states were labelled as security 
risks. The Cold War manifested itself in everyday life through police checks and Royal Canadian 
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Mounted Police (RCMP) security screening. Proponents of business attempted to thwart the 
immigration of noted leftists while ethnic communities – including Eastern European groups – 
attempted to suppress the leftist influence in their communities. 
In this era of increasing sensitivity to the Communist threat from within and outside of 
Canada‟s borders, the federal government welcomed newcomers including refugees – those 
whom the United Nations defined as: being stateless, outside of their former habitual residence, 
or unwilling to benefit from the protection of their home country due to a fear of being 
persecuted on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, political view, or membership in a 
particular social group – and attempted to restrict individuals with Communist and socialist 
sympathies from entering the country. In Cold War Canada: The Making of a National 
Insecurity State, 1945-1957 (1996), filmmaker and journalist Gary Marcuse, and political 
scientist Reginald Whitaker asserted that the Canadian government cooperated with its American 
neighbor and accepted a series of ideological and political agendas that dictated which 
immigrants were admitted and restricted. The postwar consolidation of Soviet hegemony in 
Eastern Europe shocked Canadian officials as a democratic system in Czechoslovakia was 
usurped by local Communists supported by Moscow.
44
 Canada sought to prevent Communists 
and their sympathizers from entering the country. Émigrés who fled Communist states were 
cautiously settled in Canada because they came from “refugee-producing states.”45 Marcuse and 
Whitaker illustrated that in contrast to prewar immigrants who brought “Old World radicalism” 
with them to Canada, Cold War refugees from Eastern Europe brought liberal-conservative 
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values that supported democracy and economic opportunity. In addition, Eastern European 
immigration brought an ardent anti-communism and “hatred” of Soviet domination of their 
homelands. Marcuse and Whitaker asserted that many of these same anti-communist newcomers 
attached themselves to conservative causes and promoted policies that sustained the Cold War.
46
 
In the first decade after the Second World War, Canada admitted close to a million 
immigrants. Many Canadians began increasingly concerned that newcomers from Eastern 
Europe would disrupt middle-class cultural norms. In The Trouble with Normal: Postwar Youth 
and the Making of Heterosexuality (1997), sociologist Mary Louise Adams maintained that 
social workers and immigrant advocates encouraged „New Canadians‟ to “abandon their own 
family structures in favour of those thought to be essential to the moral strength of the nation: 
single family households, presided over by a breadwinner father and stay-at-home mother.” 
Whether or not white, Anglo-Celtic, and Christian family norms were desirable to newcomers, 
many immigrants who faced discrimination and economic hardship upon entering Canada were 
continually labelled as “„deviant‟ and a threat to both „Canadianization‟ and the institution of the 
family itself.”47 Meanwhile newcomers from Eastern Europe were thrust into the ideological 
fight between democracy and Communism. As a result, Adams emphasized that dissent and 
difference of opinion were seen to weaken democratic values while Canadian officials promoted 
social cohesion and the superiority of the Western way of life.”48  
In Gatekeepers: Reshaping Immigrant Lives in Cold War Canada (2006), historian 
Franca Iacovetta claimed that the Cold War in Canada imposed new social and political restraints 
on free speech and other civil liberties, and criminalized homosexuality and other social 
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immorality. Political dissent was depicted as treasonous and a sure sign that an individual was 
loyal to the Soviet Union and Communism.
49
 Social workers, professionals, bureaucrats, and 
politicians or „Gatekeepers,‟ supported “a fundamentally conservative Cold War consensus” that 
promoted the middle-class values of conformity, obedience, and a belief in a capitalist society.
50
 
In essence, Iacovetta argued that these aforementioned „gatekeepers‟ attempted to eliminate all 
Communist threats from within towards a democratic and Western way of life in Canada. The 
containment and eradication of Communist threats within Cold War Canada led to widespread 
fear and a “moral panic” that affected postwar immigration legislation including the 1952 
Immigration Act which included restricting Communist sympathizers, homosexuals, and drug 
users and traffickers from entering the country legally.
51
 Iacovetta also examined the role of the 
federal government and ethnocultural organizations in trumpeting the myth of the heroic anti-
communist freedom fighter from Eastern Europe who arrived in Canada to continue the struggle 
to liberate his/her homeland from Communism.
52
 Although an asset to Canada as a skilled 
immigrant, the anti-communist remained preoccupied with the struggle for the old homeland 
rather than integrating into Canadian society.
53
 Individuals perceived as “freedom fighters” often 
succumbed to issues of personal immorality and even played both sides of the Cold War. As a 
result, the role of the anti-communist largely influenced how successful the state would be in 
undermining ethnic leftists.
54
 The Soviet Union and its satellite-states used agents in Canada to 
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“infiltrate large ethnic groups” including the Czechoslovak and nationalist Slovak communities 
in the hopes of eliminating anti-communist activities.
55
 
In Canada and the Cold War (2003), political scientist Reginald Whitaker and historian 
Steve Hewitt concluded that the West “overreacted” in its response to the threat posed by the 
Soviet Union. Both scholars determined that in Canada the Cold War led to …signs of panicked 
reactions, and excesses in pursuit of security that did liberal democracies like Canada no 
credit.”56 In Love, Hate, and Fear in Canada’s Cold War (2004), editor Richard Cavell 
suggested that Canada‟s Cold War effort was more “centralized” than its American neighbour 
and at times even anti-American.
57
 In recent years, scholars of the Cold War have increasingly 
emphasized that Western states including Canada failed to distinguish between what were actual 
threats on the part of Communists and their sympathizers inside the country, and those from the 
Soviet Union and abroad. As a result, Canadian officials failed to “calculate coolly and rationally 
a measured and proportionate response.”58 
Previous historiography illustrated that Canadian authorities actively participated in the 
admission, settlement, and integration of anti-communist refugees during the Cold War. 
However, it is difficult to ascertain the level of influence that anti-communist newcomers had on 
Canadian officials and other non-governmental “gatekeepers” in undermining ethnic leftists in 
Canada and on foreign policy towards Communist Eastern Europe. The scope of participation, 
commitment, and success in fighting communism on the part of newcomers from 
Czechoslovakia also requires further analysis. Czech and Slovak refugees transplanted their 
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democratic politics and anti-communism to Canada during the Cold War. Many of these 
newcomers joined Canadian Czechoslovak institutions where, as self-appointed representatives 
of their community, they attempted to act as intermediaries between Czechoslovaks and 
Canadian society. These community brokers often maintained a transnational identity with a 
loyalty to the old democratic homeland and their new home, Canada. Cold War refugees from 
Czechoslovakia joined community organizations out of self-interest to increase their 
socioeconomic standing, promote their political views, and establish their roles as members of 
the Canadian Czechoslovak elite. In using their anti-communist background and status as Cold 
War refugees, newcomers bolstered their position in the Czechoslovak community and Canadian 
society by promoting anti-communist values through persuasive language including „fight,‟ 
„struggle‟ and „liberate‟ in an attempt to use rhetoric to exemplify their wish to see democracy 
return to their old homeland. Often, rhetoric exceeded reality in which many anti-communist 
refugees sought to change Canadian public perceptions of Czechoslovakia and global 
Communism. It is important to note that much of the anti-communist Cold War rhetoric within 
the Canadian Czechoslovak community was also anti-Soviet in nature.  
During the Cold War, Czech and Slovak refugees arrived in Canada at a time when the 
cultural norms of a nuclear family, Christian faith, loyalty to country, and democratic values 
were considered vital to the preservation of Canadian society. Individuals including newcomers 
from Czechoslovakia were viewed suspiciously if they diverted from these postwar cultural 
norms. A fear of being labelled as communists or Soviet spies, and put under surveillance played 
an influential role in how refugees from Communist Eastern Europe settled in Canada as they 
transplanted their old world values, and navigated the norms they found in their new homeland. 
An examination of the role played by Czechoslovak institutions and Canadian authorities in the 
 27 
settlement of these newcomers will help determine what part of the newcomer‟s anti-
communism was rhetoric – an attempt to embrace postwar Canadian cultural norms or 
Czechoslovak community interests – and what was reality. 
This study also examines the evolution of Czechoslovak identity and how it influenced 
community institutions in Cold War Canada. During the Cold War, Czech and Slovak identity in 
Canada was not only shaped by their political ideologies and personal backgrounds, but also by 
their ties to an ethnic nationalism in Europe. Beginning in the 1920s, the politics of identity 
contested in Czechoslovakia were transplanted to Canada. State-sponsored Czechoslovakism was 
promoted by Prague‟s diplomatic representatives in Canada and opposed by nationalist Slovaks 
who defended a distinct Slovak ethnic heritage and homeland in Slovakia. 
Scholars of immigration history frequently question how to use subjective markers of 
ethnicity. Group self-identification remains the standard measure of how to label an ethnic 
community.
59
 In the early twentieth century, the study of immigration and ethnic groups in 
Canada suffered from a lack of a conceptual and theoretical framework. Following in the 
footsteps of American scholarship that viewed immigration as a „problem,‟ early Canadian 
studies focused on the settlement of the Canadian West. As a result, the study of immigration and 
ethnicity as a separate field was largely overlooked and even ignored.
60
 Prior to the Second 
World War, historians and sociologists began to question the role that ethnicity and „race‟ played 
in Canadian society. Beginning in the latter-half of the twentieth century scholars have taken a 
vast range of approaches to the study of Canadian immigration history and ethnicity. The 
interdisciplinary nature required to study these issues also evolved throughout the twentieth 
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century. As scholars were inherently linked to the time period in which they wrote, many works 
contained established ethnocentric views of the era and diminished, downplayed, or even 
degraded certain groups into racial and ethnic hierarchies.
61
 
Since the 1960s, historians and sociologists have sought to promote cultural relativism 
where ethnicity was accepted as an “innate property of culture-bearing groups.” Hence, common 
ethnic identity was defined as a social construction involving “internal rules” of exclusion and 
inclusion around a perception of a common descent based on such factors as ancestry, language, 
religion, history, and territory.
62
 Profoundly influenced by American scholarship, the study of 
Canadian immigration history and ethnicity followed the reaction of scholars to Harvard 
historian Oscar Handlin‟s influential 1951 Pulitzer Prize-winning thesis The Uprooted.63 As a 
result, the history of North American ethnic communities in the sixties was viewed largely as a 
break with the past and stressed the uprootedness, alienation, and eventual assimilation of the 
immigrant to the greater society. In 1964, sociologist Raymond Breton published his influential 
work in which he demonstrated that by using information on the number of national churches, 
mutual benefit societies, and ethnic press, for example, an ethnic community‟s rate of 
institutional completeness could be ascertained. Breton studied how ethnic institutions allowed 
immigrants to live their lives within their own ethnic cultures away from the receiving society.
64
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In his findings, ethnic groups with a large concentration of ethnic organizations were classified 
as “high” and included among others: Germans, Greeks, French, Hungarians, Italians, Poles, and 
Russians. Ethnic communities that were considered to be “low” in terms of institutional 
completeness included: Belgians, Bulgarians, Danes, Dutch, Irish, Latvians, Romanians, and 
“Czechoslovaks.”65 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, scholars of immigration and ethnicity such as historian 
Rudolph Vecoli who first refuted Handlin‟s thesis no longer viewed the immigrant experience 
within the broader field of ethnic history as a rupture with the past, but rather as a continuity.
66
 
Scholars began to view immigrants and their experiences in the context of transplanted lives and 
asserted that they too held human agency in choosing and adapting to their settlement in North 
America.
67
 Canadian scholarship on immigration and ethnic groups outside of an Anglo-Irish 
and French origin lacked a generation of scholars similar to Handlin, Vecoli, and American 
historian Marcus Hansen who could aptly examine the experience of „other‟ groups in Canada. 
As a result, the study of the immigrant experience in Canada was derived from the emergence of 
social history and the study of the past “from the bottom-up” such as works on labour and ethnic 
communities.
68
 Initially, the histories of ethnic communities that were produced in the three 
decades after Handlin‟s Uprooted thesis were heavily filiopietistic in nature often promoting 
romantic visions of the old homeland, culture, language, and the success of community members 
in attaining social, political, and economic success in Canada. As a result, such works were not 
highly critical of the ethnic community under study because they were written from within – by 
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established members including academics and professionals often times in the author‟s second 
language.
69
 
Canadians envisioned their country to be different in its understanding of ethnicity and 
reception of immigrants than that of the United States. Canadians viewed their country as a 
“mosaic” in which ethnic groups were able to maintain their diversity, whereas American 
identity was formed from the fusion of diverse ethnic groups into a “melting pot.”70 Historian 
Howard Palmer dispelled this notion in asserting that past American and Canadian immigration 
policies were similar in their objectives to restrict and to exclude certain immigrants based on 
ethnic or racial origin.
71
 As a result, Canada witnessed the promotion of three theories of 
assimilation over time: first, Anglo-conformity – Franco-conformity in the province of Quebec – 
attempted to merge an immigrant‟s culture with that of the dominant Anglo-Saxon and French 
groups; second, the melting pot sought to bring together the existing broader community with the 
ethnic community to establish a Canadian identity; and lastly, the notion of cultural pluralism or 
multiculturalism which permitted immigrants and ethnic communities to preserve their cultures 
and traditions from the old world while actively integrating in Canadian society as citizens.
72
 In 
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the early 1980s, historian Roberto Perin lamented the lack of space in historiography for 
immigrants to “…claim exclusively for themselves.” Perin asserted that the immigrant 
experience was separate to that of the ethnic community and proposed the use of “immigrant 
communities” or “immigrant cultures” instead of “ethnic.”73 Perin noted that while the history of 
immigrant groups was missing or understudied in Atlantic Canada, in areas outside of major 
urban centres, and largely throughout British Columbia – which focused primarily on nativism – 
local or regional studies were essentially capturing the immigrant experience.
74
 
In recent decades, Canadian immigration scholarship has underrepresented or outright 
ignored the experiences of smaller and highly assimilable ethnic groups, since European ethnic 
groups are often simply appropriated as having rapidly integrated into Canadian society and 
therefore are overlooked. In the case of immigration from Czechoslovakia to Canada in the 
twentieth century, ethnic Czechs were not as ethnoculturally cohesive in terms of community 
establishment in North America as ethnic Slovaks who embraced the resurrection of their own 
organizations, parishes, and festivals in the new world. Only a minority of Czechs did not 
embrace Canada‟s Anglo or Franco-conformity in the first several decades of the twentieth 
century. 
 For the purposes of this study, it is important to examine the similarities and differences 
between Czechs and Slovaks as separate ethnic groups in Canada. Beginning in the late 
nineteenth century, both groups settled in areas where other Central and Eastern Europeans 
resided due to a familiarity with their cultures. Czechs and Slovaks were numerically smaller in 
comparison to other European groups including the Ukrainians, Russians, Poles, Germans, and 
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Hungarians. Historians Mark Stolárik and Elena Jakešová observed that the three pillars of 
Slovak life in Canada were the family, fraternal-benefit society, and the parish. Approximately, 
80 percent of Slovaks are Catholic, 15 percent are Lutheran, and 5 percent are Greek Catholic. 
Prior to the First World War, Slovaks relied on the fraternal-benefit society to build parishes 
where mass was delivered in the Slovak language. With an increase in Slovak immigration after 
1918, many national parishes were erected across Canada to serve local Slovak Catholic and 
Protestant communities. During the interwar period, many sojourners found their initial 
experience in Canada difficult and chose to live within their community. As a result, they did not 
learn English or French and never adapted to Canadian culture and customs. Subsequent 
generations of Slovaks often intermarried with other Slavic groups and with individuals of a 
similar religious background. For example, Slovak Catholics often intermarried with individuals 
from a French, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, or Polish background. Postwar Slovak immigrants 
arrived in Canada with a high level of education and experience and were able to quickly 
improve their socioeconomic status.
75
  
Postwar newcomers established community schools for their children where they were 
taught Slovak culture and history, and could learn the Slovak language. Catholic Slovak 
immigrants enrolled their children in separate schools, while Protestant Slovaks placed their 
children in public schools. In recent decades, Slovak Canadians continue to support local 
community institutions and press.
76
 A majority of Slovaks in Canada espouse a distinct Slovak 
ethnic identity and culture. A minority of the Canadian Slovak community supports a common 
Czechoslovak identity with their neighbours, the Czechs. 
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 In comparison to the Slovaks, the Czechs have accepted a higher level of institutional 
assimilation. Historian Marek J. Jovanovic observed that Czechs in Canada often retained their 
ethnic identity, but did not actively participate in Czech or Czechoslovak institutions choosing to 
join non-ethnic Canadian organizations and groups. Prior to the Second World War, Czech 
immigrants often joined other national churches and organizations because their numbers were 
too small to establish their own institutions. Before 1939, Czechs preferred to join Slovak 
organizations or attempted to establish institutions that promoted a Czechoslovak identity which 
many nationalist Slovaks opposed. Relations between Czechs and Slovaks were often a 
microcosm of the political situation in Central Europe as both groups shared a common 
statehood. From 1918 until its dissolution in 1993, Czechoslovakia was home to both the Czech 
and Slovak nations. With the birth of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic in 1993, 
Czechoslovak groups referred to themselves as „Czech and Slovak.‟  
A majority of Slovaks opposed a common Czechoslovak ethnic identity which caused 
friction and division between both communities. Compared to the Slovaks, Czechs had a higher 
rate of intermarriage and often moved out of ethnic neighbourhoods in an attempt to avoid being 
“ghettoized.”77 Approximately 75 percent of Czechs in Canada are Catholic, while a minority 
belong to the Protestant churches including the Moravian Brethren, Lutheran, and Baptist 
Churches. During the twentieth century, many Czechs favoured intermarriage with individuals of 
an Anglo-German background.
78
 After the Second World War, Czech immigrants brought a high 
level of education and experience to Canada which allowed them to rapidly improve their 
socioeconomic status compared to other groups who arrived in Canada during the same period. 
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Similar to the Slovaks, postwar Czech immigrants also established weekend schools for their 
children who would learn about Czech culture and history, and practice their Czech language 
skills. With the rise of public education, Czech immigrants increasingly placed their children in 
public schools. Community institutions which taught the Czech language and culture to 
successive generations decreased, as Czech parents taught their children at home or failed to pass 
on their culture and language. With an increase in the number of government-supported 
community services since the 1970s, many Czechs in Canada seldom support Czech or „Czech 
and Slovak‟ institutions and the community press.79 
During the postwar period, only a limited amount of historical scholarship emerged on 
the Czechs and Slovaks in Canada.
80
 In the 1950s and 1960s, works such as Konštantín Čulen‟s 
Slovaks in Slovakia and Canada (1955) offered a general overview of Slovakia‟s history and the 
Slovak experience in Canada from a nationalist perspective. Similarly, Mario Hikl‟s A Short 
History of the Czechoslovak People in Canada (1955) produced a synopsis of the experience of 
Czechs and Slovaks in Canada from a Czechoslovak viewpoint.
81
 Not until the late sixties did a 
work of substantial scope appear. During Canada‟s Centennial, Joseph M. Kirschbaum published 
The Slovaks in Canada (1967). Written from a nationalist perspective, Kirschbaum largely 
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undermined the relationship that a minority of Slovaks played in Czechoslovak ethnic 
associations and activities in illustrating that a majority of Slovaks were nationalistic and their 
ethnic identity was separate to that of the Czechs.
82
 Prominent Marxist historian Josef V. 
Polišenský‟s Canada and Czechoslovakia (1967) promoted the historical relationship between 
Canada and Czechoslovakia in culture and trade at the time of the International and Universal 
Exposition (Expo 67) held in Montreal.
83
 A year later, John Gellner and John Smerek‟s largely 
Czechoslovak-oriented The Czechs and Slovaks in Canada (1968) demonstrated that Czechs and 
a minority of Slovaks in Canada adhered to a Czechoslovak ethnic identity.
84
 The 
aforementioned works are now largely outdated and do not examine the admission and 
settlement of the 1968ers and individuals who entered Canada in the 1970s and 1980s.  
In the mid-1980s, Anthony X. Sutherland examined the history of the largest and most 
influential nationalist Slovak organization in Canada in The Canadian Slovak League (1984).
85
 
With the fall of communism in 1989, no history of the Slovak people existed whereas works 
discussing Czechoslovaks were readily available.
86
 As a result, those Slovaks who chose to 
participate with their Czech colleagues were predominantly known as Czechoslovaks due to their 
support for a common ethnic identity and were a minority within the Canadian Slovak 
community. Simultaneously, a majority of works published on Slovak immigration in North 
America and modern Slovakia have espoused a nationalist Slovak orientation in an attempt to 
challenge the widespread perception that Slovaks are members of a broader Czechoslovak 
identity. As a result, events in Czechoslovakia profoundly shaped how Canadian authorities and 
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the public perceived and understood Czech and Slovak identity. In many cases, Canadian Czechs 
and Slovaks were often referred to as Czechoslovaks. Many nationalist Slovaks who immigrated 
to Canada fought against their misrepresentation as Czechoslovaks in the hopes of raising 
awareness of a distinct Slovak ethnic identity and nation. Scholarship on the Czechs and Slovaks 
in Canada was initiated by these same immigrants from Czechoslovakia. 
Approximately two decades later, Czech Canadian lawyer Josef Čermák published 
Fragmenty ze života Čechů a Slovaků v Kanadě (Fragments from the Life of Czechs and Slovaks 
in Canada) (2000), and It All Started with Prince Rupert: The Story of Czechs and Slovaks in 
Canada (2003). Čermák attempted to finally produce a comprehensive history of the Czechs and 
Slovaks in Canada. His works illustrated the evolution of settlement and sociopolitical 
organization since the nineteenth century through a lens that promoted the notion of a 
Czechoslovak and later a “Czech and Slovak” community.87 Due to a dearth of historians with a 
knowledge of the Czech or Slovak languages, „community insiders‟ such as Čulen, Hikl, 
Kirschbaum, Gellner and Smerek, and Čermák produced works that examined the history of 
these communities. Meanwhile, recent historical scholarship beginning with Gerald Dirks‟ 
Canada's Refugee Policy: Indifference or Opportunism?(1977), and later followed by Reginald 
Whitaker‟s Double Standard: The Secret History of Canadian Immigration (1987), Freda 
Hawkins‟ Canada and Immigration: Public Policy and Public Concern (1988), Valerie 
Knowles‟ Strangers at our Gates: Canadian Immigration and Immigration Policy, 1540-1997 
(1997), Ninette Kelly and Michael Trebilcock‟s The Making of the Mosaic: A History of 
Canadian Immigration Policy (1998),  and Franca Iacovetta‟s Gatekeepers: Reshaping 
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Immigrant Lives in Cold War Canada (2006) have briefly mentioned the migration experience of 
individuals from Czechoslovakia within a broader study of Canadian immigration history.
88
 
This study of Czech and Slovak immigration to Canada primarily focuses on Toronto for 
two main reasons. First, beginning in the interwar period, Czechs and Slovaks began to settle in 
urban centres across Canada with Toronto and Montreal attracting sizeable Czech and Slovak 
populations. During the Cold War period, nearly half of all newcomers from Czechoslovakia 
chose to settle in Toronto or southern Ontario where established Czechoslovak and nationalist 
Slovak communities existed. Second, the largest and most influential Canadian Czechoslovak 
institutions during the Cold War, the Czechoslovak National Alliance (CNA) and the Masaryk 
Hall (MH) were headquartered in Toronto.  Although existing archival records and previously 
conducted oral histories contain information on Czechoslovak community life across Canada, 
these collections focus predominantly on Czechoslovak community activities in Toronto and 
southern Ontario.  
Research conducted for this study included federal and provincial archival records and 
statistics, ethnic community archival fonds, previously-recorded oral histories, and mainstream 
and ethnic newspapers. Government records are a rich source of information on Canadian 
officials‟ role in the admission, settlement, and integration of newcomers. Records pertaining to 
the Immigration Branch, the Departments of External Affairs, National Defence, and the 
Secretary of State, and the Ontario Department of the Provincial Secretary and Citizenship were 
consulted for this study. Ethnic community fonds also shed light on the social, cultural, and 
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political participation of citizens and newcomers to Canada. Institutional records donated by 
various Canadian Czechoslovak organizations such as the Czechoslovak National Association of 
Canada (CNAC), Masaryk Memorial Institute (MMI), Canadian Czechoslovak Benevolent 
Association (CCBA), and the Sokol Gymnastic Association of Canada (SGAC) form a body of 
information from which we can ascertain the conditions and composition of membership, the 
level of participation in annual congresses and celebrations, and relations between other 
Canadian Czechoslovak groups, nationalist Slovak Canadian institutions, and local, provincial, 
and federal authorities.  
These same organizations donated a significant amount of documentation to various 
national and provincial repositories. Often, these collections are cleansed of records which reflect 
negatively on individuals and groups within the Canadian Czechoslovak community. 
Documentation found in ethnic community fonds is often produced by „community insiders‟ who 
claim to represent their entire community whether or not their ideological views are supported by 
a majority of community members. Similarly, these records contain donated papers, receipts, 
reports, minutes, letters, memoranda, and are often biased towards an organization‟s 
sociopolitical ideology, aims, and objectives. Ethnic community fonds also exclude the „silent 
voice‟ – members who did not actively participate in their community‟s sociocultural and 
political activities. Therefore, ethnic community fonds give us a glimpse into the institutional 
and social history of the Czechoslovak community in Canada, but often exclude sizeable 
constituencies within the community who are not regular participants in its activities, nor do they 
create documentation which is later preserved as a part of the community‟s archival record. 
Potential pitfalls in the use of institutional records from archival repositories include restricted 
access, privacy legislation, and accessioning or deaccessioning. The archival records of the 
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Canadian Slovak League held by Library and Archives Canada were largely unavailable for 
consultation due to accessioning. 
Oral histories used in this study provided a rich source of information on ethnic Czech 
and Slovak immigration to Canada. The Czech and Slovak collections of the Multicultural 
History Society of Ontario contained interviews with newcomers to Canada spanning several 
decades of the twentieth century. The collections were comprised predominantly of postwar 
arrivals including the 1948ers and the 1968ers. Historians continually gather contextual 
information in an attempt to reconstruct an objective past. Oral history provides the historian 
with an individual‟s perception of reality. These same individual accounts of the past illustrate 
how memory remains an unstable aspect in the construction of narratives. Individuals often 
forget or even amend the past when recounting their experiences. As a result, an interviewee‟s 
memory of the past can change once he or she comes into contact with new information in the 
present.
89
 
Complementing the aforementioned archival and oral history sources are news clippings 
from mainstream Canadian English and French language newspapers including, but not limited 
to the Globe and Mail, Le Devoir, Le Droit, La Presse, Montreal Gazette, Ottawa Citizen, and 
the Toronto Star. The Canadian Czech and Slovak language ethnic press was also a vital source 
of information on ethnic Czech and Slovak refugees and the existing Czechoslovak community 
in Canada. Czech and Slovak language press included the Prague sponsored Nová vlasť (New 
Homeland) which ceased production in February 1948, the MMI‟s official organ, Nový domov 
(New Homeland), and Czechoslovak community papers, Kanadské listy (Canadian Papers), and 
Naše hlasy (Our Voices) which published its last issue in 1974. Canadian mainstream and ethnic 
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newspapers were primarily intended for commercial consumption and provided their leadership 
with regular documentation on current events at home and abroad. As sources, newspapers hold 
limitations including the promotion of an ideological bias. Ethnic newspapers can also promote 
an ethno-nationalist bias reflected in news coverage and reporting. These same newspapers often 
reflected the biases of their editors and served to include, exclude, or marginalize particular 
ideologies, political persuasions, and issues of class, gender, and ethnic identity. The 
aforementioned Canadian Czech and Slovak language newspapers promoted a Czechoslovak 
sociopolitical orientation, while diminishing nationalist Slovak aspirations for self-determination 
and independence. During the Cold War, these same newspapers espoused an anti-communist 
ideology and anti-Soviet bias. 
This study takes a chronological approach to examine the history of Czechoslovak 
community institutions in Canada and the immigration of refugees from Czechoslovakia to 
Canada, placing significant events within the context of the Cold War. Each chapter provides 
varying degrees of emphasis to questions of ethnic identity, sociocultural involvement, political 
ideology, and relations between successive waves of newcomers from Czechoslovakia, and 
between refugees, and Canadian society. Each chapter demonstrates how historical events 
profoundly influenced the significance of Canadian Czechoslovak institutions. 
Chapter One discusses interwar immigration from Czechoslovakia and the existence of 
an interwar Czechoslovak community in Canada prior to the arrival of diplomats and politicians, 
anti-Nazi Sudeten Germans, and a transplanted Bata Shoe Corporation before the German 
invasion of the Czech lands (Bohemia and Moravia). During the Second World War, Czechs, 
Slovaks, and Subcarpathian Ruthenians organized into a Czechoslovak alliance in order to assist 
in the liberation of their homeland from German occupation and to provide relief to their fellow 
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compatriots. Chapter Two focuses on the postwar plans of the Czechoslovak community 
institutions in Canada with a particular emphasis on the resurrection of a democratic 
Czechoslovak state, postwar relief, the promotion of Canadian citizenship, and the preservation 
of ethnic heritage. Chapter Three describes the reaction of the Czechoslovak community 
organizations to the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia in February 1948 and its 
preparations and resettlement of political refugees who fled to Canada in search of safe haven. 
Chapter Four explains how community tensions and ideological divisions within the 
Czechoslovak community increased over efforts to return democracy to the old homeland and 
the desire to instill postwar values of Canadian citizenship within the community. Chapter Five 
examines the Canadian government‟s response to the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia 
in 1968 and the subsequent refugee crisis which led to the admission and settlement of close to 
12,000 Czech and Slovak refugees. Chapter Six discusses the role of Czechoslovak community 
groups in the continued struggle against communism, the promotion of human rights in Canada 
and abroad, and the continued effort to assist refugees who arrived in the 1970s and 1980s.  
The Cold War immigration experience of individuals and families from Czechoslovakia 
is a microcosm of a much larger movement of refugees to Canada. These unique experiences are 
an invaluable resource in the study of immigration and ethnic history in Canada. This 
dissertation sheds new light on the reasons behind the immigration of Czechs and Slovaks to 
Cold War Canada and their settlement experience through the lens of Czechoslovak community 
institutions. In examining Canadian governmental records, Czechoslovak and nationalist Slovak 
community files, Czech and Slovak-language ethnic press, and oral histories, this study furthers 
our understanding of the Canadian governmental response to immigration from Czechoslovakia 
and its influence on the activities of Canadian Czechoslovak organizations during the Cold War. 
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At the same time, this study also assesses the role of Canadian Czechoslovak groups in the Cold 
War relationship between Canada and Communist Czechoslovakia.    
Successive waves of anti-communist Czech and Slovak refugees including František 
Braun arrived in Canada with the hope of seeing democracy return to their homeland and one 
day returning home. Through a series of complex exchanges with Canadian society and the 
existing Czechoslovak community that were characterized by continuity and change, Czech and 
Slovak immigrants joined local organizations such as the CNA and MH in the hopes of 
furthering their anti-communist and humanitarian agenda. At the same time, Canadian 
Czechoslovak community institutions were influenced by the arrival of the 1948ers, 1968ers, and 
later refugees and joined lobbying efforts against communism in Czechoslovakia. Initially 
supportive of the newcomers‟ anti-communism, older members of these Czechoslovak 
organizations later opposed attempts to move their institutions towards the political goal of 
returning democracy to Czechoslovakia. While the „struggle‟ against communism gave Czech 
and Slovak newcomers who supported a Czechoslovak identity a sense of purpose, over time 
successive waves of refugees turned their focus towards Canadian citizenship and the 
preservation of Czechoslovak ethnic heritage and language for future generations. In the case of 
František Braun and his wife, their experiences were defined by a complex interplay between 
Old World identities and those being forged in the New World.
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Chapter One: 
 
Between People of Whom We Know Nothing:  
Farm Labourers, Enemy Aliens, and Allied Citizens 
 
Martin Bursík arrived in Quebec City on 22 August 1930. Along with his sister, they 
made the twenty-two day journey from Czechoslovakia to Canada in order to work as 
agricultural labourers who sought to return home with their accumulated savings. The Bursíks 
chose to come to Canada primarily because they already had a brother and sister-in-law residing 
in the country who were able to pay for their transatlantic journey. Bursík recalls that his voyage 
to Canada included other young adults from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. He arrived in 
Blenheim, Ontario where his brother worked and immediately began picking tomatoes on a farm. 
Although he could not speak English, Bursík attempted to use his knowledge of German in the 
hopes that he could communicate with others. Immigrants from Moravia often came with very 
little finances and material possessions. As a result, these same immigrants depended on a sense 
of community with each other and worked jointly to solve individual and group needs. Bursík 
was paid $3-$6 a day for picking tomatoes and general farm labour. Bursík recalls that a typical 
100 acre farm in the late 1920s cost approximately $6-10,000 to purchase. Many Moravian 
Czechs including Bursík bought farms after a decade of working as farm labourers in Canada.
1
 
Before the turn of the twentieth century, immigrants from Czechoslovakia settled in 
Western Canada due to its abundance of available land. They were joined by Czech immigrants 
from the United States who had initially settled in Illinois, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oklahoma, 
Texas, and by Slovak immigrants from Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, New Jersey, New York, 
Ohio, and Pennsylvania. A majority of these newcomers to Canada were agriculturalists and 
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industrial labourers who settled in areas where other Eastern European immigrants resided. In 
1884, a Czech community was established in Kolin, Saskatchewan and later followed by 
settlements at Derdard, Glenside, and Dovedale. A majority of these settlements were founded 
by Czech immigrants from Europe. During this period, Slovak immigrants from the United 
States settled in the Crow‟s Nest Pass of Alberta and British Columbia where they were engaged 
in mining. By the 1890s, small Slovak communities existed in Bellevue, Blairmore, Coleman, 
Frank, and Lethbridge in Alberta, and Fernie, Michel, and Natal in British Columbia. A decade 
later, Slovak colonies were also established at Esterhazy, Kaposvar, and Kenaston in 
Saskatchewan. In 1900, a Czech colony was established at Prague, Alberta by Czech immigrants 
from the United States. Meanwhile, in Edmonton, a small community was established which 
included a number of professionals and artisans. Prior to the First World War, Winnipeg served 
as the centre of the Czech community in Canada, while Fort William in Ontario was home to the 
largest Slovak community in Canada.
2
  
Further east, small communities of Czech miners were established at Haileybury, Fort 
William, and Kirkland Lake, all in Northern Ontario. Meanwhile, industrial workers settled in 
cities including Windsor, Kingston, and Toronto. The 1911 Census gathered information on 
7,204,838 persons and indicated that approximately 1,800 Czechs and 851 Slovaks resided in 
Canada.  It is entirely possible that some Slovaks were counted as Czechs or Hungarians since 
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ethnic Slovak immigration to Canada from the United States and Austria-Hungary significantly 
outnumbered Czech immigration in the interwar period.
3
 
During the 1920s, Czech and Slovak immigrants continued to settle in Western Canada as 
agriculturalists in search of available land, while labourers moved to central Canada in search of 
industrial employment. Czech immigrants from Moravia joined a labour scheme agreed upon by 
the Sugar Beet Grower‟s Association of Canada and the Czechoslovak International Institute 
(Československá Zahraničová Instituce) which brought over farm labourers to work in the Sugar 
Beet industry in Lethbridge, Alberta and Chatham, Ontario.
4
 During the interwar period, many 
Slovaks moved to mining towns in Northern Ontario and Quebec including Kirkland Lake, 
Sudbury, Timmins, Arvida, and Val d‟Or. With the rise of industry and urbanization, Czechs and 
Slovaks increasingly migrated to Ontario and Quebec looking for employment and opportunity. 
In Montreal, the Czechoslovak and nationalist Slovak communities together numbered some 
3,700 individuals, while Toronto attracted approximately 2,500 individuals. Czech and Slovak 
immigrants also settled in the southern Ontario communities of Hamilton, Kitchener, Oshawa, 
St. Catharines, Welland, and Windsor where many were employed in industry.
5
 
Immigrants residing outside of urban areas in the late 1920s predominantly arrived in 
small groups from the United States. They sought employment in industry, mining, and railway 
construction in the hopes of accumulating enough capital to purchase land for agricultural work.
6
 
Many immigrants from Czechoslovakia were initially denied entry into Canada because the 
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“quota was full.”7 These same prospective immigrants simply waited a year in order to come to 
Canada. Often, the heads of households were forced to journey to Canada alone as they could not 
afford to bring their spouses and dependents during their initial resettlement. Immigrants from 
Czechoslovakia often required a substantial bank loan to successfully fund their journey to 
Canada.
8
 
From 1918 to 1945, immigration from Czechoslovakia to Canada was predominantly of 
Slovak origin. Individuals and families that identified themselves as historically belonging to an 
ethnic Slovak nation accounted for approximately four-fifths of all immigration from 
Czechoslovakia.
9
 From 1920 to 1923, the Dominion Bureau of Statistics classified ethnic Czechs 
and Slovaks as “Czecho-Slovaks” for the purposes of recording immigrant admission by ethnic 
origin. For the years 1923-1926, Czech and Slovak immigrants were classified as 
“Czechoslovaks.” From 1926 to 1945, the Dominion Bureau of Statistics identified 5,716 
immigrants as having Czech “racial origins” upon entering Canada. These same Czechs included 
immigrants who claimed to be “Bohemian” and “Moravian” or individuals from the historic 
provinces of Bohemia and Moravia. In comparison, the bureau identified 23,718 immigrants as 
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having Slovak “racial origins.” Consequently, during the period 1931 to 1945, 9,577 immigrants 
gave their nationality as Czechoslovakian.
10
 
This chapter discusses how immigration from Czechoslovakia from 1918 to 1945 
influenced the establishment and composition of a “Czechoslovak” community, and the 
subsequent interaction between Czech and Slovak immigrants who arrived in Canada during 
these years. Czech and Slovak immigrants viewed their own arrival and settlement in their new 
country as a difficult experience because they were not offered any form of assistance from the 
Canadian government or from Prague‟s diplomatic officials. Czech and Slovak immigrants who 
came to Canada in the 1920s and early 1930s sought economic opportunity. Immigrants who 
arrived in Canada in the years directly before and during the Second World War fled the 
emergence of fascism and the occupation of their homeland in Central Europe. Beginning in the 
interwar period, “three principal groups” of Czechoslovakian immigrants existed in Canada. The 
largest group comprised the Slovak nationalists who only permitted Slovaks to join their 
organizations and advocated for Slovak autonomy in a federalized Czechoslovakia. A smaller 
group of Slovak leftists including communists and socialists joined with Canadian Czechs to 
constitute a Czechoslovak community that advocated for a single Czechoslovak national identity 
and defended the existence of a Czechoslovak Republic.
11
  
Ethnic and political identities divided immigrants who arrived from Czechoslovakia to 
Canada during the period 1918-1945. Immigrants such as Martin Bursík were left to rely on 
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themselves and their fellow compatriots for assistance. During the Second World War, Canadian 
Czechs and Slovaks who supported a common Czechoslovak ethnic community identity 
vehemently fought against their status as „enemy aliens‟ after their homeland was invaded by 
Nazi Germany and ceased to exist. Canadian Czechoslovaks joined the Allied war effort by 
enlisting in the military, raising funds, and sending relief parcels to Czechoslovak forces 
oversees. As a result, Canada later recognized its Czech and Slovak populations as Allied 
citizens. The Canadian Czechoslovak community successfully liberated its homeland from 
fascist domination. After the Second World War, interwar immigrants such as Martin Bursík 
were an integral pillar of the Czechoslovak community in Canada and influenced the reception 
and resettlement of Czech and Slovak refugees into their community institutions. 
 
Beginnings of a Czechoslovak Community in Canada 
During the interwar period, Slovak immigrants arrived in Canada from two separate 
locations. Many Slovak immigrants came to Canada from economically underdeveloped eastern 
Slovakia. For these immigrants, their service in Czechoslovakia‟s Army allowed them to gain an 
education and many arrived in Canada as “loyal Czechoslovaks.” Other Slovak immigrants 
arrived from the United States having also served in the Austro-Hungarian Army prior to the 
establishment of Czecho-Slovakia in 1918. The latter immigrants were predominantly 
nationalistic and avoided fraternizing with individuals who promoted a Czechoslovak identity 
because they remained suspicious of “Czechoslovak democracy” in their homeland.12  
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In 1924, the Czechoslovak Mutual Benefit Society was formed in Montreal.
13
 For many 
of the Czechs and Slovaks in the city, the society was simply a sociocultural association in which 
they could meet other individuals of Czech or Slovak background. The organization later 
established a branch in Toronto in 1927. The society‟s official organ Nová vlasť (New 
Homeland) claimed that membership was over 90 percent Slovak. The paper ceased to exist a 
few years later due to financial difficulty and a lack of membership. A significant portion of the 
paper‟s readership were nationalist Slovaks who did not support a Czechoslovak identity and 
political ideology. These same individuals left to join or establish independent nationalist Slovak 
groups.
14
 
Although interwar Slovak immigration substantially surpassed the small influx of Czechs 
arriving in Canada from Czechoslovakia, a substantial wave of immigrants from the Czech 
province of Moravia came to Canada in search of work.
15
 On 11 June 1925, František Všetula 
arrived in Canada at the age of fifteen. As an inexperienced agricultural worker he wanted to 
save his future wages in the hopes of one day returning to Czechoslovakia.
16
 After arriving in 
Chatham, Ontario, he went to work with other Czechs in the fields. A majority of the Moravian 
farm labourers arrived in Canada without any previous knowledge of the English language. With 
a sizeable community taking shape in the region, a meeting was held on 12 December 1928 at 
Chatham‟s St. Joseph‟s Hall for all interested “Czechoslovaks.” Approximately 350 people were 
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in attendance to discuss the future of their community. Subsequently, a Czechoslovak musical 
band named after Saints Cyril and Methodius was created and later played traditional Czech and 
Slovak music across southern Ontario and the United States. Meanwhile in Chatham, Moravian 
parents organized their children into a theatre group and taught them ethnic songs as a reaction to 
what they perceived as a lack of parental responsibility in Canadian society.
17
 
Frank Konečný arrived in 1930 at the age of twenty-two. He chose to come to North 
America because he already had a sister in Canada and the United States. In describing his initial 
view of Canada, Konečný noted that as a child he was a fan of Jack London‟s books which in his 
eyes “romanticized” the country. Apart from literature, Konečný could only recall that Canada 
was “big.”18 He spoke no English and used his understanding of Polish in an attempt to 
communicate with fellow farmers from Central Europe. Many Moravian Czechs initially came to 
Canada to work as sugar beet farmers with the intention of signing short-term labour contracts, 
while saving their wages and returning home to Czechoslovakia after two or three years of work. 
According to fellow immigrant Antonín Vajdík, many of the Czechs who worked in the 
sugarbeet farm industry were well liked “because they did a better job” than some of the other 
workers from Mexico and the United States.
19
 Those farmers who chose to stay in Canada due to 
the Great Depression were later able to purchase farms with their accumulated wages. 
Approximately 3,000 Czechs from southern Moravia eventually settled in the Chatham area of 
southern Ontario without any help from the Canadian government. Moravian farmers including 
František Všetula, Antonín Vajdík, Martin Bursík, and František Konečný settled around 
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Chatham and worked in the sugar beet farming industry where they were left to depend on 
themselves and their fellow compatriots for financial and social assistance. 
A year later, Canada closed its doors to immigration in order to prevent further strain on 
its economy. Order-in-Council P.C. 695 of 21 March 1931 limited immigration to American 
citizens, and British subjects from the United Kingdom, Ireland, Newfoundland, Australia, New 
Zealand, and the Union of South Africa “who possessed sufficient means to maintain themselves 
until employment was secured.”20 Wives, unmarried children under the age of eighteen, or 
fiancées of men already residing in Canada were also admissible, meanwhile agriculturalists with 
“sufficient means to farm in Canada” were also permitted entry.21 Because of these restrictions, 
the number of immigrants from Czechoslovakia seeking to come to Canada stabilized. Even as 
Canada‟s gates were closed, Czech and Slovak immigrants with capital and agricultural 
experience were permitted to enter Canada. However, Order-in-Council P.C. 695 forced 
immigration from Czechoslovakia to stabilize with only a slight increase or decrease each year. 
At only twenty-one years of age, Marie Gabriel came to Canada with her husband to pursue 
farming. The Gabriel family came from an agricultural background in Moravia and ultimately 
settled in Kenora, Ontario on 26 November 1932. Marie reared twelve children while her 
husband supported the family by working in the local flour mill.
22
 
As individuals and families from Czechoslovakia searched for land and economic 
opportunity, authorities in Prague insisted that their consulate in Canada unite all ethnic Czechs 
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and Slovaks into a cohesive Czechoslovak ethnic identity regardless of their sociopolitical or 
religious affiliation – in an effort to spread Czechoslovakism as an ideology to compatriot 
communities across Canada. Canadian Slovaks who professed a belief in a distinct Slovak ethnic 
identity avoided participating in Czechoslovak associations. Similarly, Czechoslovakia‟s 
Consulate General in Montreal viewed nationalistic Slovaks as “anti-Czech” and even 
“treasonous.” 23  
In Canada, the Czech and Slovak ethnic press played an influential role in the politics 
between proponents of Czechoslovakism and those advocating for a separate Slovak national 
identity. In 1934, a weekly newspaper entitled Nová vlasť was inaugurated in Montreal to inform 
Czechs and Slovaks of community news in Canada and events in their homeland. Through 
financial contributions from the Consulate General in Montreal, the publication became the 
semi-official organ of Czechoslovakia‟s representatives in Canada.24 Even as many interwar 
immigrants from Czechoslovakia settled in Canada primarily to work in agriculture and industry, 
Consul General František Pavlásek lamented that Slovaks in Canada transplanted many of the 
ideas behind the nationalist and autonomist ideology of the Hlinkova slovenská ľudová strana 
(Hlinka‟s Slovak People‟s Party) including the slogan: “Slovakia for the Slovaks.”25 In 1937, 
Pavlásek observed that:  
 
…there are only a few Czechs here, and they are mostly assimilated, and a 
majority of them have withdrawn from public life due to permanent 
attacks...loyal Czechoslovak thinking, ever representing the democracy and 
the Czechoslovak national unity, represents in some colonies but a 
minority.
26
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Prague‟s Consul General in Montreal astutely recognized the ideological cleavages between 
Canadian Czechs and Slovaks. In effect, both ethnic groups were divided between those loyal to 
a single Czechoslovak nation-state, Slovak autonomists who sought home rule for Slovakia, and 
Slovak communists.
27
 
 
Democratic Sudeten Germans and the Bata Shoe Corporation Arrive in Canada 
As Prague attempted to transplant its national policies onto Czech and Slovak immigrants 
in Canada, events in Central Europe soon forced many more Czechoslovakian citizens to seek 
refuge in Canada. In 1938, with the emergence of Nazi Germany as a threat to Europe‟s 
continental security, 1.5 million Czechoslovakian troops were deployed to the borders with 
Austria, Germany, Hungary, and Poland.
28
 Leaders of the governments of France (Édouard 
Daladier), Great Britain (Neville Chamberlain), Italy (Benito Mussolini), and Germany (Adolf 
Hitler) met in Munich in September 1938 in an attempt to appease Hitler‟s desire for territorial 
expansion. As British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain proclaimed “peace in our time,” 
Czechoslovakia was not invited to the conference and felt betrayed by the French with whom 
Prague had signed a treaty of alliance and friendship in 1924, and a treaty of mutual assistance in 
1925.
29
 The British and French governments advised Czechoslovakia‟s President Edvard Beneš 
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to concede to Hitler‟s demands for the annexation of the predominantly German-speaking 
Sudetenland to Nazi Germany.
30
 Prior to the conference with Adolf Hitler in Munich, British 
Prime Minister Arthur Neville Chamberlain infamously stated: 
 
How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches 
and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a far away country 
between people of whom we know nothing. It seems still more impossible 
that a quarrel which has already been settled in principle should be the 
subject of war.
31
 
 
An agreement was reached overnight on 29-30 September 1938 in which Western Europe 
acquiesced to Hitler‟s demands in exchange for continental peace. In Canada, Czechs and 
Slovaks who professed a belief in a common Czechoslovak ethnic identity became convinced 
that the Munich Agreement forced upon their old homeland brought their “national and ethnic 
durability” into question.32 
Prior to the Munich Agreement, Czechoslovakian nationals left their homes in search of 
economic opportunity and a better quality of life. However, in the fall of 1938, 80,000 Czechs 
and democratic Sudeten Germans fled the heavily German-populated Sudetenland as political 
refugees who feared the emergence of fascism and a German invasion of Czechoslovakia. With 
news of the outcome of the Munich conference reaching Canada, a public outcry led secular 
refugee lobbies to pressure Ottawa to find a solution to the plight of these refugees. The 
Canadian National Committee on Refugees and Victims of Persecution (CNCR) actively joined 
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the struggle to resettle anti-Nazi Sudeten German refugees in Canada.
33
 Railroad immigration 
agents attempted to help 10,000 Sudeten Germans and 20,000 Czech refugees who were 
temporarily sheltered in camps on the outskirts of Prague. These refugees were primarily 
farmers, glass and textile workers, and traders. With the Depression raging at home, Ottawa 
refused to be seen directly examining and admitting immigrants. The federal government used 
Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) and Canadian National Railway (CNR) agents to avoid making 
“direct contact” with prospective refugees and also permitted these agents to examine and select 
potential immigrants.
34
 As Canadian immigration authorities moved slowly to resettle the 
Sudeten Germans and Czechs, approximately 1,200 Sudeten German families arrived in Canada 
aided by diplomats from Czechoslovakia‟s Consulate General in Montreal.35 Sudeten German 
refugees arrived in Canada on ships including the SS Montcalm, a Canadian Pacific steamship 
which departed Southampton, England on route to Pier 21 in Halifax.
36
 The Sudeten German 
refugees were taken from Pier 21 by train to Montreal before heading west towards their final 
destination. A majority of the refugees were resettled in agricultural land districts administered 
by the railway companies. Subsequently, the CPR relocated the Sudeten refugees in the vicinity 
of Tomslake, British Columbia. In the spring of 1939, 518 settlers arrived in Tate Creek, near 
Tomslake. The CNR concentrated its resettlement efforts around St. Walberg, Saskatchewan. 
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Thirty families arrived in St. Walburg where they were each given a farm in disrepair and 160 
acres of land.
37
 
 With Czechoslovakia severely truncated following Hitler‟s annexation of the 
Sudetenland, Canadian Czechs and Slovaks attempted to hold a parade in support of democracy 
in Montreal on 1 October 1938. As Mayor of Montreal, Adhémar Raynault issued a proclamation 
cancelling the parade‟s permit out of fear that the demonstration was under “Communist 
influence.” The mayor claimed that: 
 
…there has been question of certain public manifestations liable to raise 
controversies and provoke incidents which it is preferable to avoid, the City 
of Montreal cannot now permit public manifestations against the gigantic 
work accomplished by the representatives of the Great Powers who to the 
great relief of pacific nations have made superhuman efforts to remove at 
least for the time being, the horrors of war.
38
  
 
Approximately, 4,000 demonstrators from various anti-fascist societies and international 
labour unions in attendance to support “democracy in Czechoslovakia” gathered at St. James 
Market to listen to speeches from English, French, German, Czech, Slovak, Russian, Ukrainian, 
Romanian, and Polish presenters.
39
 Four days later, Edvard Beneš officially resigned from office 
as President of Czechoslovakia, leaving the country without a de jure head of state. In Slovakia, 
the nationalist Hlinka‟s Slovak People‟s Party joined other Slovak political parties in Ţilina to 
agree to terms on Slovakia‟s pending autonomy from Prague. On 6 October, the ruling Hlinka‟s 
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Slovak People‟s Party declared national autonomy in Slovakia.40 With the support of Prague, a 
government was established in Slovakia under the leadership of Monsignor Jozef Tiso.
41
 
Following widespread public outrage over the appeasement of Hitler, General Jan Syrový was 
introduced as de facto president of Czechoslovakia. On 28 November, due to Slovakia‟s 
declaration of autonomy, Prague renamed the country as Czecho-Slovakia to emphasize a 
federation between the Czech lands and Slovakia. For the next three months, the Second Czecho-
Slovak Republic was secretly undermined by Adolf Hitler and members of the conservative and 
nationalist Hlinka‟s Slovak People‟s Party. On 30 November, a new cabinet was officially 
appointed with Emil Hácha as Czecho-Slovakia‟s president.42 On 11 March 1939, Prague 
dismissed the Slovak parliament and arrested approximately 300-400 individuals it believed 
were conspirators against the Second Republic. A majority of those arrested were Slovak 
intellectuals, students, and social leaders.
43
 On the eve of Nazi Germany‟s invasion of the Czech 
lands, former Slovak Prime Minister Jozef Tiso summoned the dismissed Slovak parliament in 
Bratislava to declare Slovakia‟s independence and alignment with Nazi Germany.44 
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Czech anxiety over events in Central Europe intensified in the spring of 1939. Shortly 
before midnight on 14 March 1939, Hácha arrived in Berlin and informed Hitler that Prague 
would respect Slovakia‟s declaration of independence. Hitler subsequently informed the Czecho-
Slovak president that the following morning Nazi Germany would invade the Czech lands. A day 
later, on 16 March 1939, Hitler proclaimed the Reich Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.
45
 
Subsequently, many politicians, businessmen, clergy, and social leaders fled the country. The 
Second Czecho-Slovak Republic dissolved less than six months after it was created.
46
 In early 
1939, a Czechoslovak National Committee was established in London, England by democratic 
political figures that fled the German invasion. Edvard Beneš became the Committee‟s president, 
Štefan Osuský as foreign minister, General Jan Ingr as defence minister, and Edvard Outrata as 
finance minister. The Czechoslovak National Committee lobbied Western governments for 
recognition as Czechoslovakia‟s official government.47 Czech and Slovak politicians, 
bureaucrats, and businessmen fled from fascism in their homeland. Similarly, Prague‟s 
diplomatic officials sought residency as immigrants in Canada. 
Czechoslovakia‟s Consulate General in Montreal initiated correspondence with Ottawa in 
the hopes that the Liberal government could accommodate its diplomats. Dr. Frey, a senior 
diplomat at the Montreal consulate who earlier helped thousands of Sudeten Germans obtain new 
homes in Canada was informed by Canadian diplomat Lester Bowles Pearson that there was “no 
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hope for his entry” as Ottawa sought individuals with agricultural training.48 However, Canadian 
immigration authorities did permit the resettlement of Czechoslovakian officials with specific 
business interests and capital. Ottawa later permitted 100 Czechoslovakian officials to enter 
Canada as “temporary refugees.” 49 
In the aftermath of the German invasion of the Czech lands and the declaration of Slovak 
statehood and alignment with Nazi Germany, approximately 186,000 refugees fled 
Czechoslovakia. Canada became a beneficiary of this movement of people when two industrial 
plants were re-established in Canada.
50
 A munitions plant originally part of the Škoda Works in 
Plzeň, Bohemia was built at Sorel, Quebec. Simultaneously, the Bata Shoe Company from Zlín, 
Moravia was re-assembled as a company town named Batawa near Frankford, Ontario.
51
 Even 
though the Canadian shoe industry opposed the relocation of the Bata Shoe Company to Canada, 
the Canadian and Newfoundland press supported the plan.
52
 In December 1938, Tomáš J. Baťa 
arrived at Canada House in London. After speaking with an immigration official, Baťa 
discovered that he would not be permitted to immigrate because Ottawa officially sought 
agriculturalists. Once the immigration official in question discovered Baťa‟s position as an 
industrialist, the Czech businessman was requested to meet with Canada‟s High Commissioner 
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in London, Vincent Massey.
53
 In his meeting with Massey, Baťa discovered that only through an 
Order-an-Council could he be legally permitted to enter Canada. Subsequently, Baťa was asked 
for his Czechoslovakian passport in which the immigration official – with Massey‟s approval – 
signed the passport with: “Admit the bearer as a visitor.” Baťa received no official stamp and 
later realized that Canada‟s immigration bureaucracy was not “efficient” or “progressive,” but 
rather selective and informal.
54
  
Upon arriving in Canada, Tomáš Baťa travelled to Ottawa to meet with Frederick Charles 
Blair, director of the Immigration Branch, regarding visas for 250 Bata employees and their 
families. In his meeting with Blair, the Czech industrialist was told that Canada would admit 
them.
55
 Later in June 1939, Blair reneged on his early promise to Baťa and only offered to admit 
100 families due to “political difficulties.”56 With the CNCR lobbying on his behalf, Baťa and 82 
employees were eventually permitted to come to Canada and re-establish themselves and their 
industrial enterprise.
57
 After discussions with other Bata Corporation executives, it was decided 
that the company‟s research and development, and engineering departments would be safely 
relocated to North America due to political uncertainty in Central Europe after the Munich 
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Agreement. Frankford, Ontario was chosen as the site for the company town, Batawa, because it 
was near a major transportation route to large markets across Canada and the United States.
58
 
Employees of the Bata Shoe Corporation continued to arrive in Canada throughout 1939. 
One group came to Canada after spending several days in the United Kingdom. Along with her 
fellow workers, Milada Čechová arrived in Canada aboard the Antonia. Upon taking a train to 
Montreal before her final destination of Batawa, Čechová found that many Canadians were 
unemployed and “on relief.” The Bata workers found food and small products cheap to purchase. 
Čechová and her fellow workers were given $20 per week in wages of which $2 went to pay the 
rent for company housing. Many of the Bata workers did not feel as though they had it as hard as 
the immigrants who arrived after them because they came to Canada with secure employment 
while other immigrants from Czechoslovakia were forced to find work and acquire savings.
59
 
In the case of Leon Koerner, who served as Czechoslovakia‟s timber controller in the 
1930s, Lester Bowles Pearson successfully helped him to settle in Vancouver in 1939. Koerner 
arrived in Vancouver as a Czech refugee of half-Jewish ancestry. His business capital and 
expertise in the forestry industry were immediately used to purchase Alaska Pine and Cellulose 
Limited which later produced 75 percent of the ammunition and ration boxes used by the 
Commonwealth forces during the Second World War.
60
 Leon Koerner and his wife arrived in 
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Vancouver “with an acute case of depression” due largely to events back in Central Europe. Both 
of Koerner‟s grandmothers were Jewish and his family‟s property was confiscated by the 
German authorities. The former timber controller‟s first impression of Canadian society was 
pessimistic in nature. According to Koerner, Vancouver‟s social and business elites were 
unwelcoming and remained closed to him. In business, the local timber companies feared his 
vast wealth and experience, while the city‟s socialites spurned his “foreign features, formal 
clothing and heel-clicking manners.”61 
With Order-in-Council P.C. 695, the Canadian government severely restricted 
immigration only permitting immigrants with capital including Bat‟a and Koerner to enter the 
country. In 1933, one-third of the Canadian population was out of work. The percentage of 
unemployed workers slowly improved in subsequent years. Scholars illustrated that in fact 
“…the depression also afforded the Canadian government officials with a dramatic opportunity 
to complete a process of restriction begun in the boom years of the 1920s.”62 As director of the 
Immigration Branch, F.C. Blair, who was anti-Semitic, fervently supported restricting 
immigration so that under his direction less than 5,000 Jews were admitted to Canada during the 
1930s and 1940s.
63
 While Jewish immigration was restricted, exceptions did exist as some 
individuals of Jewish descent were successful in settling in Canada. With rising levels of anti-
Semitism in Czechoslovakia, Hanna and Mimi Fischl, two Czechoslovakian sisters of Jewish 
origin sought safe haven in Canada where their uncle, Louis Fischl owned and operated a glove 
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factory. The Fischls were granted refugee permits by the British authorities to enter the United 
Kingdom – on their way to Canada – on the condition that they did “…not enter any employment 
other than as a resident in service in a private household.”64 On 4 June 1939, the Fischls left 
England aboard the Alaunia whose passengers consisted of a group of Sudeten German Social 
Democrats, a Jewish family, and British citizens. After ten days crossing the Atlantic, the 
Alaunia stopped in Quebec City where Canadian immigration authorities boarded the ship for 
medical examinations and passport control before heading to its final destination of Montreal.
65
  
Upon reaching Canada, Hanna Fischl recalled that in order to qualify as a Canadian 
immigrant, she had to declare herself to be nondenominational, about which she wrote: “I had no 
problem with that. I never did feel particularly Jewish.”66 Fischl became a member of the United 
Church of Canada on the advice of her uncle who viewed the church as a “strictly Canadian 
institution.”67 The Fischl sisters were able to settle in Canada due largely to Louis Fischl‟s 
capital and his transplanted glove factory in the country. In looking to save his nieces from 
looming war in Europe, Louis Fischl indicated to Canadian immigration authorities that his 
nieces were skilled workers and essential to his business. Immigration Branch director F.C. Blair 
may have overlooked the Fischls‟ Jewish background because of Ottawa‟s desire for capital and 
new business, and their standing as nondenominational Czechoslovakian immigrants. 
According to official government estimates, 317 Czechs and 291 Slovaks arrived in 
Canada as immigrants in 1939. Over the next three years only 112 Czechs and 82 Slovaks were 
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 64 
permitted to enter Canada as immigrants.
68
 Although Canada‟s door to prospective immigrants 
remained officially closed, individuals fleeing fascism in Europe whether diplomats, 
industrialists, or workers were able to find a safe haven in Canada through personal relationships 
and professional contacts where they could re-establish their political and businesses networks, 
employment, and ultimately, their lives. The immigration of the Koerners, the Fischls, Tomáš J. 
Baťa, and 82 Bata Shoe Corporation employees in 1938-1939 strengthened the Canadian 
Czechoslovak community after the German occupation of the Czech lands. Under Baťa‟s 
leadership, a company town named Batawa was established near Frankford, Ontario, and it is 
estimated that his industries employed close to 5,000 employees and produced goods valued at 
$22 million.
69
 
 
From „Enemy Aliens‟ to „Allied Citizens:‟ Canadian Czechoslovaks Come Together 
In response to the German occupation of the Czech lands and Slovakia‟s alignment with 
Germany, nationalist Canadian Slovaks led by the Canadian Slovak League were forced to 
mitigate their support for Slovakia‟s independence and its status as an enemy state. At the same 
time, the Canadian Czechoslovak community publicly opposed fascism in the old country and 
took a number of actions that promoted their anti-fascist and democratic stance. On 7 April 1939, 
Prague‟s Consul General in Montreal with the assistance of the RCMP (Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police) refused to surrender his consulate to German diplomatic representatives. On 16 
April 1939, Consul General František Pavlásek addressed a gathering of Czechoslovaks at the 
Bonsecours Market in Montreal assuring his audience that the homeland would be freed from 
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Nazi domination.
70
 Czechs and Slovaks who professed a belief in a unified Czechoslovak 
identity sensed that further action was necessary on their part. On 7 May 1939, a group of 
Canadian Czechs, Slovaks, and Subcarpathian Rusyns (Ruthenians) met in Toronto to discuss the 
formation of a national organization which would promote Canadian Czechoslovak interests and 
work to liberate their Nazi-occupied homeland. On 19 June 1939, the National Alliance of 
Slovaks, Czechs, and Subcarpathian Ruthenians in Canada was formally inaugurated. Attending 
the organization‟s first meeting were 140 delegates from across Canada. Štefan Rudinský, a 
Slovak immigrant from Montreal was elected as president, and Karel Buzek, a Czech immigrant 
from Toronto became the Alliance‟s national secretary.71 On 24 June, the Alliance held its first 
annual congress in Toronto‟s Church of All Nations. On 7 April 1940, Toronto‟s National 
Alliance of Slovaks, Czechs, and Subcarpathian Rusyns (Ruthenians) merged with Montreal‟s 
Czechoslovak National Alliance (CNA).  
Across Canada supporters of a Czechoslovak identity joined forces to coordinate the 
second Czechoslovak liberation movement‟s war and relief efforts in Canada.72 The newly 
enlarged CNA recognized the Czechoslovak National Committee in London as the legitimate 
political representative of the former Czechoslovak state. Incidentally, the Canadian government 
was the last British Dominion to officially recognize the Beneš-led national committee as the 
Czechoslovak Government-in-Exile in October 1940. During the Second World War, Czechs 
and Slovaks who remained foreign nationals residing in Canada and who were not naturalized 
were subject to national security measures. For nationals of states that no longer existed due to 
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the German invasion, occupation, or annexation, the federal government viewed these same 
individuals as potential security risks. As a result, Ottawa instituted the Defence of Canada 
Regulations (DOCRs) which attempted to classify foreign nationals including Czechs and 
Slovaks in Canada as “enemy aliens.” Immigrants from former Czechoslovakia who had yet to 
be naturalized as Canadian citizens witnessed their civil liberties become severely restricted. 
Under the DOCRs, foreigners residing in Canada were denied habeus corpus, legal 
representation, and a court date. As the principal instrument of Ottawa‟s drive to secure the state 
from potentially subversive individuals, the RCMP was able to detain and arrest persons of 
interest and seize their property and assets.
73
 Similarly, Ottawa requested foreign legations to aid 
in the selection of their nationals who were trustworthy residents. On behalf of the lobbying 
efforts of Czechoslovakia‟s Consulate General in Montreal, individuals who were registered as 
“enemy aliens” were permitted to receive new documents indicating their amended status as 
“Liberated Enemy Aliens” and were also entitled to receive a Certificate of Exemption as 
nationals of a friendly Allied nation.
74
 On 12 October 1940, Ottawa officially recognized the 
Czechoslovak Government-in-Exile in London. Two months later, the CNA registered some of 
its members in an effort to demonstrate to Canadian officials that the Czechoslovak community 
was loyal to Canada.
75
  
 On 1 April 1941, a delegation from the CNA testified before the House of Commons 
committee responsible for overseeing the DOCRs. The CNA‟s president Štefan Rudinský and 
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national secretary Karel Buzek were assisted by Arthur W. Roebuck, Member of Parliament for 
the Ontario riding of Toronto-Trinity where many Canadian Czechs and Slovaks resided. 
Rudinský and Buzek called on Canadian officials to consider individuals of Czechoslovak origin 
as loyal Canadians. The delegation went on to claim that many members of the Czechoslovak 
community could not secure employment due to the stigma of having registered as “enemy 
aliens.”76 The nationalist Canadian Slovak League (CSL) also lobbied federal authorities in an 
effort to prevent Canadian Slovaks from registering as “enemy aliens.” On 9 April 1941, 
Minister of Mines and Resources, Thomas Alexander Crerar informed the local CSL branch in 
Flin Flon, Manitoba that an amendment was made to the DOCRs, “…to the effect that these 
regulations shall not apply to persons who are nationals of and, were born in, Czechoslovakia, 
which means, for purposes of this regulation Czechoslovakia as it existed on the first day of 
January 1938.”77 In April 1941, Ottawa issued an Order-in-Council recognizing Czechs and 
Slovaks as Allied peoples rather than as supporters of Nazi Germany. Nationalist Slovaks who 
defended the existence of an independent Nazi-aligned Slovak state were forced to moderate 
their support for Slovakia since Canada was at war with Germany and her allies. The CNA‟s 
lobbying efforts during this period were largely influenced by its membership which by 1942 
grew to 86 branches and 6,500 members.
78
 
As Czechoslovak politicians attempted to secure the future re-establishment of a 
Czechoslovak state, Canadian Czechoslovaks who were finally recognized as Allied peoples 
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turned their focus towards the creation of an ethnocultural association in Toronto.
79
 On 11 
December 1943, the CNA agreed to commence teaching at its newly established Czechoslovak 
school. Nineteen students were registered with an average age of twelve and half years. Initially, 
poor attendance at the language school was blamed on a lack of public awareness of the school‟s 
existence. The school taught reading, writing, and speaking in both Czech and Slovak languages, 
and included geography and the history of Czechoslovakia as subjects. After school, an hour was 
dedicated to physical education led by a member of the patriotic calisthenics organization: the 
Toronto Sokol Gymnastic Union.
80
 
Along with the CNA, the Masaryk Hall (MH) in Toronto rallied to the cause of liberating 
Czechoslovakia. The MH was created by charter in 1944, and as an organization it was led by a 
twelve-member volunteer board of directors and an executive committee with three members. 
Prior to the purchase of a hall in Toronto, MH held its meetings at the Church of All Nations. On 
28 November 1944, a meeting of Czechoslovak groups was held at Toronto‟s Church of All 
Nations which raised $9,000. By 4 December, Sokol Toronto began to use the hall built from an 
old tin structure – previously an old skating rink – and could accommodate approximately 1,000 
people for its patriotic calisthenics exercises.
81
 In January 1945, Masaryk Hall was incorporated 
and given a charter by the province of Ontario. The organization moved into its own space and 
elected Slovak Rudolf Koreň as its president, and two Czechs – Karel Buzek as secretary and Jan 
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Mráček as treasurer. In its original memorandum to members, MH declared that it would use all 
incoming funds to improve its programs and facilities and provide a cultural and educational 
centre for Czechoslovak Canadians. Among its principal activities were the following: English-
language instruction, arts and crafts, the obligations of Canadian citizenship, financial relief and 
social assistance, physical training, the acquisition of Canadian and Czechoslovak literature and 
art, and the establishment of a Czechoslovak community centre for the region of Toronto.
82
 
During the 1944-1945 school year, twenty-eight students attended Czech and Slovak 
classes on Saturdays at MH‟s Masaryk Supplementary School. Classes were organized around 
thirty half-days held on Saturdays. Of the twenty-eight students who took Czech and Slovak 
classes, four attended only once. The oldest student was nineteen years of age, while the 
youngest was only five years of age. The average age of students who attended classes was 
fourteen years.
83
 In his end of the year letter to the parents of children who attended the 
Supplementary School, instructor Prokop V. Havlík requested that parents spend one hour per 
week with their children practicing how to read and write in their maternal language so that they 
did not become neodnárodnily (losers of their ethnic nationality).
84
 
On 24 February, MH advertised its activities across Toronto and the rest of Canada which 
garnered 148 donations for a total contribution of $13,472.72. By April, MH‟s fundraising and 
membership drive attracted 293 members and gained a total of $16,301.90.
85
 Ten months later, 
on 29 December 1946, members gathered to witness a symbolic burning of their hall‟s mortgage 
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certificate indicating that the outstanding mortgage of $11,925 was paid.
86
 The establishment and 
growth of MH offered the Czechoslovak community in Canada with a sociocultural institution 
from which it could promote Czechoslovak identity and continue to work towards the liberation 
of their old homeland from fascism. Canadian Czechoslovaks were outraged by the demise of the 
Czechoslovak Republic after only two decades of independence. The German occupation of their 
old homeland illustrated to Czechoslovaks in Canada that the preservation of their ethnocultural 
heritage remained an important necessity. The introduction of a Czech and Slovak language 
school, financial and social assistance, and a patriotic calisthenics program permitted Canadian 
Czechoslovaks to ensure that their ethnocultural heritage was passed on to successive 
generations. 
 
Relief Work for a Resurrected Czechoslovakia 
 Many Canadian Czechoslovaks were members of the MH and the CNA. Both 
organizations worked together in an effort to support the Allied war effort. The CNA was 
instrumental in establishing the Czechoslovak War Charities Fund (CWCF) which later became a 
constituent organization under the auspices of the Canadian United Allied Relief Fund 
(CUARF). The CWCF collected funds to be sent to the Czechoslovak Government-in-Exile in 
London and for relief including medicine, clothing, and foodstuffs which was sent to 
Czechoslovak troops fighting across Europe and North Africa. As national secretary of the CNA 
and an executive board member of the Canadian United Allied Relief Fund (CUARF), Karel 
Buzek was an instrumental figure in the development of fundraising efforts to liberate the Czech 
lands and Nazi-aligned Slovakia from fascist oppression, and relief work for a future resurrected 
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Czechoslovak state. Buzek informed the CNA‟s executive committee on 15 February 1945 that 
its Czechoslovak War Charities Fund (CWCF) would be guaranteed $450,000 by the Canadian 
government through CUARF. In addition, CWCF‟s own fundraising campaign garnered a further 
$72,779 for a total of $522,779. Ottawa allowed the CWCF to use $3,345 – or less than two-
thirds of one percent – to support its administrative costs.87 Buzek also indicated to the CNA 
executive committee that CUARF would order $450,000 worth of goods considered to be of the 
upmost necessity to the Czechoslovak Red Cross in London, England – which was spearheading 
a first aid action to compatriots currently under German occupation. The CWCF funds were used 
to purchase milk, flour, cooking oil, dried fruit and vegetables, cans of fish, cigarettes, hospital 
and medical supplies, bedrolls, clothing from government stores for infants and young children, 
and Red Cross relief packages.  
Ethnic associations across Canada were not permitted to officially establish independent 
fundraising campaigns for their homelands in Europe under the War Charities Act. As a result, 
the CNA‟s Czechoslovak War Charities Fund became a member of CUARF. The CNA‟s 
executive committee was forced to inform the Czechoslovak Red Cross in London that its 
fundraising duties were organized under the guidance of CUARF and the Canadian Red Cross. 
The CNA advised the Czechoslovak Red Cross that it would be seeking a grant from monies 
previously collected to establish a Collection for National Liberation for which the CNA could 
send more financial support to the Czechoslovak Government-in-Exile led by Edvard Beneš and 
to the Czechoslovak Red Cross as they prepared to re-establish a postwar Czechoslovak state 
with funds gained from the Allied war effort.
88
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Supporting the Allied War Effort and Resurrecting the Czechoslovak State 
With Soviet forces gaining ground in Eastern Europe in the spring of 1945, an agreement 
was facilitated between the Czechoslovak Government-in-Exile in London under the leadership 
of ex-President Edvard Beneš and exiled Czechoslovak communists in Moscow to create a 
national front government. Following the Soviet liberation of Slovakia, the Third Czechoslovak 
Republic was established in April 1945. A government was installed in Košice, Slovakia on 4 
April. A National Front coalition comprised of three socialist political parties: the National 
Socialists, who composed the largest contingent; the Social Democrats; and the Czechoslovak 
and Slovak Communists. Two non-socialist parties, the Catholic People‟s Party in Moravia, and 
the Democratic Party in Slovakia were also included in the coalition. On 5 April, the National 
Front of Czechs and Slovaks (Czechoslovak Government) published its Košice Program calling 
for a swift end to the Second World War and the expulsion of Czechoslovakia‟s ethnic Sudeten 
German and Hungarian populations, along with all other Nazi collaborators. Simultaneously, 
land and industry belonging to German collaborators in the Czech lands and to proponents of the 
pro-Nazi wartime Slovak state were confiscated by presidential decree and appropriated to the 
civil population. With Soviet troops liberating the majority of land under German control, the 
Czech and Slovak populations viewed the Soviet Union favourably.
89
 Meanwhile, over 10,000 
ethnic Slovaks displaced by the war including conservative and fascist proponents of the wartime 
independent Slovak state fled to the West seeking refuge in Displaced Persons (DPs) camps in 
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Austria, Germany, and Italy. These DPs refused to support the resurrection of a Czechoslovak 
state.
90
 
In a meeting of the CNA‟s Joint Committee held on 12 April 1945, Cyprián Slimák 
representing the Slovak-language Communist paper Ľudové zvesti (People‟s News) wanted the 
CNA to lobby the Canadian government to lessen restrictions on the purchase of goods and 
telegrams to a newly liberated Slovakia even though Canada‟s war effort continued.91 Slovak 
communists within the Czechoslovak community in Canada supported the liberation of Slovakia 
from its alignment with Nazi Germany and advocated for the reconstruction of a war-torn 
Slovakia. In Canada, the RCMP Security Bulletins indicated that the force was cognizant of 
events in Eastern Europe and the new Czechoslovak and Soviet relationship:  
 
The Czechoslovak government of Benesh [sic] has sold out completely to the 
USSR. One need only note that while a Soviet ambassador has gone with 
Benesh [sic] from Moscow to Kosice, Britain and the United States have 
been notified – by the Soviets, not the Czech government – that their 
ambassadors will not be admitted at present. Benesh [sic] is evidently no 
longer an independent statesman, but a puppet of the Kremlin. The 
significant exclusion of American forces from operating on Czechoslovak 
territory also tells its own story.
92
 
 
In the spring of 1945, the Canadian Red Cross informed the CNA that it prepared forty 
crates of clothing destined for the Czechoslovak Red Cross in London. The CNA‟s executive 
committee received news from the Czechoslovak Red Cross that the socioeconomic situation in 
the Czechs lands and Slovakia was desperate. Children and the elderly were singled out as 
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individuals who urgently requiring clothing. As a result, Czechoslovak Red Cross officials in 
London were to send the shipment of clothing to the open Port of Galatz (Galati) in Romania. 
However, Canadian Red Cross officials were hesitant to send the shipment because its safe 
arrival could not be guaranteed.
93
 Meanwhile, the CNA‟s own Clothing Action under the 
leadership of Gustav Přístupa sent forty-eight crates of clothing across the Atlantic. Clothing 
donations were received from Canadian Czechs and Slovaks in Batawa, Owen Sound, Belleville, 
Oshawa, Dresden, Hamilton, and Montreal.
94
 
From 6 February to 26 June 1945, the CWCF collected $14,043.02 in donations. From 
this amount, $609.76 was used towards the purchase of material to support the CNA‟s Clothing 
Action. The remaining $13,433.26 was to be used by CUARF for the procurement of relief 
goods for Czechoslovakia.
95
 During the summer of 1945, Czechs and Slovaks across Canada 
donated funds to the CWCF with specific requests for their money to be donated to the 
Czechoslovak Red Cross based in London, children in Czechoslovakia, and to the partizani 
(partisans) who were in the midst of helping to liberate the Czech lands and Slovakia from Nazi 
domination. One of the largest donations bequeathed to the partisans occurred in Windsor, 
Ontario where CNA members donated $2,900 in May 1945.
96
 Donations collected for Slovak 
partisans were sent by the CNA to the Czechoslovak Military Mission in Ottawa where a Fund 
for Partisans in Slovakia was organized.
97
 Women‟s Committees within local CNA branches 
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also donated funds to impoverished children in the homeland. For example, the women‟s 
committee of the CNA branch in Batawa, Ontario donated $143 to Czechoslovak children.
98
 
Although Canadian Czechoslovaks generously supported the Allied war effort, many donations 
continued to be destined to charities and organizations based on the ethnic or geographic 
background of the donor. Donations were also sent to religious groups such as the Catholic 
Church and secular non-governmental organizations including the Czechoslovak Red Cross. 
A majority of fundraising continued to be sent to the CWCF as a consolidated charity 
under CUARF. In the spring and summer of 1945, CUARF purchased $217,046.82 worth of 
goods from the $450,000 allocated to the CWCF. As a result the fund‟s quantity of relief 
shipments grew to include 1,686 crates consisting of 834 crates of citrus extract, 351 crates of 
disinfectant, 313 crates containing milk powder, 84 crates consisting of cigarettes, 50 crates 
including warm leather boots, 48 crates with high socks, 3 crates of shaving blades, 2 crates of 
dried beans, and 1 crate of playing cards for hospital patients. In Montreal, these supplies were 
loaded onto the shipping vessel Chertsey and destined for the Romanian port of Constanta 
(Constantza) before arriving by rail in Czechoslovakia.
99
 Across Canada, 1,200 clothing 
committees were established to seek clothing donations for Europe. The National Clothing 
Collection allocated 250,000 pounds of clothing to Czechoslovakia. Accordingly, the CNA 
requested that all of its branches across Canada cooperate with their local clothing committees in 
order to reach Czechoslovakia‟s allocation of donated clothing.100  
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 As fundraising for the Allied war effort continued, Nazi Germany formally surrendered 
to the Allies on 7 May 1945.
101
 A few days later the CSL called for the revival of an independent 
Slovak state rather than the re-establishment of a Czechoslovak Republic which would thwart 
nationalist Slovak demands for autonomy. Political appeals were sent to delegates meeting at the 
founding convention of the United Nations in San Francisco. On behalf of Canadian Slovaks, the 
CSL, Slovak Catholic Sokol, First Catholic Sokol Union, and the National Slovak Mutual 
Benefit Society called on delegates to support the independence of the Slovak nation from 
Czechoslovakia. The lobbying of nationalist American and Canadian Slovaks was largely 
ignored due to the Allied recognition of the Czechoslovak Government-in-Exile in London, 
England as the legitimate representative of a resurrected Czechoslovak state. Slovakia‟s wartime 
status as a Nazi-aligned state severely hampered any attempts at Western recognition.
102
 
In an August 1945 report in the RCMP Security Bulletin under the heading of “Friction,” 
Canada‟s national police force became increasingly aware of the cleavages that events in Central 
Europe reproduced within the Czechoslovak and nationalist Slovak communities in Canada. 
Although the RCMP depicted the relations between ethnic Czechs and Slovaks as containing 
“some friction,” they were conscious of the divisions within the previous waves of Czech and 
Slovak immigration to Canada. The RCMP was aware that historically “three principal groups” 
existed in Canada. The “Slovak nationalists” – who only permitted Slovaks to join their 
organizations – did not cooperate with Slovak leftists, or the Czechoslovaks. The RCMP went on 
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to assert in its bulletin that the “… factions get along fairly well at present, only occasionally the 
class-conscious leftists criticize the “bourgeois” National Alliance.”103 Although the RCMP 
understood the sociopolitical cleavages between the Czechoslovak and nationalist Slovak 
communities in Canada, they erroneously overestimated the size of the CNA. The RCMP 
believed that the Czechoslovak organization held 10-12,000 members and more than 200 
branches across Canada. In reality, the CNA‟s membership peaked in 1945 with 92 branches and 
approximately 10,000 members.
104
 Left-leaning Sudeten Germans also joined the CNA forming 
two branches in Tupper Creek, British Columbia, and St. Walburg, Saskatchewan.
105
 
In terms of a security assessment and threat to Canada, the RCMP and Canadian 
immigration authorities were vigilant to the possibility that many „undesirables‟ were attempting 
to hide their Nazi or communist affiliations by joining the CNA. The Security Service‟s “O” 
Division discovered that an alleged refugee from Czechoslovakia was attempting to conceal his 
true identity as a Sudeten German with membership in the NSDAP (National Socialist German 
Workers‟ Party). The individual in question was a German citizen and as a result was 
subsequently interned. A RCMP wartime Security Bulletin noted that “it can almost be taken for 
granted that there are other Nazis hiding in Canada in the disguise of Czechoslovakian 
refugees.”106 Nazis, fascist sympathizers, and Communist spies did attempt and eventually 
succeeded in entering Canada in the years immediately after the Second World War. 
In October 1945 on behalf of the Czechoslovak government, František Pavlásek 
requested that Canadian authorities consider all passports issued by the former Nazi-aligned 
                                                 
103
 Kealey and Whitaker, eds, R.C.M.P. Security Bulletins, 380-383. 
104
 Jovanovic, “Czechs,” 402. Finding Aid MSS1179 located at Library and Archives Canada 
(http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/digital-initiatives/012018-10007-e.html) indicates that the CNA reached a 
pinnacle with 92 branches. 
105
 Čermák, It All Began with Prince Rupert, 163. 
106
 Kealey and Whitaker, eds, R.C.M.P. Security Bulletins, 71. 
 78 
Slovak state as invalid documents, and that any “alien” presenting such a document should 
automatically be refused admission to Canada.
107
 Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, 
Slovakia aligned itself with Germany following Hitler‟s invasion and annexation of the Czech 
lands creating a Reich Protectorate on 15 March 1939. Neither the Czechoslovak Government-
in-Exile in London nor Ottawa recognized the Slovak “puppet regime.” The Department of 
External Affairs (DEA) noted that many individuals who obtained Slovakian passports had in 
fact escaped from Czechoslovakia through Austria in an attempt to avoid postwar trials for 
treason against the state. The DEA indicated that many of these passport-holders could “apply 
for admission to Canada.” According to officials in Ottawa, the Slovakian passports did not meet 
Canada‟s Passport Regulation requirements as held in P.C. 3016. Subsequently, Canadian 
officials looked to their Immigration Branch counterparts to refuse admission to any individual 
with such a travel document.
108
  
On 29 October 1945, the Commissioner of Immigration informed District 
Superintendents across the country of the DEA‟s advice regarding Slovakian passports.109 On 2 
November 1945, a memorandum was sent from the Immigration Branch‟s Western District 
Superintendent in Winnipeg informing inspectors that the DEA advised that “a number of aliens 
[were] travelling on passports issued by the former Slovak State or Tiso Government.” On 7 
November 1945, the Pacific District Superintendent in Vancouver informed officials at the 
Immigration Branch in Ottawa that the DEA‟s advice regarding Slovakian passports would be 
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passed along to officers at all border ports.
110
 Additionally, Under-Secretary of State for External 
Affairs, Norman Alexander Robertson, indicated in a letter to Minister of Mines and Resources, 
James Allison Glen, that Canadian diplomats in Washington also received representations 
regarding the forthcoming admission of anti-Nazi Sudeten German refugees to Canada.
111
 
Czechoslovakia‟s diplomatic representation attempted to thwart the admission into Canada of 
nationalist Slovak politicians who actively fought the re-establishment of a pro-Czechoslovak 
state. 
With the Second World War over and relief and reconstruction efforts in progress, 
Canadian Czechoslovaks gathered at the CNA‟s Victory Congress in Toronto on 24 November 
1945. In a resolution passed at the meeting, delegates expressed their loyalty to their homeland 
and thanked the Allied forces, and in particular their Soviet “brothers” for their “invaluable help” 
in supporting the struggle to liberate their homeland.
112
 In his report from the Victory Congress, 
CNA national secretary Karel Buzek described the tremendous role that Canada‟s 40,000 
“Czechoslovaks” played during the war. In highlighting the sacrifices made across the country to 
support the liberation of Czechoslovakia from Nazi domination, Buzek illustrated that even in 
small towns such as Margo, Saskatchewan where five to ten Czechoslovak families settled 
during the Great Depression, two young pilots lost their lives for both of their homelands “old 
and new.” According to Buzek, no mobilization or draft forced them to join the Czechoslovak 
Air Force in Europe; they simply could not sit idle through the war. In essence, they gave their 
                                                 
110
 LAC, IB Fonds, RG 76, volume 617, file 916207, pt. 10, “Immigration from Czechoslovakia, 1947-1953,” 
memorandum from Pacific District Superintendant to Commissioner of Immigration, 7 November 1945, microfilm 
reel C-10436. 
111
 LAC, IB Fonds, RG 76, volume 617, file 916207, pt. 10, “Immigration from Czechoslovakia, 1947-1953,” letter 
from Norman Alexander Robertson to Hon. James Allison Glen, 8 December 1945, microfilm reel C-10436. 
112
 LAC, CNAC Fonds, MG 28 V111, volume 2, file 6 “VI Congress, 1945,” Resoluce VI. Sjezdu – Vítězného 
Kongresu Ceškoslovenského národního sdruţení v Kanadě, 24.-25. XI. 1945. 
 80 
lives for freedom.
113
 Buzek concluded that the approximately 40,000 Canadians of Czech and 
Slovak heritage sent over 11,753,000 cigarettes to Czechoslovak soldiers serving in England, 
7,250,000 cigarettes to their compatriots on the Soviet front, and approximately 2 million 
cigarettes to their forces in Yugoslavia via London. Among the CNA‟s various wartime funds to 
send food, clothing, and material goods to troops in Europe and to victims of German oppression 
in their homeland, Canadian Czechs and Slovaks raised a total of $330,922.00 or $65 per 
Czechoslovak household in Canada.
114
 Incidentally, the CNA‟s Toronto branch donated the 
single largest amount of $58,676.19 to the war effort, while members in remote Farmington, 
British Columbia were able to collect $18 dollars.
115
  
With the CWCF as a member fund of the Canadian United Allied Relief Fund, over $9 
million dollars were allocated for aid to the people of twelve Allied countries.
116
 The CWCF was 
allocated $450,000 in 1945 for the purchase of goods to be sent to victims of war in the Czech 
lands and Slovakia. In November 1945, $364,420.88 of that initial allocation had already been 
spent on aid.
117
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In a letter to Colonel P.L. Browne, director of the Voluntary War Relief section of the 
Department of National War Services in Ottawa, Buzek indicated that CUARF‟s allocation of 
$450,000 to the CWCF for 1945 was divided into six categories: foodstuffs ($157,002.05), 
medical and surgical supplies ($121,222.44), freight charges ($85,603.33), new clothing 
($56,798.92), Canadian Red Cross buying services ($22,500), and comforts ($6,873.26).
118
 
Browne advised that his department would grant the CWCF a special permit to continue to send 
foodstuffs to Czechoslovakia. Relief parcels containing food were not permitted to contain sugar 
or sugar-related commodities due in part to the length of time that packages from Canada to 
Czechoslovakia remained in transit. War charities such as the CWCF required special 
government permits in order to ship large food, clothing, and medicinal stores to Czechoslovakia 
after the end of the Second World War.
119
 
With conflict in Europe over, Canadian Czechoslovaks continued to focus their attention 
on sending aid to Czechoslovakia. In his address to delegates at the Czechoslovak National 
Alliance‟s Victory Congress, in November 1945, vice-president Jan Gaţo, a Slovak from 
Windsor, Ontario, called on the members in attendance to move the organization towards a three-
point plan. Gaţo believed that continuous aid to Czechoslovakia, maintenance of ethnic heritage 
for future generations, and the promotion of Canadian citizenship would firmly entrench the 
CNA‟s existence in the immediate postwar years.120 Czechs and Slovaks across Canada heeded 
                                                                                                                                                             
towards relief aid to a defunct Czechoslovakia, citizens across Canada donated over $450,000 which is 
proportionally more than their American counterparts. 
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Gaţo‟s call and CNA branches across Canada continued to donate funds and goods to the relief 
effort. Many members remained active in the dialogue regarding where their financial and 
material support should go. In December 1945, Moravian Catholics donated $200 dollars to the 
CNA‟s aid efforts and requested that their donation be specifically sent to relief efforts in 
Moravia. Half of the funds donated were destined for the Czechoslovak Red Cross, while $50 
dollars each were to be allocated to the relief efforts in the town of Hodonín and for orphanages 
in the towns of Hroznová Lhota and Veselí nad Moravou.
121
  
The CNA executive also desired to assist their homeland. During an executive committee 
meeting of the CNA in December 1945, committee member Matuš Pavlík argued that funds 
could be collected to honour the service of all Czechoslovak volunteers during the Second World 
War. Pavlík suggested that proceeds could be used for the purchase of food which would then be 
sent to impoverished civilians in Czechoslovakia.
122
 Meanwhile, Czechoslovakia‟s legation in 
Canada lobbied the federal government to have demobilized and returning Canadian Czech and 
Slovak volunteers recognized equally with their Canadian counterparts for veteran benefits. In 
Canada, 782 men applied for the Czechoslovak forces overseas. The applicants for duty from 
Canada consisted of 314 Slovaks, 270 Czechs, 112 Canadians, 62 Sudeten Germans, 20 
Subcarpathian Rusyns, and 4 Hungarians. After the cessation of hostilities in 1945, Colonel 
Karel Lukáš, Prague‟s Military and Air Attaché in Canada indicated in a letter to the CNA that 
only 230 individuals eventually joined the Czechoslovak forces oversees with 157 men enlisting 
in the Czechoslovak Army and 73 men in the British Royal Air Force. The 230 successful 
                                                 
121
 LAC, CNAC Fonds, MG 28 V111, volume 11, file 229 “Head Office Correspondence – Chatham, Ont., Branch 
No. 7, n.d., 1945,” letter from John Botek to Karel Buzek, 3 December 1945; LAC, CNAC Fonds, MG 28 V111, 
volume 11, file 229 “Head Office Correspondence – Chatham, Ont., Branch No. 7, n.d., 1945,” letter from Karel 
Buzek to John Botek, 29 December 1945. 
122
 LAC, CNAC Fonds, MG 28 V111, volume 21, file 70 “Czechoslovak Government Ministries, 1946,” letter from 
Czechoslovak Minister of Labour and Social Welfare to Karel Buzek, I 2679/126, 3 December 1945. 
 83 
applicants from Canada consisted of 139 Slovaks, 79 Czechs, 6 Sudeten Germans, and 6 
Subcarpathian Rusyns.
123
 
 
Conclusion 
Immigrants who arrived from Czechoslovakia during the interwar period did not receive 
the same level of social and financial assistance as subsequent waves of postwar refugees. For 
many Czech and Slovak immigrants, the absence of Canadian or Czechoslovakian government 
support and Czechoslovak institutions capable of assisting in their immigration and initial 
settlement in Canada greatly influenced the interwar newcomer‟s identity in their new country. 
During the 1920s and 1930s, many Czechs and Slovaks who supported a Czechoslovak identity 
viewed themselves as independent, hard-working, and self-made since they could only depend 
on themselves and their fellow immigrants for material and financial support. 
Important to our understanding of interwar Czech and Slovak immigration to Canada is 
how newcomers during this period influenced the emergence of Canadian Czechoslovak 
institutions. Beginning in the 1920s, three groups of Czechoslovakian immigrants existed in 
Canada. The largest group was comprised of nationalist Slovaks who only permitted ethnic 
Slovaks to join their institutions and advocated for Slovak autonomy within a federalized 
Czechoslovakia. A small group of Slovak leftists joined ethnic Czechs in promoting a common 
Czechoslovak ethnic identity and supported the Czechoslovak Republic.  
The Canadian Czechoslovak community remained small prior to the arrival of farmers 
and labourers from interwar Czechoslovakia. As a result, sizeable and far-reaching Czechoslovak 
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institutions with member branches across Canada did not exist. Many interwar Czech and Slovak 
newcomers were largely responsible for establishing Czechoslovak groups and associations that 
postwar arrivals from Czechoslovakia later joined. Interwar Czech and Slovak immigrants 
transplanted their Old World ethnic and ideological divisions to Canada which they embedded 
into newly established Czechoslovak institutions. Tensions between the proponents of a 
Czechoslovak identity and nationalist Slovaks also resurfaced in Canada. An example of these 
Old World tensions was the establishment and demise of the Czechoslovak Mutual Benefit 
Society first formed in Montreal in 1924. A small group of Czech members sought to turn the 
organization into a thoroughly Czechoslovak institution to which a majority of Slovak members 
disapproved. The society ceased its activities in 1927 after its mostly Slovak membership left 
Montreal and established or joined other Slovak groups. 
Interwar Czech and Slovak immigrants were responsible for the establishment of 
Czechoslovak institutions such as Toronto‟s National Alliance of Slovaks, Czechs, and 
Subcarpathian Ruthenians, which later merged with Montreal‟s Czechoslovak National Alliance 
(CNA) in 1940. Established in 1944, Masaryk Hall (MH) worked closely with the CNA as both 
institutions shared many of the same members. Both organizations were immediately joined by a 
small group of immigrants who arrived in Canada during the Second World War. From 1939 to 
1945, 1,009 immigrants gave their racial origin as Czech – including Bohemian and Moravian – 
compared to 420 individuals who claimed their racial origin as Slovak.
124
 During the same 
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period, 2,232 individuals claimed Czechoslovakian nationality.
125
 Individuals who arrived during 
the war combined with earlier immigrants from Czechoslovakia were instrumental in welcoming 
arrivals from postwar Czechoslovakia into their ethnocultural groups and associations in the 
hopes that they would assist in promoting the preservation of Czechoslovak culture and 
Canadian citizenship. Interwar immigrants would come to view successive waves of Cold War 
refugees from Czechoslovakia with dismay due to the availability of government support for 
their settlement in Canada and the 1948ers and 1968ers‟ virulent promotion of an anti-
communist identity. 
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Chapter Two: 
 
A Three-Point Plan:  
Promoting Postwar Relief, Citizenship, and Ethnic Heritage in Canada  
 
In December 1946, Masaryk Memorial Hall (MH) introduced a magazine entitled Bobřík 
(Beaver) for children of “Czechoslovakian origin in Canada.” The magazine taught youngsters 
about Czechoslovakia‟s history through trivia, games, and stories. As president of MH, Gustav 
Přístupa asked young readers “to be like the small, hard-working animal – working for its new 
homeland, Canada – but not forgetting our old homeland, Czechoslovakia.”1 On behalf of the 
organization‟s members, Přístupa pressed Czech and Slovak children to show confidence, 
industriousness, admiration for their homelands – old and new – and a desire to distinguish 
themselves and the Czechoslovak community in Canada. Přístupa concluded by asking children 
to help preserve the ethnic heritage and customs their parents brought with them to their new 
country.
2
 
Czechs and Slovaks in Canada successfully assisted in resurrecting a Czechoslovak state 
in 1945. During the Second World War, the Czechoslovak National Alliance (CNA) reached a 
pinnacle of 92 branches and a membership nearing 10,000 individuals. In the immediate postwar 
period, Czechoslovak organizations such as the CNA suffered from a decline in membership and 
financial support as many of its supporters turned their attention towards their own integration 
into Canadian society. The CNA never reached the same level of financial support and 
membership as it had during the Second World War. Although Canadian Czechoslovaks rejoiced 
at the liberation of their old homeland from Nazi domination, they continued to recognize that 
postwar relief was an immediate concern in a re-established Czechoslovakia. Following the 
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CNA‟s Victory Congress in November 1945, Czechs and Slovaks as members of a broader 
Czechoslovak group in Canada looked to CNA vice-president Jan Gaţo‟s three-point plan for 
direction on how to better improve life for their compatriots in Central Europe, and continue to 
promote integration into Canadian society for all Czechoslovaks. 
This chapter assesses how Canadian Czechoslovak institutions addressed the needs of a 
resurrected Czechoslovak state in the immediate postwar period, by means of Gaţo‟s three-point 
plan which went as follows. First, Czechs and Slovaks in Canada continued to fundraise in an 
effort to send postwar relief in the form of medicine, clothing, and foodstuffs to their compatriots 
devastated by six years of German occupation. Second, Canadian Czechoslovak community 
leaders within the CNA and MH actively promoted the development of Canadian citizenship 
among Czechs and Slovaks even as many prewar immigrants began to consider returning to 
Czechoslovakia after six years of war and separation from relatives and friends in the old 
country. As non-denominational and anti-communist institutions, the CNA and MH welcomed 
individuals of various backgrounds including Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish members whose 
origins connected them to Czechoslovakia. Many of these same individuals were Canadian 
Czechs and Slovaks who regarded with suspicion the increasing Communist influence in the old 
country. Third, Canadian Czechs and Slovaks also turned their attention towards the preservation 
of a Czechoslovak ethnic heritage with the establishment of MH in Toronto in 1944 as a 
charitable sociocultural organization which could better promote the preservation of ethnic 
heritage for future generations. These three pillars of the community‟s immediate postwar 
agenda entrenched the existence of the MH and the CNA, and solidified the Czechoslovak 
community‟s ethnocultural identity within postwar Canada. 
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Postwar Relief for a Resurrected Czechoslovakia 
Recognizing that social and economic conditions in Czechoslovakia were dire in the 
months following the end of the Second World War, the CNA‟s executive committee was 
regularly updated regarding the relief situation in their homeland. On 3 December 1945, 
Czechoslovakia‟s Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare wrote to the CNA head office in 
Toronto indicating that improving food consumption on the part of small children was the 
ministry‟s top priority. According to Prague, children up to six years of age had an average 
caloric intake of 1,428 calories, below the required consumption of 1,600 calories. Meanwhile, 
children and adolescents between the ages of six and twenty years of age consumed an average 
of 1,907 calories instead of the recommended 2,650 calories to maintain general health. Due to 
an increasing need for food and medication, and relief packages arriving slowly to 
Czechoslovakia, the ministry indicated that many children and youth suffered from 
malnourishment and tuberculosis.
3
 
In early 1946, CNA members called on their leadership to renew the wartime Cigarette 
Fund which successfully sent donated cigarettes to Czechoslovak forces in England, Russia, and 
North Africa during the Second World War. Czechoslovak National Alliance members sent 
goods to Czechoslovakia‟s civilian population including cigarettes. In an executive committee 
meeting held on 10 January, CNA national secretary Karel Buzek noted that approval for such a 
scheme had to come from Ottawa. Subsequently, Canadian authorities informed the CNA that 
Czechoslovak servicemen no longer qualified for cigarette parcels from Canada since the war 
was over. That same month, the Post Office Department notified the CNA that postal services 
between Canada and Czechoslovakia “had just been resumed” and Canadians were now free to 
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send parcels –subject to customs regulations for tobacco in Czechoslovakia.4 It was also noted 
that the American government already permitted a cigarette service for war-torn Europe. 
Although the Canadian government lifted restrictions on the shipment of individual parcels with 
a maximum weight of four pounds and permitted the shipment of foodstuffs up to eleven pounds, 
Ottawa lagged behind the American government in permitting the shipment of relief goods 
including cigarettes to Europe.
5
 As a result, the CNA struggled to meet its previous obligations 
and a growing demand for the shipment of consumable products. Various organizations 
continued to assist the CNA in meeting its obligations. The Canadian United Allied Relief Fund 
(CUARF) offered to ship clothing and footwear from Canadian military stores at a rate of five 
dollars per pair of footwear, $1.25 per pair of pants, and $2.50 per shirt. Canadian Commercial 
Enterprises of Toronto offered to facilitate the purchase of relief goods in Denmark to be sent to 
Czechoslovakia. The Bata Corporate offices in Copenhagen indicated to the CNA that butter 
could be purchased at 60 cents per pound. As a result, a shipment of 2,000 pounds of butter with 
a value of $1,200 was to be sent to Czechoslovakia.
6
 
As a result of this development, the CNA and its member branches resorted to purchasing 
smaller quantities of relief goods and sent them from Denmark to Czechoslovakia through the 
Czechoslovak War Charities Fund (CWCF) which was a member fund of CUARF. With funds 
from the CNA, the Canadian Red Cross purchased $26,000 worth of vitamin tablets, viosterol 
(oil-based vitamin D), citrus concentrate (vitamin C), sulfate, penicillin, sweaters, coats, and 
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socks.
7
 By March 1946, goods were being sent to the Czechoslovak Red Cross in Prague and to 
the Slovak National Council (Slovenská národná rada) in Bratislava. 
In a letter to the Toronto Daily Star, Karel Buzek who also served as the executive 
director of the CWCF expressed his gratitude to all Canadians for their donations of money, 
food, and clothing to the Canadian Red Cross, the National Clothing Collection, and the 
Czechoslovak War Charities Fund. At the end of 1945, $1,067,000 worth of relief goods was 
shipped to Czechoslovakia. Buzek informed the paper‟s readers that in some parts of 
Czechoslovakia, the destruction was so severe that government and voluntary agencies could not 
adequately manage the situation on the ground. The CNA‟s national secretary used the example 
of thousands of children who remained “undernourished, insufficiently clad, many of them 
homeless orphans” and insisted that parcels of food and cigarettes for families could still be 
ordered through the CWCF.
8
  
As relief organizations continued to send aid packages to war-torn Europe, Canadian 
Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie King announced a food conservation program designed to 
increase Canadian shipments of vital foods overseas to Europe. In a letter to organizations and 
individuals involved in collecting donations for war-ravaged Europe, the Minister of National 
War Services asked Canadians to: 
 
…reduce their ordinary requirements of these vital foods and substitute in 
their diets the canned and packaged foods which would be donated in 
voluntary food collections, it will make it possible for the Food Boards of the 
Government to take delivery of all essential food products at the most 
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effective source and to deliver them to the authorities which can most 
effectively distribute them where the need exists.
9
  
 
The Canadian government hoped that its citizens would support the Food Conservation Program 
by purchasing less wheat products, flour, meats, cheese, and eggs, while avoiding unnecessary 
waste and only purchasing these items for immediate needs. Ottawa also encouraged the 
establishment of residential gardens that would lead to the substitution of vegetables for many of 
these now vital foods.
10
 
In the fall of 1946 a delegation from the CNA arrived in Czechoslovakia to assess the 
destruction caused by the Second World War. The delegation began its tour of the country in 
Bratislava, Slovakia and completed its visit in Prague. During its stay in the country, the 
delegation witnessed the wartime destruction of property, nationwide protests, and visited with 
the injured, sick, and infirm in hospitals across the country. In eastern Slovakia, the delegation 
viewed first-hand how Canadian relief goods – arriving first in 1945 – were put to use before 
American aid appeared. As chair of the CNA‟s auditing committee, Prokop V. Havlík informed 
members of the executive upon his return from Czechoslovakia that it was “completely 
pointless” for Canadian Czechoslovaks to send money to their relatives and friends due to the 
low value of Czechoslovak currency. Although one Canadian dollar was worth approximately 50 
Czechoslovak Crowns, Havlík argued that more could be bought with a dollar in Canada than 
with 50 Crowns in Czechoslovakia due to high prices and demand back in the old homeland. 
Havlík
 
advised his compatriots to send clothing, footwear, and cigarettes instead. In addition, 
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Havlík argued that in a newly resurrected Czechoslovakia, cigarettes continued to be a valuable 
gift.
11
 
A subsequent delegation to Czechoslovakia led by CNA president Rudolf Koreň and 
national secretary Karel Buzek met with a ministerial committee at Prague Castle, the official 
residence of President Edvard Beneš. One of the many issues discussed was the large number of 
missing or undelivered aid packages that compatriots in Canada were sending to Czechoslovakia. 
Government officials in Prague claimed that they were not responsible for these parcels. Many 
needy recipients were being forced to wait for ships docking at the German port of Hamburg, or 
its Polish counterpart at Gdansk for the release of cargo, and for trains to deliver these goods to 
the country. Czechoslovakian officials informed the CNA delegation that many packages were 
improperly labelled, while others simply did not arrive at their intended destination.
12
 Many 
within the Czechoslovak community across Canada sent packages to their families and friends, 
and to the elderly and orphaned. In 1947, aid packages could not weigh more than six kilograms. 
An individual package could contain one of the following items: one pound of tobacco (for 
$2.25), 600 cigarettes (for $4.00), 300 cigarettes (for $2.25), or 120 cigars. The shipment of these 
packages was processed by the CNA head office on Richmond Street in Toronto.
13
 
In an attempt to raise funds for infirm and afflicted compatriots in Czechoslovakia, on 11 
September 1947, the central executive committee of the CNA informed the readership of Nová 
vlasť that it was commencing a campaign to raise $10,000 for postwar relief. In an attempt to 
instigate internal political divisions, Slovak communists in Canada countered this initiative by 
claiming in their official organ Ľudove zvesti (People‟s News) that the CNA‟s campaign was a 
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deliberate attempt to fill its own coffers.
14
 The CNA countered the Slovak communist claims by 
indicating to readers that the organization received annual membership dues of $1.00 since its 
founding in 1939. All other collected funds were for various projects such as the Cigarette Fund, 
or to aid Czechoslovakia‟s orphans and Displaced Persons (DPs).15 The CNA‟s executive 
committee noted that monies collected during the Second World War effort and counted at the 
CNA‟s Victory Congress in November 1945 equalled $330,922. Of this sum, $209,212.42 was 
given to the CWCF, $30,983.04 was used to purchase travelling passes for Czechoslovak troops 
in Europe and North Africa, and $19,735.50 was given to the committee for all Czechoslovak 
groups to which the Ľudové zvesti newspaper was a member. The CNA also raised funds to help 
its compatriots who did not have the financial means to insure themselves. Those of old age who 
were no longer eligible for life insurance were now able to access funds for medical reasons.
16
 
On 13 November, Czechoslovakia‟s Consul General in Montreal Josef Kotrlý explained 
why the CNA was seeking donations for its various projects and why a fund for Canadian 
Czechoslovaks run by the same organization was necessary. Kotrlý informed Canadian 
Czechoslovaks in Nová vlast’ that there were approximately 40,000 Czechoslovaks living in 
Canada with only a small portion of this group maintaining Czechoslovak citizenship. The 
overwhelming majority of individuals within the community were Canadian citizens or without 
citizenship since they lost their Czechoslovak citizenship and had yet to become naturalized 
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Canadian citizens.
17
 The Consul General went on to argue that not every Czechoslovak acquired 
financial or professional success after immigrating to Canada. According to Kotrlý, many 
individuals succumbed to accidents, unfortunate occurrences, and medical issues that left them 
and their families devastated. Kotrlý used several examples to illustrate why such a fund within 
the community was necessary – including that of a war veteran recently released from service 
that suffered an accident and could not provide for his young wife and child. Others lost 
property, while some sought to return to Czechoslovakia, but did not have the financial means to 
do so. Those Czechoslovaks not yet naturalized and who were in dire need of assistance looked 
to the Consulate General for support. Kotrlý claimed that the Czechoslovak community in 
Canada had the ability and resources to help compatriots in need – including those individuals 
without Canadian or Czechoslovak citizenship who were not entitled to consular aid.
18
 The 
Consul General concluded his remarks in Nová vlasť by arguing that it was the duty of 
compatriot groups in Canada to provide social services to fellow immigrants from 
Czechoslovakia. Kotrlý firmly believed that the CNA along with other Czechoslovak community 
organizations in Canada collected donations openly from the public for a social fund for all 
Czechoslovaks.
19
 
During Christmas season in 1947, a campaign letter was sent out to CNA members, 
friends of the organization, and the general public to inform them that its popular Cigarette 
Service would be discontinued and that any future orders would require time for proper 
packaging and for delivery. Matuš Pavlík, treasurer of the Cigarette Service sent a letter to the 
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CNA head office in Toronto explaining that according to his estimates, the service‟s prices of 
$3.20 for 600 American cigarettes and $4.00 for 600 Canadian cigarettes were actually losing the 
organization crucial funds. As a result of his assessment, Pavlík asked for the CNA‟s assistance 
in helping the service pay off all outstanding costs before the final shipment date of 31 December 
1947.
20
 Although the Cigarette Service was terminating its activities, the CNA continued to 
fundraise for Czechoslovakia. One of the Alliance‟s most important aims during the immediate 
postwar period was for all CNA branches across Canada to assist in raising $10,000 to help 
elderly Czechoslovaks in Canada, compatriots back home, and recent arrivals in Canada. The 
CNA believed that this fundraising drive would highlight the organization‟s postwar plan of 
encouraging Canadian citizenship among its members, the continuation of a Czechoslovak 
heritage in Canada, and to continue financial and material support for a newly freed 
Czechoslovak state.
21
 During the Second World War, the Canadian Czechoslovak community 
successfully raised over $330,922 for the Allied war effort. In two years since the end the war, 
the Canadian Czechoslovak community continued to raise awareness for postwar relief of 
Czechoslovakians and the reconstruction of their homeland. Community organizations including 
the CNA and the CWCF initially struggled to meet their obligations of sending parcels of 
clothing, food, cigarettes, and medication to Czechoslovakia due to Canadian government postal 
restrictions. While demand for relief items such as consumable products remained high, the 
Canadian Czechoslovak community continued to raise funds to purchase and ship parcels to 
Czechoslovakia in order to meet the needs of a population devastated by six years of war.   
                                                 
20
 LAC, CNAC Fonds, MG 28 V111, volume 30, file 11, “Miscellaneous – General, n.d., 1941-1945,” letter from 
Matuš Pavlík to CNA head office,Toronto, December 1947. Pavlík also noted in his letter to the CNA head office 
that they were losing 1-2 percent of all parcels in shipping destined for Czechoslovakia. 
21
 LAC, CNAC Fonds, MG 28 V111, volume 30, file 1-2 “Clippings, n.d., 1941-1946,” “Canadians All: Over 75 
Societies in Toronto Work to Help Immigrants Become Better Citizens,” Globe and Mail, 4 June 1946.  
 96 
 
Immigration, Repatriation, and the Promotion of Canadian Citizenship 
During the first two years after the Second World War, Canada‟s immigration controls 
remained firm. Although labour organizations largely opposed the opening of Canada‟s gates to 
immigrants from Europe in an attempt to protect their workers, proponents of business and 
industry along with humanitarian organizations advocated for a more generous immigration 
policy which would respond to the DP crisis in Europe. Although the CNA continued to facilitate 
the purchase and shipment of relief goods to Czechoslovakia, it also assisted prospective 
immigrants in reaching Canada‟s shores. In 1946, persons who desired to immigrate to either 
Canada or the United States corresponded directly with Czechoslovak and nationalist Slovak 
organizations in North America. Czechs and Slovaks abroad lobbied the CNA for support in 
gaining entry into Canada. In one case, Staff Sergeant Karel Juzl of the Czechoslovak forces 
overseas described himself as a “farmer by occupation who desires to come forward to Canada.”  
The Immigration Branch informed the CNA that a provision existed in the Immigration Act “for 
the admission to Canada of bona fide agriculturalists who have sufficient means to commence 
farming in Canada.” District Superintendent J.D. McFarlane instructed the CNA to advise Juzl to 
visit the London office of the Canadian Immigration Branch whereby officials could determine if 
the applicant was admissible under the regulations.
22
 Ultimately, Juzl was successful in gaining 
entry into Canada and later disembarked from the SS Ile de France in Halifax on 26 February 
1946.
23
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A day later, the Department of Mines and Resources – which remained responsible for 
the Immigration Branch – notified the CNA that its regulations permitted the entry of visitors 
“who are in good health and in possession of an unexpired passport” issued by the country of 
their citizenship and carrying a visa issued by a Canadian diplomatic official in Europe.
24
 
Prospective non-immigrants were to have their papers examined at a Canadian port of entry.
25
 
Canadian Czechs and Slovaks used the temporary entry regulations to bring their relatives to 
Canada for stays lasting from a few weeks to one year.
26
 On 28 May 1946, the Canadian 
government issued Order-in-Council P.C. 2071 permitting Canadian citizens to sponsor their 
close relatives including parents, siblings, and orphaned nieces and nephews. At the same time, 
Czechs and Slovaks who wished to immigrate to Canada from Czechoslovakia or one of the DP 
camps in Western Europe continued to wait as Canadian immigration controls remained tight. 
The Canadian public began to mount considerable pressure on the Canadian government to 
respond to the humanitarian crisis in Europe by opening the country‟s doors to immigration. 
With the Second World War over and a Czechoslovak Republic firmly established, many 
Canadian Czechs and Slovaks entertained the idea of returning to the old country. Although 
economic opportunity, a better standard of living, and the threat of German invasion brought 
many Czech and Slovak immigrants to Canada, a desire to reconnect with relatives and friends or 
even to repatriate led an unknown number of Canadian Czechoslovaks to return to 
Czechoslovakia in the early postwar years. For Canadian Czechoslovaks who wished to visit or 
resettle in Czechoslovakia, the Department of External Affairs (DEA) enclosed a document 
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entitled Memorandum to Persons Travelling to Continental Europe with every passport 
application to future travellers from Canada.
27
 With Europe in the midst of rebuilding its vital 
infrastructure including transportation networks, Canadian officials informed prospective 
travellers that “…approval of your [passport] application does not accord any priority with 
regard to transportation to Europe, nor can any responsibility be undertaken with regard to return 
transportation.”28 Ottawa indicated that passengers from Canada could find “a few seats” for sea-
rail service between London and Paris “without too much difficulty.”29 The Canadian 
Ambassador in France, Brigadier Georges Philias Vanier confirmed that continental travel was to 
be considered “very difficult and accommodation hard to secure.”30 Canadian travellers were to 
expect their itineraries to include delays and difficulties.  
In 1946, Czechs and Slovaks throughout Canada applied to travel companies including 
Cunard White Star Limited (Donaldson Atlantic Line) for Atlantic passage via Great Britain to 
Czechoslovakia. Prospective travellers were assisted in filling out their applications by the CNA 
head office in Toronto which examined each application. In many cases, applicants born in 
Austria-Hungary at the turn of the twentieth century never became naturalized Canadian citizens.  
One such applicant was 55 year-old Jozef Šimkovič, a married gardener from Fort Erie, Ontario 
who on 21 March 1946 indicated on his travel application with the Cunard Line that he wished 
“to settle permanently in Czechoslovakia.” Cunard officials indicated that Simkovic‟s state of 
health was “good” and that he was prepared to leave “as soon as possible.” Farmers and 
labourers also wanted to return to their homeland. On 30 March 1946, John Somr, a 49 year-old 
                                                 
27
 LAC, CNAC Fonds, MG 28 V111, volume 23, file 93 “Immigration and Travel – Cunard Line, 1945-1946,” 
DEA, Memorandum to Persons Travelling to Continental Europe, n.d., 1. 
28
 Ibid., 1 
29
 Ibid., 1 
30
 Ibid., 2 
 99 
married farmer from Tupperville, Ontario indicated that he wished to settle permanently in 
Czechoslovakia. Antonín Heindl, a 54 year-old married labourer residing in Toronto, Ontario 
also sought to return to Czechoslovakia. In many cases, applicants were middle-aged men who 
previously arrived in Canada looking for economic opportunity, but who later yearned for their 
families back in Central Europe. In some instances, farmers and labourers from Czechoslovakia 
never intended to remain permanently in Canada. While many applicants resettled in the old 
country, others simply desired to reconnect with family back in Czechoslovakia, including Steve 
Kulkoský, a 59 year-old married coal miner from Bellevue, Alberta who earlier became a 
naturalized British subject. In his travel application, Kulkoský revealed that he longed to visit his 
wife and family in Orava, Slovakia.
31
 
As Canadian Czechs and Slovaks continued to re-connect with relatives and friends in 
Czechoslovakia and were able to bring their loved ones to Canada for visits, they also watched 
the popular emergence of the Communist movement in their homeland during the elections of 
May 1946. In the Czech lands, the Czechoslovak Communists under Klement Gottwald garnered 
40.17 percent of all votes. In Slovakia, the Democratic Party under Jozef Lettrich achieved 62 
percent of all votes. Altogether, the Communists in Czechoslovakia – including the Communist 
Party of Slovakia – gained 38 percent of all votes cast throughout the country and were the 
largest party in parliament.
32
 The Communist movement was more popular with Czech voters, 
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while Slovaks predominately favoured the Democratic Party as a broad coalition of non-
Communists. The May 1946 election results in favour of the Communists in the Czech lands 
were due to a “bitter disillusionment” that many Czechs felt towards the West and Munich 
Accords of 1938. After approximately six years of fascist occupation, many Czech voters were 
grateful towards the Allies and in particular the Soviet Union for their liberation.
33
 Subsequently, 
Edvard Beneš remained in office as president of Czechoslovakia, meanwhile Gottwald became 
prime minister. The May 1946 election results brought together four political parties into a 
National Front coalition government. The Communists retained the premiership and nine cabinet 
posts meanwhile other parties shared the remaining seventeen ministries.  The Communists 
consolidated their power over influential ministries including: Interior, Information, Agriculture, 
Social Welfare, Internal Trade, and Finance. In Ottawa, Canadian diplomats noted that the 
Communists under Gottwald left “no doubt therefore that they are in a strong position” since 
they also maintained control over the police and the internal security service.
34
 Many Canadian 
Czechoslovaks became increasingly alarmed by their homeland‟s flirtation with communism. 
Since Josef Kotrlý‟s appointment as Czechoslovakia‟s Consul General in Montreal in 
1946, Slovak members of the pro-Communist Independent Mutual Benefit Federation of Toronto 
visited his office demanding to be recognized as official advisors of the Consulate General. The 
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federation‟s secretary and member of the Labour Progressive Party of Canada, Cyprián Slimák 
insisted that he be permitted to screen all persons claiming Czechoslovakian nationality, and 
demanded that decisions on their identities be deferred to him.
35
 Slimák requested that 
Czechoslovakian passports be provided to individuals without any identification papers. Kotrlý 
noted that in one case, individuals of German and Hungarian descent arrived at the Consulate 
General demanding passports. When asked for references to ascertain their identities, the 
individuals gave the name of Tim Buck, the national leader of the Labour Progressive Party.
36
  
During his tenure as Czechoslovakia‟s representative in Montreal, Kotrlý reported to 
Vladimír Clementis, the Communist Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in Prague. Kotrlý 
claimed that Clementis “injected himself and directed foreign legations and consulates.” 
Subsequently, domestic Communist sympathizers attempted to subvert the Consulate General 
and turn it into a front for Communist propaganda.
37
 The Czechoslovakian Consul General 
alleged that Slimák attempted to turn his office into a space for the dissemination of Communist 
literature, films, and other materials that the Labour Progressive Party of Canada received from 
Prague. Following Kotrlý‟s protests, Communist authorities sent all their propaganda via 
diplomatic mail to Czechoslovakia‟s legation in Ottawa, thus avoiding any opposition from 
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Kotrlý in Montreal.
38
 In detailing his experience with Communist sympathizers in Canada and 
Communist Party authorities in Prague, Kotrlý observed: 
 
There is a small group sometimes of simple and honest people who support 
Communism. It is mostly due to a minority complex. These people arrived in 
Canada. They did not speak the language. They could never integrate 
themselves into the civic, into the national, yes, into the intellectual and 
artistic life of the country. They did not always find the necessary human 
approach on the part of the Canadians. That will explain to a large extent 
why the Communist approach to the insecure, through grouping them around 
benevolent associations, was a devilishly clever and successful approach.
39
 
 
Exacerbating the frustrations felt by Prague‟s diplomats in Canada and the CNA was Canada‟s 
failure to establish a permanent legation in Prague. The Canadian government delayed opening 
an office in Czechoslovakia because it required additional personnel in its diplomatic corps. A 
Canadian presence in Czechoslovakia resumed on 24 March 1946 when Ronald Macalister 
Macdonnell was appointed chargé d‟affaires in Prague.40 
On 4 April 1946, Senator Arthur W. Roebuck delivered a speech on the floor of the 
Canadian Senate. In his speech, the Canadian senator introduced a motion to establish a 
committee of inquiry into “the problem of immigration.” Roebuck questioned whether Canada 
was to remain “for an indefinite period a third-rate power, wielding at most a secondary 
influence in world councils and depending for our existence as a nation upon the favour and 
forbearance of more populous states…” or would Canada …“open the vast treasure-trove of our 
resource-laden wilderness” to immigration in order to become “one of the most pregnant and 
                                                 
38
 Ibid. 
39
 Joseph Kotrlý, “Communists Move in Canada in a Secret Manner,” Halifax Chronicle Herald, 29 March 1948, 5. 
40
 John Hilliker and Donald Barry, Canada’s Department of External Affairs, Volume II: Coming of Age, 1946-1968 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen‟s University Press, 1995), 12. On 8 September 1944, Ottawa‟s diplomatic presence in 
Czechoslovakia was terminated when chargé d‟affaires, Pierre Dupuy, concluded his mission. See Heads of Post 
List, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (http://www.international.gc.ca/department/ 
history-histoire/heads_of_posts_search-en.asp). 
 103 
powerful of nations.”41 The newly established Senate Standing Committee on Immigration and 
Labour considered several issues including: the desirability of admitting immigrants to Canada; 
the type of immigrant which should be preferred, with reference to their origin, experience, and 
other characteristics; the availability of immigrants for admission to Canada; the resources, 
infrastructure, and national capacity to effectively “absorb, employ, and maintain” new 
immigrants; and future regulations for entry into Canada.
42
 
As Canada‟s Senate examined the future of Canadian immigration policy, a federal 
Cabinet Committee on Immigration Policy convened in May 1946 decided that the RCMP would 
become responsible for screening prospective immigrants overseas. The Committee noted that 
the RCMP “should investigate the records and backgrounds of applicants.”43 The Committee 
sought to prevent Communist agents, sympathizers, and leftist agitators from entering the 
country against the labour needs of the business community and the market.
44
 Fears that an 
increase in immigration could prevent returning Canadian soldiers from finding employment 
were eased only gradually due to the aforementioned security pressures despite the lobbying of 
the Minister of Reconstruction, Clarence Decatur Howe. As a result, the Cabinet Committee was 
slow to view an increase in immigration as advantageous to Canadian society and its economy.
45
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The RCMP‟s operations were overseen by an interdepartmental group known as the 
Security Panel which consisted of senior civil servants, military intelligence officers, and RCMP 
officials. The Security Panel maintained a permanent secretariat in the Privy Council Office.
46
 
The interdepartmental Security Panel‟s mandate was to advise the federal government on the 
vetting procedures of prospective civil servants. However, this agenda was soon broadened to 
include immigrant vetting since Canada closed its immigration offices in Europe in the 1930s. 
With British authorities indicating that they would no longer examine prospective immigrants for 
entry to Canada, the Security Panel proposed that the RCMP become responsible for the security 
screening of immigrants seeking to enter the country from overseas.
47
 
As Canada‟s postwar economic recovery began to take shape, businesses and ethnic 
associations increasingly lobbied the federal government to allow for more immigrants to resettle 
in Canada. The federal government opened the country‟s doors to forestry workers, garment 
industry workers, and farm labourers. Immigrants who were deemed admissible, but did not fit 
into these categories – such as entrepreneurs and professionals – were required to sign one-year 
agricultural labour contracts in order to enter Canada. The Department of Labour‟s priority was 
to relocate young, single, and physically healthy Displaced Persons (DPs) – individuals forced to 
migrate due to socioeconomic or political displacement as a result of the Second World War – to 
Canada.
48
 Under the department‟s labour schemes, workers were admitted into the country for 
one or two-year work contracts. Those who sponsored incoming DPs had to guarantee that they 
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had the financial and residential means to support them for the length of their labour contract.
49
 
On 28 May 1946, the Canadian government issued Order-in-Council P.C. 2071 which permitted 
Canadian citizens to sponsor their close relatives including brothers and sisters, parents, and 
orphaned nephews and nieces.   
A month later, Senator Arthur W. Roebuck wrote to national secretary Karel Buzek 
informing him of the CNA‟s hearing before the Senate Standing Committee on Immigration and 
Labour. The committee set aside one hour to hear the CNA‟s representatives submit their brief. 
The Canadian senator indicated to Buzek that the committee previously contacted progressive 
and conservative Ukrainian and Polish groups. When it came to Czech and Slovak Canadians, 
Roebuck did not know them “to be split so markedly in this way.” In his letter to Buzek, 
Roebuck asked whether the CNA represented “practically” all Czechs and Slovaks in Canada. 
The Canadian senator was keenly aware of domestic ethnic political sensitivities and enquired 
whether there would be any protests from individuals if only the CNA was invited to witness 
before the committee. Roebuck believed the CNA to be an “appropriate” Canadian ethnic 
association and desired to hear their brief to the committee.
50
 In his reply to Senator Roebuck‟s 
questions, Buzek indicated that should the committee wish to hear representations from members 
with various political orientations, the Senate committee could contact the Czechoslovak Joint 
Committee, an umbrella of various groups cooperating in postwar relief matters. The CNA 
national secretary also sent the senate committee names of successful Canadian Czechoslovak 
farmers who were available to speak including Alfred Mráček of Dodsland, Saskatchewan and 
Joseph Gaschnitz of Nacmine, Alberta. The names of successful industrial workers were also 
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submitted and included Stan Kvarda of Batawa, Ontario.
51
 The Senate Standing Committee on 
Immigration and Labour later requested that the Czechoslovak Canadian delegation discuss the 
widening of the categories of relatives that were permitted to enter Canada. 
On 24 July 1946, the Senate Standing Committee on Labour and Immigration invited 
informed parties dealing with immigration to testify.
52
 The standing committee heard 
presentations on the selection and resettlement of immigrants from a retired staff officer with the 
Allied military government in Europe, representatives of the Czechoslovak National Alliance in 
Canada alongside the Association for the Advancement of Finns in Canada, and the Finnish 
Organization of Canada.
53
 On behalf of the CNA, president Rudolf Koreň and national secretary 
Karel Buzek testified before the committee.
54
 In his testimony before the Senate standing 
committee, Buzek noted that the CNA‟s mandate was to provide assistance to Czech and Slovak 
refugees who requested it. The CNA sought to help newcomers in adapting to Canada while 
putting an emphasis on psychological resettlement.
55
 Buzek lamented the severed contact 
between Czechoslovaks in Canada and their families back home, especially since transatlantic 
transportation companies had yet to begin bringing individuals to Canada for which a voyage had 
already been paid for. In his testimony to the committee, Buzek was keenly aware that 
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transportation had to be reserved first for Canadian troops returning home, while he argued that 
“Canada could lose some of its most recent immigrants, because the same efforts have not been 
made to bring over their families whom they have not seen in fifteen years or more.” The CNA‟s 
national secretary claimed that it was very likely that husbands and wives already in Canada 
would return to Czechoslovakia to reconnect with their families.
56
 
On behalf of Czechoslovak Canadians, Karel Buzek recommended to the Canadian 
Senate Standing Committee on Labour and Immigration that Canadian authorities initiate 
measures to rapidly reunite recently arrived DPs with their families back home in Europe. 
Specifically, the CNA called on Ottawa to “accord these families priority on the transports 
immediately after the families of members of the Canadian Army.” Buzek indicated that 
Canadian immigration authorities should also be stationed in Prague to expedite the process.
57
 
The CNA delegation‟s second recommendation was that a larger quota be set for parents and 
individuals seeking to enter Canada so that Canadians could reunite with their relatives from 
Czechoslovakia. Buzek acknowledged that many Czechs and Slovaks required “donations of 
foreign capital” to reunite with family and friends in Canada and as a result, the situation seemed 
inadequate.
58
 The CNA‟s third recommendation called on Canadian immigration authorities to 
discontinue dividing prospective immigrants into privileged and non-privileged groups based on 
ethnicity. Buzek stated that this method of classifying immigrants was in his opinion “…at the 
very least disgusting and exploitative.” The CNA could not understand how Germans were 
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considered “privileged,” while other groups with a similar cultural background such as the 
Czechs and Slovaks were considered to be inferior.
59
 In its final recommendation, the CNA 
called on the Canadian government to appoint “impartial administrators” to oversee the 
admission of prospective immigrants, and that a “consultative committee” should be 
implemented to act as an information service within the immigration branch.
60
 In claiming to 
represent the Canadian Czechoslovak community in Ottawa, the CNA was also concerned with 
the admission of nationalist Slovaks who supported the Nazi-aligned Slovak state during the 
Second World War. 
After the Second World War, approximately, 8,000 Slovaks fled their homeland 
attempting to “escape the vengeance of Beneš and the Communists.” 61 Within this wave of 
émigrés were intellectuals, priests, politicians, professors, lawyers, and journalists who resettled 
in North America.
62
 In 1946, the Czechoslovak government in Prague charged former wartime 
Slovakian Foreign Minister, Ferdinand Ďurčanský, with having been on the Nazi secret service 
payroll and promulgating anti-Semitic laws in Slovakia during the Second World War. The 
United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC) accepted these charges and listed him as a 
war criminal. Prior to the court decision and sentencing due to his status as an enemy of the state, 
Ďurčanský fled Czechoslovakia for Italy. Prague convicted Ďurčanský in absentia for war crimes 
and sentenced him to death. In Rome, he aggressively searched for compatriots and the necessary 
resources required to stage a coup d‟état in Czechoslovakia.63 The former wartime Slovakian 
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cabinet minister founded the Slovak Action Committee (later renamed Slovak Liberation 
Committee).
64
 
Another former wartime Slovakian official that Czechoslovak authorities attempted to 
convict for high treason was Karol Sidor. As the former commander of the Hlinka Guard, the 
militia unit of the ruling Hlinka‟s Slovak People‟s Party during the Second World War, Sidor fell 
out of favour with Nazi authorities and was removed from Slovakia‟s cabinet. Sidor was 
subsequently transferred to Rome as Slovakia‟s ambassador to the Vatican. Prague attempted to 
convict Sidor, but he remained outside the country‟s borders. Sidor subsequently become a 
political distraction to the Vatican and he was relocated outside of Europe.
65
 
In a letter to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Prague‟s Minister to 
Canada, František Pavlásek, indicated that authorities in Czechoslovakia established a list of 
“politically notorious” individuals from the wartime Nazi-aligned Slovakian government to 
which Czechoslovak officials did not want Canada to grant admission.
66
 Pavlásek went on to 
state that if after the war some of these aforementioned persons were successful in entering 
Canada, “…my Government would request that they be held as war criminals for the purpose of 
being handed over to the Czechoslovak authorities.”67 In his reply to the Czechoslovakian 
Minister to Canada, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Norman Alexander 
Robertson, indicated that the potential entrance of followers of the Slovak “Tiso Regime” would 
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be given “careful consideration.” The Under-Secretary of State later raised the issue with 
officials at the Immigration Branch.
68
 In an internal memorandum entitled Political Adherents to 
Tiso Regime in Slovakia – Admission to Canada, Canadian officials reassessed the validity of 
travel documentation from Slovakia. With the adoption of P.C. 2070 on 28 May 1946, the 
Immigration Branch could no longer legally bar holders of Slovakian passports from entering the 
country strictly based on their travel documentation as they had been able to do with Passport 
Regulation P.C. 3016 of 29 November 1938. Order-in-Council P.C. 2070 confirmed that a travel 
document which established the identity of the holder “may be accepted” in lieu of a passport. 
The list of “politically notorious” supporters of the wartime Slovak state was cross-
examined by the Canadian government with the UNWCC‟s lists. Only one name – 
“Sonnenwand” – was found to be on both lists. In light of this result, Ottawa decided that a 
majority of persons found within Pavlásek‟s list would be considered as “suspected political 
offenders,” and not as war criminals. Since Canada was not at war with Czechoslovakia, these 
same individuals would not be viewed as “enemy aliens.”69 Canadian officials were undecided 
whether to deny admission to alleged political criminals. External Affairs bureaucrats understood 
that these same persons would not constitute desirable immigrants. Conversely, Under-Secretary 
of State for External Affairs, Norman Alexander Robertson did not wish to establish a precedent 
by which these same political criminals would be denied entry into Canada. It was noted that 
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Ottawa was “under no international obligation with respect to political fugitives and, moreover, 
our Extradition Agreement with Czechoslovakia specifically excludes political criminals.”70  
The Canadian government chose to follow the American and British governments‟ 
formulation of policy with regards to war criminals and politically undesirable individuals. 
Simultaneously, Ottawa decided not to adopt a concrete plan for politically unsuitable 
immigrants until a “first case arises in practice.”71 The DEA sought further consultation with the 
American and British governments as to their legal procedures regarding the admission of 
political criminals. The Canadian High Commission in London indicated that the British 
government would “attach all due importance” to any report from the UNWCC that a sufficient 
case already existed to justify bringing a suspected war criminal to trial. The British government 
also sought detailed evidence that a prima facie case existed against an individual wanted by an 
Allied government for actively supporting “a state at war with his own country.”72 British 
officials suggested to the Canadian High Commission in London that Ottawa should request 
Prague to satisfy its concerns whether a Czechoslovakian national was in fact guilty of 
“treachery involving active assistance to the enemy.”73 
On 25 October 1946, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Norman Alexander 
Robertson, wrote to Arthur L. Joliffe, director of the Immigration Branch, to inform him that 
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Washington could not deny admission to any prospective immigrant from Czechoslovakia based 
simply on the fact that Prague labelled the person as a “quisling” or enemy of the state for their 
wartime activities. The American government used international law to fairly assess any 
prospective immigrant with a Czechoslovakian passport.
74
 According to the Canadian Chargé 
d‟affairs in Washington, a refusal to grant a visa had to be strictly based on American law. 
Therefore, the American immigration authorities could refuse a visa to any individual who 
Prague viewed as a political criminal or enemy of the state. However, United States law did 
allow for the deportation of „enemy aliens‟ including suspected war criminals, but did not cover 
nationals of countries who were declared by that government to be traitors.
75
 After receiving 
reports from Canadian diplomats regarding their consultations on the admission of suspected war 
criminals and political traitors to the United Kingdom and the United States, the Immigration 
Branch notified the DEA that the Immigration Act did not contain any authority to refuse entry 
to Canada to a suspected war criminal nor did it allow for such individuals to be removed by 
deportation proceedings. Accordingly, the director of the Immigration Branch indicated to the 
DEA that immigration officers would follow the Branch‟s instructions and consider travel 
documentation that established the identity of the holder in place of a passport as insufficient to 
be admitted to Canada.
76
 
As Prague attempted to repatriate former members of the wartime Slovakian government 
to face judicial charges against the state, the Czechoslovak government notified the CNA and its 
branches across Canada that it was also promoting the “re-emigration and repatriation of 
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compatriots” back home. Prague attempted to fill vacancies left in the economy by those who 
fled in 1939 and also by the postwar mass expulsion of Sudeten Germans and Hungarians that 
began in 1945.
77
 For individuals seeking to return to Czechoslovakia, registration forms could be 
requested from the Czechoslovak General Consulate in Montreal. The CNA head office also 
stored the forms and provided advice to prospective returnees.
78
 In his 2 January 1947 issue, 
Nová vlasť editor Martin Dudák claimed that 300 “compatriots” who were active in the 
Czechoslovak community in Canada returned to Czechoslovakia the year before. Dudák 
expected that the community would lose another 100 individuals who desired to be reunited with 
their families back home. According to the editor, it was incumbent upon the existing community 
to shore up its membership while continuing its efforts to provide help to orphans and families 
back in the homeland.
79
  
Nová vlasť continued to bring attention to the issue of community members permanently 
returning to Czechoslovakia. Canadian Czechoslovaks also paid attention to the introduction of a 
new citizenship law that changed their legal identity.  On 1 January 1947, the Canadian 
Citizenship Act came into effect. Previously, Canadians were recognized as British subjects. 
Canada became the first Commonwealth country to enact a separate Citizenship Act.
80
 Canadian 
citizenship was to be conferred on any individual born or naturalized in Canada who was deemed 
eligible by the federal government. The editor of Nová vlasť argued that new Canadians from 
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Czechoslovakia would quickly transplant their loyalty to their country of resettlement and would 
build a “future here with their children.”81 In the 16 January 1947 issue of Nová vlasť, the 
Czechoslovak Consulate General in Montreal informed the paper‟s readership that individuals 
who fled Czechoslovakia after 1 September 1938 would be permitted to repatriate back to their 
homeland by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA). However, those 
who left before this date would not be recognized and would not be considered for repatriation.
82
 
On 13 February 1947, Czechoslovakia‟s new ambassador to Canada, František Němec arrived to 
assume his post replacing František Pavlásek who left in July 1946.83 With Němec‟s guidance, 
the Consulate General in Montreal advised fellow compatriots in Canada that only the wives and 
children of Czechoslovaks who chose to become naturalized Canadian citizens could be 
permitted to leave for Canada and be reunited with their families. Consul General Josef Kotrlý 
noted that officials would grant travelling documents to those individuals with relatives who 
were Canadian citizens. Canadians of Czech or Slovak descent were to have their citizenship 
documents translated into Czech and forwarded to authorities in Prague for verification.
84
 
In an attempt to assuage demands for a liberalized immigration program, on 1 May 1947, 
Prime Minister Mackenzie King outlined his Liberal government‟s immigration policy to the 
House of Commons. In his speech to fellow members, Mackenzie King revealed that his 
government would “foster the growth of the population of Canada by the encouragement of 
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immigration.”85 Ottawa would continue to carefully select immigrants “as can be advantageously 
absorbed in our national economy.” Moreover, Mackenzie King indicated to the House of 
Commons that Canada‟s policy regarding immigration had to be specifically related to the social, 
political, and economic situation resulting from the Second World War. The Liberal Prime 
Minister illustrated that immigration to Canada would fall into two categories: measures 
designed for immediate application, and a long-term program.
86
 Canadian immigration policy 
was to critically assess the “urgent problem of the resettlement of persons who are displaced and 
homeless, as an aftermath of the world conflict.”87 Mackenzie King admitted that the 
resettlement of refugees and DPs constituted a “special problem.” Although Canada was a 
member of the United Nations (UN), the International Refugee Organization (IRO), and actively 
participated in the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (ICR), it was not obligated to 
accept any specified number of refugees or DPs. However, Mackenzie King felt that Canada had 
a “moral obligation to assist in meeting the problem, and this obligation we are prepared to 
recognize.”88 Ottawa was willing to aid its Western allies in resettling millions of refugees and 
DPs that remained in camps across war-ravaged Europe.
89
 Of upmost importance to the Liberal 
government was that prospective immigrants be carefully selected and the numbers of admitted 
persons be adjusted to the “absorptive capacity” of the country.90 As a result, the Canadian prime 
minister argued that entry into Canada was not a “fundamental human right.”91 Immigration was 
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subject to the control of Canada‟s parliament. However, Mackenzie King noted that 
discriminatory provisions within immigration legislation should be removed.  
In an effort to appease his opponents who claimed that the Liberal immigration policy 
remained discriminatory, Mackenzie King indicated that his government initiated further action 
to repeal the Chinese Immigration Act.
92
 Conversely, with the Chinese Immigration Act still in 
place, and Japanese immigration to Canada restricted since Japan fought against the Allied 
powers in the Second World War, Mackenzie King argued that “the people of Canada do not 
wish as a result of mass immigration, to make a fundamental alteration in the character of our 
population.”93 
In May 1947, the Canadian government issued an Order-in-Council permitting the 
relatives of Canadian citizens or legal residents including fiancés, spouses, and unmarried 
children to apply for entry into Canada. For applicants wishing to work in agriculture, the CNA 
noted those families or unmarried and single men with a minimum of $2,000 in capital could be 
admitted into Canada and resettled onto their own farm. If applicants already had guaranteed 
work on a relative‟s farm, it was only necessary to possess a minimum of $1,000 in capital. The 
CNA‟s head office in Toronto welcomed the submission of documents including: a Canadian 
citizenship certificate, Landing Card, bank statements, and a letter indicating residential status 
which its staff would review in an attempt to help its members‟ relatives achieve entry into 
Canada.
94
 Although the Canadian government was willing to assist European DPs in settling in 
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Canada, its process of selection and restriction was guided by economic, ethnic, and political 
considerations. Department of Labour officials were sent overseas to select applicants for 
settlement, while Immigration Branch representatives routinely rejected prospective immigrants 
based on ethnic and political prejudices including Jews and left-wing or Communist 
sympathizers who were additionally labelled as „undesirables,‟ and „security risks.‟   
 
Preserving Ethnic Heritage for Successive Generations 
During the 1930s and 1940s, 9,577 immigrants who claimed Czechoslovakian nationality 
arrived in Canada. Many Czechs and Slovaks who settled in Canada in search of employment 
and a better quality of life returned home to be reunited with their families back in Central 
Europe. Those Czechs and Slovaks who immigrated to Canada with young families or wanted to 
start their own family in a new land focused their attention on preserving their ethnic heritage for 
future generations. An example of how Czechs and Slovaks fostered heritage and citizenship 
values in younger generations was the MH‟s Masarykův klub mládeže (Masaryk Youth Club) in 
Toronto.  On 17 March 1946, the first meeting of the Masaryk Youth Club was held inside 
Masaryk Hall. At the club‟s first meeting twenty-three adolescents were in attendance. Czech 
and Slovak youth discussed a variety of activities they wished to organize within the club 
including: a basketball team, ethnic dancing, trips and outings, music and singing, and an 
amateur talent night in which to showcase drama and musical performances. Membership dues in 
the club were set at 25 cents per month for those sixteen years of age and over, and 10 cents per 
month for youth under sixteen years of age.
95
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In an attempt to grow youth interest in Czechoslovak activities in Toronto, the Masaryk 
Hall‟s executive committee sent its president Gustav Přístupa to meet the members of the youth 
club. In his meeting with the club on 24 March 1946, Přístupa informed them that if they could 
find 150 members by April or May 1946, Masaryk Hall would pay for a trip to the Thousand 
Islands in Ontario or wherever the members of the club were interested in visiting. The youth 
agreed that each member in attendance had to attract five new members. According to the youth, 
new members did not have to be of Slavic descent, but had to learn a few words so that they 
could understand what was occurring at meetings. At the same meeting, sixteen new members 
joined an existing group of twenty-three individuals.
96
 
On 7 April 1946, the Masaryk Youth Club met to discuss the group‟s planned activities. 
It was decided that a trip to Niagara Falls would be preferable over the Thousand Islands. 
Czechoslovak youth decided to also organize football and tennis groups, and a basketball team 
that would compete against other groups. The youth club maintained a treasury with a value of 
$47.82. The club‟s members agreed that it would be beneficial to their finances if they could 
hold one concert per month. Přístupa asked the members present “which of our boys never 
drink?” The youth replied that only a few of them never drank alcohol, while “all except one” 
smoked cigarettes. The executive committee responsible for MH actively engaged youth in an 
attempt to foster Czechoslovak identity and culture. Simultaneously, the committee sought to 
watch over its young members as they came of age in postwar Canadian society.
97
 On 4 May 
1946, club members decided that a concert would be held on Mother‟s Day later that month. 
Each mother would receive a flower free of charge and the club would cover the cost. The club‟s 
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girls were responsible for the serving of food and drinks at the concert and for decorating the 
hall. Czechoslovak women were engaged to provide cakes and pastries.
98
 
As Toronto‟s MH focused its attention on the promotion of ethnic heritage in younger 
generations and as postwar relief activities decreased in frequency, the CNA sent out 
questionnaires (dotazníky) to its branches throughout Canada in the hopes of gaining further 
information on the size and activities of each Czechoslovak community. For 1947, members in 
Winnipeg wrote that their community consisted of 750 individuals of whom 400 were of Slovak 
origin and the other 350 were Czechs. The teaching of either the Czech or Slovak language was 
deemed unsustainable due to the small amount of Czech and Slovak youth in Winnipeg. Czechs 
and Slovaks in Winnipeg believed that their ethnic identities were “respected” by the local press 
and prominent city officials.
99
 In Kingston, Ontario, members indicated that 53 persons of 
Slovak origin and five individuals with a Czech background resided in the city and were 
primarily employed as factory workers. Relations with the greater Kingston community were 
deemed as “velmi dobré” (very good).100 In Oshawa, Ontario, members revealed in their 
questionnaire that many of their brethren were employed as factory workers and relations with 
their fellow citizens who they identified as “60 percent English and 40 percent mixed” with the 
latter consisting of “Slovaks, Poles, Ukrainians, Italians, and Germans” were in fact only 
“obstojné” (tolerable). The responses suggested that interethnic relations among individuals from 
Central and Eastern Europe contained hostility due in part to the transplanting of old world 
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tensions. However, CNA members in Oshawa believed that their relations with municipal 
officials and the press were relatively “good.”101  
Throughout the 1940s, the largest concentration of Czechs and Slovaks resided in 
Montreal. The city was home to 3,000 Canadians of Slovak origin and 250 Czech Canadians. 
Many Czechs and Slovaks were employed as industrial and construction workers, craftspeople, 
and entrepreneurs. Czechoslovaks operated a Slovak language Supplementary School with a 
teacher hired from Czechoslovakia. This ethnic institution was tasked with promoting a pro-
Czechoslovak history of the homeland and instilling the Slovak language in youth.
102
 Montreal 
Czechs and Slovaks were divided between Czechoslovaks and what the questionnaire noted as 
nationalist Slovak “separatisti.”103As a result, three ethnic newspapers were regularly read by 
Montreal‟s Czechs and Slovaks. Nationalist Slovaks followed the Canadian Slovak League 
(CSL) and its official organ, the weekly Kanadský Slovák (Canadian Slovak) with a national 
circulation of close to 2,000; meanwhile Slovak communists – who until 1937 supported 
Czechoslovakism – sponsored the weekly Ľudové zvesti which garnered nearly 2,500 readers 
each week. The remaining Czechs and Slovaks in Montreal and across Canada sustained the pro-
Czechoslovak Nová vlasť newspaper with a weekly national circulation of approximately 2,500 
readers.
104
 
In his final end of year editorial in Nová vlasť in 1947, Martin Dudák claimed that the 
“public life” of the Czechoslovak community witnessed many changes. While many immigrants 
who initially settled in Canada returned home to Czechoslovakia, Dudák‟s assertion that this 
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wave of returnees decreased the community‟s numbers in Canada is exagerrated. An influx of 
postwar DPs greatly outnumbered those individuals who left for the old country. Many Czechs 
and Slovaks chose to return to Czechoslovakia after spending several years separated from 
relatives and friends. Although these same immigrants initially came to Canada in search of 
economic opportunity and a better standard of living, the resurrection of a Czechoslovak state 
after the Second World War saw many Czech and Slovak immigrants return permanently to 
Czechoslovakia in the early postwar years. Consequently, Dudák lamented the loss of individuals 
that he believed would be hard to replace and as a result “hard to come back from.” He claimed 
that middle-aged immigrants were preoccupied with attaining greater property and standing for 
themselves, while the community‟s youth were being left behind in terms of their own 
knowledge of their Czechoslovak heritage. In his editorial, Dudák argued that young people were 
nowhere to be seen at national holiday celebrations or other cultural events, nor did they attend 
Czech and Slovak language schools.
105
 
After fourteen years of service to the Czechoslovak community in Canada, Nová vlasť 
published its final issue on 5 February 1948.
106
 The newspaper succumbed to a lack of finances 
since individual subscriptions began to drastically decrease after the end of the Second World 
War. The paper also became a victim of community politics. In early 1948, the CNA sought to 
bring the Montreal-based publication to its headquarters in Toronto. The organization 
subsequently withdrew $1,400 from the newspaper‟s reserves to fund the transfer to Toronto 
where it could finally have greater control over content and publication. The CNA executive 
committee later informed Dudák that it would repay the loan once the newspaper was re-
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established in Toronto and resumed publication. The editor of Nová vlasť claimed in his final 
issue that the CNA reimbursed the newspaper only $42. Although the paper had no debts for the 
years 1946 and 1947, it was effectively forced to cease activity in February 1948 as the CNA‟s 
executive committee failed to repay its loan and the paper no longer had funds to continue.
107
 
With the demise of Nová vlasť, the Canadian Czechoslovak community lost an important pillar 
of its community. As an important Czechoslovak-oriented newspaper in Canada, it faithfully 
reported on sociopolitical events in Czechoslovakia, and kept Czechs and Slovaks in Canada 
aware of community activities across the country. The ethnic newspaper also vigorously 
supported the preservation of a Czechoslovak cultural heritage and Czech and Slovak language 
retention. Canadian Czechoslovaks did not have to wait long for another important institution to 
preserve and promote Czechoslovak culture in Canada. Several months later, MH members 
established a centre for Czechoslovak community life on the outskirts of Toronto.   
 
Masaryktown: Establishment of a Centre for Czechoslovak Community Life in Canada 
At the end of the Second World War, members of Masaryk Memorial Hall (MH) 
resolved to establish a cultural and educational centre on the outskirts of Toronto. In a meeting 
held 12 March 1948, the MH‟s membership condemned the “rape of the Czechoslovak 
Republic” at the hands of the Communists. Many of the Hall‟s members were also active in the 
patriotic calisthenics organization, Sokol (Falcon) Toronto which held its meetings inside MH. 
On the recommendation of MH executive committee member Prokop V. Havlík, Sokol Toronto 
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became the first group in Canada to directly abandon relations with Communist Czechoslovakia. 
The members of MH agreed that they would work to illustrate that a tragedy had taken place in 
Czechoslovakia while attempting to strengthen Czechoslovak life in Canada.
108
 
On the eastern outskirts of Toronto, MH purchased property in Scarborough to build a 
cultural and recreational facility for Czechoslovaks in Toronto and those visiting from across 
North America. The parcel of land which would one day incorporate Masaryktown – and named 
after Czechoslovakia‟s first president, Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk – was purchased on 15 June 
1948 and unanimously approved by MH‟s membership in a meeting held on 18 October 1948. 
Masaryktown‟s founding purpose was to “provide [a] recreational centre for games, 
entertainments, cultural education, and summer holidays for all Canadian citizens of 
Czechoslovak origin and their friends.”109 Czech and Slovak members also sought to build a 
facility whereby it would be possible to house and care for senior citizens and those unable to 
work within the Czechoslovak community. The northern half of Masaryktown was divided into 
individual lots of 60 by 100 feet for which an individual would pay 200 dollars as rent for a lease 
of 99 years. Each lot could eventually be willed to a lessee‟s children. Each lessee was expected 
to erect a cottage on their property with an area of 320 square feet. The cottage was required to 
hold two windows and one door, be painted every three years, and contain a working toilet and 
septic tank. During the summer of 1948, the committee responsible for maintaining the newly 
acquired land sent out letters to its membership informing them that farm land had been 
purchased. The MH committee noted that it bought 62 acres of land for $14,500 so that all 
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Czechoslovaks could have a place to rest and relax away from the stresses of city life.
110
 
Although it was not built specifically in response to the Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia, 
Masaryktown became a meeting point for anti-communists and democrats as a centre of 
Czechoslovak community life on the outskirts of Toronto. 
On 11 July 1948, MH held its first annual Czechoslovak Day on the grounds of the newly 
purchased Masaryktown in Scarborough, Ontario. Individuals and families from Kitchener, 
Guelph, Hamilton, and Niagara Falls came to the celebration of Czechoslovak heritage and 
culture. Sokol branches from Batawa, Toronto, Cleveland, and Detroit attended and 
demonstrated various calisthenics exercises, while local, provincial, and federal guests gave 
speeches.
111
 With Masaryktown – opened to all visitors, its membership was requested to 
volunteer two or three hours of work to prepare the land. Members were requested to bring 
various landscaping tools with them.
112
 While Czechoslovaks in Toronto looked towards their 
newly acquired land as a „little Czechoslovakia,‟ many residents who lived in the vicinity of 
Masaryktown opposed its establishment. In the 15 July issue of a local newspaper, The 
Enterprise, residents complained to the local city council about Czechoslovak children raiding 
nearby orchards and gardens. In a letter to The Enterprise, a regular visitor to Masaryktown 
noted that intolerance and hatred could be heard and seen from local residents who opposed a 
Czechoslovak institution near them. One resident was heard shouting: “I‟ll send the dog after 
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them!” The letter asked readers to treat Czechoslovak children with respect as they would 
“…grow up to be first class Canadian citizens.” The letter noted that “even though they are 
children of immigrants, they also have the right to the sun, fresh air, and water.”113 
A significant component of Masaryk Memorial Hall‟s agenda was to promote the 
maintenance of Czechoslovak ethnic heritage and the retention of Czech and Slovak languages. 
Ethnic schools were one structure in which ethnic organizations could attempt to preserve their 
cultural heritage. According to Aloysius Balawyder; “Ethnic schools not only taught Slavic 
children their history and language, but also arranged concerts, displays, and festivities. Latent 
nationalist sentiments were stirred up in the hearts of young and old as they listened to Slavic 
songs, or watched Slavic dramas and Slavic dances.”114 Meanwhile, these ethnic organizations 
promoted Canadian citizenship amongst its members. The teaching of English (and French in the 
province of Quebec) was urged to embed Canadian traditions in ethnic communities. Canadian 
Slavic groups frequently organized national days and invited distinguished representatives of 
Canadian society such as their local members of parliament, mayors, government ministers, 
bishops, and even prime ministers.
115
 At Masaryktown in Scarborough, calisthenics were 
organized by the local patriotic Sokol (Falcon) unit. Important dates such as the birthday (7 
March) of Czechoslovakia‟s first president, Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, and the birth of the First 
Czechoslovak Republic (28 October) were celebrated annually. In a circular letter to all 
branches, the CNA informed its members that it would work in cooperation with the MH to 
further build Masaryktown, the Masaryk Youth Club, Supplementary School, and Library. The 
CNA would continue efforts to expand the Czech and Slovak-language School to other locations 
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across Canada where Czechoslovaks wished to establish such an institution. The CNA viewed 
the growth of the Masaryk Youth Club as an important medium in which Czechoslovak youth 
would recognize their citizenship obligations. It was deemed vital that Czechoslovak youth 
across Canada organize a national congress.
116
 
On 8 September 1948, the MH invited Prime Minister Mackenzie King to a memorial 
service to be held on 12 September in memory of Czechoslovakia‟s last democratic president 
Edvard Beneš. The hall‟s president Gustav Přístupa indicated that it would be a great honour to 
Canada‟s Czechoslovaks to have the prime minister in attendance as one of their “closest 
Canadian friends.”117 The Prime Minister‟s Office replied by thanking the hall for its invitation 
and informing them that Mackenzie King was unable to attend as he was in the midst of 
preparing to head the Canadian delegation at the General Assembly of the United Nations.
118
 
 
Conclusion 
The Second World War served as a pinnacle in the sociopolitical organization of 
Canadian Czechs and Slovaks who professed a belief in a common Czechoslovak identity. As 
the largest Czechoslovak organization in Canada, the Czechoslovak National Alliance (CNA) 
successfully brought awareness of the German occupation of the Czech lands and Slovakia‟s 
alignment with Germany to the Canadian public. The organization‟s members were instrumental 
in fundraising to support the Allied war effort and relief work to resurrect a democratic 
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Czechoslovakia. The CNA reached a highpoint of 92 branches across Canada and approximately 
10,000 members. 
Important to our understanding of Czech and Slovak immigration to Canada in the early 
postwar years is how Canadian Czechoslovak institutions such as the CNA and Masaryk 
Memorial Hall (MH) responded to political developments in a newly re-established 
Czechoslovakia and to Canadian foreign policy towards their old homeland. Czechs and Slovaks 
who supported a Czechoslovak identity in Canada fundraised through the CNA‟s Czechoslovak 
War Charities Fund (CWCF) in an effort to send funds, clothing, foodstuffs, and medicine to 
their old country ravaged by six years of German occupation.  
After the Second Word War, a number of Czechs and Slovaks returned to a newly re-
established Czechoslovakia in order to be closer to their families, friends, and ethnic culture. The 
emigration of Canadian Czechs and Slovaks affected Canadian Czechoslovak institutions 
including the CNA as it began to lose members and branches to emigration. After the successful 
liberation of their homeland, many Czechoslovaks in Canada turned towards domestic issues 
including Canadian citizenship and the preservation of Czechoslovak heritage for successive 
generations. As a result of this general decline in community interest, many of the CNA‟s 
branches across Canada closed due to a lack of activity rather than emigration. The organization 
would never again reach the same level of financial support and membership as it had during the 
war years.  
Although many Czechs and Slovaks returned to Europe after the Second World War, 
immigrants from Czechoslovakia continued to resettle in Canada. After six years of devastation, 
Czech and Slovaks arrived in Canada in search of economic opportunity and a better quality of 
life. Their immigration was directly tied to events in Central Europe. During 1946-1947, 572 
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immigrants claimed their nationality as Czechoslovakian upon arriving in Canada. Similarly, 400 
individuals claimed their racial origin to be Czech, 111 individuals indicated they were Slovaks, 
58 persons claimed they were Bohemians, and a further 12 individuals claimed to be 
Moravians.
119
 While immigration from Czechoslovakia remained small during this period, 
postwar immigrants from a newly established Czechoslovakia continued to transplant their Old 
World ethnic and ideological divisions including an adherence to democratic values. In Canada, 
Czechs and Slovaks who supported a Czechoslovak identity continued to oppose nationalist 
Slovaks and their drive for an independent Slovak state. 
During the early postwar years, Czech and Slovak newcomers encountered previous 
immigrants from Czechoslovakia and Canadian-born members of the Czechoslovak community 
who influenced their new identity in Canada. Czech and Slovak immigrants who supported a 
Czechoslovak identity joined Canadian Czechoslovak institutions including the CNA and MH. 
These organizations received new postwar arrivals and turned their focus towards postwar relief 
to rebuild Czechoslovakia, attaining Canadian citizenship, and the maintenance of ethnic 
heritage for future generations. These three pillars of the CNA and MH‟s immediate postwar 
agenda entrenched their postwar existence.  
The wartime experience of postwar arrivals also influenced Canadian Czechoslovak 
institutions which increasingly promoted democratic values and advocated against 
totalitarianism. The postwar agendas of Canadian Czechoslovak-oriented organizations such as 
the CNA and the MH would be heavily influenced by the Communist seizure of power in 
February 1948 and the subsequent wave of political émigrés fleeing their homeland.
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Chapter Three: 
 
Preparing for Their Arrival:  
The 1948ers and Liberation of the Homeland 
 
As a Bata Employee who fled Zlín, Czechoslovakia prior to the German invasion of the 
Czech lands in March 1939, Karol Štark settled with the company in Batawa before moving to 
Kitchener, Ontario where he was able to save his earnings and acquire a mortgage for a six-room 
home for his family. As chair of the local Czechoslovak National Alliance (CNA) branch from 
1948 to 1954, Štark travelled frequently to Toronto and Hamilton where larger Czech and Slovak 
populations resided. In Hamilton, for example, 60-100 individuals regularly attended the local 
CNA branch‟s meetings. Local branches were instrumental in promoting Czechoslovak culture 
with activities that included regularly scheduled dance and theatre events, classes for language 
retention, and book publication in Czech and Slovak languages. Many of the existing CNA 
members were immigrants themselves and could not afford to financially assist newcomers from 
Czechoslovakia. However, prewar immigrants such as Štark were important to many newly 
arrived Displaced Persons (DPs) who sought their assistance in finding accommodations and 
employment.
1
  
Marie Flossman and her family left Czechoslovakia after the Communists confiscated 
their mill property and deemed them to be enemies of the working class. Marie‟s brother was a 
senator whose political immunity was lifted when he refused to join the Communist Party. The 
Flossmans left Czechoslovakia without their possessions in an attempt to demonstrate that they 
were not in the process of illegally leaving the state. At the border, West German authorities sent 
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the family to a DP camp under American administration. The Flossmans later arrived in Canada 
in 1950.  Once in Canada, Marie was employed picking fruits and vegetables, while her husband 
worked as a farm labourer for 65 cents per hour in Chatham and later Burlington, Ontario. Their 
eldest son was employed in a Toronto hotel earning $20 per week to help support the family. 
Upon moving to Burlington without the knowledge of English, the Flossmans improved their 
standard of living by working for other Czechs, Slovaks, and Eastern Europeans who could 
communicate with the family. The Flossmans relied on the local branch of the CNA and the 
“Czech colony” of immigrant farm labourers and their families who initially worked in Western 
Canada prior to relocating eastward to Burlington and Hamilton. The Canadian government did 
not provide the Flossmans with financial assistance in finding accommodations or employment.
2
 
In preparation for the arrival of Czechs and Slovaks who fled Communist Czechoslovakia, CNA 
branches across Canada planned programs for their local Czechoslovak community and for 
newcomers to their area. Among the organization‟s goals were the continued maintenance of 
ethnic heritage and assistance to political refugees from Czechoslovakia.
3
 
After the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia in February 1948, the country resided 
in the Soviet sphere of influence. With the Allied powers ceding the country to Moscow in the 
hopes of preventing further Communist expansion, the American policy of Cold War 
Containment became a controversial topic among Canadian Czechs and Slovaks, and remained a 
powerful symbol of the suppression of democracy and freedom of rights. Canadian Czechs and 
Slovaks who were proponents of a Czechoslovak identity turned their focus from postwar 
reconstruction of Czechoslovakia and providing relief to their compatriots who suffered through 
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the Second World War, to assisting those who fled oppression at home. Referred to by the 
Communist government press as the utíkali or those who „ran away,‟ approximately 55,000-
80,000 Czechoslovakians fled to the West in the two years after the Communist seizure of 
power.
4
 The CNA was instrumental in establishing the Canadian Fund for Czechoslovak 
Refugees (CFCR) whose mandate was “to assist displaced and refugee persons of Czecho-
Slovak origin” arriving in Canada with obtaining employment, housing, and facilitating their 
settlement and integration into society. Many of the CNA‟s members also played an active role 
in Toronto‟s Masaryk Memorial Hall (MH) which provided short-term financial assistance to 
Czechs and Slovaks, and signed affidavits for prospective DPs and – after February 1948 – 
refugees to enter Canada on one-year farm labour contracts.  
This chapter examines how refugees who left Czechoslovakia in the wake of the 
Communist takeover – including individuals who languished in DPs camps in Austria, Italy, and 
Occupied Germany for years – found the pre-existing Canadian Czechoslovak community 
sympathetic to their plight. These same political refugees became commonly referred to as 
„1948ers‟ or „48ers‟ for their emigration was ultimately tied to the Communist seizure of power. 
In Canada, many of these anti-communist refugees who were members of democratic political 
parties in Czechoslovakia joined Czechoslovak groups such as the CNA and the MH seeking to 
focus their agendas on humanitarianism and the liberation of their homeland from communism. 
These same individuals began to represent “Czechoslovaks” as their legitimate constituents. 
Their agenda was opposed by a minority of conservative and nationalist Czechs and by the 
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nationalist Slovak community.
5
 Older members of the Czechoslovak community such as Karol 
Štark were informally referred to as “oldtimers” or “old-fashioned” because they emphasized 
domestic issues including Canadian citizenship, English and French-language instruction, and 
the maintenance of ethnic heritage. Ultimately, these agendas led to intergenerational conflict 
and ideological differences between the older members of the CNA and the MH and the 
newcomers from Czechoslovakia.
6
 Existing scholarship largely overlooks and simplifies the 
events of February 1948 and their consequences. The immigration of 1948ers consisted primarily 
of democratic and anti-communist politicians, diplomats, intellectuals, clergy, professionals, 
workers, and students whose reasons for leaving were not homogeneous. Karol Štark recalls that 
the 1948ers came to Canada with a better level of education than previous waves of immigrants 
from Czechoslovakia.
7
 While some individuals fled the possibility of torture, imprisonment, and 
a lack of social mobility, others chose to leave out of a sense of adventure and opportunity.
8
 
 
Communist Seizure of Power: Canada and the Plight of Czechoslovakia‟s Diplomats   
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In January 1948, Canadian Chargé d‟affaires in Prague, Ronald Macalister Macdonnell 
noted in his correspondence with Ottawa that “Communist parties everywhere in their drive to 
obtain power, regard control over the police forces of a country as one of their main objectives.”9 
Macdonnell went on to explain that in Czechoslovakia the Communists “realized this aim to a 
very considerable extent, a fact which obviously has bearing on the struggle for power between 
Communists and the non-Communists.”10 Canadian diplomats in Prague were well aware of the 
early manoeuvrings of the Communists for a police-state. Although the diplomatic reports sent 
back to Ottawa by Canadian officials in Prague were consistent and insightful, they remained 
tentative and hopeful that the political situation in Czechoslovakia could be resolved with a 
“typical Czech compromise or [would result in] a Communist resort to action.”11 
On 20 February, twelve cabinet ministers resigned in protest over Communist 
intransigence and the party‟s control of the national police. Unlike the National Socialists and the 
People‟s Party, the left-leaning Social Democrats took a neutral position and criticized the tactics 
of both sides. President Beneš refused to accept the twelve resignations and remained steadfast 
against subsequent demands for new elections.
12
 The political crisis in Czechoslovakia attracted 
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the attention of the Canadian public. The 21 February 1948 edition of Saturday Night magazine 
carried an article written by Alec Harrison entitled “Can Beneš Save the Czechs from Iron 
Curtain?” Harrison depicted Czechoslovakia‟s President Edvard Beneš as a passionate defender 
of his country. On 24 February 1948, Canada‟s Chargé d‟affaires in Prague, Ronald Macalister 
Macdonnell wrote to Ottawa that with a rise in arrests, strikes, accusations and the further arming 
of police, the best possible outcome on the eve of the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia 
was that “the non-Communists can retain enough strength and courage to remain a real, if 
weakened, Opposition.”13 In Macdonnell‟s view, any future elections would witness non-
Communists supporting the Communist movement in an effort to avoid retribution.
14
 
On 25 February, Czechoslovakia‟s president, fearing sociopolitical unrest accepted the 
twelve resignations and acknowledged a new Communist-led cabinet with Communist leader 
Klement Gottwald as prime minister. In all, the Communists held thirteen of the twenty-four 
cabinet posts.
15
 As president, Beneš was previously responsible for Czechoslovakia‟s 
capitulation to Nazi Germany without a fight in 1938 and for accepting Communist demands in 
February 1948. Beneš erroneously believed that closer ties between Prague and Moscow, himself 
and Stalin, would allow Czechoslovakia‟s democratic independence to coexist with the Soviet 
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Union after the Second World War.
16
 The following day in a dispatch to Ottawa, MacDonnell 
indicated that “the iron curtain has begun to descend.”17 
Canadian newsprint outlets actively reported daily events during the Communist seizure 
of power. The Associated Press wrote “thus for the first time in its 20 years of life as a state and 
nine years after the Nazi invasion, Czechoslovakia  was virtually under complete Communist 
rule.”18 Democratic parties resigned in an attempt to catch the Communists off guard and later 
called for a general election. The Communists demanded that Beneš let them form a new 
government. The Communists‟ threat of a general strike – the first in the country‟s history – and 
a massive 50,000-strong demonstration in central Prague forced Beneš to acquiesce. The 
Associated Press also noted that “it was all a “Cold” operation, no bloodshed, no barricades; only 
a few fist fights here and there.”19 Similarly, the Canadian Press reported that the 
Czechoslovakian embassy in Ottawa was shrouded in silence. Reporters could not reach 
Prague‟s minister in Canada, František Němec who avoided making any official comments on 
events back home. After dining with Major James Coldwell, leader of the left-leaning 
Cooperative Commonwealth Federation, František Němec asked his close friend if he would be 
willing to secretly store the papers of the wartime Czechoslovak Government-in-Exile in 
London. Němec informed Coldwell that he was being watched by Communist authorities who 
had stationed an operative on his staff at the legation. The Ottawa police later placed a cordon 
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around the legation after the Communist takeover in Prague.
20
 Canadian diplomats also refused 
to comment on events in Central Europe, but noted that it “appeared unlikely” that Ottawa would 
withdraw her recognition of the Czechoslovakian government following the Communist 
takeover.
21
 
The Ottawa Evening Citizen published an editorial entitled “Strangling Czech Liberty” in 
which it argued that the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia with less than 40 percent of the 
popular vote was a “political crime beyond condemnation or even excuse…” The paper defended 
the coalition government formed after the May 1946 national election in which socialism 
through democratic means was slowly being achieved. The paper accurately noted that to view 
the Communist seizure of power as a Soviet plot merely oversimplified the situation in 
Czechoslovakia.
22
 Beneš formally installed the Communist government informing them that “the 
decision to accept you is personally difficult for me.” Although Beneš did not immediately 
resign, the Associated Press argued that “tension in Prague had given way to apathy. Most 
Czechs shrugged and appeared to have accepted the situation.”23 
Refugees fleeing the border on the heels of the Communist takeover of the country were 
left in utter dismay at the turn of events. Wenzel Kuttig and his wife muttered that “it just can‟t 
be true” and “our country will be ruined” upon being told that Beneš officially installed the 
Communist government. The Kuttigs arrived at Dorval airport in Montreal as part of a group of 
85 immigrants from London and were en route to their son‟s farm in British Columbia. Along 
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with other refugees from Czechoslovakia, the Kuttigs were handed cigarettes and beverages by 
airport officials in an attempt to ease their arrival in Canada. Due to events in Czechoslovakia, 
the couple remained skeptical when informed by airport officials that a peaceful and quiet life 
was available in Canada.
24
 
In Ottawa, František Němec resigned his diplomatic post on 3 March 1948 in response to 
the political events in Czechoslovakia. The former diplomat asserted that “I am an anti-
Communist. I subscribe to freedom of speech, freedom of worship and freedom of the press.”25 
Following in the footsteps of the Czechoslovakian minister, four other embassy officials resigned 
from their diplomatic posts to coincide with the resignation of the Czechoslovakian ambassador 
to Washington.
26
 Němec‟s resignation was read aloud in the House of Commons by Canadian 
Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent. Progressive Conservative Member of Parliament for 
Kamloops, Edmund Davie Fulton noted that Němec‟s decision was “proper and courageous.” 
Canadian officials could only conclude that Němec acted in his own best interest rather than 
waiting for his recall to Prague. Němec and his wife were to remain in Canada as 
Czechoslovakian citizens. Incidentally, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester 
Bowles Pearson, indicated during a press conference that the former Czechoslovakian minister 
would be considered as a Canadian immigrant. Pearson asserted that Němec would “be 
considered in the same way as we would consider a Czech applying for immigration visas from 
Czechoslovakia.”27 Němec later telephoned Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent who personally 
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took up his case in cabinet.
28
 The Czechoslovakian Consul General in Montreal, Josef Kotrlý 
informed members of the press that he cabled a letter of resignation to his superiors in Prague. 
Unlike Němec, the former consul general was more direct in his assessment of the situation 
facing Czechoslovakian diplomats in Canada: 
 
I would like to inform you all that this afternoon I sent a cable to my 
government in Prague to let them know that I will be quitting my post as 
consul general here in Montreal in protest over the communist and dictatorial 
politics of Czechoslovakia. I have always been a democrat and fought in the 
underground against the Nazis. I am very sad to see my people fall under 
tyrannical oppression. I and my colleagues have not received any money or 
financial support from anyone. We are all poor. We have families and are 
obligated to work in order to live.
29
 
 
In light of the Communist seizure of power, the federal government maintained the status quo in 
its relations with Czechoslovakia. However, St. Laurent noted before the House of Commons 
that approximately $1.4 million trade credits were left untouched by Prague and these funds 
could be removed in light of the Communist party‟s takeover.30 With legations in other Soviet-
bloc capitals, Canadian officials viewed their diplomatic missions in Eastern Europe as official 
“listening posts” able to relay vital information back to Ottawa. As a result, the Canadian 
government continued to monitor the situation in Czechoslovakia.
31
 On 16 March 1948, Order-
in-Council P.C. 1108 formally permitted former Czechoslovakian Minister in Canada, František 
Němec, commercial attaché Karel Bala, first secretary Karel Moudrý, including their families 
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and some members of the embassy‟s clerical and domestic staff to remain in Canada.32 
Subsequently, officials in Ottawa granted non-immigrant visas for periods ranging from three to 
twelve months to five other Czechoslovakian diplomats and their families.
33
 
 
Émigrés and Exiles: 1948ers Flee Czechoslovakia 
After entrenching one-party rule in Czechoslovakia, the Communist authorities used 
party propaganda in an attempt to politically humiliate and disclaim individuals who recently left 
or who were in the midst of fleeing the oppressive regime. Prague was able to produce a new 
class of criminal who was disloyal to the state: the illegal emigrant – “an individual who left the 
country without permission.” Communists refused to define those who fled in the aftermath of 
February 1948 as „exiles‟ because it implied that they left their homeland due to political reasons 
such as being expelled for democratic leanings. Conversely, „émigrés‟ left their country to 
improve their socioeconomic position.
34
 Family members left behind were blacklisted by the 
Communist regime for their ties to „enemies of the state,‟ and „criminals,‟ and forced to live with 
their relatives. Children were denied access to university studies because of their bourgeois or 
democratic family background and were only later permitted to learn a trade.
35
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In the spring of 1948, the federal Cabinet approved a proposal to provide unofficial 
assistance to anti-communist democratic Czech and Slovak refugees. In May, the Canadian 
government became aware that over 10,000 individuals had crossed the Czechoslovakian border 
into the American and British zones of Occupied Germany. Canadian officials estimated that 200 
refugees arrived in the West each day. Close to 10,000 of these political refugees were 
temporarily settled in the American Zone, followed by 300 Czech and Slovak refugees in the 
British Zone. Approximately, thirty refugees made their way into Austria. The federal 
government viewed the resettlement of Czech and Slovak refugees in Canada as advantageous 
since this movement of people “…would bring to our shores a considerable number of people 
who share our ideals and who, over the years, would contribute richly to our national life.”36 
Canadian representatives in Europe viewed the resettlement of refugees from Czechoslovakia as 
the “cream of the crop.”37 
Under the direction of the International Refugee Organization (IRO), refugees from 
Czechoslovakia were registered in receiving camps and given shelter, food, and financial support 
before being permanently resettled in the West. According to the IRO, political refugees were 
individuals who fled Czechoslovakia between 1 February 1948 and 1 October 1950.
38
 In early 
June 1948, the Preparatory Commission of the International Refugee Organization (PCIRO) 
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informed the Canadian Immigration Mission in Karlsruhe, Germany that permission would have 
to be obtained from the United States military government before Czech and Slovak refugees 
could be interviewed. The refugees were situated in six permanent camps under the jurisdiction 
of the United States Army. The six refugee camps consisted of Dieburg (385), Burg (447), Orb 
(Wegscheid) (380), Wasseralfingen (460), Unterjettingen (583), and Schwabach (802). The 
refugee camps comprised a total of 3,057 refugees. Within these camps were refugees with 
various types of professional occupations, while children constituted twelve percent of the entire 
refugee population.
39
 
On 12 June 1948, Czech Canadian industrialist Tomáš Baťa met with Canadian officials 
and informed them of his recent trip to Europe. Baťa estimated that there were approximately 
500-700 desirable immigrants among the Czech and Slovak refugees in Occupied Germany. He 
claimed that a majority of the individuals had previous agricultural experience and should be 
admitted into Canada. Among this group of refugees were engineers, chemists, draughtsmen, and 
a few artisans. Baťa implored Canadian officials to give careful attention to refugee selection and 
screening as “…those selected for coming to Canada as among the refugees are those who are 
deserting their wives and families, some have made off with the cash box and there are 
undoubtedly some who have been placed by the Communists.”40 Ten days later, the Canadian 
Immigration Mission in Karlsruhe sent a telegram to the Immigration Branch in Ottawa 
informing officials that refugees from Czechoslovakia were being processed at the Regensburg 
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and Schwabach reception centres, and then screened by the United States Army Counter 
Intelligence Corps (CIC) before being sent to one of the permanent refugee camps in the 
American Occupied Zone. Canadian officials noted that many of the Czech and Slovak refugees 
were of the “professional and clerical type [and] therefore [a] low percentage would qualify for 
existing group movements” to Canada. 
On 29 June, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Louis St. Laurent, informed the 
Minister of Labour, Humphrey Mitchell, that the American government recently passed 
legislation admitting approximately 2,000 Czech and Slovak anti-communist democratic 
refugees. St. Laurent remained concerned that the Americans would “…skim off the cream” of 
this wave of refugees. The Secretary of State for External Affairs demonstrated his sympathy 
with the plight of Czech and Slovak refugees by declaring: 
 
These Czechs [and Slovaks], who have fled from the Communist 
dictatorship in Czechoslovakia, are people who have demonstrated that they 
are free men [and women] and are on our side of the line in the fight against 
Communism. There are other people like them behind the iron curtain and in 
countries which are susceptible to indirect Soviet aggression through the use 
of fifth columns. There is little that we can do to help them in their struggle 
against Communism. Should we not, therefore, do all we possibly can for 
those who escape from behind the curtain. This would demonstrate to those 
who have to remain behind that our sympathy is not merely a matter of fine 
phrases. A generous attitude by us to the admission of these people to 
Canada might have quite important international political consequences in 
the present cold war…if we make clear to our own people and to people 
abroad that we are making the gesture in spite of the fact that it is going to 
cause us difficulties, at least in the short run.
41
 
 
The Canadian government continued to stall in its reception of refugees from 
Czechoslovakia. Officials in Ottawa chose to defer action until they received a report from 
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Canadian immigration officers in Europe who were assessing the possibility of resettling Czech 
and Slovak refugees in Canada.
42
 Preliminary inquiries by officers of the Canadian Immigration 
Mission found that each refugee‟s health appeared good and many were interested in settling in 
Canada. The Czech and Slovak refugees were “for the most part white-collar workers, trade 
unionists, civil servants, teachers, professional men and the like. All share this common 
characteristic; they have chosen the path of uncertainty and probable privation rather than 
submission. They have themselves demonstrated the sturdiness of the faith which is in them.”43 
In the years following the February 1948 Communist takeover, nearly 20,000 Czechs and 
Slovaks settled in the United States and a few thousand in Canada. Among this group of political 
refugees were members of democratic Czechoslovakia‟s leading social and political figures 
including former party leaders, members of parliament, clergy, intellectuals, and military 
officers.
44
 North America and in particular the United States was seen as the final destination of 
choice for many of the exiles who sought official recognition and financial support for their 
struggle to liberate Czechoslovakia from Communist rule.
45
 At the same time, the American 
government actively solicited displaced democratic exiles for information on the Communist-
bloc and sought “auxiliaries” for its countless intelligence activities. The military authorities in 
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the American Zone of Occupation in Germany were instructed by the State Department to pay 
particular attention to refugees fleeing Czechoslovakia.
46
 
In an attempt to promote his government‟s covert operations against the Communist-bloc, 
American ambassador to Prague, Laurence Steinhardt sent diplomatic bags to the residences of 
prominent democratic politicians and professionals in order to safely deliver their most prized 
possessions to the American Zone by way of a diplomatic flight. As a right-wing member of 
parliament who witnessed the early purges against the democratic political class, Jiří Škvor 
decided that he would leave his homeland. The former parliamentarian believed that Communist 
rule would eventually succumb to the country‟s strong democratic tradition. However, when it 
became clear that the Communists were solidifying their grip over Czechoslovakia, he left his 
wife and young son and fled across the border into the American Occupied Zone of Germany, 
where he eventually obtained political asylum.
47
 Many of those prominent figures important 
within the democratic movement in Czechoslovakia were housed by the United States on the 
outskirts of Frankfurt in an old nursery school labelled “Alaska House.” Similarly, the 
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Czechoslovakian refugees renamed the school as the “Golden Cage.”48 As so-called “agenti 
chodci” (walking agents), anti-communist refugees joined the American intelligence network 
and worked clandestinely in the borderlands between Czechoslovakia and Occupied Germany 
delivering messages between the West and the anti-Communist underground.
49
 
A majority of the anti-communist Czech and Slovak refugees biding their time in the 
American Occupied Zone of Germany chose the United States as their primary choice for 
resettlement. However, only a select few would be granted admission if they could demonstrate 
that that they were “immediately employable.” Canadian immigration and labour teams travelled 
across Europe to the DPs camps in an attempt to assess and select prospective immigrants based 
on their respective skills and abilities. From their headquarters in Karlsruhe, Germany, the 
Canadian Immigration Mission dispatched four teams to Germany and another two teams to 
Austria.
50
 The nationalist Canadian Slovak League (CSL) was concerned that Canadian 
immigration officials were ignorant to the plight of thousands of ethnic Slovaks scattered across 
Europe‟s DPs camps. In a letter to O. Cormier, Consul General of the Canadian Immigration 
Mission in Karlsruhe, Germany, general secretary of the CSL, Fero J. Zeman indicated that 
Slovaks were a separate nation and should not be identified as Czechoslovaks, Hungarians, or 
Germans “because some of these happened to be born when Slovakia was not free.”51 Zeman 
argued that the Slovak refugees were “comparable to our best Canadian citizenry” and should 
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thwart attempts at ethnocultural assimilation by not accepting credentials from ethnic Czechs or 
Czechoslovakian officials. Zeman asked that the Canadian Consul General in Karlsruhe treat 
Slovak refugees who sought admission to Canada as democrats and Christians.
52
  
In the years directly after the Second World War, Canadian immigration authorities 
counted ethnic Slovaks as “Czech” or “Czechoslovakians” when it came to their country of last 
permanent residence. From 1948 to 1949, 3,984 newcomers to Canada identified their nationality 
as Czechoslovakian. Similarly, 3,626 individuals claimed “Czech” as their racial origin. 
Meanwhile, 4,713 gave Czechoslovakia as their last country of residence.
53
 Canada accepted 
over 4,000 predominantly Czech refugees residing in camps Schwabach (near Nuremburg), Bad-
Orb (Wegscheid), and Regensburg (near Dieburg).
54
 Within this initial wave of 1948ers were 
approximately 1,500 Slovak refugees who settled in Canada. These individuals were a mixture of 
former government officials and intellectuals divided between nationalist Slovaks and 
Czechoslovaks. Although they disagreed over Slovakia‟s political future, they were united by 
their hatred for communism.
55
 Within this group of Slovak refugees were former officials of the 
wartime Slovak state and intellectuals who became active in the nationalist Canadian Slovak 
community. As nationalist Slovak refugees, they advocated for Slovak identity and an 
independent democratic Slovak state.
 56 
While the United States refused to open its gates, Canada 
was forced to deal with the arrival of former officials of the Nazi-aligned wartime Slovak state 
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originating from a resurrected Czechoslovakia.
57
 Czechoslovakian authorities viewed the 
nationalist Slovak DPs as fascists and Nazi collaborators, and sought their repatriation as 
enemies of the Czechoslovak state.
58
 American and Canadian authorities were aware that many 
of these individuals were former Nazi collaborators during the Second World War.
59
 Many of the 
remaining Slovak DPs desired for the Czechoslovak Republic to continue to exist and joined 
Czechoslovak groups in Canada including the CNA and the MH.
60
 Canada remained a preferred 
secondary choice for settlement and many of these DPs found immigration to the country to be 
more accessible than the United States. Czech and Slovak DPs were permitted entry into Canada 
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due to their university education, high technical training, and willingness to sign one-year farm 
labour agreements.
61
 
Czech and Slovak refugees who arrived in Canada in the aftermath of February 1948 
were largely forced to accept unskilled and menial jobs, and in some cases, to sign agricultural 
labour contracts for a term of one or two years.
62
 A significant portion of 1948ers turned to the 
city in the hopes of finding employment. In Hamilton, for example, Czechs and Slovaks often 
boarded in the homes of Eastern European immigrants who arrived in Canada prior to 1939. 
With the help of members from the existing Czechoslovak community, who were referred to as 
oldtimers, many newcomers found work in local factories or steel plants. The newly arrived 
Czech and Slovak refugees chose to stay in the city due to a belief that they would be able to 
save their earnings more quickly than out west on farm labour contracts. Many of the 1948ers 
arrived in Canada without agricultural skills and desired to settle in urban centres where they 
could also seek assistance from the local CNA branch and Czechoslovak community.
63
 
With Czechoslovakia‟s borders open, Canadian Chargé d„affaires, R.M. MacDonnell 
informed his superiors that individuals seeking immigration and temporary visas to enter Canada 
occasionally paid 50,000 Czechoslovakian Crowns or 1,000 Canadian dollars to acquire legal 
documentation permitting them to leave Czechoslovakia. In other cases, MacDonnell indicated 
to Ottawa that visa applicants “merely hint[ed] at this type of corruption.”64 From January to 
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April 1948, the Canadian Legation in Prague issued 326 immigration visas and 27 visitor visas.
65
 
On 5 August 1948, MacDonnell informed Ottawa that the Czechoslovak government continued 
to permit emigration to Canada without any recourse even though legal documentation proved 
too costly for most Czechoslovakians. The Chargé d‟affaires noted that in the last few months 
there was no “change in the attitude of the Czechoslovak authorities,” and as a result, the average 
of immigrant visas issued continued to increase.
66
 Although Czechoslovakia‟s borders remained 
open, most Czechoslovakian citizens could not secure the necessary documentation from the 
Communist authorities in Prague to leave the country for the West. For individuals who could 
afford to pay corrupt officials for travel documentation, they were able to leave Communist 
Czechoslovakia for the West. In many instances, these same émigrés were forced to settle in 
refugee camps in Austria, Occupied Germany, and Italy. 
 
Preparing for their Arrival: Establishing the Canadian Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees 
As early as March 1948, Department of External Affairs (DEA) officials considered the 
plight of “democratic anti-Communist refugees” and sought to enlist the interest of an “unofficial 
group of humanitarians” who would be supported by “outstanding refugees” who already settled 
in Canada including the last democratic Czechoslovakian Ambassador to Canada, František 
Němec.67 Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Escott Reid, indicated to 
Secretary of State for External Affairs, Louis St. Laurent, that Senators Adrian Knatchbull–
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Hugessen and Cairine Wilson could be persuaded to help form such an organization. Reid went 
on to argue that: 
 
The communists and fellow-travelers did a magnificent job in the thirties in 
organizing public sympathy and support for anti-fascist refugees. If 
liberalism is to demonstrate that it is a dynamic creed, liberals should show 
at least the same degree of enthusiasm and ability on behalf of democratic 
anti-communists.
68
 
 
A month later an application for incorporation of the Canadian Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees 
(CFCR) was sent to Louis St. Laurent by a group of petitioners led by CNA national secretary 
Karel Buzek, Senator Cairine Wilson, and Bernard Keble Sandwell, Editor-in-Chief of Saturday 
Night magazine.
69
 The newly established fund‟s objectives were “to assist displaced and refugee 
persons of Czecho-Slovak origin” who were legally admitted to Canada in obtaining 
employment, housing, and facilitating their settlement and integration into Canadian society. The 
fund also sought to aid newcomers who required financial assistance. The CFCR was also 
instrumental in locating relatives and friends of these newcomers in the hopes that reunification 
would further help Czech and Slovak DPs and political refugees in resettling in Canada. The 
fund carried a political agenda that attempted to “assist with information and educational 
materials so that the democratic heritage of such persons can be combined and integrated with 
that of Canada at the earliest possible date.”70 The CFCR desired to promote the “democratic 
heritage” of those Czechoslovaks who fled the Communist takeover after February 1948. The 
fund solicited financial contributions including subscriptions, donations, and money to procure 
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food, clothing, blankets, and medicine for the health and well-being of individuals in Austrian, 
German, and Italian DP camps.
71
 
As Canadian Czechoslovaks sent funds and relief to refugee camps in Europe, Czechs 
and Slovaks continued to arrive on Canadian shores. On 23 April 1949, under the guidance of 
International Refugee Organization (IRO) Escort Officer, Arne Hansen and the ship captain, 
MacMillan, the turbine steamer USAT General Leroy Eltinge carrying 841 refugees arrived at 
Pier 21 in Halifax. The ship supported the International Refugee Program by transporting 
refugees from Bremerhaven, Germany to Canada. Among the newly arrived group were 113 
Czechoslovakian citizens. These same individuals were recruited for work as contract labourers 
on Canadian farms.
72
 In their ten days aboard the USAT General LeRoy Eltinge, the 
Czechoslovakian refugees published a ship newspaper, The Voice of New-Canadians, Ship’s 
Newspaper – USAT General LeRoy Eltinge. The newspaper reported that Communist authorities 
back home published news of the ship‟s departure in which the “capitalist pirate, Captain 
MacMillan, supported by the Norwegian bandit Arne Hansen, captured 841 fascist refugees in 
Bremerhaven so that instead of repatriating them to their homeland, where under communism 
there was better living and happiness, directed the ship to Halifax in Canada.”73 Less than a week 
after the arrival of 113 Czechoslovakian refugees, officials in Ottawa approved the incorporation 
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of the CFCR without any security objections. Canadian officials viewed the new organization as 
“semi-officially inspired” since Senator Cairine Wilson was a director.74 
Along with the newly established CFCR, the CNA also continued to aid in the settlement 
of Czech and Slovak DPs and political refugees. Subsequently, the CNA was instrumental in 
providing assistance to Canadian Czechs and Slovaks who wished to bring their families and 
friends to Canada. In one case, Mike Nikodem of Smithville, Ontario applied to the Canadian 
Pacific Railway (CPR)‟s Department of Colonization seeking to relocate Jozef Brunovský and 
his family to Canada. Nikodem‟s application was initially denied because Brunovský fought for 
the wartime Nazi-aligned Slovak state during the Second World War.
75
 Due to Nikodem‟s lack 
of English language skills, he solicited the assistance of CNA national secretary, Karel Buzek 
who informed the Immigration Branch that Brunovský was drafted into the wartime Slovak 
Army, but later deserted to join the partisan movement and took part in the 1944 Slovak National 
Uprising against the Germans and their Slovak collaborators. After receiving a letter from A.H. 
Creighton, District Superintendent of Colonization for the CPR, Buzek informed Nikodem that a 
“provision existed that granted admission to persons in this class where it can be established that 
such service was under compulsion.”76 Buzek advised Nikodem that definitive evidence be 
submitted to the immigration authorities in order for the decision to be reversed.
77
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As Canadian Czechs and Slovaks sought to relocate their relatives and friends to Canada, 
officials in Ottawa were charged with selecting refugees who would become Canadian citizens 
and “useful” to the Canadian economy. Successive federal Liberal governments under Prime 
Ministers William Lyon Mackenzie King and Louis St. Laurent viewed the movement of 
Europe‟s DPs and anti-communist refugees to Canada as constituting a significant contribution 
to the development of postwar Canada. Subsequently, Ottawa implemented an Immigration-
Labour Committee to which representatives from the Departments of Mines and Resources, 
Labour, External Affairs, and National Health and Welfare were appointed. This committee 
assessed and defined the necessary labour requirements and what type of refugee should be 
resettled in Canada.
78
 
With both the CNA and the CFCR‟s resettlement activities gaining wider public 
attention, Canadian Czechs and Slovaks began corresponding with Karel Buzek regarding the 
feasibility of admitting close relatives and friends into Canada. Buzek informed his compatriots 
that they would need to fill out forms for prospective immigrants who would enter Canada as 
farm labourers engaging in assured farm employment. The CNA worked to arrange signed 
affidavits in which farmers who sought contract labourers were contacted for their signatures. 
The CNA also worked closely with the last democratic Czechoslovakian ambassador to Canada, 
František Němec, in the hopes that his political contacts could help to accelerate the process of 
admitting successful political refugees.
79
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On 1 June 1949, a Czech-language newspaper entitled Čas (The Time: Independent 
Democratic Weekly for Canadian Czechoslovaks) published its first issue in Trenton, Ontario. 
The newly established paper served democratic and anti-communist Czechoslovak Canadians. 
Editor Jan Dočkálek informed the paper‟s readers that “it has now been three years since I 
finished my service with the Czechoslovak forces overseas. I have come to Canada to run a 
paper for Czechoslovak Canadians. I wanted to establish a paper for democratic Czechoslovaks 
since one did not exist at the time.”80 Čas was supported by the influential émigré organization,  
Council of Free Czechoslovakia (CFC) based in Washington. In meetings with the council‟s 
leadership in Windsor, Ontario and Detroit, Michigan, it was agreed that a pro-democratic 
newspaper was necessary in Canada.
81
 In the paper‟s inaugural issue, the Mayor of Trenton, 
Ontario, Ken J. Couch, claimed that a thriving Czechoslovak community existed in his town. The 
Mayor expected that the members of the community would become “Good Canadians, if they are 
not so already.” Couch believed that Czech and Slovak Canadians would retain their “native 
skills, their native culture which will fortify them and add to the cultural life of our community 
as well.” Couch asserted that Čas would aid these same individuals and the city of Trenton in 
better understanding each other.
82
 
Anti-communist Czechs and Slovaks continued to promote their democratic ideals and 
protest against Communist oppression in their homeland. On 26 June 1949, the CNA held its 
seventh congress and adopted a resolution in which individuals could not be members of the 
organization if they supported the Communist movement, acted on behalf of the Czechoslovak 
government, or maintained relations with Prague. Many of the delegates in attendance were 
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recently arrived refugees who joined the congress‟ call on the UN to use its powers to establish 
“a free democratic election in Czechoslovakia… [to] be held under its supervision and control.”83 
A month later, the organization closed its Montreal Branch for alleged activities that were 
sympathetic to the Communist cause. In its 27 July 1949 issue, the pro-democratic weekly Čas 
argued that Communist sympathizers within the Montreal Branch “refuse to vote for anti-
communist measures, do not support Czechoslovak refugees, and maintain relations with 
Czechoslovak government representatives. They also publish their propaganda in compatriot 
Czechoslovak papers to the detriment of the community.”84 
Anti-communist Czechs and Slovaks continued to work against the Communist 
authorities in Czechoslovakia. In assisting the anti-communists, Čas called on Czechoslovaks in 
Canada to support their countrymen who were fleeing the Communist regime. The pro-
democratic weekly argued that many of these same individuals were skilled agriculturalists who 
could only be “a very great asset to Canada.” Czechoslovak Canadians were subsequently asked 
to follow the example of other ethnic groups and aid the resettlement of their countrymen by 
providing them with labour contracts. Čas argued that Czechoslovak Canadians would be doing 
their national duty and providing newcomers with the opportunity for a new life in Canada.
85
 
In late August 1949, twenty-four university students boarded the Charlton Sovereign and 
the Heinzelman as part of a group of 302 DPs classified as Catholic orphans, close relatives, 
students, and miners. These students were permitted to enter Canada on one-year International 
Students‟ Service Scholarships to institutions across the country. After an eleven-day trans-
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Atlantic journey, the students arrived at Pier 21 in Halifax and spent three days in the city. On 9 
November, the students arrived by train in Montreal where they were greeted by the local press. 
Five students were to remain in Montreal to attend McGill University, Université de Montréal, 
and Macdonald College. The remaining nineteen DPs were to attend other schools. Although 
immigration regulations required adults to commit to one-year labour contracts, the university 
students were the first group of individuals to have this requirement waived. Within the group of 
twenty-four students were three individuals of Czechoslovakian origin who were previously 
incarcerated as political prisoners. Miroslav Doseděl and Václav Opřátko were to study natural 
sciences and chemical engineering, both at the Université de Montréal. Nicholas Thuroczy, an 
ethnic Hungarian of Czechoslovak origin was to study agronomy at Macdonald College.
86
 
As Canadian immigration officials continued to admit Czech and Slovak DPs and post-
1948 refugees, DEA officials discussed the value of maintaining Canadian diplomatic missions 
in Prague and Warsaw. In a confidential memorandum, officials within the DEA‟s European 
Division argued that consular work pertaining to immigration accounted for the majority of the 
legations‟ workload. The replacement of the mission in Prague with a consulate would not 
reduce costs and could seriously deprive the mission of its influence in the local diplomatic 
community and with the Communist authorities. Officials in Ottawa noted that should a change 
be made, the Prague and Warsaw offices would lose their diplomatic “…protection, rations, 
customs and other privileges…necessary to maintain  any sort of tolerable living in 
“Transcurtainia.””87 
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Communist Tactics and the Immigration of Czechoslovakians to Canada 
In January 1950, DEA officials learned that the Communist authorities in Prague were 
implementing increasingly hostile tactics against Western government representatives. In the 
case of the Canadian legation, locally engaged staff were arrested or prevented from working. 
Unsubstantiated charges were filed against two Canadian non-commissioned officers, Sergeant 
Reginald Danko and Corporal J.G. Vanier.
 88
 In order to protect Canadian representatives, 
Ottawa arranged with the Chief of the Air Staff for the return of Danko and Vanier to Canada. 
On the recommendation of Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Arnold Danford 
Patrick Heeney, the Canadian government expelled bookkeeper Richard Berhmann and assistant 
clerk Hugo Bohounak, two members of the Czechoslovakian Legation in Ottawa as persona non 
grata.
89
 Canadian diplomats stationed in Eastern Europe informed Ottawa of evidence that a 
“concerted drive, probably part of a general Russian strategy” was underway to interfere in the 
activities of Western diplomatic missions.
90
 It was noted that the strategy effectively sought out 
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the arrest and false accusation of Western diplomatic personnel in order for local Communist 
authorities to be able to blacken their reputations. As a result, Western diplomats including 
Canadian representatives stationed in Prague worked in “…a growing atmosphere of fear, 
suspicion, frustration, and isolation in which the westerner simply has no place. He becomes in 
short an enemy alien.” Canadian representatives in Prague informed DEA officials in Ottawa that 
legations in Eastern Europe should not close due to Communist intervention because they were 
important in safeguarding Canadian legal and financial interests, and the immigration of relatives 
of Canadian citizens.
91
 
Canadian Czechoslovak leaders were increasingly frustrated by the tactics used by 
Communist authorities. For example, visa applicants in Czechoslovakia were required to collect 
far more documents than were required by the Canadian legation for a visa to be granted. Three 
types of passports were attainable from the Communist regime; diplomatic, business relations, 
and emigration (vystěhovalecství).92 After February 1948, the acquisition of a valid passport for 
travel abroad became increasingly hard to attain. Excluding Communist officials, passports were 
rarely granted to the average Czechoslovakian family in order to prevent emigration aboard.
93
 In 
his correspondence with officials in Ottawa, Canadian Chargé d‟affaires in Prague, John Arnold 
Irwin mentioned the case of a fourteen year-old orphan, Anna Sukelová. Since September 1948, 
Sukelová attempted to obtain a passport from the Communist authorities in order to be reunited 
with her uncle in Canada. In two years, Sukelová collected twenty-two official documents from 
various Communist government offices and agencies. Once she had received a “promise of visa” 
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from Canadian officials, the Communist government summarily refused her application for a 
passport.
94
 Initially, individuals were required to submit along with their passport application: an 
identity card, proof of citizenship, police registration card, and a marriage certificate, if 
applicable.
95
 Legal emigration to Canada from Czechoslovakia drastically slowed in March 1949 
when the Canadian Legation was able to grant 68 visas to Czechoslovakia‟s citizens. A year 
later, only ten visas were issued.
96
 Canadian Chargé d‟affaires John Arnold Irwin stated that 
correspondence between Czechoslovakians and the Canadian legation was still large in volume, 
but began to steadily decrease as the Communist authorities clamped down on official 
emigration. 
In a memorandum entitled “Czechoslovak Immigration,” Canadian immigration officials 
were hesitant to support a plan by the CFC to vet the background and desirability of prospective 
immigrants submitted to Canadian officials by the council. Former Czechoslovakian ambassador 
to Canada, František Němec informed immigration officials that the council was offering the 
services of former Czechoslovak Brigadier-General František Dastich to aid immigration officers 
in analyzing the background and desirability of prospective immigrants to Canada.
97
 Immigration 
bureaucrats noted that acquiring reliable security information on behalf of Czechoslovakians was 
increasingly difficult for Canadian security officers to obtain. Officials in Ottawa ultimately 
refused to get involved in the internal political divisions between former Czech and Slovak 
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politicians within the CFC, and refused Němec‟s request to send a representative from the 
council overseas to assist in the selection of Czechoslovakian citizens for immigration to Canada. 
Conversely, Canadian officials believed that the council could be valuable in steering suitable 
and desirable immigrants to Canadian visa offices in Germany.
98
 
The Canadian Immigration Branch worked in cooperation with the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police (RCMP) to implement an immigrant security vetting process known as “Stage 
B.”99 This additional security step took place once an applicant was interviewed by a visa officer 
and underwent a medical test in Europe. In 1948, the RCMP stationed Stage B officials across 
Europe and began assessing individual security clearances in the hopes of keeping Communist 
agents and their sympathizers from entering Canada. By 1950, twenty percent of immigrants 
whose entry to Canada was rejected due to a suspicion of Communist sympathies appealed to the 
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. Of these appeals, only twenty percent were eventually 
permitted entry into Canada. As a result, 96 percent of individuals labelled as security risks by 
Immigration officials and RCMP officers never entered Canada.
100
 During this period, Canadian 
military intelligence indicated that the threat of a Soviet-led attack remained probable. In its 
assessment of possible “forms and scales” of offensive operations against Canada, the 
Department of National Defence indicated ten situations in which the Soviet-bloc could attack 
Canada. The first scenario listed in the intelligence analysis considered “subversive activities of 
all kinds, from anti-war propaganda to strikes and acts of sabotage” as the most likely threats.101 
Canadian military authorities identified communist subversion from within as the greatest threat 
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to national security. Similarly, in Ottawa, the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB) concluded that 
Czechoslovakia remained an asset to the Soviet Union as long as the satellite state continued to 
import raw materials from the West. The bureau noted that Czechoslovakia remained an “easy 
partner in the Red Bloc” as there was “ample evidence to show that Soviet ideology on the one 
hand and the cold logic of industrial necessity on the other may rapidly become conflicting 
elements in the formation of future policy.”102 Intelligence authorities were aware that Prague 
was suffering from a “deficiency in manpower” with the expulsion of the Sudeten German and 
Hungarian minorities. As a result, the agricultural, mining, and technological industries were in 
decline. Prague commenced efforts to alleviate this problem by campaigning to attract Czechs 
and Slovaks living abroad to return to their native country.
103
 Under the direction of the Ministry 
of the Interior, the OBZ (Army Security Intelligence Office), and the Ministry of National 
Defence, Czechoslovakian agents were sent overseas in a concerted effort to blackmail Czech 
and Slovak immigrants in Canada to return home.
104
 
In the summer of 1951, the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status 
of Refugees and Stateless Persons adopted the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 
The convention defined the term “refugee” which was to be applied to DPs who fled their 
countries out of a genuine fear of persecution. Since the term “Displaced Person” remained open 
to interpretation, the Convention established that a refugee was any individual who “as a result of 
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events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling 
to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being 
outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”105 The RCMP feared that the 1951 Convention 
would hinder Ottawa‟s ability to deport persons who were considered security threats. As a 
result, the Canadian government did not become a signatory to the 1951 Convention because it 
guaranteed asylum as an international human right. Canada used the Convention instead as a 
framework for the admission and denial of individuals to the country. Similarly, Ottawa 
continued to use an ad hoc approach whereby Orders-in-Council were used to grant refugees‟ 
entry to Canada.
106
 Even with the establishment of the 1951 Convention, Czech and Slovak 
refugees in Austria, West Germany, and Italy remained at the mercy of Canadian immigration 
officials and the RCMP who enforced security screening over the refugees‟ rights to asylum. 
Canadian immigration authorities continued to fear the infiltration of Communist agents 
within the wave of refugees who continued to arrive in Canada. Conversely, Canadian 
Czechoslovak organizations continued to receive grievances from newly arrived refugees 
regarding their relocation to Canada. On 23 May 1951, MH president Gustav Přístupa wrote to 
the Canadian Department of Labour insisting that the hall received several complaints from 
recently arrived Czechs and Slovaks indicating that upon reaching the government hostel at 
Ajax, Ontario – on the outskirts of Toronto – they were “not sufficiently fed, and after mealtimes 
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remained hungry.” The main complaint of the refugees was that food servings were too small. 
Přístupa recommended that instead of giving each refugee two slices of bread, a loaf could be 
left on the table for everyone to eat according to their need. The MH president noted that “it 
doesn‟t seem right that, in a country such as Canada, anyone should go hungry, especially for the 
lack of bread.”107 The Department of Labour replied that it was surprised by the contents of the 
letter and claimed that Ottawa operated the hostel for over four years without any complaints. 
The department noted that its official policy guaranteed that meals served to newcomers were of 
“…good quality and sufficient in quantity.”108 Newly-arrived refugees from Czechoslovakia 
were later welcomed by Reverend Jaroslav Zeman and a group of parishioners from the 
Czechoslovak Baptist Board in Toronto where they were each given two dollars, a Czech-
language bible and other religious literature.
109
 
Although many refugees from Czechoslovakia found their initial experience in Canada to 
be lacking, other refugees were heroically welcomed to Canada as anti-communist freedom 
fighters. On 11 September 1951, Czech engineer František Jarda raced a train belonging to 
Czechoslovak state railways from the western town of Cheb, passed the border town of Aš, and 
into Selb, West Germany. The train carried 111 passengers, mostly students and spa patients. 
Seventy-seven individuals later returned home including several train employees, six children, 
two soldiers, and a policeman who were not aware of the Czech engineer‟s plan to flee to the 
West. According to Jarda, he brought his wife and two children along on his daring escape to the 
West because it was “no longer bearable to live in an Eastern European state. We made plans for 
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our flight for a long time. We bought food and clothing – everything we could.”110 Jarda was 
later offered employment by the Shoe production magnate Tomáš J. Baťa, whom the Globe and 
Mail reported as having admired “the ingenuity, resolution and courage of the engineer.”111 
The Freedom Train incident illustrated to Canadian Czechoslovak institutions including 
the CNA and MH that the need to help refugees was of paramount importance. Many more 
Czechs and Slovaks desired to flee Communist oppression in Czechoslovakia and were forced to 
attempt daring and life-threatening escapes in order to reach freedom in the West. The refugees 
from the Freedom Train not only garnered praise and increased the morale of the Czech and 
Slovak refugees already in Canada, but they also fascinated a Canadian public that increasingly 
began to understand the efforts of these refugees against the Communist regime. As a passenger 
aboard the Freedom Train in Czechoslovakia, Karel Ruml chose to settle in Canada because the 
federal government offered to accept him, more quickly than other western countries.
112
 For the 
thirty-three Freedom Train passengers who wished to remain in the West, Canada became a 
desired destination because they viewed a prolonged stay in temporary housing in the 
Ludwigsburg refugee camp as “dangerous” – perhaps because Communist agents were known to 
infiltrate holding centres and attempt to repatriate individuals back to Czechoslovakia. Although 
the United States remained preferential to Canada in the eyes of the Freedom Train refugees, 
American authorities expected them to become active in propaganda activities against their 
Communist homeland to which these refugees were less than favourable.
113
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Canadian officials in West Germany informed the Freedom Train passengers wishing to 
resettle in Canada that they would be subjected to a health exam while Canadian labour 
commission officials classified successful candidates for labour contracts. In the case of Karel 
Ruml, officials confirmed upon him the status of a woodsman (dřevorubec).114 František Jarda, 
Karel Ruml, and the other Freedom Train refugees arrived in Halifax aboard the Norwegian ship 
Goya from Bremerhaven, West Germany to a hero‟s welcome. The Freedom Train incident 
captured the hearts of many Canadian readers who became enamored with their courageous act 
of defiance against Communist tyranny. Canadian authorities transported some of the refugees to 
Ajax, Ontario by train prior to resettling them in Toronto where Ruml was later employed in an 
insurance company. Ruml began his career in Canada by sorting documents in a company 
basement for $27 dollars per week.
115
 He recalls the financial difficulty of resettlement and 
starting over in Canada:           
 
I lived in a small bedroom in an old home on Summerhill Ave., nearly 5km 
from City Hall. Breakfast with the room cost $25 a week which left me with 
$2 a week for everything else. I ate as much porridge as I could fit inside me 
every morning, otherwise I only bough the cheapest groceries, usually bread 
and sardines. In the first few months, I often went hungry. Toronto was a 
spread out major city and I walked everywhere because I did not have 
enough for the tramway or the bus.
 116
 
 
Many Czech and Slovak newcomers to Canada had difficulty in facing the harsh Canadian 
climate because they were often ill-equipped to handle their first Canadian winter. Ruml 
remembers that he was unprepared for winter since “almost every day after walking all the way 
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downtown, I worked in a cold basement in soaked shoes and pants that had been sullied by the 
dirty snow and salt from the street.”117  
 
Integrating Refugees into the Canadian Czechoslovak Community 
Czech and Slovak Refugees from Czechoslovakia who resettled in urban centres often 
found friendship within the local Canadian Czechoslovak community. In Toronto, Czech and 
Slovak refugees often visited MH located in the European quarter below Queen Street. Instead of 
finding cooperation and goodwill among Czechoslovaks, Ruml found intra-ethnic animosity as 
prewar Czechs or „oldtimers‟ who arrived prior to 1948 largely ignored the newest members of 
their transplanted community. Many older members within the Czechoslovak community 
donated time and money to assist postwar immigrants, and were aware that recent arrivals 
languished in European holding camps – sometimes for years. However, Ruml claimed that these 
earlier immigrants often did not extend their hand in friendship and cooperation, but remained 
inhospitable.
118
  
Czech and Slovak refugees continued to seek assistance from Canadian Czechoslovak 
organizations. Masaryk Memorial Hall continued to support the settlement of refugees from 
Czechoslovakia. In one case, Czech refugee Zdeněk Štřelec wrote to MH from Casablanca, 
Morocco seeking help in coming to Canada. Štřelec spent time in a DP camp in Germany prior to 
agreeing to Morocco‟s offer to accept him. Štřelec hoped to make Canada his new home if a 
democratic and independent Czechoslovakia could not be resurrected.
119
 In another case, 
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Antonín Sevelka, his wife Věra, and their son, Anthony wrote to MH president Gustav Přístupa 
for help in leaving their DP camp in Germany for Canada. On behalf of the Sevelka family, MH 
sent applications for admission to the Immigration Branch. Canadian officials informed the hall 
that the proposed immigrants would be included on immigration lists furnished to officers 
overseas where arrangements could be made for their examination.
120
 
Masaryk Memorial Hall also provided assistance to Czechs and Slovaks already living in 
Canada. In one case, Ladislav Libý of Chicoutimi, Quebec lost his vision after a chemical 
explosion occurred at the ornament factory where he worked. On his family‟s behalf, a letter was 
written to MH in the hopes that financial assistance could be secured for his medical care and re-
integration into society.
121
 The hall provided compatriots with financial loans of varying 
amounts, for example, $500 or $1000 with an interest rate of six percent payable twice per 
year.
122
 However, given the dire situation of Czech and Slovak refugees in Austrian, German, 
and Italian camps, MH continued to make the resettlement of these individuals a priority. By the 
fall of 1951, Gustav Přístupa personally signed 652 affidavits for overseas Czech and Slovak 
refugees who were seeking to be admitted to Canada.
123
 
Refugees such as František Jarda and Karel Ruml arrived in Canada after years spent in 
holding camps or through daring escapes to the West. Canadian Chargé d‟affaires in Prague, 
Benjamin Rogers informed Ottawa that persons seeking to immigrate to Canada were no longer 
officially permitted to leave by Communist authorities. In 1951, the Canadian legation issued 
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only twenty-one visas. On 1 January 1952, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague assumed 
control of issuing Czechoslovakian passports and effectively restricted access to official 
emigration. Rogers noted that only one visa was issued that year to an individual with a 
Czechoslovakian passport for emigration to Canada.
124
 Canadian diplomatic representatives in 
Prague informed government officials in Ottawa that immigration to Canada from 
Czechoslovakia had “hit a complete standstill.” Communist authorities refused to grant exit 
permits to prospective immigrants who already had a close relative or family in Canada. Initially, 
Canadian officials were left to believe that each decision to refuse an exit permit was based on 
merit. However, Canadian diplomats soon realized that Czechoslovakian authorities refused to 
grant passports for travel to Canada en masse. Unofficially, Canadian officials began to suspect 
that Communist authorities were discriminating against applicants when passports for West 
Germany were considerably easier to acquire than for Canada.
125
 
While Czechoslovakia‟s citizens were finding it impossible to obtain a passport in order 
to leave, Canadian officials were in the process of officially affirming what had been standard 
practice in Canadian immigration policy. The 1952 Immigration Act granted the minister of 
immigration far-reaching powers to set regulations that enforced the legislation. As a result of 
ministerial discretion, individuals and groups could now be refused entry into Canada based on 
factors such as nationality, geographic origin, custom and tradition, unsuitability to climate, or 
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inability to assimilate into Canadian society. Homosexuals, drug addicts and traffickers were 
added to the prohibited classes.
126
 
 
Fighting Allegations of Communism with the Canadian Czechoslovak Community 
In March 1952, the conservative-leaning Toronto Telegram alleged in a front-page series 
entitled “Communists gain in „front‟ groups of many tongues,” that the CNA had “some degree 
of association with the (Communist) Labour Progressive party.” The Alliance‟s executive 
vehemently denied the allegation and their connection to communism. In a letter to the 
newspaper, executive members including; president Karol Štark, vice-president Antonin Daičar, 
treasurer Gustav Přístupa, and secretary Prokop V. Havlík asserted that the CNA was “one of the 
strongest anti-Communist groups in the country.” The executive went on to note that every 
member of the organization had publicly pronounced their loyalty to Canada and pledged to fight 
communism. After the allegations were published the executive feared for the safety of its 
membership who could be wrongly associated with communist activities in Canada and deemed 
to be disloyal Canadians or even Communist spies.
127
 Canadian Czechoslovaks continued to 
fight allegations within the Canadian press that they were associated with communism. A year 
later, Canadian Czechoslovaks were embroiled in a controversy at Toronto City Hall as 
Czechoslovaks and nationalist Slovaks openly contested each community‟s commemoration of 
the past. 
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Commemorating the Past: Tensions Between Czechoslovaks and nationalist Slovaks  
As the Canadian Czechoslovak community continued efforts to assist their compatriots 
scattered in refugee camps across Europe, they were also forced to deal with heightened tensions 
between Czechoslovaks and nationalist Slovaks. As a site of commemoration, Toronto‟s City 
Hall cenotaph was often used to pay homage to Canada‟s participation in the First and Second 
World Wars. On 3 May 1953, controversy erupted when members of the nationalist Slovak 
community dressed in traditional clothing placed a wreath at the cenotaph to commemorate 
wartime Slovak president, Monsignor Jozef Tiso and General Milan R. Štefánik. Czechs and 
Slovaks who supported a common Czechoslovak ethnic identity and were subsequently critical 
of the independent wartime Slovak state noted that its leaders including Tiso were responsible 
for collaborating with Nazi Germany and were complicit in the deaths of thousands of innocent 
civilians. The following day, the Toronto Daily Star published an image of the ceremony with a 
caption that incorrectly informed its readers that Tiso was formerly a “president-martyr of 
Czechoslovakia.”128 The CNA sent a letter to the newspaper, the Royal Canadian Legion, and 
Mayor Allan A. Lamport, vehemently opposing the wreath and arguing that its presence wrongly 
“couples the names of a patriot and a traitor.” In the letter, CNA president Karol Štark argued 
that Jozef Tiso was a “pronounced Nazi collaborator,” meanwhile the “Slovak state, of which 
this group of „Democratic Slovaks‟ is an ardent follower was Hitler‟s ally, fighting side by side 
with the German armies against the Canadian soldiers during the last war, and against those who 
lost their lives for the cause of freedom and whole glory we remember when passing the 
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cenotaph at the Toronto city hall.”129 In light of the cenotaph controversy, city officials sought to 
prevent the cenotaph for becoming a site of transplanted “European factional difficulties.”130  
 On 16 May, executives of eight Canadian Slovak organizations assembled in Toronto to 
craft a resolution which was sent to Mayor Lamport in an attempt to drive back the accusations 
made by the CNA in the Toronto Daily Star. Members of the Canadian Slovak League, First 
Catholic Slovak Union, First Catholic Slovak Ladies‟ Union, Slovak Catholic Sokol, Slovak 
Liberation Committee, Slovak National Council Abroad, Slovak Legion, and the Union of 
Slovak Journalists Abroad accurately asserted that Tiso was not a “puppet president” because he 
was elected by members of the Slovak Parliament in October 1939. The executives in attendance 
illustrated in their resolution what they perceived as the “malignancy of a small group which 
wishes to continue in its domination and oppression of the Slovak people.” They considered the 
CNA‟s accusations as “racial discrimination” and contrary to the United Nations Declaration of 
Human Rights.
131
  
 
Conclusion 
In early 1948, Canadian diplomats in Czechoslovakia astutely recognized that the 
Communist Party was solidifying its control over the state‟s affairs. Several weeks later, the 
Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia in February 1948 was met with caution on the part of 
Canadian officials who sought to maintain relations with the Communist authorities and keep 
their legation in Prague open as a “listening post.” The fall of democratic Czechoslovakia into 
the Soviet sphere of influence increasingly concerned Canadian authorities who were in the 
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midst of securing the state against Soviet infiltration and homegrown Communist sympathizers. 
Franca Iacovetta explored the role of the Canadian state in spreading a “sense of moral panic” in 
which public and non-governmental officials warned citizens of the influx of dysfunctional and 
immoral immigrants who could weaken Canada‟s predominantly Christian, democratic, and 
middle class society.
132
 According to this perspective, Canadian authorities were concerned with 
the potential of immoral, sexually deviant, and weak families entering the country. Combined 
with a sociopolitical climate in which government officials actively increased the public‟s fear of 
communism, the Liberal government of Prime Minister Mackenzie King welcomed Europe‟s 
Displaced Persons (DPs) and anti-communist refugees as constituting a significant contribution 
to the development of postwar Canada. 
In cooperation with the Canadian government, Czechoslovak institutions were 
instrumental in resettling Czech and Slovak DPs and anti-communist refugees. The CNA and 
MH‟s members were predominantly older immigrants who felt it was their duty to help their 
compatriots. Older members of the Czechoslovak community referred to the newcomers as the 
„1948ers,‟ while the recent arrivals referred to members of the existing community as „oldtimers‟ 
or „old-fashioned.‟ Canadian Czechoslovak organizations signed affidavits for farm labour 
contracts, found accommodations, other employment, basic goods, clothing, translation services, 
and provided financial and social assistance to newcomers from Czechoslovakia. From 1948 to 
1954, 12,374 newcomers to Canada identified their nationality as Czechoslovakian. Similarly, 
10,353 persons gave Czechoslovakia as their last country of residence.
133
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After February 1948, the immigration of ethnic Czechs and Slovaks to Canada was 
directly a consequence of Cold War politics. Anti-communist Czech and Slovak refugees 
transplanted their Old World ethnic and ideological divisions to Canada. Older compatriots were 
surprised by the behaviour of many of the newcomers who only wished to discuss their political 
party affiliations back in Czechoslovakia. The oldtimers became aware that a small group of 
individuals came to Canada with the notion of re-establishing their political allegiances in exile 
before eventually returning to a Czechoslovakia liberated from communism.
134
 A small number 
of 1948ers sought to promote their anti-communist and democratic politics in Canada by 
attempting to use the MH as a front for their anti-communist activities. When it became clear 
that many oldtimers in the Czechoslovak community did not share their ideological aspirations, 
the hall was labelled as a private company for private gain.
135
 Essentially, the Czech or Slovak 
political refugee was a vital component in the Canadian government‟s attempts to eliminate 
domestic leftists and prevent Communist infiltration. These same refugees served as a 
legitimizing force for conservative and anti-Soviet politicians, bureaucrats, and non-
governmental organizations who sought to promote fear of the Soviet Union and communism at 
home. Similarly, the newcomers proved to be a source of embarrassment to Communist 
authorities in Eastern Europe once they began to agitate for a return of democracy in 
Czechoslovakia. The 1948 wave of political refugees from Czechoslovakia enhanced Canada‟s 
democratic identity during the Cold War.
136
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The 1948ers were convinced that they would return to Czechoslovakia in a few short 
years. Similarly, many of these refugees believed that parliamentary democracy would return to 
their homeland in less than five years since “communism could not last” in a country with a 
strong democratic tradition.
137
 This mindset prevented many refugees from rapidly assimilating. 
As one 1948er declared: “if they had known that they would stay permanently then they would 
have assimilated more rapidly.”138 In the coming years, the 1948ers learned that their initial 
temporary stay in Canada would in fact become their new permanent home. Through encounters 
with previous immigrants from Czechoslovakia and Canadian-born members of the 
Czechoslovak community, many of the 1948ers claimed to no longer view themselves as exiles, 
and thus sought to heal the rifts in the Czechoslovak community between themselves and the 
oldtimers. The 1948ers were profoundly shaped by the Communist seizure of power in February 
1948. In joining Czechoslovak institutions such as the CNA and MH, the 1948ers successfully 
entrenched their anti-communist agenda and democratic values in Canadian Czechoslovak 
institutions. As members of Czechoslovak institutions in Canada, many 1948ers steered these 
organizations in an attempt to actively influence Canadian foreign policy towards Communist 
Czechoslovakia.
                                                 
137
 Vít Wágner, interview by Jana Cipris, 26 August 1980, interview CZE-7955-WAG, Czech Oral History 
Collection, MHSO, John M. Kelly Library, University of Toronto. 
138
 Ibid. 
175 
 
Chapter Four: 
 
Community Tensions:  
Divisions between Canadian Czechoslovaks and Communist Czechoslovakia  
 
“How an Immigrant Girl Fell in Love with Canada” garnered much attention when 
Maclean’s published the story in April 1960. In the article, Czech refugee Marika Robert 
described her experience in coming to a new country and her integration into Canadian society.
1
 
Upon arriving in Montreal aboard the Columbia in 1951, Robert pondered: “How many years 
have I got to assimilate and become part of that great future?” In the Maclean’s article, Robert 
describes her initial problems in finding accommodations as a single female and newcomer to 
Canada. Robert met dozens of “landladies” who were wary of the issues that newcomers such as 
an unmarried woman could bring into their traditional environment. Many of these property-
owners informed her that no male visitors would be permitted in her room, followed by questions 
including, “Do you have pets? Are you a Roman Catholic? Do you use the toilet at night?”2 
Canadians willing to rent out rooms to newcomers insisted that no cooking, smoking, bathing, or 
staying in the room during the day would be permitted.
3
  
Many newcomers to Canada in the postwar era initially struggled to find employment and 
became destitute thus often causing difficulty for their landlords. Robert eventually found 
accommodations in a house with multiple rooms or „cells‟ and a communal bathroom while she 
looked for employment. Robert also lamented the complexity of the immigrant setting in which 
intra-ethnic dynamics heavily influenced her experience. She noted that immigrant communities 
and society at large could be divided between old and new immigrants, political and economic 
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immigrants, Western immigrants and immigrants from the Iron Curtain, and that each group 
envied the other‟s immigration experience.4 According to Robert: 
 
The new immigrant is a person who has lost everything except his accent. In 
the eyes of others he is that strange animal with an unpronounceable name 
and a way of speech that is either cute or irritating depending on his age and 
sex. Liked by some, disliked by many, the immigrant is a statistical figure, 
the subject of arguments, interviews and articles. He is also the hero of a 
tragicomical adventure which few Canadians understand and which after a 
certain time he himself is apt to forget.
5
 
 
After nine years in Canada, Marika Robert claimed to feel as an equal member of Canadian 
society: 
 
I think I am finally part of it all: part of the skyscrapers and slums, the 
superhighways and department stores, the lack of aesthetic beauty and the 
abundance of comfort…after almost a decade in Canada I have only vague 
recollections of the years when every move seemed to be an experience: 
when my days were filled with nightmarish and hilarious discoveries.
6
 
 
Although many refugees from the across the Iron Curtain continued to recognize and 
maintain their ethnic identity through adherence to a common nation, language, religion, history, 
and territory, they also became Canadians. During the Cold War, Czech and Slovak refugees like 
Marika Robert began to self-identify with Canadian society and its culture and customs after 
realizing that they had acquired a new way of thinking, vocabulary, habits, tastes, and interests – 
all while preserving their ethnic heritage.
7
  
During the early 1950s, refugees who fled Czechoslovakia after the Communist takeover 
of 1948 continued to arrive in Canada. Profoundly influenced by the events of 1948, later 
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refugees were often more determined in their anti-communist stance because they experienced 
the early years of Communist oppression and/or spent a significant amount of time in refugee 
camps in Austria, West Germany, and Italy. In the following years, few Czechoslovakian 
citizens were granted travel documents and officially permitted to leave the Communist regime. 
The Stalinist authorities in Prague restricted individuals and families from leaving the country, 
thus forcing many to attempt dangerous and life-threatening border crossings to the West in 
search of freedom and opportunity. 
This chapter examines how Czech and Slovak refugees who came in the years after the 
Communist seizure of power in 1948 continued their efforts to liberate Czechoslovakia into the 
1950s and 1960s. From 1947 to 1953, refugees from Czechoslovakia accounted for three percent 
of all European refugees who resettled in Canada.
8
 During the 1950s, many 1948ers turned their 
focus towards resolving ideological divisions and personality conflicts between themselves and 
the oldtimers within the pre-existing Czechoslovak community in Canada. Prague‟s surveillance 
and infiltration of Canadian Czechoslovak organizations including the Czechoslovak National 
Alliance (CNA), Communist repatriation propaganda, and the tragic events surrounding the 
failed Hungarian Revolution of 1956 demonstrated to the 1948ers that Communism in 
Czechoslovakia would not be easily defeated. The 1948ers‟ return home would be delayed. 
Eventually, many 1948ers, disillusioned by the liberation movement, joined with the pre-existing 
community and began to emphasize Canadian citizenship through the preservation of ethnic 
heritage and the promotion of cultural activities. In this period, two major Canadian 
Czechoslovak organizations: the Czechoslovak National Alliance and the Masaryk Memorial 
Hall (MH) were incorporated – with the former receiving a federal charter from the Canadian 
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government. The CNA and MH became centres of advocacy in the struggle to liberate 
Czechoslovakia and reunite Canadian Czechs and Slovaks with their relatives in Czechoslovakia. 
Many 1948ers left family and close relatives behind following their escape to the West. 
Subsequently, the 1948ers‟ efforts to visit Czechoslovakia without legal difficulties and be 
reunited with their loved ones were hampered by the Communist authorities in Prague. 
Authorities viewed the 1948ers as illegal émigrés and the emigration of their relatives to Canada 
as an “internal matter.” During the 1950s and 1960s, very few individuals and families arrived in 
Canada from Czechoslovakia since few were able to officially emigrate. 
 
Prague‟s Appeal for the Repatriation of Compatriots 
In May 1955, the head of Czechoslovakia‟s legation in Ottawa, Bedřich Hruška, 
purchased advertising space in Canadian newspapers requesting recently arrived refugees from 
Czechoslovakia to “come home.” The advertisement stated that individuals guilty of a “criminal 
offence” for leaving Czechoslovakia illegally “under the influence of propaganda” would be 
pardoned if they returned within six months after the 9 May amnesty.
9
 The question of refugees 
returning home during the Communist era was a contentious issue within the Canadian 
Czechoslovak community. Although some individuals did return to their homeland after initially 
resettling in Canada, their numbers were negligible and their reasons were largely ideological 
rather than financial or personal. The Communist scheme ultimately failed as fewer than 1,000 
refugees returned home from the West. The Communists quickly turned to an extensive 
campaign of propaganda attacks aimed at émigrés in the West. Soon after, agents for the StB 
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(Státní bezpečnost – State Security) attempted to convince these same individuals to return to 
Czechoslovakia and defend themselves against these attacks.
10
 Communist authorities used 
disinformation as a useful tactic in spreading lies and creating divisions between the anti-
communist 1948ers. In Ottawa, legation officials later claimed that 80 individuals returned to 
Czechoslovakia from Canada during the amnesty campaign, while the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police (RCMP) and anti-Communist Czechoslovak leaders in Toronto believed that the figure 
was much smaller with less than ten individuals returning to Czechoslovakia.
11
 An 
overwhelming majority of those who returned to Czechoslovakia after the Second World War 
were Canadian Slovaks who were politically active in left-wing organizations including the 
Slovak Benefit Society of Canada, the Independent Mutual Benefit Federation, the Communist 
Party of Canada, and its successor, the Labour-Progressive Party of Canada.
12
 
Refugees from Czechoslovakia who entered Canada after the 1948 Communist takeover 
did so at a cost to their families, relatives, finances, and properties. They were labelled as “illegal 
emigrants” and their networks of family, friends, and business contacts back home were 
subjected to police surveillance, interrogations, and even torture. In an effort to repatriate those 
who had fled and subsequently embarrassed the Communist regime, diplomatic officials and 
Czechoslovakia‟s StB were employed to coerce, blackmail, sabotage, and spy on refugees in 
Canada. On 28 October 1955, the Toronto Daily Star published the sensational story of a Soviet-
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led espionage network operating in Toronto. In the piece entitled, “Red Espionage Ring is Bared 
in Ottawa by Toronto Czech: Gets Orders to Spy on Twenty New Canadians from Ottawa Czech 
Legation,” reporter Eric Geiger interviewed Jiří (George) Stembura, a 29 year-old Czech refugee 
living in Toronto who claimed to have been “commissioned” as a secret Communist agent by 
Prague.
13
 Stembura was asked by officials within Czechoslovakia‟s embassy in Ottawa to spy on 
6,000 recently-arrived refugees from Czechoslovakia, as well as twenty prominent members of 
the Czechoslovak communty in Toronto. Any intelligence that Stembura provided would be used 
to “lure or blackmail” these refugees into returning to their homeland. Unbeknownst to embassy 
officials in Ottawa, Stembura was one of the twenty they sought to spy on in the Greater Toronto 
Area.
14
  
In his initial interview with a StB intelligence official in Ottawa, Stembura used a false 
identity (Milan Jina) and was offered cigarettes and cognac. Stembura claimed to have met with 
third secretary Antonín Dvořák and attaché Lubomír Sefrna in the legation basement. During this 
meeting, Stembura was informed that “Canadians were barbarians, who knew little of culture 
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and cared less” about the plight of Czechoslovakia‟s refugees.15 In order to commence his 
deception, Stembura fooled legation officials by asking for information on how to return to 
Czechoslovakia.
16
 In response to his request, these same Communist officials informed him that 
Canada could offer nothing to refugees such as himself except “unemployment and starvation.”17   
While Czechoslovakia‟s Communist authorities were attempting to recruit members of 
the Czechoslovak community to spy on each other in Canada, they were also keen on acquiring 
access to sensitive information pertaining to Canadian defence plants and government agencies. 
Legation officials informed Stembura that Prague sought sensitive information from sources 
including the A.V. Roe plant in Malton, Ontario.
18
 On 30 October 1955, an outraged group of 
nearly 200 anti-Communist Czechoslovak Canadians gathered in Toronto and elected a 
committee of four prominent community members to draft and present a memorandum to the 
Department of External Affairs (DEA) in Ottawa. On behalf of the anti-communist 
Czechoslovaks, the memorandum pressured the Canadian government to expel Czechoslovakian 
diplomats Dvořák and Sefrna.19 Although many Czechoslovaks across Canada approved of 
Stembura‟s activity in exposing a Communist spy ring, others including Prokop Havlík, a former 
treasurer of the CNA questioned Stembura‟s intentions. In an editorial entitled “Vyzvědačství” 
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(Spying) in the Canadian Czech-language paper Nový domov (New Homeland), Havlík argued 
that Communist authorities vetted the background of every person they considered for espionage 
work. Although Havlík conceded that embassy officials could have believed that Stembura was 
in fact Milan Jina, in his view, it remained unlikely that StB operations in Canada were “greatly 
inaccurate and shabby” and therefore Havlík questioned the accurracy of Stembura‟s story.20 
The initial news of an alleged spy ring within the Czechoslovak community in Toronto 
divided individuals between those who questioned its authenticity and others who believed the 
threat to community life and Canadian national security was real. Oldtimers within MH opposed 
the expulsion of the diplomats because they feared that relations between Ottawa and Prague 
would suffer as a result and cause “undesirable diplomatic entanglements.” According to the 
executive of MH, the memorandum was based on unsubstantiated claims made by George 
Stembura whose truthfulness the hall was not convinced of. In its letter to Secretary of State for 
External Affairs, Lester Bowles Pearson, MH illustrated that it was comprised of Czechoslovaks 
“…who have a strong anti-communist feeling,” but noted they desired to prevent any tensions 
between Ottawa and Prague. Masaryk Hall continued to accept recently arrived political refugees 
as members regardless of the political differences between old immigrants and the 1948ers. 
Divisions between members of MH continued to simmer in the summer of 1955 when it became 
public that many of the 1948ers were allegedly attempting to influence others with their party 
ideologies, and seize control of Czechoslovak organizations in order to align them with their 
anti-communist agenda. Consequently, MH severed ties with many of these recent political 
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refugees because of their political activities which were influenced by old party ideologies and 
transplanted from Czechoslovakia.  
As president of MH, Gustav Přístupa informed Secretary of State for External Affairs, 
Lester Bowles Pearson, that the hall was vigilantly watching Ottawa‟s steps in securing Canada, 
“for the preservation of peace, and the revival of self-destiny for all nations. We are very grateful 
to you for your efforts, from which the land of our origin will certainly benefit to the extent that 
its citizens will gain the opportunity, without reprisal, to freely express themselves for a 
democracy of the type which we enjoy in our homeland, Canada, and will be able to, in this way 
break out of the iron jaws of their communist dictatorship.”21 In representing the viewpoint of 
many oldtimers, Přístupa condemned the irresponsibility of the group of 200 anti-communist 
Czechoslovaks and the Canadian Press for publishing their story which brought unnecessary 
attention to the Czechoslovak community in Toronto.
22
 
Although members of the Czechoslovak community across Canada disagreed over the 
authenticity of Stembura‟s claims and the viability of the anti-communist memorandum to 
Ottawa, officials at the Czechoslovakian Ministry of Foreign Affairs protested what they 
perceived as a breach of diplomatic immunity.
23
 According to Prague, the subsequent press 
campaign that alleged its diplomats in Canada engaged in improper activities in connection to the 
repatriation campaign was false. The alleged recruitment of George Stembura as a spy forced 
Prague to assert that it was “engaged only in normal consular assistance to Czechoslovaks.” 
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Canadian officials minimized Prague‟s complaints by stifling further publicity and expressing 
their desire to maintain good relations.
24
 The repatriation campaign resulted in the return of 
approximately three dozen Czechs and Slovaks from Canada. Soon after arriving in 
Czechoslovakia, a minority of these returnees applied to return to Canada and were summarily 
denied. The Canadian legation in Prague notified Ottawa that exit visas for Canada remained 
difficult to acquire since the number of successful applicants rose insignificantly from four in 
1954 to seventeen in 1955. Canadian Chargé d‟affaires in Prague, John McLaurin Teakles 
indicated that the majority of successful applicants were “aged relatives of persons in Canada.”25 
As Communist authorities continued to deny allegations of espionage and the blackmail 
of Czechs and Slovaks into dubious repatriation schemes, Soviet satellite states continued their 
efforts to lure anti-communist refugees back home. Communist authorities in Prague attempted 
to thwart their compatriots‟ increasing influence on Western-Communist relations and ability to 
embarrass the Communist regime in their home country. In the summer of 1956, Under-
Secretary of State for External Affairs, Jules Léger, read a statement before the House of 
Commons External Affairs Committee indicating that Communist governments were attempting 
to lure refugees back across the Iron Curtain where they would be effectively “better silenced.”26 
The Globe and Mail indicated that only a few individuals fell victim to this Communist 
operation. However, the Communist authorities employed a scheme whereby first-class mail was 
sent from Europe often pretending to be written by relatives of those who escaped to Canada. 
These „letters‟ from relatives were orchestrated by local repatriation authorities in Eastern 
Europe. Prague became increasingly aware of the potential political influence the 1948ers 
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received in Canada and sought to thwart their role in anti-Communist propaganda. On behalf of 
Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester Bowles Pearson, Léger argued that Ottawa could 
not prevent this type of Communist scheme from occurring, but noted that any interference on 
the part of foreign governments in Canada should be brought to the attention of the federal 
government. 
In the months following Stembura‟s claims that the Czechoslovakian legation attempted 
to enlist him as an undercover agent, the RCMP counter-espionage branch began to investigate 
claims that the Soviet embassy in Ottawa attempted to intimidate its former citizens into 
returning behind the Iron Curtain. Soviet authorities were behind suspicious letters allegedly 
written by close relatives to Canadian residents in an attempt to force their return. Pearson 
indicated that there was no course of action for Canadian authorities to take as “there was no 
censorship of the mails in Canada.” Consequently, the federal minister noted that any evidence 
of the intimidation of Canadians or the improper conduct on the part of officials representing 
foreign governments should be sent to the authorities.
27
 Canadian authorities and anti-
communist 1948ers remained vigilant to the threat posed by the Communist government in 
Czechoslovakia. 
In July 1956, Masaryktown held its ninth Czechoslovak Day. At the annual celebration, 
members of MH discussed the reunification of families separated by the Iron Curtain. They 
resolved that the Canadian government should negotiate with the Communist authorities in 
Czechoslovakia to release all persons who wished to leave the country and be reunited with their 
families in the West. Individuals who chose to leave were also to be fairly compensated for their 
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properties.
28
 Canadian Czechoslovaks demanded that valid passports be issued for those persons 
who desired to leave as long as they asked for permission to immigrate to Canada or be released 
from their Czechoslovakian citizenship. The resolution included a request for the Communist 
authorities not to persecute emigrants seeking to leave the country and individuals whose poor 
health prevented them from leaving the country.
29
 The DEA instructed the Canadian legation in 
Prague to write letters on behalf of persons who sought to immigrate to Canada and were found 
to be admissible. The prospective immigrant then presented the letter to the Communist 
authorities informing them that a Canadian visa would be granted to the applicant provided that 
an exit permit and medical screening were successfully completed. Negotiations between the 
DEA and Prague centred on Czechoslovakians with dual citizenship and “pure Czechoslovaks” 
whose relatives resettled in Canada prior to the Communist takeover in 1948. After further 
discussion with Communist officials, the Canadian Legation in Prague forecasted “little hope” of 
family reunification for persons who left Czechoslovakia “illegally” after February 1948. The 
Communist regime in Czechoslovakia actively prevented 1948ers whom it believed worked to 
embarrass Prague from being reunited with their families.
30
 
Several months later in the fall of 1956, the CNA held its annual congress in Montreal. 
At the gathering, CNA executive member, Josef Broušek informed delegates that an agent of 
the StB spent the last five years collecting information on fellow compatriots in Toronto. As an 
executive member of the local CNA branch in Toronto, 55 year-old Dr. Bruno Dostál 
infiltrated the work of anti-Communist Czechoslovaks in Canada. As part of his operation, 
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Dostál was employed by the University of Toronto as a librarian. After suspicions were raised 
about his activities, Dostál returned to Czechoslovakia in October 1956 after he was suspected 
of spying on behalf of Prague. Information regarding his departure was confirmed when the 
Communist paper, Hlas domova (Voice of Homeland) in Prague published an interview with 
Dostál following his return to Czechoslovakia.
31
 Subsequently, outraged delegates representing 
thirty anti-Communist and pro-democratic groups in Canada issued a statement warning 
Czechoslovak Canadians “to be on guard against Red agents who may try to intimidate you.” 
Communist infiltration was increasingly seen as highly dangerous to Czechoslovak community 
institutions and to Canada‟s national security.  
Delegates at the annual CNA congress in Montreal also discussed the rift among the 
organization‟s membership.32 On the agenda of the two-day annual meeting in 1956 was how 
to heal the divide between those individuals who wanted to turn towards the promotion of 
Canadian citizenship and those who wanted to focus the organization‟s agenda towards 
returning democracy to Czechoslovakia. The discovery of another attempt by Prague to spy on 
its former citizens in Canada put further pressure on CNA members to deal with Communist 
infiltration within the Canadian Czechoslovak community. Newly-elected CNA president and 
the last democratic Czechoslovakian minister in Canada, František Němec identified the 
situation as the “most deplorable and damages the good name thousands of loyal 
Czech[oslovak]-Canadians have earned for themselves in this country.” The annual meeting 
unanimously approved a motion that called on the organization to re-establish unity among its 
membership. The CNA subsequently passed a resolution expressing the loyalty of its members 
to Canada and their willingness “to give our lives in the defence of our new homeland against 
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any enemy.
33
 For some members, Communist participation within their organization led them 
to renounce their membership. Upon hearing of Dostál‟s activities, Josef Ludvík, a member of 
the CNA‟s Toronto Branch headquartered at MH requested that the organization‟s head office 
immediately revoke his membership and his name from its member listing. Ludvík informed 
the CNA that as a political refugee and anti-communist he could no longer remain a member 
since a Communist was able to infiltrate the organization before returning to Czechoslovakia.
34
 
A week later, Czechoslovaks in Ottawa were to celebrate the anniversary of the birth of 
the Czechoslovak Republic, but the festivities were hindered by a demonstration in support of 
the Hungarian revolution. Local members of the CNA joined Hungarian Canadians and other 
individuals whose homelands were behind the Iron Curtain to protest the Soviet invasion of 
Hungary. The demonstration engaged old immigrants and recent arrivals from Eastern Europe 
to present a resolution to Minister of External Affairs, Lester Bowles Pearson demanding that 
Canada assist the Hungarian freedom fighters.
35
 In the Globe and Mail, former CNA executive 
and Czechoslovakian consul in Toronto, Karel Buzek indicated that the recent uprisings in 
Hungary and Poland begged the question whether Czechs and Slovaks had reached a moment 
to strike for freedom against the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia. The former national 
secretary of the CNA noted that “…we who are fortunate to have our homes in Canada must 
make it clear on their behalf, leaving no doubt, that our brothers and sisters in the old country 
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will not tolerate being a Soviet protectorate forever.” Buzek informed the Globe and Mail‟s 
readership that the Canadian Red Cross was one of the first humanitarian organizations to send 
aid to Hungary and that Canadians ought to get involved. Buzek desired that local ethnic 
groups meet in a conference to “secure more help for those who fight today, as well as for 
those who will fight tomorrow.”36  
In Czechoslovakia, the Communists maintained a substantial following across all 
sectors of society and controlled all aspects of daily life. Most Czechoslovakian citizens could 
do little to change the political situation in their country. Since Czechoslovakia remained a 
Communist satellite-state with a relatively higher standard of living than its counterparts in 
Eastern Europe, opposition towards the regime from within was often more measured, if not 
more apathetic. As a result, the uprisings that swept through Poland and Hungary in 1956 did 
not occur in Czechoslovakia. However, they served to awaken the country‟s intellectuals who 
would later commence a process of reforming the Communist system from within.
37
  
Canadians of Eastern European origin were shocked by the Communist infiltration in 
their organizations and dismayed by the Hungarian revolution. Across Canada, many 
Czechoslovaks struggled to promote the return of democracy in Czechoslovakia due to 
decreasing memberships as community members continued to turn towards the maintenance of 
ethnic identity and the promotion of Czech and Slovak culture. In Winnipeg, nineteen members 
of the local CNA branch met in the hall of the Canadian Czechoslovak Benevolent Association 
(CCBA) to renew their branch and continue their efforts against communism. With cooperation 
                                                 
36
 Karel Buzek, “Czech People Still Seek Freedom,” Globe and Mail, 7 November 1956, 6. 
37
 Kusin, The Intellectual Origins of the Prague Spring, 26-27. 
 190 
from the CCBA, and Western reports of daily Soviet repression in Hungary, the Winnipeg 
Branch was revitalized with over 105 members at the beginning of 1957.
38
 
 
Resolving Community Tensions 
During the first decade of the Cold War, relations between Canada and Czechoslovakia 
suffered due to political events in Eastern Europe. An increase in international tensions due in 
part to the workers‟ uprisings in East Germany in June 1953, Poznan, Poland in June 1956, the 
failed Hungarian Revolution of October 1956, and the subsequent emergence of hardline 
communist control caused a further setback to relations between Communist Eastern Europe and 
the West. Canadian diplomats informed officials back home that Prague maintained a “cautious 
policy” of developing better relations with the West.39 Within the Czechoslovak community, the 
failure of the workers‟ uprisings in East Germany and Poland combined with the demise of the 
Hungarian Revolution illustrated to anti-communist 1948ers that their attempts to help return 
democracy to Czechoslovakia would last longer than a few years. In the minds of many 1948ers, 
settlement in Canada was seen as temporary until their homeland was liberated from Communist 
rule. Sensing that their stay in Canada was becoming permanent due to events in Eastern Europe, 
many 1948ers began to turn their attention towards settling ideological differences between 
oldtimers and recent arrivals within the Czechoslovak community. Many of the differences 
between both groups in the Czechoslovak community revolved around the leadership and 
direction of the Sokol (Falcon) movement in Canada and the appropriation of its title. 
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As a patriotic voluntary organization established in Prague in the nineteenth century, the 
Sokol movement promoted patriotism and calisthenics for its educational, spiritual, and physical 
benefits. The movement‟s annual meetings were known as slets (flights).40 In interwar 
Czechoslovakia, the movement was firmly rooted in democratic principles and remained “above 
politics.”41 Sokol members were instructed to be the “first line of defense for freedom and 
democracy, not only in Canada and Czechoslovakia, but for the whole world through their 
physical and moral power, for peace and freedom should be the common property of all peace-
loving and free democratic peoples of every land.”42  
On 4 June 1957, former MH president Gustav Přístupa met with officials within the 
Department of the Secretary of State in Ottawa to give his version of the misunderstandings 
surrounding the use of the name Sokol by both groups. Přístupa indicated to the federal officials 
that a Sokol association existed in Toronto for years prior to the arrival of postwar Czech and 
Slovak refugees in Canada. Přístupa claimed that, the new arrivals were welcomed into the pre-
existing Czechoslovak community, yet many shunned any guidance offered by the oldtimers.  
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Among the wave of postwar arrivals were political refugees fleeing Communism who 
later established an organization named Sokols in Exile in 1949. Although Přístupa and his 
fellow members in Toronto briefly joined the group, they soon resigned as they considered 
themselves Canadians of Czechoslovakian extraction rather than Czechoslovaks in exile.
43
 
Canadian officials noted that “…one group considers themselves to be Canadian citizens and the 
purpose is to perpetuate Czechoslovakian customs so as to embody these customs in the 
Canadian way of life, whereas it is alleged that the newer group wishes to preserve 
Czechoslovakian customs and culture in the hope of their eventual return to their native land.” 
Přístupa informed Canadian officials that in his opinion, the 1948ers would forgo their desire to 
return to Czechoslovakia and seek to remain in Canada once they spent a certain number of years 
in their new country. The former MH president was keen to acknowledge that once the 1948ers 
began to identify with Canadian society conflicting interests would be reconciled among 
members of the community.
44
 
Přístupa‟s successor as MH president, Prokop V. Havlík lamented the divisions in the 
Canadian Czechoslovak community and specifically within the Sokol movement. Havlík sought 
to stabilize Toronto‟s Sokol unit at MH. In the mid-1950s, the Toronto Sokol unit‟s membership 
levels began to concern oldtimers and community leaders who feared that not enough Canadian 
Czechs and Slovaks were joining the Canadian Gymnastic Sokol Association. Havlík feared that 
numbers were dwindling because ethnic Czech and Slovak youth were not joining the Sokol 
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movement, turning instead to other Canadian pursuits.
45
 Conversely, the 1948er-led Sokol 
Gymnastic Association of Canada (SGAC) which previously left the Canadian Sokol movement 
joined the Czechoslovak Sokol Abroad to fight Communist rule in Czechoslovakia. Many 
postwar immigrants chose to join the latter group and involved their children as young members. 
In May 1958, the SGAC opened its own Sokol facility in Toronto and boasted 158 members, all 
partaking in calisthenics, sports, and cultural activities.
46
 A men‟s volleyball team competed 
provincially and a table tennis team played throughout the city.
47
 The opening celebration was 
attended by several officials including Jay Waldo Monteith, Minister of National Health and 
Welfare, W.J. Dunlop, Minister of Education for the Province of Ontario, and Vladimir Kaye, 
National Liaison Officer for the federal Department of Citizenship and Immigration.
48
 
In an attempt to diminish the influence of the old ethnic left across Canada, and promote 
their efforts against communism, federal and provincial politicians courted the ethnic vote. This 
courtship helped integrate “New Canadians” into society, and more importantly, civic life where 
they were increasingly co-opted into joining political parties, lobby groups, voting blocs, 
patronage appointments, and patron-client relationships.
49
 Beginning in the 1950s, a large 
portion of Canadians who arrived after the Second World War were ardent anti-communists and 
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tended to align themselves to the political tenets of the Progressive Conservative Party and the 
Liberal Party. The Conservatives actively sought out the anti-communist ethnic vote in an 
attempt to displace the vote for the left which dominated prewar ethnic politics in Canada. 
Postwar Displaced Persons (DPs) and refugees brought with them fresh memories of their 
persecution at the hands of the Communists in their home country. After 1948, ethnic Czechs 
and Slovaks were no strangers to Communist-led purges, imprisonment, harassment, 
surveillance, blackmail, and the suppression of individual and religious freedoms. As a result, the 
postwar anti-communist refugee identified predominantly with the Conservative Party brand 
while some immigrants viewed the Liberal Party as somehow linked to social democracy 
movements in Europe.
50
  
In hopes of raising support for the federal Liberal Party, Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration John Whitney Pickersgill, Minister of Finance Walter Edward Harris, and 
Parliamentary Assistant to the Minister of Defence Paul Hellyer joined the Czechoslovak Day 
celebrations and Sokol festival at Masaryktown. After attending the festivities, Pickersgill 
published his thoughts about the Sokol movement in Canada in MH‟s official organ, Nový 
domov stating that the movement 
…stressed the development of physical culture and the fostering of 
democratic principles,” and  claimed that “in a Sound Body there Dwelleth a 
Sound Soul…in Canada the Sokol tradition lives on, continuing to mould 
sound minds…bodies, producing the type of citizens who uphold the high 
principles on which the freedom and happiness of our country rests. If the 
real strength and the basic resources of a nation is its people, then activities 
such as Sokol are making an essential contribution to the development of 
Canada.
51
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In illustrating his support for the activities of MH and Sokol members, Walter Edward Harris 
wrote a letter to MH congratulating Sokol Toronto on the twenty-fifth anniversary of its 
founding which was subsequently published in Nový domov. Harris informed the newspaper‟s 
readership that he first visited MH and Sokol Toronto on the grounds of Masaryktown on 5 
December 1954. In his letter, Harris made the following comment: 
 
…members and their children have benefited from the physical and moral 
education program, of your organization. The Sokol idea is a great one, 
demanding constant activity and persevence [sic], but giving in return, the 
satisfaction of knowing that this effort is of great benefit to sister and brother 
members. The activity and growth of the Sokol Organization in Canada 
shows that Canadians of Czechoslovak origin have brought with them to this 
country, the best qualities from the land of their birth, and are putting them 
to practical use in the their adopted country, Canada.
52
  
 
In hoping to gain the support of the Czechoslovak community in Toronto, Harris and 
his wife became the first non-Czechoslovakian members of Sokol Toronto. In extending his 
best wishes to the members of Sokol Toronto on their milestone anniversary, Minister of 
National Health and Welfare Paul Martin indicated in Nový domov that he was also well 
acquainted with the programs of the Sokol movement across Canada. The federal minister 
noted that in 1955 he and his wife became members of the Sokol Windsor branch. Martin went 
on to argue that the significance of the efforts of the Sokol movement in Canada were two-fold: 
first, in helping new Canadians to “build healthy bodies and sound minds,” the Sokols were 
making an important contribution to the well-being of its members and Canadian society as a 
whole. Second, the federal minister believed that the Sokols were instrumental in preserving 
and strengthening health activities in Canada.
53
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Communist Tactics and Family Reunification Cases  
As transplanted party politics and ideological differences continued to shape relations 
between 1948ers and the pre-existing Czechoslovak community and its institutions, Canadian 
diplomats in Prague continued to suffer from Communist “intransigence” when it came to 
solving the longstanding issues pertaining to family reunification and Canadian consular affairs. 
Communist authorities in Prague continued to prevent the emigration of Czechoslovakians to 
Canada or their visits to the West. As a result, Canadian officials could not process the high 
demand for visas without the applicant possessing the proper travel documents.
54
 In September 
1958, the DEA was advised by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) that they 
previously received information indicating that Prague intended to permit the reunification of 
three or four children with their parents in Canada. Officials in Ottawa indicated that the StB 
corresponded with the Czech and Slovak parents in Canada. The children in question were left 
behind by their parents after fleeing from Communist Czechoslovakia. In one case, a Czech 
couple applied to the International Red Cross (IRC) in Geneva in the hopes of finding 
international support for their fight to be reunited with their child. Their son of twelve years of 
age was left in Czechoslovakia after the Communists seized power. On behalf of the Czech 
couple, the International Red Cross petitioned Prague to permit the reunification of their son with 
his parents. Authorities in Prague previously denied permission for the son to visit Canada. In an 
attempt to repatriate the parents, Communist officials informed the International Red Cross in 
Geneva that children should not be without their parents and that nothing was stopping them 
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from returning to Czechoslovakia to be with their son.
55
 In 1958, Communist authorities in 
Prague permitted thirty-three individuals to immigrate to Canada compared to only thirteen the 
previous year. The issuance of travel visas remained steady as approximately 400 Canadians 
were able to visit Czechoslovakia compared with only 275 the year before. Many of these 
individuals were officials, business representatives, and persons with friends and family in 
Czechoslovakia.
56
 
Although the Communist authorities were permitting individuals to enter the country, 
very few Czechoslovakians were able to secure the necessary documentation to leave the country 
legally. Individuals who left Czechoslovakia following the events of February 1948 remained 
separated from loved ones. In some cases, prominent anti-communist refugees solicited the 
services of their local Czechoslovakian consular office in the hopes that a close relative could be 
permitted to emigrate. On 7 January 1958, Bořivoj Čelovský, a 1948er who worked for Statistics 
Canada, approached the Czechoslovakian legation in Ottawa to enquire about bringing his 
ageing mother to Canada. The legation‟s third secretary Milan Kleník – who also served as the 
local StB officer and was codenamed “Kolda” – informed him that his mother could be brought 
over for a favour. “Kolda” asked Čelovský to infiltrate and monitor Czechoslovak organizations 
in Canada.
57
 Čelovský agreed to cease engaging in exile politics and swore that he viewed his 
emigration as “unfavourable.”58 After visiting the Czechoslovakian legation where he was given 
the StB codename “Red,” Čelovský informed the RCMP Special Branch of his meeting with the 
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Czechoslovakian diplomat and agreed to become a double-agent.
59
 While driving around the 
Ottawa Valley and the Outaouais region of Quebec, Kleník received regular reports from 
Čelovský about his activities. “Red” was given bottles of liquor and pretended to become 
intoxicated while discussing his activities. Čelovský also pretended to be an alcoholic in public 
in the hopes that his activities would be masked as those of an unreliable drunk.
60
 Soon enough, 
the local Czechoslovak community in Ottawa began to suspect he was a Communist. Čelovský 
remained a double-agent for a period of three years. During this time, “Red” was required to sign 
an oath of allegiance to Czechoslovakia. Two months after commencing his deception, the StB 
visited his mother in Ostrava and asked her to request a visit to Canada. The Communist 
authorities used the visit of Čelovský‟s mother to Canada as part of a scheme to follow Kleník in 
order to make sure that “Red” was clean.61 On 30 July, Čelovský‟s mother arrived in Canada and 
he no longer felt any desire to remain a double-agent, but continued to pretend he was an 
alcoholic and a traitor to Canada in order to deceive the StB.
62
 Following Čelovský‟s deception, 
the StB sent him a letter pretending to be from his ex-wife in which she demanded that he pay 
spousal support. This intiative was meant to cause further tension between him and his family in 
the hopes that he would become more dependent on the StB.
63
 Similar to Čelovský, other 
1948ers attempted to bring their close relatives to Canada. If this option remained closed, a few 
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individuals cooperated with the StB in the hopes that they could secure financial support, better 
accommodations, or a loan for their relatives to purchase an automobile in Czechoslovakia.
64
 
As Canadian Chargé d‟affaires in Prague in 1960, Arthur Julian Andrews wrote to 
Ottawa that “relatives in Czechoslovakia are one of the most important sources of pressure which 
can be brought to bear on persons living in Canada and this advantage will only be relinquished 
either in the face of considerable concessions or a threat.”65 In the spring of 1960, the Canadian 
legation suspected that Communist authorities were interfering with its mail or intimidating 
recipients of mail from the legation. In his correspondences with Ottawa, Andrews argued that 
the legation should limit its communication with applicants to persons with a “fair chance of 
obtaining permission” to leave the country – in order to protect legation staff and 
Czechoslovakian applicants. Andrews concluded rather pragmatically that applicants with 
relatives who left Czechoslovakia “illegally” after February 1948 should be avoided as their 
chances of success were minimal.
66
  
Beginning in 1960, Canadian Czechoslovaks were also introduced to a new form of 
blackmail by Communist authorities in Czechoslovakia. The RCMP informed the DEA that the 
StB “developed a technique for infiltrating illegal agents into Western countries” which was not 
previously seen by Canadian intelligence officials. According to the RCMP, the illegal agent 
gained entry to Canada by submitting a letter to the Canadian embassy in Prague. In the letter, 
the writer claimed that he or she was the illegitimate child of a Canadian woman living in 
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Czechoslovakia by an unknown father. The writer then requested Canadian citizenship after 
claiming that the Communist authorities refused him or her Czechoslovakian nationality. The 
RCMP noted that the mother of the applicant died prior to seeking a Canadian passport.
67
  
Dismayed by Communist tactics in their homeland, Czechoslovaks in Canada 
enthusiastically supported the implementation of a Canadian Bill of Rights by the Conservative 
government of Prime Minister John George Diefenbaker on 10 August 1960. The Canadian Bill 
of Rights attempted to entrench individual freedoms including religion and speech with the right 
to life, liberty, and security. The CNA‟s Ottawa Branch endorsed the new law and argued in a 
letter to Diefenbaker that:  
 
We – New Canadians from behind the Iron Curtain – fully appreciate the 
importance of the new Act, safeguarding the human dignity and political 
rights of each citizen. In the changing world of today, with all its 
revolutionary convulsions, your steadfast pursuit of the legalization of the 
high ideals of individual freedom remains a statesmanlike deed that only the 
history willy fully evaluate.
68
  
 
 
Discord between Canadian Czechs and Slovaks over the CNA‟s Federal Charter   
 
 Coinciding with the incorporation of Masaryk Memorial Hall into Masaryk Memorial 
Institute (MMI) on 16 July 1960, the CNA was given a federal charter and incorporated as a 
non-for-profit organization on 28 September 1960.
69
 The organization‟s name was changed to 
the Czechoslovak National Association of Canada (CNAC).
70
 Among the newly chartered 
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organization‟s goals were to “develop the highest standards of citizenship” for Czechoslovak 
Canadians through the establishment and participation in ethnocultural and patriotic activities. 
This agenda served to further Canadian citizenship in individuals of Czechoslovak origin in the 
following ways: act in all matters pertaining to the rights and welfare of Czechoslovak 
Canadians and those individuals coming to Canada from Czechoslovakia; aid in the 
improvement of socioeconomic and cultural conditions of Czechoslovaks in Canada and the 
rehabilitation of immigrants and refugees from Czechoslovakia; promote “tolerance, 
understanding, and goodwill” between all ethnic groups in Canada while maintaining and 
defending freedom and democracy in Canada and promoting democracy elsewhere in the 
world. Lastly, the CNAC was also responsible for instilling cultural and linguistic heritage and 
traditions among its members and the broader Czechoslovak community in Canada.
71
 
The CNAC‟s standing committees included a Committee on Refugees, Reconstruction 
and Rehabilitation – “to take charge of the programme to aid Czechoslovak refugees and others 
seeking asylum in Canada from persecution abroad and to assist them in establishing themselves 
in this country.” The committee was also responsible for “aid to Czechoslovaks elsewhere where 
such aid shall be deemed necessary for their rescue and rehabilitation.” The other committees 
included the Public Relations Committee, a Research, Press, and Archives Committee, and an 
Organization Committee.
72
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Fairclough presented the federal charter to the newly incorporated Czechoslovak National 
Association of Canada (CNAC) at a ceremony in Hamilton.
73
 
Not all Canadian Czechs and Slovaks approved of the federal charter and incorporation 
of the CNAC with a mandate to represent Canadians of Czechoslovak origin. Individuals who 
opposed the federal charter did so because of personality clashes and refugee politics originating 
in the party politics of interwar Czechoslovakia. Clerical, right-wing, moderate, and centre-left 
parties were re-established in exile by prominent individuals who were members of these 
government parties in democratic Czechoslovakia. In Canada, these groups re-assembled and 
began to speak for “Czechoslovaks” as their true representatives. Many of the 1948ers joined the 
CNAC. In the case of the latter, its membership was opposed by conservative and nationalist 
Czech and Slovak groups who previously accused Edvard Beneš and his followers of 
cooperating with the Soviet Union during and immediately after the Second World War.
74
 
Nationalist Canadian Slovaks opposed the CNAC‟s federal charter because it gave the 
organization a mandate to represent all ethnic Slovaks and Czechs.  
As the largest ethnic Slovak organization in Canada, the Canadian Slovak League (CSL) 
was incorporated and granted a federal charter on 26 June 1954.
75
 In March 1960, the CSL 
protested to the Department of the Secretary of State arguing that Canadian Slovaks were already 
represented on a similar mandate with the incorporation of the CSL. The organization argued 
that providing a federal charter to the CNAC would further confuse the Canadian public 
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regarding the differences between Czechoslovaks and Slovaks, and would provoke protests on 
the part of Canadian Slovaks. The CSL concluded that its members no longer lived in 
Czechoslovakia, and therefore “there is no ground for using the name of a foreign state for 
“protecting or educating” Canadians of Slovak origin.76 Nationalist Canadian Slovaks did not 
want the CNAC to use “Czechoslovak” as part of its organizational name. 
As proponents of a Catholic and conservative faction of 1948ers who were removed from 
the local CNA branch in Hamilton, Václav Vostřez and František Hašek opposed the CNAC‟s 
mandate and contested its executive‟s claim to represent all Czechs and Slovaks. As a former 
member of the right-wing and pro-business Agrarian Party in interwar Czechoslovakia, Vostřez 
disapproved of the centre-left and moderate party politics of many of the CNAC‟s members and 
among the 1948ers themselves.
77
 Canadian officials were aware of the inter-organizational 
politics between Czech and Slovak groups. Ottawa recognized that the MMI did not 
fundamentally oppose the CNAC‟s federal charter application as its leadership sought to steer 
the organization away from transplanted refugee politics and focus its resources on Canadian 
issues. 
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Ideological clashes continued to be present between members of the Sokol movement in 
Canada. On 31 May 1961, representatives of the SGAC and the Canadian Sokol Organization 
(Kanadská Obec Sokolská (KOS)) who were at odds with each other for years over the direction 
of the Sokol movement in Canada met in Toronto. Ervin Sypták and MMI president Prokop V. 
Havlík represented the KOS and were joined by Jan Waldauf, Karel Jeřábek, Jiří Corn, and Louis 
Vávra of the SGAC. Corn raised four issues in the meeting that he believed needed to be 
addressed: first, joint attendance in public for both groups; second, joint representation – athletic 
unity and working together on gymnastic issues in Canada; third, objections to a federal charter 
and incorporation for both organizations; and fourth, resolution of the differences in 
organizational names for both groups. Havlík replied by informing the representatives of the 
SGAC that the Sokol unit based at MMI and Masaryktown would continue to operate there and 
would not relocate its activities. Consequently, Louis Vávra noted that the hundredth anniversary 
of the Sokol movement was to occur in 1962 and that it was in the interest of all Czechoslovaks 
to hold a united Slet. Vávra envisioned a united Slet that included oldtimers – who supported the 
Sokol movement‟s calisthenics and the preservation of Czechoslovak cultural heritage, and the 
1948ers – who also emphasized Sokol‟s non-partisan democratic values. Havlík replied that the 
annual Czechoslovak Day and Slet would continue under any conditions because “they have a 
tradition that cannot be disobeyed.” Both groups agreed to continue discussions on how to find a 
“modus vivendi” within Toronto‟s Czechoslovak community.78 Although both parties sought 
reconciliation, SGAC and KOS remained separate groups. On 20 May 1962, the SGAC hosted 
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its fourth annual Slet at the Central National Exhibition displaying gymnastics, group 
calisthenics, track and field, and folk dancing.
79
 
In December 1964, KOS published its first magazine, Sokol – Toronto News Letter. As 
the original Toronto Sokol unit housed at MMI, the group sought to inform its members and the 
greater public about its physical fitness and social program. The KOS hosted dances, hallowe‟en 
parties, and its annual Slet in July at Masaryktown.
80
 With increasing cooperation between rival 
Sokol institutions in Canada, KOS ceased to exist two years later. Sokol units across Canada 
joined the SGAC which became known as Sokol Canada.
81
  
According to its membership, the incorporation of the CNA into the CNAC in the fall of 
1960 greatly increased its mandate to effectively speak on behalf of the Canadian Czechoslovak 
community. The organization took a leading role in the establishment of ethnocultural and 
patriotic activities, and lobbied the Canadian government to assist the Canadian Czechoslovak 
community in its efforts to promote democracy in Communist Czechoslovakia. A small group of 
conservative Canadian Czechs and the nationalist Canadian Slovak League opposed the CNAC‟s 
federal charter because they believed that the Czechoslovak-oriented organization did not speak 
for them. In attempting to steer clear of identity politics, the CNAC sought to focus its activities 
on domestic issues. 
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Assisting Newcomers from Czechoslovakia and the Promotion of Canadian Citizenship 
As Canadian Czechoslovaks began to resolve ideological tensions between members 
within the Sokol movement; many of these same individuals were also members of the CNAC 
and MMI. The CNAC‟s various committees worked alongside MMI due to its experience in 
financially supporting immigrants from Czechoslovakia. The Women‟s Council of the CNAC 
regularly corresponded with MMI to guarantee that newcomers were accommodated in Canada. 
Established in 1960, the Women‟s Council of the CNAC secured accommodations, clothing, 
food, employment, language courses, and access to new schools for refugee families. 
Incidentally, newcomers were grateful for the early support these groups offered them. However, 
many refugees – while thankful for community support – felt they had overused community 
resources and refused additional support out of fear of losing their independence or ability to 
make decisions for themselves or their families.
82
 In many instances, the Women‟s Council was 
the intermediary between newcomers and the existing Czechoslovak community in Toronto and 
across Canada. In recognizing the needs and desires of refugee families, volunteers from the 
council individually assessed each refugee family on their own merits to determine whether they 
required clothing, employment, and residence, or simply financial support to send their children 
to summer camp at Masaryktown.
83
 The Women‟s Council was also instrumental in sending 
donations and clothing to Czechs and Slovaks in refugee camps in Austria, West Germany, and 
Italy.
84
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In December 1962, MMI members were captivated by news of a young Czech 
stowaway‟s escape to Canada. After spending three days in the freezing fuselage compartment of 
an outbound Cubana Airlines plane from Prague, fifteen year-old stowaway Miloš Navrátil 
disembarked in Gander, Newfoundland where Canadian immigration officials noticed the 
adolescent did not possess any travel documents. Subsequently, the Cubana Airlines employees 
were forced to admit that the boy was a stowaway. Canadian immigration officials enquired 
whether he wished to remain in Canada and seek asylum or continue to Havana. Navrátil replied 
that he had a great uncle in Ottawa and that he wished to remain in Canada.
85
 News of the 
teenage stowaway spread quickly as several Canadian newspapers reported his story to 
Canadians. Immigration officials took Navrátil from Gander to Pier 21 in Halifax where he was 
processed. Later, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) requested 
further information from Canadian immigration officials to determine whether Navrátil could be 
considered as a convention refugee.
86
 In a letter sent a week later from MMI to the Acting 
Superintendent of Immigration at Pier 21, Prokop V. Havlík informed immigration officials that 
an anonymous Canadian Czechoslovak donated $100 dollars to Navrátil. The president of MMI 
also demanded that Navrátil “as an escapee from a country ruled by communists, should be in 
the category of opponents to the communistic rule” and be permitted to remain in Canada. 
Havlík claimed that should the young stowaway‟s relatives not be located, MMI would assume 
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responsibility for him.
87
 Two months later, Miloš Navrátil was taken in by Jaroslav Tichý and his 
wife in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia.
88
 As an important Canadian Czechoslovak organization, MMI 
was instrumental in providing assistance to newcomers from Czechoslovakia. The plight of 
Miloš Navrátil illustrated that MMI successfully lobbied Canadian authorities to have the fifteen 
year-old stowaway legally admitted into Canada as an individual who fled from communism in 
his homeland. Masaryk Memorial Institute also guaranteed Navrátil‟s safety and provided 
assistance in locating accommodations and basic necessities upon his arrival.   
In an effort to assist recently arrived refugees, non-Czechoslovakian groups often donated 
funds to MMI for its activities at Masaryktown. The Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter Day Saints donated $25 dollars which was later allocated to Jan Machálek, a fifteen-year-
old boy who recently arrived in Canada with his widowed mother after residing in West 
Germany as a refugee. In gratitude for the contribution, Havlík invited the church to send a 
young child, of eight to twelve years of age, to spend two weeks at Masaryktown during the 
annual children‟s summer camp.89 As a charitable organization, MMI carried out many of its 
activities at its centre of Czechoslovak community life, Masaryktown, in Scarborough on the 
outskirts of Toronto. Although established to provide financial, cultural, and educational support 
to “Czechoslovak people,” it did not restrict its programs to individuals and families of Czech or 
Slovak origin. Masaryktown held annual children‟s summer camps where families paid a small 
fee, while orphans and underprivileged children were admitted free of charge. The Masaryk 
Memorial Institute permitted other groups to use the grounds at Masaryktown including the local 
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Scarborough police club, Catholic Aid Society, and the Toronto Young Men‟s Christian 
Association Camping Branch. The latter group often voluntarily contributed to the MMI building 
fund which collected funds for property maintenance and the future construction of a community 
residence for elderly Czechs and Slovaks.
90
 Similarly, individuals and families were welcomed 
by MMI to use Masaryktown‟s grounds and swimming pool for a nominal fee of five dollars. 
Guides were provided to supervise children‟s activities and to train adolescents in gymnastics 
and other physical pursuits.
91
 
Czechs and Slovaks in remote communities across Canada also solicited MMI for short-
term financial support or long-term charity due to unemployment, disability, and illness. A 
questionnaire sent to respondents asked whether the individual in need was employed, their 
salary or wage, behaviour on the job, level of honesty, and whether they were married and had 
children. In one case, MMI was unable to easily reach a compatriot in northern Ontario and sent 
a “Questionairre [sic.] for charity” to the local postmaster in town to verify the individual‟s 
character and whether they were a “good risk” for a loan. The local postmaster in Renabie, 
Ontario replied by stating that the individual seeking a short-term loan was “a very good worker, 
does not miss a shift, never drinks.” The applicant was deemed to be honest and conscientious. 
When asked if there was any illness or accident which made it necessary for assistance, the 
postmaster replied: “no – s.o.s. children‟s teeth – Mrs. E. is a very good wife and housekeeper – 
but they have never enough money for a dentist (for example).”92 
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Supporting Czechoslovak Ethnocultural Heritage in Canada 
In his 1964 annual report to the membership of MMI, assistant treasurer Edward Ovsenný 
discussed the organization‟s future and its “cultural purpose.” Ovsenný asked “why does MMI 
continue to exist? Are not most of us assimilated into the „Canadian way of life‟…especially the 
second generation? Why are we of the board of directors, striving so strongly to keep a bit of the 
old world culture alive in this modern New World community? What good is it? Who now needs 
it?” Since the treasurer‟s annual report contained only financial information about the 
corporation, Ovsenný sensed that communal reflection was necessary in order to decide upon the 
institute‟s future role in Canada as a centre of Czechoslovak community life. In 1964, the 
assistant treasurer argued that European culture and way of life contributed to the Czech or 
Slovak immigrant‟s experience in Canada. However, time and assimilation made it more difficult 
for the institute to attract second-generation youth as members. Ovsenný proposed that MMI 
adapt to the changing interests of young parents. If MMI did not directly engage youth and 
young adults, its purpose would be “doomed to a slow denegration.”93 
In the summer of 1963, the Canadian government announced that it would examine the 
state of biculturalism and bilingualism across Canada and recommend any necessary actions to 
improve the relationship between English and French Canada and recognize the cultural 
contributions of other ethnic groups in the country. On 19 July 1963, the Liberal government of 
Prime Minister Lester Bowles Pearson established a Royal Commission to evaluate the existing 
state of bilingualism and biculturalism in Canada. The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and 
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Biculturalism was implemented to recommend how the federal government could develop the 
country based on an equal partnership between Anglophones and Francophones.
94
 As part of its 
mandate, the Royal Commission also took into account the cultural contribution of other ethnic 
groups in Canada. On 10 October 1963, commission co-secretaries Neil M. Morrison and Paul 
Lacoste welcomed ethnic groups to submit briefs to the Royal Commission.
95
 As the local 
Member of Parliament for the Toronto riding of Parkdale in which the original Masaryk Hall 
resided, Stanley Haidasz, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Health and 
Welfare, invited Czechoslovaks in Toronto to submit a brief to the Royal Commission and to 
participate at the public hearings of the commission.
96
   
As a national ethnic organization which claimed to represent the Czechoslovak 
community across Canada, the CNAC submitted a brief to the Royal Commission detailing its 
observations and recommendations.
97
 Similar to other ethnic groups, the Czechoslovak 
contribution to the commission was later labelled as “generally cautious, even-handed and 
largely supportive of the Commission‟s role.”98 The CNAC‟s brief indicated that the association 
believed that “the maintenance and strengthening of a united, though not necessarily uniform 
Canada to be a goal towards which they are prepared to work and contribute their share.”99 
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Although the CNAC recognized the “special position” of the English and French languages in 
Canadian society, it felt that Canada of the early 1960s was a product of a multitude of ethnic 
groups. As the CNAC remained sympathetic to the political and cultural aspirations of French 
Canadians, it argued that these aspirations had to be compatible with Canadian unity and the 
work of the federal government. As a result, CNAC members approved of any necessary 
constitutional changes to support French Canadian demands if they did not “jeopardize Canada‟s 
integrity.”100 In discussing the role of French Canadian minorities outside of Quebec, the CNAC 
recommended that rights be given to “minority” schools, involvement in government, and that 
the use of French be guaranteed when dealing with federal authorities. 
The CNAC used the example of interwar Czechoslovakia where Sudeten German and 
Hungarian minorities, for example, were assured linguistic rights for their own schools and for 
all judicial and administrative offices in districts where an ethnic minority represented a 
minimum of twenty percent of the local population. The brief noted that “the European 
experience in linguistically mixed areas is that the acquisition of an additional language is the 
result of either economic necessity or the close daily contact of two interdependent ethnic 
groups, and that attempts to increase the knowledge of the second language by force or 
propaganda are generally unsuccessful.”101 
 When it came time to discuss multiculturalism, the CNAC appreciated that Canada did 
not force its ethnic communities to rapidly integrate, and as a result supported a much slower 
process of assimilation. Ethnic Czech and Slovak children in Canada were able to learn English 
or French as a second language to their benefit. However, instruction in ethnic languages other 
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than English and French was to be left to “private initiative” of the parents or ethnic community, 
and supported by public funds.
102
 The CNAC supported government funding of multiculturalism, 
but sought to remain responsible for its implementation at a local level – in the home and the 
ethnic community. Consequently, the CNAC argued that Canada‟s cultural evolution would be 
strengthened if individuals with diverse ethnic backgrounds were represented in public 
organizations including the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Canada Film Board, and federal 
and provincial departments with portfolios in cultural and educational affairs.
103
 
In having sold half of its Masaryktown property to alleviate a difficult financial situation 
a decade earlier, MMI funded a voluntary English-language school, its weekly newspaper Nový 
domov, a community library, a local Sokol unit, and the annual children‟s summer camp at 
Masaryktown.
104
 During this period, $416,813.46 was raised from bingo games as revenues to be 
used to maintain these services for the Czechoslovak community in Toronto.
105
 Thirty-nine 
percent of bingo funds were used for relief and assistance – support for the needy, elderly, or 
disabled, and for the future construction of an old age home in Masaryktown. A quarter of all 
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funds were allocated for the cultural, recreational, and entertainment activities including the 
annual children‟s summer camp at Masaryktown. Meanwhile, nearly twenty-two percent was put 
towards physical training involving the local Sokol unit. Eleven percent of funds were used to 
support “Obligations of Canadian Citizenship” such as literature and art pertaining to Canada.106 
In early 1964, MMI informed the Canadian Czechoslovak community that it was allotting 
$1,250 towards a scholarship fund. The institute envisioned that students would receive prizes if 
they met the following conditions: Czech, Slovak, or Carpathian Ruthenian ancestry; high school 
matriculation with first or second class honours; and enrolment in university studies. Applicants 
submitted a written composition on the theme of “Constructive Citizenship – a Conscious 
Responsibility” pertaining to either the family, Czechoslovakian ethnic group, or to a town, city, 
country, or the world. Submissions were to remain between 250 to 750 words and could be 
written in Czech, Slovak, Carpathian Ruthenian, English, or French. Seven prizes were allocated 
for the competition. A first prize of $500 dollars was established with the seventh prize winner 
receiving $20. Submissions were judged by a scholarship committee comprised of the institute‟s 
executive officers and Czech and Slovak Supplementary school teachers, and the editorial staff 
of Nový Domov.
107
 
In order to fund the scholarship program and its other community activities, the institute 
continued to hold twice-weekly bingo games to raise funds and sought to licence and supervise 
the games to prevent undesirable individuals from seizing control of its fundraising structure. 
Local authorities were aware of the bingo games and only banned them once it became clear that 
they were becoming frequent. Players were charged one dollar as an entrance fee and $3.35 for 
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bingo cards.
108
 As a result, 66.7 percent of the income generated from the games returned to 
participants in the form of prizes, while 5.05 percent was paid to staff the games, a further 28.25 
percent was left as gross profit. The revenue from these bingo games was used to fund cultural, 
educational, and welfare activities. Similarly, funds were used to improve MMI‟s facilities.109 
The institute‟s bingo games were shut down by local police after a court order instructed local 
authorities to confiscate the organization‟s bingo blower machine.110 In court, the institute 
pleaded guilty to operating an illegal gaming establishment and was handed a $2,000 fine.
111
 The 
institute continued to search for ways to generate revenue in order to continue to provide cultural 
programs and financial assistance to the Czechoslovak community in Toronto and across 
Canada. 
Increasingly, community members became concerned with maintaining a Czechoslovak 
ethnocultural heritage in Canada as younger members of the community were assimilating into 
Canadian society, and were no longer participating in community activities. In an effort to 
support its activities including a children‟s summer camp, scholarship program for students, 
community library, newspaper, and local Sokol group, MMI held fundraising activities such as 
bingo games in an effort to maintain its financial viability. As the Canadian Czechoslovak 
community worked to support its goals to preserve its ethnocultural heritage for younger 
generations, its membership engaged the Canadian government to increase family reunifications 
and to undermine the Communist government in Czechoslovakia. 
                                                 
108
 LAC, MMI Fonds, MG 28 V110, volume 7, file “Miscellaneous – Bingo,” Masaryk Memorial Institute 
Incorporated and the Bingo Games, 3 April 1965, 2. 
109
 Ibid., 3. 
110
 LAC, MMI Fonds, MG 28 V110, volume 4, file “Correspondence, January-19 May 1965,” letter from Prokop V. 
Havlik to Arthur Maloney, 19 May 1965. 
111
 LAC, MMI Fonds, MG 28 V110, volume 4, file “Correspondence, January-19 May 1965,” letter from D.C. 
Trowell, Vice-President, CKEY 59 Radio to Arthur Maloney, Barrister for MMI, 18 May 1965. Counsel Arthur 
Maloney represented MMI in court. Magistrate C.A. Thorburn fined the institute $2000 for operating an illegal 
gaming establishment. 
 216 
 
Permitted to Travel: Czechoslovakians Come to Canada 
Early in the 1960s, the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia began to rewrite its 
emigration regulations whereby the reunification of families would be facilitated.
112
 Individuals 
who left Czechoslovakia “illegally” after February 1948 were permitted to return for a visit 
without difficulties as long as they did not engage in activities detrimental to Czechoslovakia.
113
 
Officials in Ottawa asked their legation staff in Prague to confirm whether the DEA‟s practice of 
submitting individual cases to the Communist authorities was harming each applicant‟s chances 
of success, and whether submitting a list of names was preferable.
114
 Karel Vojáček, the head of 
the Consular Department within the Czechoslovakian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed 
Western diplomats that Prague eased its visa restrictions and allowed Czechs and Slovaks 
travelling on a Canadian passport to enter Czechoslovakia. Canadian citizens were no longer to 
be considered as Czechoslovakian citizens who could be detained for illegally leaving the 
Communist regime. More importantly, Czechs and Slovaks who left the country more than a 
decade ago were to be granted a visa, excluding individuals who actively opposed the 
Communist regime. As a result of this change, Czech and Slovak parents residing in Canada 
could now reunite with the children they left behind, while couples could legally emigrate and be 
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married abroad. Czechoslovakian diplomats hoped that the lessening of emigration and travelling 
restrictions would bring about friendly relations between East and West.
115
 Canadian 
Ambassador to Prague, John Alexander McCordick assessed the new consular conditions:  
 
It is evident that the Czech[oslovakian]s have come to the conclusion that 
their former policy was costing them much in the image they created abroad 
and was not compatible with the campaign they were mounting to attract 
large numbers of tourists to this country, especially from among Czechs who 
had settled elsewhere in the last 30 years or so.
116
  
 
In August 1965, a Canadian Parliamentary Delegation landed in Czechoslovakia for an 
inaugural visit. The delegation was invited by Czechoslovakia‟s National Assembly. Prague‟s 
earlier step to allow Czechs and Slovaks with Canadian citizenship to visit their old homeland, 
and for families to be reunited remained a hollow gesture. Canadian parliamentary 
representatives raised the issue of family reunification with Communist politicians indicating 
that since 1961 only 260 Czechoslovakians were able to legally immigrate to Canada. 
Communist officials informed Canadian representatives that Prague viewed emigration as an 
internal matter in which Canada could not interfere. On 2 May 1966, Canadian delegation 
members submitted a list of thirty applicants to the Czechoslovakian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
in the hopes of reuniting Canadian citizens with their relatives in Czechoslovakia. An additional 
list of twenty-five names was sent a month later. Communist authorities in Prague viewed the 
gesture as another “negative issue” in which Ottawa had no jurisdiction to interfere.117 As 
Canadian officials lobbied Prague for the reunification of families, the Department of Manpower 
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and Immigration introduced a White Paper calling for the introduction of new liberalized 
immigration regulations that eliminated racial and geographic discrimination. Refugees who held 
ideological beliefs in opposition to those of the Canadian government – including Communism – 
would continue to encounter difficulty in gaining entry to Canada.
118
 
Communist authorities in Prague ignored Canadian demands for family reunification and 
actively promoted the repatriation of Czechs and Slovaks back across the Iron Curtain as they 
increased espionage activities in Canada. Although a majority of the individuals who returned 
behind the Iron Curtain were communists predominantly of ethnic Slovak origin, a few did 
return as spies. The RCMP Directorate of Security and Intelligence observed that the Soviets 
were using “evasive countersurveillance techniques” by arranging to meet their agents outside of 
urban centres.
119
 On 3 October 1965, Victor Myznikov, a KGB (Komitet gosudarstvennoy 
bezopasnosti – Committee for State Security) officer within the Soviet embassy in Ottawa used 
“hitchhiking” as a means to meet one of his agents in Brockville, Ontario. Once there, Myznikov 
handed his contact two papers. The KGB officer returned to Ottawa, while his contact departed 
for Toronto and later flew back to Edmonton via Thunder Bay.
120
 Born in Canada to parents of 
Slovak origin, Mike Mihalcin, Jr. moved back to Czechoslovakia with his family after the 
Second World War. In 1961, he returned to Canada with his wife and child as a StB spy. The 
Mihalcins resettled in Edmonton under their real names. Upon discovering Mihalcin, the RCMP 
Special Branch believed they had made a significant discovery because to them he showed 
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“signs of a deep penetration agent.”121 The RCMP Special Branch nicknamed their surveillance 
of Mihalcin as “Operation Kitbag” and codenamed him as “Elf.”122 Canadian security officials 
waited for the StB sleeper agent to make his first move in Canada. 
While Canadian authorities watched for Communist spies, and Canadian diplomats 
continued to pressure Prague for the reunification of Czechoslovakians with their Canadian 
relatives, the CNAC held its eighteenth congress in Hamilton on 16 April 1966. A particular 
focus of the agenda was the problem of compensation to Canadians for property nationalized in 
Czechoslovakia.  Members in attendance resolved to request that the Canadian government insist 
that Prague agree to pay compensation to persons who were Canadian citizens at the time that 
their property was nationalized by the Communist authorities.
123
 In a letter to the Secretary of 
State for External Affairs, Paul Martin, CNAC president Antonín Daičar and secretary general 
Jiří Corn argued that international law “afflicts an injustice on persons who were not citizens of 
the espousing state at the time when the property damages were suffered. It would appear that 
these persons do not enjoy the same protection as other Canadian citizens.”124 Congress 
delegates were concerned with Prague‟s refusal to transfer estate inheritances and proceeds from 
the sales of assets in Czechoslovakia to their beneficiaries in Canada. Subsequently, attendees 
urged Ottawa to adopt a “policy of reciprocation” by denying the transfer of proceeds from sales 
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of property in Canada to their inheritors in Czechoslovakia.
125
 A year later on 1 April, CNAC 
members met in Ottawa to discuss further lobbying efforts regarding compensation claims for 
the nationalized property and the renunciation of Czechoslovakian citizenship.
126
 
Perhaps sensing that the world‟s attention would soon be focused on Canada and learning 
of the Czechoslovakian President‟s upcoming visit to Montreal in May, the CNAC informed 
Canadian officials that it would not take part in nor support any protests that could damage or 
embarrass Canada. On behalf of their membership, CNAC president Antonín Daičar and 
secretary general Jiří Corn indicated that under normal circumstances they would have asked 
their members to demonstrate in protest of Novotný‟s visit to Canada. However, both men 
desired to “do our duty as loyal citizens of Canada on the occasion of its centenary and so we 
appeal to all Slovaks and Czechs to be composed and dignified and permit a correct reception of 
Mr. Novotný and his entourage.”127 
On 14 May, Canada‟s Governor General Roland Michener welcomed President Antonín 
Novotný to Canada for his five-day official visit to Ottawa, Quebec City, and the International 
and Universal Exposition in Montreal (Expo 67) to discuss bilateral trade, cultural affairs, and 
technology.
128
 In a press conference held in Ottawa, Czechoslovakia‟s president was asked 
                                                 
125
 Ibid. 
126
 Although the CNAC‟s membership was energized to seek a favourable outcome for these issues, the organization 
gained 58 new members while losing twenty-eight individuals who departed, relocated or were deceased. In all, the 
CNAC welcomed an increase of thirty individuals among its ranks. The CNAC was now comprised of twelve 
branches – all in urban centres, except for Batawa, Ontario. See LAC, CNAC Fonds, MG 28 V111, volume 3, file 
15 “XVIII Congress, 1966,” Československé národní sdruţení v Kanadé centennial kongres, Ottawa, Ontario – 1. 
Dubna 1967, 12. 
127
 LAC, CNAC Fonds, MG 28 V111, volume 14, file 8 “Head Office – General Correspondence, 1967-1968,” letter 
“Why Canadian Czechs and Slovaks will not Demonstrate against Mr. Novotný, President of Czechoslovakia and 
Canada‟s Guest at Expo 67,” from Antonín Daičar and Jiří Corn to Unknown, Secretary of State for External 
Affairs, n.d., 3. 
128
 Canadian Press, “Michener, Pearson Welcome Novotny,” Globe and Mail, 15 May 1967, 11; Canadian Press, 
“Czech President to Talk Trade during Visit,” Toronto Daily Star, 15 May 1967, 3. From 27 April to 29 October, 
Montreal played host to the 1967 International and Universal Exposition. Commonly referred to as Expo 67, the 
event brought 62 countries and their representative exhibits to Canada during its centennial year. 
 221 
whether political prisoners built some of his country‟s displays at the Expo in Montreal. Novotný 
could only reply that it was entirely possible. A small commotion erupted when Lubor Zink, a 
1948er, and Toronto Telegram correspondent asked the president whether Ottawa and Prague 
concluded a secret agreement to suppress defections among Expo 67 personnel who desired to 
stay in Canada.
129
 Perturbed by the question, Novotný subsequently denied any knowledge of a 
secret agreement between both countries and labelled Zink a spy who was “engaged in these 
activities himself.”130 Zink‟s conservative stance and anti-communism shone through when he 
continued to question the Communist leader by asking about the status of individuals in the “so-
called free socialist society” of Czechoslovakia.131 The exchange between Novotný and Zink 
made national headlines and was also followed by the international press. Zink went on to 
receive dozens of letters from Canadians and compatriot organizations overseas including České 
slovo (Czech Word: Newspaper of the Czechoslovak Exiles), whose editor praised Zink‟s direct 
questioning of the Czechoslovakian leader.
132
 Two days later, the Czechoslovakian president 
arrived in Montreal and visited his country‟s pavilion at Expo 67 where he was enthusiastically 
greeted by a fifty-five year old, William Valeš who alongside Novotný was imprisoned at the 
Mauthausen concentration camp during the Second World War. Similarly, Novotný was 
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confronted by Gerry Kernc, a Montreal resident who slipped the president a letter seeking help in 
getting his 23 year-old twin daughters, Ludmila and Marie from Prague to Expo 67.
133
   
As Ambassador and General Commissioner for Czechoslovakia‟s participation at EXPO 
67, Miroslav Galuška informed Canadians that it was Prague‟s ambition in Montreal to bring 
“new foundations for a yet wider development of mutual contacts in the years which are to 
come.” Galuška hoped that both countries‟ involvement in the exhibition would result in a 
“mutual acquaintance, a contribution to international cooperation and to the consolidation of 
world peace.”134 The Communist authorities desired an increase in economic trade with Canada 
to aid their stagnant economy. Prague was interested in importing wheat, metals, chemicals, 
asbestos, hides, and seeds from Canada. Conversely, Czechoslovakian officials sought to export 
ham, beer, jewelry, glass, sports equipment, furniture, among other goods.
135
 The Communist 
government hoped that trade would increasingly lead to peaceful coexistence between both 
countries.
136
 
In May 1967, the DEA informed Canadian citizens that Ottawa was entering negotiations 
with the Czechoslovakian government over outstanding claims by individual Canadians against 
Prague. Potential claims were limited to issues involving nationalized property, rights, interests, 
and debts with the Communist government after February 1948. In its Notice Concerning Claims 
of Canadian Citizens against Czechoslovakia, the department could not guarantee that individual 
and business claims would be submitted to Prague, and requested that the attached questionnaire 
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be submitted to Ottawa with supporting evidence before 1 September 1967.
137
 , The CNAC 
lobbied Ottawa to pressure Czechoslovakia‟s visiting president, Antonín Novotný and delegation 
officials during their visit to Expo 67 in Montreal. The CNAC demanded that the Canadian 
government request that Prague permit Czechoslovakian nationals to visit Montreal for Expo 67, 
especially individuals whose expenses were to be paid by Canadian residents. The CNAC 
demanded that Canadian claims for property nationalized by the Communist authorities be 
settled and called on the Canadian government to include claims from persons who became 
Canadian citizens after the nationalization of their property. The reunification of 
Czechoslovakian families and Prague‟s acceptance of the renunciation of Czechoslovakian 
citizenship by naturalized Canadian citizens were included in the CNAC‟s lobbying efforts 
before Ottawa.
138
 
As Czechoslovakia‟s Expo 67 representatives promoted cordial relations between both 
countries, StB spy Mike Mihalcin flew to Montreal to meet Anatoli Shalnev, a Soviet citizen 
attached to the Soviet pavilion. Both men met on Park Avenue where Mihalcin received a 
shortwave radio and tuner to be able to listen to coded Soviet intelligence broadcasts. Soon after, 
the RCMP finally brought Mihalcin in for questioning. During his interrogation, “Elf” admitted 
that he was a Soviet spy who received coded information. Mihalcin claimed that his shortwave 
radio broke soon after acquiring it and therefore, he ignored all Soviet information and espionage 
activity. Whether the RCMP found Mihalcin‟s story credible is debatable, but he was later 
released on the belief that too much time elapsed for him to have been a productive and useful 
double agent. During his interrogation, Mihalcin informed the RCMP Security Service that he 
                                                 
137
 LAC, CNAC Fonds, MG 28 V111, volume 33, file 2 “Hamilton Branch No. 34 – Correspondence, 1967-1968,” 
DEA, Notice Concerning Claims of Canadian Citizens Against Czechoslovakia, May 1967. 
138
 LAC, CNAC Fonds, MG 28 V111, volume 14, file 8 “Head Office – General Correspondence, 1967-1968,” letter 
from Antonín Daičar and Jiří Corn to Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs, 10 May 1967, 2-3. 
 224 
became disillusioned with Soviet Communism after his return to Canada, and as a result, simply 
chose to ignore further Soviet information and activity.
139
 
Even as the CNAC lobbied the Canadian government to assist in efforts to reunite 
Czechoslovakian citizens with their relatives in Canada, and compensation for nationalized 
property, the organization also submitted its recommendations to the Special Joint Committee of 
the Senate and the House of Commons on Immigration. The Special Joint Committee examined 
the proposed new immigration regulations and the introduction of the points system which 
removed geographic and racial discrimination and focused on linguistic ability, previous 
education, and employment experience in the selection of immigrants. The CNAC argued that 
membership in the Communist Party should not preclude an applicant from gaining entry into 
Canada from Eastern Europe. The association noted that in many cases, individuals were coerced 
into joining the party out of fear of losing their employment and the persecution of close 
relatives. Known democrats and their relatives were denied promotions and access to higher 
education which often also included subsequent generations. The CNAC recommended that the 
federal government permit Eastern Europeans to seek asylum and be recognized as refugees 
regardless of whether they were admissible according to the proposed points system.
140
  
For those Czechoslovakian citizens who were granted passports by Communist 
authorities to travel to Expo 67, many were finally able to visit their families in Canada.
141
 
Approximately one-fourth of persons legally permitted to travel outside of Czechoslovakia 
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headed west.
142
 In certain cases, individuals chose to request asylum once in Canada. A majority 
of these individuals chose to resettle in Toronto. The MMI undertook a large action for these 
newcomers by assisting them as they were processed by the local office of Department of 
Manpower and Immigration in Toronto. The newcomers were each loaned a maximum of $140 
per week from the Czechoslovak Credit Union to meet their basic living expenses. As the 
waiting period for Landed Immigrant Status was long, MMI contacted Canadian officials and 
arranged for individual work permits on behalf of their recently arrived compatriots. As 
chairman of MMI‟s Immigration and Public Relations Committee, František Novotný negotiated 
with Canadian immigration officials on behalf of Czechoslovakian immigrants and signed 
guarantees for individuals requesting political asylum.
143
 In certain cases, Ottawa attempted to 
deport some of the asylum seekers back to Czechoslovakia due to their political backgrounds as 
Communist Party members. After lobbying the federal government, MMI was able to prevent 
their deportation. The asylum seekers became known in Toronto as the „Expo Émigrés.‟ Once 
their immigrant status was ascertained, the institute contacted the Ontario Department of 
Education and arranged for six month English-language courses with financial assistance 
consisting of $35 for single adults and $75 for families.
144
 In his report to the membership of 
MMI, Novotný indicated that he attempted to secure accommodations and employment for these 
refugees with Czechoslovak families and businesses in Toronto. The cultural officer also claimed 
that finding accommodations and work for these new arrivals was difficult in the greater Toronto 
                                                 
142
 Korbel, Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia, 276. 
143
 LAC, MMI Fonds, MG 28 V110, volume 4, file “Correspondence, July – December 1967,” letter from Ervin 
Sypták, MMI president and H. Kubík, MMI office manager to unknown, 24 August 1967. 
144
 LAC, MMI Fonds, MG 28 V110, volume 2, file “Annual Reports, 1963, 1965, 1967, 1970,” Výroční zpráva za 
rok 1967 – Zpráva referenta pro občanství a styk s úřady. 
 226 
community due to the language barrier between English-speaking Torontonians and the 
newcomers from Czechoslovakia.
145
 
In the months following Expo 67 and the arrival of the Expo Émigrés, members of 
Toronto‟s Czechoslovak community began discussing the feasibility of establishing a Czech and 
Slovak literature course to be held at a Canadian university. Three Czechoslovak organizations 
agreed in principle to work together in making a postsecondary university course a reality. The 
MMI, CNAC, and Canadian Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees (CFCR) approached the 
University of Toronto due in part because the city was home to a sizeable community from 
Czechoslovakia.  The University of Toronto was chosen to host the Czech and Slovak 
undergraduate course for the “promotion of knowledge of our literature in Canada among 
university students planning to enter an academic or diplomatic field.” In addition, the proposed 
course was to enable subsequent generations of Czech and Slovak Canadians to study the 
language and literature of their ethnic heritage.
146
All three pro-Czechoslovak organizations in 
Canada, undertook fundraising efforts to contribute $12,000 per year for a period of three years 
to support the salary of an instructor. After 1970, the University of Toronto agreed to finance the 
course from its own sources for another period of three years.  
The three Czechoslovak Canadian organizations hoped that the Czech and Slovak 
language course would remain viable and become a permanent offering at the university. In 
reaching out to members of the Czechoslovak community in Canada, the CNAC detailed its 
efforts in a letter to business magnate and prewar Czech immigrant Walter Koerner in 
Vancouver. In seeking Koerner‟s help, CNAC president Antonín Daičar and MMI president 
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Ervin Sypták argued for the importance of teaching Czech and Slovak literature in Canada. Both 
Daičar and Sypták noted that since Polish, Russian, and Ukrainian were already being taught at 
the University of Toronto, “our literature should not remain a Cinderella among them.” Simply, a 
Czech and Slovak course was necessary for the preservation of a Czechoslovak cultural heritage 
in Canada.
147
 Nationalist Canadian Slovaks opposed the establishment of a Czech and Slovak 
course due to its promotion of a unified ethnic Czechoslovak identity. A year later, the 
University of Toronto partnered with MMI, CNAC, CFCR, and together subsidized a Chair for 
Czechoslovak Studies for a period of three years. Czechoslovak culture, language, and identity 
could now be studied at a Canadian university. With the beginning of classes in 1968, a majority 
of students enrolled in the course were second-generation Canadian Czechs and Slovaks, many 
of whom arrived with their parents after 1948 and could speak or write in their native language. 
As a result, classes primarily focused on Czech and Slovak literature and grammar.
148
 By the 
early 1970s, a Czech and Slovak language and literature course continued to attract students, 
while additional funding in the form of subsidies for a Chair in Czechoslovak studies was 
discontinued. The Chair in Czechoslovak studies collapsed amid increasing opposition from the 
Canadian Slovak community. 
 
Conclusion 
During the 1950s and 1960s, Czech and Slovak refugees continued to arrive in Canada. 
Many of these newcomers languished in Austrian, German, and Italian refugee camps for years 
                                                 
147
 Ibid. 
148
 LAC, MMI Fonds, MG 28 V110, volume 2, file “Annual Financial Statements, 1970-1973,” Combined Financial 
Statements: Masaryk Memorial Institute Incorporated, Toronto, 30 November 1973, 16; Ian Willoughby, “Professor 
Lubomír Doleţel – Now Retired Doyen of Czech Studies in Toronto,” Radio Prague, 3 May 2010, accessed 10 
October 2012, http://www.radio.cz/en/section/one-on-one/professor-lubomir-dolezel-now-retired-doyen-of-czech-
studies-in-toronto. 
 228 
prior to their resettlement in Canada. In Prague, Canadian diplomats informed officials in Ottawa 
that travel visas and emigration passports were increasingly hard to obtain. Throughout the 
1950s, fewer Czechoslovakians were able to legally leave their homeland. Without travel 
documentation, Czechoslovakian citizens seeking to leave the Communist regime were forced to 
carry out daring escapes to the West. Since leaving the state was deemed illegal, Communist 
authorities in Prague labelled individuals as “enemies of the state,” and “illegal émigrés.” Many 
of these newcomers joined Canadian Czechoslovak organizations. The political refugees of the 
1950s and 1960s united with those who came immediately after the February 1948 Communist 
takeover of Czechoslovakia and attempted to promote the return of democracy in their homeland. 
Perhaps no single event in the first two decades of the Cold War influenced Czech and 
Slovak political refugees more than the tragic failure of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. The 
Soviet-led suppression of the uprising in October 1956 demonstrated to the 1948ers and the 
existing Czechoslovak community that Communism in Eastern Europe would not be easily 
defeated, and their return home would continue to be delayed. The events of 1956 heightened 
anti-Soviet sentiment among 1948ers and many individuals became disillusioned with their anti-
communist efforts. Czech and Slovak refugees who supported a Czechoslovak identity began to 
turn their attention towards their own community in Canada. As a result, oldtimers and 1948ers 
met to settle individual personality clashes and ideological differences. The subsequent 
rapprochement permitted members of the CNA and MH to work together and provide financial 
and social assistance to compatriots across Canada. The 1948ers increasingly focused their 
attention towards domestic issues including the obligations of Canadian citizenship, the 
maintenance of ethnic heritage, and the promotion of Czechoslovak cultural activities such as the 
annual Sokol Slet and Czechoslovak Day held at Masaryktown on the outskirts of Toronto. 
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The arrival of Czech and Slovak political refugees who espoused anti-Soviet and anti-
communist sentiments were reinforced by Canadian officials who continued to warn the 
Canadian public of the impending threat posed by domestic Communist sympathizers and Soviet 
agents to the country‟s predominantly Christian, democratic, and middle class values. In the 
1950s, Canadian newspapers heightened public anxiety over the immigration and settlement of 
immoral, sexually deviant, and mentally ill Europeans and claimed that these individuals were 
threats to Canadian democratic and moral values. Franca Iacovetta demonstrated that social 
workers, professionals, and public officials actively examined and treated “deviant” European 
newcomers including men who were deemed “sexual predators or wife abusers,” and “morally 
damaged women” in an attempt to bring them in line with Canadian Cold War ideology.149 
Although Canadian officials remained vigilant towards the arrival of immoral and sexually 
delinquent Eastern European political refugees, federal and provincial officials visited 
community events in the hopes of promoting their anti-communist and democratic values, and to 
secure the vote of the Canadian Czechoslovak community. Cooperation between Czech and 
Slovak refugees and public officials provided the Canadian government‟s anti-communist 
agenda with greater legitimacy since many of the 1948ers had witnessed political persecution at 
the hands of the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia.
150
   
The increasing collaboration between Canadian officials and Czech and Slovak anti-
communist refugees led to greater recognition in Ottawa. In 1960, the CNA and MH were 
incorporated and their names changed to the Czechoslovak National Association of Canada 
(CNAC) and the Masaryk Memorial Institute (MMI). The CNAC received a federal charter to 
assist Canadians of Czechoslovak origin and preserve Czechoslovak heritage in Canada. 
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Canadian Slovaks represented by the nationalist Canadian Slovak League opposed the CNAC‟s 
mandate as it promoted a common Czechoslovak ethnic identity between Czechs and Slovaks. 
The immigration of Czech and Slovak political refugees from Czechoslovakia in the 
1950s and 1960s was directly a consequence of Cold War politics. These anti-communist 
newcomers transplanted their Old World ethnic and ideological divisions to Canada, where 
through contact with existing members of the CNAC and MMI, they entrenched their anti-
communist agenda, and democratic values within Canadian Czechoslovak organizations. As 
members of the CNAC and MMI, the 1948ers actively lobbied the federal government in an 
attempt to influence Canadian foreign policy towards Czechoslovakia. The 1948ers influenced 
how successful the StB was in manipulating Czechs and Slovaks into becoming agents for their 
old homeland, and how effective Canadian authorities were in combatting Soviet espionage on 
Canadian soil. With the StB‟s infiltration of Canadian Czechoslovak institutions including the 
CNA‟s Toronto Branch in 1956, Canadian Czechs and Slovaks worried about public perceptions 
regarding their allegiances during the Cold War. As a result, many individuals denounced groups 
where such infiltration had taken place and even destroyed their memberships and links to these 
organizations.    
Between 1956 and 1967, 672 individuals claimed Czechoslovakia as their country of 
former residence after arriving in Canada. Similarly, 851 individuals claimed Czechoslovakia as 
their country of citizenship upon entering the country. Each of these figures represents 
approximately six percent of all immigration from Czechoslovakia during the period, 1946 to 
1967.
151
 Not only were few individuals arriving in Canada from Czechoslovakia, few were 
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permitted to emigrate legally as Communist authorities restricted the movement of people 
abroad. Canadian Czechs and Slovaks and their relatives in Czechoslovakia remained divided 
between West and East, Czechoslovaks and nationalist Slovaks, democracy and communism, 
freedom and oppression.
                                                                                                                                                             
Czechoslovakia as their country of former residence. During the same period, 14,062 individuals claimed 
Czechoslovakia as their country of citizenship upon entering Canada. 
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Chapter Five: 
 
A Small Gold Mine of Talent: 
Canada‟s Response to the Prague Spring Refugees 
 
 As recent newlyweds with stable employment and accommodations, Libor and Jiřina 
Roštík believed they had a bright future together in Czechoslovakia. Following the Warsaw Pact 
invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 to suppress the liberalization movement known as 
the Pražské jaro (Prague Spring), the Roštíks no longer desired to remain in their homeland now 
under Soviet occupation. They decided to begin new lives in the West. In searching for an 
opportunity to apply for an exit visa from the Communist authorities in Prague, the Roštíks 
requested a close relative who worked in the sugar industry in Cuba to invite them for a visit. In 
going to Havana, they left their family, friends, and material possessions behind in 
Czechoslovakia. They believed that Canada openly invited immigrants and was a country of vast 
human and natural resources. On their return flight from Cuba to Czechoslovakia, the Roštíks 
were aware that the flight from Havana to Prague included a stopover in Gander, Newfoundland 
and Shannon, Ireland. On 6 December 1968, the Roštíks disembarked from their plane in Gander 
and immediately requested political asylum in Canada as refugees from Communist 
Czechoslovakia.
1
 The Roštíks began their new lives in Canada with only ten American dollars 
and some personal effects from Cuba. Dressed for the tropical climate of the Caribbean, the 
Czech couple arrived in the middle of winter and Canadian immigration officials transported 
them to a local hotel where they received vouchers for breakfast. After their transportation to 
Pier 21 in Halifax, the Roštíks were medically cleared and interviewed by Canadian immigration 
officials, who later accepted the couple as political refugees and allowed them to leave the 
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detention centre in Halifax and begin a government language program in the city. After 
successful completion of weekly language tests, the Roštíks received a weekly allowance of 
$35.
2
 
The Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia on 20-21 August 1968 forced 
thousands of Czechoslovakian citizens to flee the country. Many others including the Roštíks 
were outside of the country in the preceding weeks before the invasion. Along with those 
Czechoslovakians in the midst of leaving the country in the months after the invasion, they were 
forced to make a difficult decision – whether to return home or seek political asylum elsewhere. 
Since many Czechoslovakians refused to live in a country occupied by Soviet and Warsaw Pact 
troops, their only alternative was to cross the border into Austria or West Germany. In one 
instance, a Czech refugee walked approximately six hours through the Šumava Mountains and 
across the border into West Germany.
3
 During the confusion arising from the Soviet-led 
invasion, Czechoslovakian border officials permitted individuals and families to leave. Persons 
who arrived in Austria were registered and given accommodations and food tickets. In many 
cases, individuals lacked money as Communist officials back home seized most of their funds 
prior to crossing the border.  
Many Prague Spring refugees arrived in the West with only their personal effects and 
clothing – often two pieces of luggage – demonstrating to the Communist authorities that they 
only intended to leave the country for a „vacation.‟ Similarly, many refugees could not inform 
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their close relatives and friends of their emigration out of fear for their safety.
4
 Many refugees 
maintained contacts in the West who wrote letters of invitation in order for them to successfully 
acquire an exit visa. Friends and contacts in Western Europe also wired money to 
Czechoslovakian refugees as they slept in school gyms and later government-provided 
accommodations while waiting to learn whether they would remain in Central Europe, or resettle 
in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United States, or Western Europe.
5
 Referred to by the 
Communist government press as the vycestovali or those who „travelled out,‟ approximately 
150,000 individuals resettled in the West after the Warsaw Pact invasion. The vycestovali formed 
a majority of approximately 225,000 Czechoslovakians who fled their homeland for the West 
since the Communist seizure of power in February 1948.
6
 
Previously, in the fall of 1956, Canadian immigration officials initiated an emergency 
resettlement program for fleeing Hungarians during the Soviet invasion of their homeland. At the 
time, the Canadian government believed that the Hungarian refugees would be a sole exception 
to the practice of immigration admission to Canada.
7
 Twelve years later, sensing that a 
humanitarian response was necessary to the plight of the thousands of refugees who were in the 
midst of fleeing the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Canadian government instituted a 
special program for Czechoslovakian refugees – from September 1968 to January 1969 – and 
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resettled close to 12,000 Czechoslovakians. It is estimated that over 80,000 Czechoslovakian 
citizens were abroad during the events of August 1968.
8
 In response to the crisis, the Canadian 
Czechoslovak community re-established the Canadian Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees (CFCR) 
and worked alongside the Czechoslovak National Association of Canada (CNAC), Masaryk 
Memorial Institute (MMI), and various federal and provincial departments to successfully 
resettle Czechoslovakian refugees in Canada.  
This chapter discusses how the existing Czechoslovak community in Canada and various 
government departments assisted in the resettlement of approximately 12,000 Czechoslovakian 
refugees during 1968-1969. The newly arrived refugees were referred to as „1968ers‟ or „68ers‟ 
by the existing Canadian Czechoslovak community since their emigration was a direct outcome 
of the Warsaw Pact invasion. Similar to the 1948ers who fled the Communist takeover of 
Czechoslovakia, a large wave of educated and skilled refugees arrived in Canada in this later 
migration. Many of the 1968ers were multilingual with some knowledge of English, French, 
German, or Russian. Additionally, most of the 1968ers were members of the professional and 
technical classes comprised of academics, doctors, engineers, journalists, lawyers, scientists, and 
tradespeople.
9
 Unlike the 1948 immigrants, the 1968ers had spent approximately twenty years 
living under Communism and experienced first-hand the effects of totalitarianism including 
imprisonment. Once in Canada, the 1968ers yearned to continue their professions – without 
Communist interference – and were predominantly underemployed in their early years in 
Canada. However, in comparison to other immigrants who arrived in the late 1960s, the 1968ers 
were quickly employed in their respective fields and maintained a higher duration of 
                                                 
8
 Eva Marha, “Czechs/Slovaks,” In Safe Haven: The Refugee Experience of Five Families, ed. Elizabeth McLuhan, 19-
64 (Toronto: Multicultural Society of Ontario, 1995), 61. 
9
 Ibid., 62. 
 236 
employment and income than other new immigrants.
10
 Many 1968ers were also active in 
promoting the establishment of émigré publications and publishing houses in the West including 
Sixty-Eight Publishers in Toronto under the guidance of well-known authors Josef and Zdena 
Škvorecký.11 The 1968ers assisted in reinvigorating Canadian Czech and Slovak organizations. 
Within the Canadian Czechoslovak community, the 1968ers joined CNAC branches across 
Canada and the MMI in Toronto, and continued to lobby the Canadian government to pressure 
Czechoslovakian authorities to permit family reunification and safeguard human rights back 
home.
12
 
Scholars remain divided over the reasons for Canada‟s decision to resettle approximately 
12,000 Czechoslovakian refugees. Some scholars argued that economic considerations and self-
interest played a major role in the federal government‟s decision to resettle young and well-
educated professionals who could make an immediate socioeconomic impact. Conversely, others 
claimed that Cold War politics led Ottawa to temporarily suspend its immigration regulations in 
an attempt to embarrass the Soviet Union for ideological reasons.
13
 Advocates for the rights of 
refugees criticized the federal government for playing into Cold War politics in choosing to 
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permit individuals and families fleeing Communism in Eastern Europe to enter Canada whereas 
persons escaping right-wing regimes were often ignored.
14
 However, recent scholarship suggests 
that Ottawa believed it had to intervene on humanitarian grounds, bringing well-educated 
refugees to Canada who did not pose a security threat to Canadian society. Similarly, Ottawa did 
not want to embarrass the Soviet Union and unnecessarily heighten Cold War tensions.
15
 
 
The Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia and Canadian Reactions 
Throughout the 1960s, Czechoslovakian youth participation in Communist-led 
organizations was in a state of decline. In the latter half of the decade less than 1 million students 
remained as members of the Communist-supported Czechoslovak Union of Youth. Membership 
in the Communist Party became increasingly unpopular with less than one-half of one percent of 
Czechoslovakian youth choosing to remain active in the party. Increasingly, adolescents were 
joined by disillusioned university students, workers, agriculturalists, clergy, and intellectuals 
who felt that reform of the political system and stagnant economy was a priority to combat the 
deceptions, rigidness, and authoritarianism of communist rule in their country.
16
 Liberal elements 
across society outwardly criticized the party and its general secretary Antonín Novotný for 
failing to reform Czechoslovakian society and its economy.
17
 Within the Communist Party itself, 
reformers decided to seize on the opportunity to confront years of hard censorship and economic 
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decline. In January 1968, Antonín Novotný was replaced as First Secretary of the Communist 
Party by the Moscow-educated Slovak reformer Alexander Dubček.18 In assuming office on 5 
January, Dubček declared that under “socialism with a human face,” communism in 
Czechoslovakia would be liberalized. In March, Novotný was replaced as president by General 
Ludvík Svoboda. After purging the Stalinist hardliners from the leadership of the party, the 
reformers within the upper echelons of the Communist Party attempted to combine a process of 
democratization of individual rights with a liberalization of the economy. On 5 April, the 
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia released its Action Program detailing how the country 
would institute its own form of socialism instead of following the Soviet model.
19
 In the 
following months, press censorship decreased, writers who wrote in opposition to the regime 
were rehabilitated, and political reforms were instituted. In May 1968, press censorship was 
completely abolished, religious groups were free to exercise their faith, and personal freedoms 
were entrenched.
20
 This period of Communist liberalization in Czechoslovakia became known as 
the Pražské jaro (Prague Spring).21 
In Prague, Canadian diplomats viewed the Communist regime‟s changing of the guard as 
a “revolution from the top.” In correspondences shared between Commonwealth governments, 
Alan Renouf, Australian Ambassador in Belgrade, argued that with Dubček in power the Slovaks 
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could command a greater share of the national wealth in the development of Slovakia and for 
political concessions to lead to home rule.
22
 Renouf added that “…Czechoslovakia is finally 
throwing off the remnants of Stalinism and is moving into a new era where the younger, more 
modern Communists will set the pace.”23 Canadian Ambassador to Prague, Malcolm Norman 
Bow wrote in his correspondence with Ottawa that while Dubček was the first Slovak to lead the 
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, his outspoken support for “democratic centralism” and his 
defence of the pro-Czechoslovak central government in Prague against Slovak demands for 
greater political autonomy is in part why he was chosen as first secretary.
24
 Canadian diplomats 
were hopeful that a reformist leadership would be able to negotiate terms for family reunification 
which remained a contentious issue between Ottawa and Prague. After multiple meetings 
between parliamentarians on both sides, 142 Czechoslovakians were permitted to immigrate to 
Canada in the first quarter of 1968. Similarly, Canadian and Czechoslovakian officials were in 
negotiations over outstanding Canadian property claims against Czechoslovakia which totalled 
more than $200 million. Ottawa did not release this figure to the Communist authorities.
25
 
Although Czechoslovakians were hopeful that the Prague Spring movement would bring about 
much needed change, neighbouring Communist states including East Germany, Poland, and the 
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Soviet Union viewed the changes with fear as they could spread and weaken the stability of their 
hardline and conservative regimes.
26
 
During the summer of 1968, Canadians were in the midst of a federal election campaign 
after nearly five years of Liberal minority government under Prime Minister Lester Bowles 
Pearson. Newly elected as Liberal Party leader, Pierre Elliott Trudeau indicated on the campaign 
trail that Canada had to reassess its foreign policy position.
27
 Upon winning his first majority 
mandate in the 25 June federal election, Trudeau remained convinced that Soviet Communism 
was dangerous and a threat to international peace similar to aggressive anti-Communism on the 
part of conservative American politicians.
28
 Beginning in the summer of 1968, the Liberal 
government of Prime Minister Trudeau began to alter Canadian foreign policy by attempting to 
follow its own moderate course between previous governments‟ acceptance of nuclear weapons 
as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the West‟s aggressiveness 
towards Moscow. 
During this period, the CNAC carefully followed political developments in 
Czechoslovakia. The organization‟s executive informed Canada‟s Secretary of State for External 
Affairs, Mitchell Sharp that they welcomed the liberalization movement taking place within the 
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. Executive members Antonín Daičar and Jiří Corn argued 
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that while liberalization was occurring internally, Czechoslovakian citizens were benefitting with 
increased individual rights and freedoms. The CNAC hoped that the liberalization of 
Czechoslovakia would result in the democratization of the country‟s institutions, and personal 
freedoms would be fully returned to the populace. Subsequently, the CNAC, well aware of 
Moscow‟s continued intervention in Czechoslovakia‟s internal affairs, requested that Canada 
apply pressure on the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels to prevent Moscow‟s 
influence.
29
 Canadian officials carefully watched events in Czechoslovakia unfold and remained 
silent on the Prague Spring movement in an effort not to heighten tensions with Moscow. 
According to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Marcel Cadieux, “it would not be in 
the best interest of Czech people to make official public comment at this time.”30 
The Department of External Affairs (DEA) participated in discussions with its Western 
partners over the future of NATO and unilateral troop reductions in Europe. With France‟s 
departure from the organization two years earlier, NATO maintained a common policy for 
Czechoslovakia and refused to outwardly support Prague out of fear of antagonizing Moscow.
31
 
In the middle of June, a group of intellectuals urged Ludvík Vaculík, a writer and prominent 
reformist member of the Communist Party, to draft a declaration in support of socialism through 
democratic means. The letter, entitled Two Thousand Words, argued that the socialist system had 
to learn from its failures, and reform would humanize the Communist regime.
32
 Fearing that 
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Prague‟s liberalization reforms would spread, the Communist governments of Bulgaria, East 
Germany, Hungary, Poland, and the Soviet Union met in Warsaw on 14-15 July, and decided to 
issue a „Warsaw Letter‟ which demanded that Prague reinstitute censorship and suppress 
independent political groups or face a military intervention. Subsequently, the five Communist 
governments proceeded to conduct a press campaign against Czechoslovakia‟s reformist leaders 
and stationed Warsaw Pact troops along the country‟s borders. In Western capitals, the prospect 
of an invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact member-states was seen as unlikely and any 
intervention in Czechoslovakia by Western governments was ruled out.
33
  
On 29 July, Czechoslovakia‟s Communist leadership met with Soviet leader Leonid 
Brezhnev in Čierna nad Tisou, Slovakia where the Soviets impressed upon their counterparts that 
further reforms would come with grave consequences.
34
 The Soviets demanded that Prague 
remove reformers from key party positions, reinstitute press censorship, and ban all political 
clubs including KAN (Klub angažovaných nestraníků – Club of Committed Non-Party Members) 
and K 231 (Klub bývalých politických vězňů – Club of Former Political Prisoners) which were 
founded during the Prague Spring.
35
 Several days later, Communist officials from Bulgaria, East 
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Germany, Hungary, Poland, and the Soviet Union met in Bratislava and agreed that they would 
defend Communism from reform.
36
 With Dubček advocating for patience, the Soviet Union 
could no longer accept attacks by the local population against Czechoslovakia‟s Communist 
Party and ordered the Warsaw Pact to invade the country.
37
 On the night of 20 August, 
approximately 170,000 soldiers and 4,600 tanks from Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, 
and the Soviet Union crossed into Czechoslovakia as part of Operation Danube and sought to 
quell the Prague Spring and its reforms.
38
 Operation Danube‟s main objective was to assist 
conservative Communist Party officials in seizing power from reformist members in order to 
reinstitute a hardline Communist government in Czechoslovakia.
39
  
As news broke of events in Czechoslovakia on 20 August, Secretary of State for External 
Affairs, Mitchell Sharp informed the press that the movement of Warsaw Pact troops into the 
country “…was very disappointing and there‟s bound to be a great setback to the growing 
confidence in Europe and progress toward an East-West détente.” As Sharp remained confident 
that the invasion was not a threat to world peace since Czechoslovakia was not resisting the 
Soviet-led advance, Canada remained without an ambassador in Prague as Malcolm Bow 
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concluded his duty in Czechoslovakia and returned home to Canada.
40
 On 21 August, with 
Canada‟s Prime Minister enjoying a vacation on the beaches of Spain, Soviet Ambassador to 
Canada, Ivan Shpedko informed acting Prime Minister Paul Hellyer of the Soviet-led invasion of 
Czechoslovakia. Shpedko informed Hellyer that the Soviets sent troops into Czechoslovakia in 
order to “rescue socialism.”41 Meanwhile, a delegation of nine Czechoslovak community leaders 
representing the CNAC, MMI, Permanent Conference of Slovak Democratic Exiles (PCSDE), 
and the Czechoslovak Society of Arts and Sciences issued a joint statement on the events of 20-
21 August. The statement expressed that Canadians of Czechoslovakian origin were “deeply 
shocked by the rape of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet and Warsaw Pact armies.”42 The four 
organizations argued that after the Munich Conference of 1938 and the Communist takeover of 
1948, Czechoslovakia deserved the international community‟s support. Representatives of the 
four organizations met with Hellyer and Sharp and presented a memoir on events in 
Czechoslovakia.
43
 On behalf of Canadians of Czechoslovakian origin, the representatives 
demanded that strong measures be taken by the Canadian government including: formulating a 
declaration condemning the invasion of Czechoslovakia and its brutality against the local 
population; submitting a protest before the UN over the aggression of Warsaw Pact states in 
Czechoslovakia; proposing a resolution at the UN Security Council to create an international 
peace force to be deployed in Czechoslovakia; using diplomatic channels to ascertain the 
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freedom of individuals arrested by the Soviets during the invasion; and ensuring the safe 
departure of Czechoslovakians with Canadian citizenship and their return to Canada while also 
facilitating the admission of Czechoslovakian refugees fleeing their homeland.
44
 After their 
meeting, representatives of the CNAC later informed the press that the Secretary of State for 
External Affairs‟ remarks to them seemed “exceptionally bland.”45 
Fernand Beauregard, a journalist for La Presse wondered whether Canada would act. He 
argued that the Warsaw Pact invasion provided the federal government with an “excellent 
occasion to demonstrate in what direction our foreign policy is to go.” It was Beauregard‟s 
contention that Canada‟s foreign policy was anemic and passive and now could become 
proactive in the face of an international crisis. Addressing the press in Ottawa on 21 August, 
Sharp issued a statement explaining that the “Canadian government views the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia with shock and dismay. We condemn this use of force. All Canadians feel the 
deepest concern for the courageous people of Czechoslovakia in this hour of trial.”46 The 
Secretary of State went on to suggest that the invasion and subsequent occupation of the country 
“constitute[d] a flagrant breach of the principle of non-intervention to which the Soviet Union 
itself professes to subscribe.” The Secretary of State for External Affairs indicated that the 
federal government was in talks with other members of NATO and the United Nations to which 
he added that NATO sought to maintain an enduring accommodation between the West and the 
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Eastern Block. Sharp concluded the statement by indicating that Ottawa remained in contact with 
its embassy in Prague and would ensure the safety of all Canadian citizens in Czechoslovakia.
47
 
The minister argued that Czechoslovakian refugees would receive the same welcome as the 
Hungarian refugees of 1956. Beauregard wondered whether Sharp‟s condemnation would bring 
about action.
48
 The press in attendance inquired whether Dubček would be granted political 
asylum in Canada to which Trudeau replied that the question was premature. The Prime Minister 
acknowledged that Canada‟s ability to act in Eastern Europe would be limited, but that 
supporting the reformist leaders of Czechoslovakia would remain a priority.
49
  
Canadian officials consulted with their NATO partners to examine the invasion. 
Similarly, Canada cooperated with other states to draft a resolution condemning the Warsaw 
Pact. Trudeau informed the press that any actions by NATO would not be influenced by the 
Warsaw Pact and that Canada would revisit its membership in the organization.
50
 The following 
day, Canada along with Brazil, Denmark, France, Paraguay, Senegal, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States introduced a draft joint resolution at the UN Security Council condemning the 
Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia. The resolution called on the five Warsaw Pact countries 
that participated in the invasion – Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and the Soviet 
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Union – to “…withdraw their forces and to cease all other forms of intervention in 
Czechoslovakia.”51 The draft resolution mirrored the measures advocated by the CNAC. 
On the 22 August, the CNAC received condolences from the Trans-Canada Alliance of 
German Canadians expressing their shock and dismay at the Soviet occupation of 
Czechoslovakia. The Alliance also condemned the participation of East German forces in the 
invasion whose government “seemed to fear most the affects [sic.] of the freedom 
movement…”52 On behalf of German Canadians, the alliance expressed its wish for Czechs, 
Slovaks, and Germans to “live together as good neighbours.”53 Similarly, the Central 
Organization of Sudeten Germans in Canada, which represented former citizens of 
Czechoslovakia, condemned the Soviet occupation. The organization hoped that “freedom will 
not be wiped out but will rise until your people have achieved their goals.”54  
Over 200 members of the Czechoslovak community in Toronto and Hamilton organized a 
convoy of buses and cars to transport them to Ottawa where they demanded a recently returned 
Prime Minister Trudeau for assistance in ending the Soviet occupation of their homeland. The 
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bus and car convoy left from MMI‟s doors in the early morning of 22 August. President of MMI, 
Ervin Sypták claimed that the Canadian Czechoslovak community was in “complete turmoil” 
and he feared that while women and children were permitted to leave the country, the communist 
authorities would prevent men from leaving with them.
55
 Other members of the Czechoslovak 
community such as Jarmila Jelínek of Hamilton did not discount the use of force to protect 
Canadian citizens or to free her homeland from Soviet occupation, stating that “the Canadian 
government should support armed intervention.”56 The bus and car convoy decorated with 
Canadian and Czechoslovakian flags arrived at Parliament Hill in the afternoon. Czech and 
Slovak Canadians from Toronto and Hamilton held flags and placards that stated: “Nazis 1938, 
Russians 1968,” “Russians Leave Czechoslovakia,” and “Soviet Murderers are Capable of 
Killing Every Good Idea.” The demonstrators were later joined by Trudeau, Sharp, Hellyer, and 
Minister without Portfolio Paul Martin, Sr.
57
 Similarly, in Winnipeg, a silent vigil was held at the 
cenotaph in Memorial Park to show solidarity with the people of Czechoslovakia. One of the 
vigil‟s organizers, Jack Stevenson, a professor of philosophy at the University of Manitoba, 
indicated to the press in attendance that the vigil would continue for twenty-four hours.
58
 
At the time of the invasion, the Canadian Embassy in Prague maintained a staff of thirty 
individuals including their families, and 73 Canadian citizens were registered with the 
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embassy.
59
 The Canadian Embassy was led by Chargé d‟affaires Charles Cole.60 Canada had yet 
to name a new ambassador to Prague. In Ottawa, the Czechoslovakian Embassy continued to 
condemn the Soviet-led invasion. Chargé d‟affaires Alois Drhlík informed the press that “we 
cannot be very optimistic” as his homeland had entered a dark period.61 
Over the next two days, a local protest was held outside the Soviet Embassy by Czechs 
and Slovaks from Ontario and Quebec. A majority of the approximately 200 protestors were 
Czechoslovakian immigrants who carried placards and signs expressing to the Soviets to “Go 
Home,” “Give Us Back Our Liberty,” “What Happened to Humanity Soviet Imperialists,” and 
“Soviet Murderers Get Out from Czechoslovakia,” while others illustrated that “Truth Prevails, 
Even Soviet Murderers Won‟t Come to Kill an Ideology.” The protestors marched and sang 
Czechoslovakia‟s national anthem while hurling insults at those inside the embassy. Soviet press 
secretary Vladimir Makhotin was heckled and spit at as he left the grounds. The protest lasted 
almost two hours before poor weather ended the demonstration.
62
 That afternoon, demonstrators 
left the Soviet Embassy and congregated before the Czechoslovakian Legation, once again 
singing their old homeland‟s national anthem before two diplomats came to greet them. The 
demonstrators desired to bring attention to their cause and to lobby the Canadian government to 
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admit Czechoslovakian refugees who were in the midst of fleeing their homeland. Charge 
d‟affaires Drhlík and third secretary Erhard Salomon were inundated with questions regarding 
their personal political ideologies and the situation in Czechoslovakia. Both diplomats stated to 
the crowd that they supported the Prague Spring movement to liberalize the country.
63
  
In Winnipeg, over 300 individuals formed a procession up Memorial Boulevard to place 
a wreath with the words “Freedom At All Cost” at the cenotaph. Although fifteen different ethnic 
communities were represented in the procession, a majority of the individuals in attendance were 
members of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee. Winnipeggers carried placards including: 
“Warsaw Pact-Russian Control; End Soviet Aggression; Today Czechoslovakia – Tomorrow the 
World.”64 Premier of Manitoba Walter Weir addressed the crowd stating, “it is fitting that your 
protest against the ruthless and unwarranted invasion of Czechoslovakia by Russia and its 
satellites should end at the cenotaph for it is here that every year the citizens of Winnipeg pay 
tribute to those who gave their lives in the supreme sacrifice in the name of freedom…”65 In 
Montreal, approximately 800 individuals gathered at the local cenotaph in Dominion Square to 
lay a wreath for deceased freedom fighters. The crowd then proceeded to shout “Dubček, 
Dubček” as they made their way to the Soviet consulate where they attempted to present a 
petition to a consulate official demanding the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from 
Czechoslovakia. In illustrating their opposition to Soviet imperialism, demonstrators remained at 
the Soviet consulate for days even successfully breaking the legation‟s windows. A short walk 
away, Montrealers gathered at the Czechoslovakian consulate where they were greeted by two 
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legation officials who thanked the demonstrators for their support.
66
 In an editorial in his own 
newspaper, Le Devoir director Claude Ryan argued that the Soviet Union witnessed a 
humiliation due to its invasion of Czechoslovakia. To the people of Czechoslovakia, Ryan wrote: 
 
Above any material plan, is the moral lesion she is receiving from the 
Czechoslovak people. They are weak and not powerful. Practically no one in 
the world that deplores what has been done to them can come to their help. 
But the calm, pride, and unity that is found in them during their inner test 
during this struggle is eloquent. It is the force of rights that continues to be 
there and affirms itself even when violated. If man is spirit, this force will 
finish by retaking one day trump over all else.
67
 
 
Within the Czechoslovak community in Canada, only a small number of individuals were 
adherents of Communism. Throughout the twentieth century, Communists within the community 
established groups that promoted social justice, progress, and peace, all in the hopes of attracting 
members to the Communist movement. As a lifelong Communist, Jozef Duriančík published the 
Slovak-language weekly Ľudové zvesti (People‟s News).68 Founded in 1933 with a circulation of 
2,500, the socialist newspaper espoused “progressive” and “democratic socialist” ideals. The 
Communist weekly remained loyal to the Prague government, never attacking or disagreeing 
with its policies including the promotion of Czechoslovakism in Slovakia.
69
 The Soviet invasion 
of Czechoslovakia profoundly disturbed the editor who in an interview with the Toronto Daily 
Star indicated that “I don‟t know what I am anymore. I don‟t know what to do.” The invasion 
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shook Duriančík‟s Communist values “…to the core of my spirit.”70 In preparing his first issue 
since the invasion, the communist Slovak editor attacked the Soviet Union for its “aggression” 
and “brutality.” Duriančík concluded that the people of Czechoslovakia would overcome their 
new reality and would continue their struggle for freedom and national independence.
71
 
Meanwhile, the official organ of the nationalist Canadian Slovak League, Kanadský Slovák 
(Canadian Slovak) condemned the Soviet-led invasion and argued that “not to have one‟s own 
state is a question of life and death.”72  
On 28 August, Mitchell Sharp informed the CNAC that he was closely following the 
situation in Czechoslovakia on an hourly basis. The Secretary of State for External Affairs 
reassured the organization‟s executive by stating that Ottawa would “take all useful action within 
its power.”73 While Canadian officials watched events in Eastern Europe closely, protests 
continued to be held in urban centres across Canada by local CNAC branches. The largest 
demonstrations were held in Montreal and Toronto. In the latter, a protest against Soviet 
aggression in Czechoslovakia was held on 29 August. The demonstration was organized by 
prominent members of the Canadian Czechoslovak and nationalist Slovak communities. Under 
the chairmanship of George Ben, a Slovak, and Member of Provincial Parliament for the 
constituency of Humber in Toronto‟s west end, a march took place from the Ontario Legislature 
to Nathan Phillips Square at Toronto City Hall. Premier of Ontario John Robarts and Mayor of 
Toronto William Dennison spoke before a large crowd of over 5,000 individuals. A resolution 
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was signed by Canadian ethnic organizations representing all twenty-five nations under Soviet 
domination in demanding justice for Czechoslovakia. The CNAC was joined by the CSL in its 
defence of Czechoslovakia. The Czech-language weekly Naše hlasy (Our Voices) published an 
editorial entitled “Our Answer to the Soviets: No More Talks! Get Out! Save Dubček, save 
Czechoslovakia,” and promoted the public demonstration. The anti-communist paper argued that 
“…Czechoslovakia is fighting for her life – help her! Tell the competent authorities of Canada to 
do the best minimum they can do: sever all commercial, cultural and diplomatic, yes, diplomatic 
relations with the Moscow murderers!”74 
With the cooperation of twenty-five ethnocultural organizations including the CNAC, 
MMI, CSL, and Sokol Canada, the protest was successful in uniting support for a democratic 
Czechoslovakia.
75
 The aforementioned groups signed a declaration condemning “the brutal 
armed Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia abetted by groups of puppets of its Warsaw Pact 
allies.” The organizations called on Ottawa to continue to voice the country‟s displeasure with 
recent events. The declaration also called on Canadian officials to:  
 
resist Czechoslovakia being reduced to colonial status by requesting the 
General Assembly of the United Nations to condemn Soviet aggression in 
Czechoslovakia, advocate for an immediate Soviet withdrawal from 
Czechoslovakia, aid in establishing an independent and democratically 
elected government in Czechoslovakia, promote the use of international 
sanctions against the Soviet Union, and to request world‟s democratic states 
to open their doors to the “victims of the Soviet imperialistic aggression and 
domination.
76
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The protest in Toronto also pressured Ottawa to advocate for the implementation of free 
elections in all Soviet-satellite states under the auspices of the United Nations, and to 
demonstrate support for self-determination and the sovereignty of nations in Communist Eastern 
Europe.
77
 The Warsaw Pact invasion of 20-21 August 1968 shocked and dismayed Canadian 
Czechs and Slovaks. Thousands of individuals were outside of Czechoslovakia‟s borders at the 
time of the invasion. Joined by compatriots who fled their homeland in the wake of the Soviet-
led occupation, they became political refugees and sought resettlement in the West. The 
Canadian Czechoslovak community lobbied Ottawa to defend democratic reforms in 
Czechoslovakia and to permanently settle Czechoslovakian refugees in Canada.  
 
“Cream of the Crop:” Canada and the Special Program for Czechoslovakian Refugees 
In responding to pressure from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) and the Austrian government, Ottawa formed a special inter-departmental committee 
of representatives from External Affairs, Manpower and Immigration, National Health and 
Welfare, and the Solicitor General – who represented the security concerns of the RCMP – to 
facilitate the implementation of a special program for Czechoslovakian refugees.
78
 The special 
program allowed for immigration regulations to be relaxed as requirements for the possession of 
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a travel permit were waived and medical examinations and criminal record checks were 
concluded in Canada. The Canadian government sponsored chartered flights to bring refugees to 
Canada. Once in Canada, these newcomers were assisted by the Department of Manpower and 
Immigration through financial assistance for accommodations and living expenses, medical and 
dental coverage, and English and French-language training under the auspices of the Canada 
Manpower Training Program to effectively support refugees as they entered the workforce.
79
 
On 4 September 1968, officials in Ottawa instructed their immigration teams in Vienna 
and Belgrade to assist the Czechoslovakian refugees residing in those countries with the same 
special treatment the Hungarians received in 1956. In addition to relaxing the stringent 
immigration regulations, Canadian officials permitted the refugees to have their medical 
examinations after arriving in Canada instead of in Austria and Yugoslavia. For the 
Czechoslovakian refugees who were staying in camps, Canadian immigration officials in 
Belgrade received approximately 500 inquiries and 100 immigration visa applications by the end 
of the first week of September.
80
 Although Ottawa instructed its diplomats and immigration 
officials to give special treatment to the Czechoslovakian refugees similar to the Hungarians 
twelve years earlier, Canadian officials in Belgrade had difficulty in acquiring permission from 
Ottawa to hire a bus to transport refugees to Vienna where they could be further processed. 
Similar to immigration officials in Vienna, Canada‟s Embassy in Belgrade suffered from a lack 
of instructions from Ottawa on how to deal with the refugees. Tim Creery, a journalist from the 
Ottawa Citizen arrived in Belgrade on 5 September only to remark that the warm welcome 
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extended to Czechoslovakian refugees to resettle in Canada “…turned out to be a shameful 
hypocrisy as penniless Czechoslovaks give up the effort, unable to wait any longer.”81 In early 
September, Canadian officials were able to find accommodations for twenty-three refugees who 
wanted to come to Canada. The Canadian Embassy in Belgrade covered the cost of the 
accommodations by using its own funds allocated for the legation‟s rent. Creery noted that at the 
time of the Warsaw Pact invasion approximately 50,000 Czechoslovakians called Yugoslavia 
home. Several weeks later, due to high unemployment, only 5,000 remained in the country. 
Many refugees left for Austria, while others tried their luck with embassies in Western Europe.
82
 
In Vienna, Canada maintained only one immigration officer at its embassy. With informal 
cooperation of embassy staff, John Zawisza was forced to implement “local solutions as fast as 
possible. I realized that the only way to go was to develop a “Case Processing Plan” to handle 
the applications we were receiving as rapidly as possible.”83 
In Canada, the CNAC held its annual congress in Batawa, Ontario on 7 September. The 
association‟s central council resolved to invite each member to donate a minimum of five dollars 
on behalf of their families to one of the three major Canadian Czechoslovak organizations – the 
CNAC, MMI, or CFCR – and also requested they fundraise among their Canadian friends.84 On 
learning that the Canadian government would open its doors to refugees from Czechoslovakia, 
the CNAC advised its members that each refugee should be registered as an “open immigrant” to 
shorten the waiting period for their applications to be processed. The federal government also 
immediately supplied health insurance to individuals in this category whereas normal immigrant 
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applicants had to wait six months before becoming eligible. Ottawa informed the CNAC that it 
would attempt to process refugees within two-weeks of receiving their applications for 
resettlement in Canada. Refugees that wanted to be sponsored as immigrants by relatives or 
friends in Canada would prolong their wait because an application for their sponsorship would 
have to be filed in Canada.
85
 
On 8 September 1968, the first group of Czechoslovakian refugees arrived in Canada.
86
 
Three days later, on 11 September, a group of 54 refugees arrived in Montreal from Vienna 
aboard the first chartered flights arranged by the Canadian government. The Department of 
Manpower and Immigration housed the refugees at the Queen‟s Hotel in the city. Two days later, 
the group was assisted by federal officials in finding accommodations and employment.
87
 As 
Canadian officials in Europe continued to process applicants on a priority basis, the federal 
government relaxed its immigration procedures to expedite the resettlement of these refugees. 
Ottawa increased its staff in Vienna and funded the refugees‟ air transportation and resettlement 
expenses. Once in Canada, the Czechoslovakian refugees received assistance from the Canada 
Manpower Centres along with universities and private organizations for language training, 
employment, accommodations, and other services. 
On 13 September, Minister of Manpower and Immigration, Alan MacEachen handled 
questions from Members of Parliament pertaining to Canada‟s response to the Warsaw Pact 
invasion during Question Period. Before the House of Commons, MacEachen replied to a query 
from Progressive Conservative Member of Parliament for Fundy-Royal, Robert Gordon Lee 
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Fairweather, that Canadian officials overseas were instructed to “treat Czechoslovakian refugees 
on a priority basis. A relaxation of procedures has been undertaken so that refugees interested in 
coming to Canada may be processed as speedily as possible.”88 Subsequently, Progressive 
Conservative Member of Parliament for Calgary, Douglas Scott Harkness asked the Minister of 
Manpower and Immigration about the cost involved in resettling refugees to which MacEachen 
replied that there was no way to ascertain the amount spent on each refugee. The minister went 
on to note that each incoming refugee would be treated as an individual case whereby the 
Canadian government would help to pay their transportation and settlement costs. MacEachen 
later informed the Leader of the Official Opposition, Robert Stanfield that instructions to relax 
immigration procedures were sent to Europe a week earlier.
89
 Stanfield later argued in his reply 
to the Prime Minister‟s Speech from the Throne that the Minister of Manpower and Immigration 
reacted rather slowly to the crisis in Czechoslovakia. In participating in partisan politics, the 
Progressive Conservative Opposition Leader indicated that Ottawa‟s response left “…a pretty 
good indication of the detachment of this government with regard to the problems of 
Czechoslovakian refugees. I say, Mr. Speaker, that Canadians are not at all proud of their 
government in this regard…”90 
Before the House of Commons, Prime Minister Trudeau disagreed with Stanfield and 
indicated to Canadians that his government‟s efforts were successfully resettling 
Czechoslovakian refugees in Canada. Trudeau illustrated to the House that over the weekend, 
280 refugees arrived in the country with 267 of them requiring government sponsorship. In the 
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coming days, the Canadian Prime Minister noted that two more chartered flights would arrive in 
Canada bringing another 266 individuals into the country. Embassy staff in Vienna conducted 
over 150 interviews daily in order to process refugees quickly. The Minister noted that 2,374 
Czechoslovakians inquired about entering Canada and 901 individuals summarily applied.
91
 The 
next day, Allan MacEachen announced that a team of four experts would be sent to Vienna to 
select and assist highly skilled and valuable refugees such as artists, musicians, scientists, and 
intellectuals in their resettlement in Canada.
92
 The federal government sent Arnold Walter, a 
former head of the Royal Conservatory of Music in Toronto; J.D. Babbitt, secretary for 
international relations at the National Research Council; Guy Gagnon, coordinator of 
bilingualism for the Department of Manpower and Immigration; and Andrew Rossos, a professor 
in the Centre for Eastern European Languages at the University of Toronto.
93
 
On 15 September, the first group of 203 refugees destined for Toronto and southern 
Ontario arrived after a nine-hour flight from Vienna. Globe and Mail reporter Peter Whelan 
noted that the group was “well dressed as any planeload of passengers getting off flights from 
Montreal or New York.” Canadian immigration officials believed that the country was receiving 
“a small gold mine of talent.” The group of refugees arriving from Austria, France, Italy, 
Switzerland, West Germany, and Yugoslavia were rapidly processed through customs and were 
sent out to several hundred Canadian Czechs and Slovaks waiting in the airport to help them 
resettle in their new country. Immigration authorities accommodated refugees with temporary 
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stays at three local Toronto hotels before they were to be sent to various locations including: 
Hamilton, Oshawa, Kitchener, and Sudbury – all in Ontario; Halifax, Nova Scotia; and Montreal, 
Quebec.
94
 The MMI organ, Nový domov claimed that 80 percent of the refugees had already 
secured accommodations in Canada and employment in positions similar to their chosen fields in 
Czechoslovakia.
95
 
In late September, Immigration officials at the Canadian Embassy in Vienna estimated 
that they received approximately 2,400 applications for immigration visas since 21 August. 
Averaging roughly 80 applicants per day, Canadian officials were inundated with requests to 
come to Canada since the United States did not have a special program in place for 
Czechoslovakian refugees fleeing their homeland. According to the international news agency 
Reuters, an American diplomat in Vienna stated that the embassy was “handling refugees as we 
have done for the last 20 years.” Incidentally, many of the refugees did not have a clear choice as 
to where they would resettle in the West. In one instance, Ivan and Marta Straţnický visited the 
Australian, Canadian, and New Zealand embassies hoping officials would help make the 
decision easier for them. Ivan recalled that they “chose Canada strictly on superficial things. We 
chose Canada because of the way we were treated at the embassy. With the Australians and New 
Zealanders, you had the impression that they thought you might be allowed to come to that 
country. But in the Canadian embassy, there were no reservations – “of course, come over. No 
problem. Welcome.””96 As the Americans sought to take 600 refugees without placing an 
emphasis on the Czechoslovakians crossing the border into Austria, a Canadian immigration 
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official noted that “for us it is an unprecedented opportunity to get the finest type of person in a 
huge variety of fields.” The chartered flights that carried 203 refugees to Toronto included 
doctors, dentists, judges, architects, engineers, and designers.
97
 Canadian officials struggled to 
identify where to send the refugees. After placing each immigration visa applicant through a 
twenty-minute interview to assess their level of education and work experience, they were 
informed about Canada and that employment in their chosen field could not be guaranteed upon 
arrival.
98
 One of the fortunate 203 refugees was Bedřich Procházka, a 59 year-old former judge 
and diplomat. Along with his wife and daughter, they left everything behind and fled Prague by 
train to Vienna where they eventually boarded a chartered Air Canada flight to Toronto. A day 
later, Procházka visited a Canada Manpower Centre to find housing and employment as a 
technical translator. He had previously worked at the Canadian Embassy in Vienna as a 
translator. The Procházkas spoke four languages and their reasons for choosing Canada were 
simple. They had friends and family in the country and Canadian officials “…came forward to 
welcome the refugees.”99 
On 19 September in the House of Commons, MacEachen rejected a claim made by 
Progressive Conservative Member of Parliament for Prince Edward-Hastings, George Hees, that 
Canada was simply choosing to resettle “the cream of the crop” in sending a special four-
member immigration team to Vienna to specifically select refugee “specialists.”100 The minister 
argued before the House of Commons that the federal government‟s special program for 
Czechoslovakian refugees provided free air transportation and temporary financial assistance to 
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all refugees regardless of their background. The Minister of Manpower and Immigration went on 
to note that the four-person team was to provide Canadian officials in Vienna with expert advice 
on the availability of employment opportunities for scientists, musicians, artists, and other 
professionals.
101
 
In early October 1968, a meeting was held in Ottawa by representatives of the 
Departments of External Affairs and Manpower and Immigration to assess whether the Canadian 
government should continue its special program for Czechoslovakian refugees. Canadian 
diplomats informed their immigration colleagues that after the Soviet-led invasion of 
Czechoslovakia, Moscow expected the reformist regime to crumble. The subsequent demise of 
the reformist movement did not materialize and was attributed to Czechoslovak unity in support 
of the government.
102
 Canadian diplomats noted that one method the Soviets would use to gain 
advantage was to leave Czechoslovakia‟s borders open in the hopes that reformers and their 
supporters would leave the state. These same individuals questioned “how long Dubček can 
continue this balancing act, how long Soviet tempers can be held in check, or whether the 
inconclusive situation can endure indefinitely is difficult to predict, but the odds are certainly in 
favour of Moscow‟s eventually gaining its way.”103 In assessing the situation, DEA officials 
indicated that individuals and families were pragmatic in waiting to see whether the political 
climate worsened before applying for refugee status. Similarly, individuals inside the country 
waited for news that the borders would be permanently closed before leaving for the West. 
Ottawa was keenly aware that the reformist government under the leadership of Alexander 
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Dubček did not want to lose its liberal supporters and for Czechoslovakia to suffer a “brain-
drain” of its intellectual and professional classes. The federal government remained sympathetic 
to this situation and decided to accept rather than recruit refugees to Canada.
104
 Canadian 
diplomats presumed that approximately 1,000 Czechoslovakians fled each day to Western 
Europe. 
Western governments replied differently to the exodus of Czechoslovakians from their 
country. Australian authorities waived their normal immigration procedures to give priority to 
Czechoslovakians without any quota. Successful applicants would have to wait approximately 
ten weeks. Conversely, the American government did not institute a special program for refugees 
from Czechoslovakia, but rather permitted individual applicants to obtain a conditional entry visa 
from the American Consulate in Frankfurt after a period of three to five months. South Africa 
agreed to process refugees within a week of applying, while Sweden agreed to accept 1,000 
refugees. Austria did not initially place any limits on the number of refugees it would accept. 
Over 5,500 Czechoslovakians resided in Switzerland of which only ten percent had applied for 
asylum. The Swiss government later required all refugees to decide whether they would seek 
asylum or return to Czechoslovakia.
105
 In Norway, fifty Czechoslovakian refugees maintained 
contact with their homeland through the Czechoslovakian Ambassador in Oslo. They received 
newspapers from their homeland and were able to send messages to relatives through the 
embassy.
106
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European countries that were states of first refuge did not pressure Canada to expedite its 
special program. However, the Austrian government informed Canadian officials that they were 
neglecting other non-Czechoslovakian refugees residing in refugee camps across the country. 
Ottawa decided to place one of its immigration officers in Vienna to process non-
Czechoslovakian refugees. Meanwhile, DEA officials informed the Department of Manpower 
and Immigration that the Dubček government appreciated the non-interventionist and 
humanitarian role that Canada was undertaking by accepting refugees. Consequently, DEA 
officials argued that “cancellation of the program would be seen as pressure on Czechoslovak 
citizens at home and abroad to make their decision for or against the courageous contention of 
their leaders that they can save something of value from the wreckage of the invasion.”107 
Canadian diplomats also argued that an end to the special program would cause a strong public 
reaction against the federal government by a majority of the population which was sympathetic 
to the Czechoslovakian refugee dilemma. Although ethnic groups in Canada were supportive of 
the special program, Polish Canadians demanded that the special measures made available to 
these refugees be extended to other national refugees in Western Europe.  
Immigration officials in Ottawa justified maintaining the special program for 
Czechoslovakian refugees by indicating that a steady flow of 1,000 to 2,000 Czechoslovakians 
left their homeland each day. However, officials later questioned how many refugees the federal 
government would be able to accept without placing a heavy burden on the economy or 
government spending. By mid-October, Ottawa spent close to $1 million on the resettlement of 
Czechoslovakian refugees. Bureaucrats were sensitive to the possibility of public criticism over 
heavy expenditures for allowances and language training especially from unemployed and 
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seasonal workers including earlier immigrants who came to Canada independently and without 
government assistance.
108
 
In late August 1968, a federal interdepartmental committee recommended to the 
Canadian government that immigration regulations be relaxed in order to resettle thousands of 
Czechoslovakian refugees who fled the Soviet-led invasion of their homeland. On 4 September, 
Canadian immigration officials overseas were instructed to process refugees who wished to 
permanently settle in Canada. The possession of travel documentation and medical and criminal 
checks were waived. Similar to its settlement of Hungarian refugees in 1956-1957, the Canadian 
government realized that it had the opportunity to select university students, highly skilled 
tradespeople, and educated professionals from the refugees who were now in Austria, 
Yugoslavia, and other European countries. Ottawa instructed its officials to provide special 
treatment to Czechoslovakian refugees which ultimately accelerated their immigration to 
Canada. The special program‟s initial success in bringing Czechoslovakian refugees to Canada 
was applauded by a Canadian public that supported a humanitarian response to the refugees‟ 
plight. Critics of the special program, which included Progressive Conservative Members of 
Parliament, questioned the costs of bringing thousands of refugees to Canada and the preferential 
treatment the 1968ers received. Early difficulties in relaying instructions to Canadian officials in 
Europe were overcome by local solutions and the processing of refugee applications rapidly 
increased. In the fall of 1968, the special program proved to the federal government and the 
Canadian public that the settlement of thousands of Czechoslovakian refugees in Canada was the 
right choice. Canada gained highly skilled and educated immigrants who wished to begin new 
lives in Canada. 
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Public and Private Cooperation: Securing Accommodations, Financial Assistance, and 
Language Training for Refugees from Czechoslovakia 
As the federal government and provincial authorities worked to establish an effective and 
comprehensive resettlement scheme as a component of the special program, the CNAC moved to 
secure temporary accommodations for recently arrived refugees in Toronto. In early October, 
Alex Havrlant, a Czech lawyer and vice-president of the association, asked the Toronto Board of 
Education about the use of expropriated properties which were slated for demolition the 
following year. The CNAC successfully leased two properties on Marmaduke Avenue for $50 
per month in rent for each house.
109
 The MMI published an informational brochure entitled První 
směrnice pro nové příchozí (first guide for newcomers) which informed recent arrivals from 
Czechoslovakia where to find accommodations, employment, government programs, and social 
assistance.
110
 The guide advised newcomers to Toronto not to stay at a hotel for more than two or 
three days so that MMI could assist them in finding an apartment. Single adults and couples 
without children were informed that if they secured apartments on their own, Canadian 
authorities would find this situation unfavourable since they were allocating public funds 
towards their initial settlement, and would be forced to cover any previously agreed upon rental 
agreement on the part of refugees. However, couples with young children would have their first 
month‟s rent paid by the federal government and would receive a loan to cover their last month‟s 
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rent. The federal government provided loans to newcomers who wished to rent apartments in the 
city and were to be given approximately $25 for single adults and $35 for married couples.
111
 
To secure employment, newcomers were instructed to visit a local Canada Manpower 
Centre and to register with the Technical Service Council. New arrivals were expected to have 
their personal documents translated and foreign work experience certified. For example, a 
minimum of three years of experience was needed for hairdressers, and five years for mechanics 
and electricians. Refugees were informed that the minimum wage for workers was set at $4.25 
per hour, whereas carpenters made $4.15, electricians $4.70, construction workers $2.75, house 
painters $3.45, and installation workers made $4.67. Masaryk Memorial Institute also advised 
newcomers that registration with a union could cost upwards of $150.
112
 
Initially, many refugees from Czechoslovakia struggled to acquire employment upon 
arriving in Canada. For a minority of individuals including 53 year-old Igor Helfert, securing 
work came quickly even though it was not in his chosen field of law and diplomacy. The former 
lawyer and diplomat was employed as a plant worker assembling vinyl-sashed windows. Helfert 
understood that he was fortunate to acquire work and accommodations within two weeks of 
arriving in the country: “I must say that the treatment with us is excellent.”113 Many 
Czechoslovakian refugees were aided in their resettlement by friends and family already living in 
Canada. For others, the process was slow and unsettling. As a thirty-two year-old electrical 
engineer from Prague, Jiří Taranovský and his wife knew no one upon arriving. Refugees such as 
the Taranovskýs were put up by the Department of Manpower and Immigration in local hotels 
such as the Ford Hotel in Toronto‟s Chinatown and the Waldorf Hotel in Hamilton‟s Jackson 
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Square. In Hamilton, Jarmila Lenk and her children arrived several weeks after her husband. 
They moved into his one-bedroom unit in a boarding house where the landlord gave them a 
hotplate so that the family could cook meals. Once they were able to pay the rent, they moved 
into a one-bedroom apartment with $110 per month in rent and bought a bed and some 
furniture.
114
 After leaving the Ford Hotel in Toronto, Marie Vejvalková and her husband 
received train tickets from Canadian authorities for their final destination of London, Ontario. 
After arriving, the local Manpower and Immigration office found accommodations, cheap 
furniture, linens, plates, and cutlery for the Vejvalkovás leaving them in “seventh heaven.”115 
Some refugees found their own accommodations after a short stay in a government-funded hotel. 
In one instance, a Czech couple found a place to stay in the home of a Ukrainian couple in which 
the use of the kitchen and washroom was communal. Ludmila Kotáčková and her husband paid 
$10 per week in rent and they attended English-language classes in the evenings. The Czech 
couple hoped they would secure employment prior to the arrival of their first child.
116
 
Canadian immigration officials also furnished recently arrived refugees with a list of 
rental units – in many cases these lists included rundown properties such as undesirable 
basement apartments. Similarly, government assistance provided the refugees with twenty-four 
dollars per week. Refugees who did not have pre-established contacts in Canada were assisted by 
local Czechoslovak organizations such as the CNAC and MMI in obtaining furniture and clothes. 
The latter often attempted to persuade newcomers to stay temporarily with “Anglo-Saxon 
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families” rather than in ethnic Czech or Slovak homes because that way they could quickly learn 
about Canadian culture, customs, and the English language.
117
 
Since a majority of Czechoslovakian refugees desired to resettle in Ontario where sizable 
Czech and Slovak populations existed, the provincial government believed that the needs of the 
incoming refugees from Czechoslovakia would be adequately met through a temporary special 
program and the establishment of a provincial action committee comprised of representatives 
from the Department of the Provincial Secretary and Citizenship, Department of Trade and 
Development (Immigration Branch), Department of Labour (Apprenticeship Branch), 
Department of Education (Arts and Technological Branch), and the Department of University 
Affairs. The functions of the provincial interdepartmental committee were to establish contact 
with the Czechoslovak community and the refugees themselves to determine their needs in the 
following ways: to communicate to provincial and federal agencies and departments the special 
needs of the refugees; to cooperate closely with the federal Department of Manpower and 
Immigration in securing accommodations, employment, and counselling for refugees; to 
recommend to local and provincial authorities the necessary language and citizenship training 
that refugees required upon arrival; and to work closely with immigrant aid and social services 
agencies that work closely with refugees from Czechoslovakia. The Ontario government 
attempted to acquaint the refugees from Czechoslovakia with proper business practices to assist 
them in succeeding in their professions in Canada.
118
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On 8 October 1968, an unidentified constituent in the Toronto area riding of York Mills 
wrote to Ontario‟s Minister of Labour Dalton Bales regarding three Czechoslovakian refugees 
who arrived in Toronto three weeks earlier. The two young men and one woman were promised 
six months of schooling in English, with a small living allowance, by Canadian immigration 
officials in Zurich, Switzerland prior to leaving for Canada. The men were sent to the Cooksville 
area of Toronto with no directions or money and were given cards which read “Czechoslovak 
refugee – No English.” One man was a welder by trade while the other was a university student. 
After reporting to a local Manpower office, they obtained employment as workers in a plastics 
factory for $1.75 per hour and moved to downtown Toronto where they shared accommodations 
with Italian and Polish immigrants. Both refugees had yet to be paid and had already received a 
letter from the federal Department of Manpower and Immigration informing them that $28 was 
due each month for their assisted passage to Canada. Conversely, the young woman received $60 
from the Manpower office for expenses as she attempted to secure employment after 
unsuccessfully attending several job interviews. The letter to the minister argued for more spaces 
in English-language classes so that these three refugees and their compatriots could acquire 
employment befitting their training and experience.
119
 
The Ontario Department of the Provincial Secretary and Citizenship investigated the 
available language training facilities in the province and concluded that programs for immigrant 
children were more than adequate while English language programs for adult newcomers were 
lacking. Referrals to language training programs at Adult Training Centres consisted of forty 
persons per week. As a result, a long waiting list of newcomers seeking English language 
training – excluding refugees from Czechoslovakia – caused a waiting period of over six months. 
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The federal budget for English as a Second Language training under the Manpower Retraining 
Agreement was already overspent by three months.
120
 The Ontario government was aware that if 
settlement allowances were terminated for refugees without knowledge of English, they would 
necessitate applications for welfare as the refugees had no previous work experience in Canada 
and could not qualify for unemployment insurance. Experts at the Adult Training Centre noted 
that a majority of the recent arrivals from Czechoslovakia required twenty-two weeks of full-
time language training to “function effectively in our society.”121 Consequently, many 
Czechoslovakian refugees were admitted into English classes sponsored under the Ontario 
Manpower Retraining Program.
122
  
In discussions between the ministers responsible for the Department of the Provincial 
Secretary and Citizenship and the Ministry of Social and Family Services, Robert Welch 
informed his colleague, John Yaremko that many of the refugees from Czechoslovakia requested 
financial assistance while they attended English-language training on a full-time basis. Although 
financial assistance was only available to the unemployable, Welch noted that many ethnic 
groups across the province were concerned with the “preferential treatment” that Czech and 
Slovak refugees were already receiving in their initial settlement in Canada.
123
 Welch agreed that 
these refugees were receiving more assistance than previous waves of newcomers as English-
language training was being offered daily at Adult Training Centres across the province, and 
several days per week through school boards. Similarly, free tuition was offered to refugees who 
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wished to enroll in a university program along with a full living allowance for up to six weeks 
after their arrival.
124
 Provincial officials were aware that very few Czechoslovakian refugees 
were unable to find work after arriving in Canada. However, Robert Welch remained concerned 
that a reasonable level of assistance was given to all newcomers instead of establishing a 
precedent in which Ontario could not extend assistance to future arrivals.
125
 
In the House of Commons, George Harris Hees, Progressive Conservative  Member of 
Parliament for Prince Edward-Hastings in Ontario, rose before his fellow members on 8 October 
to ask the prime minister whether Canada‟s delegation to the United Nations was instructed to 
join France and the United States in calling for a Soviet withdrawal from Czechoslovakia. When 
Trudeau replied that he did not know, Hees continued his questioning by asking whether the 
Liberal government was “waiting for the countries surrounding Russia to make the first move?126 
In seizing upon the newspaper coverage of the plight of five refugee Czechoslovakian dentists 
attempting to practice their profession in Canada, on 9 October, Robert Norman Thompson, 
Progressive Conservative Member of Parliament for Red Deer in Alberta and Opposition Critic 
for Employment and Immigration asked the Minister of Manpower and Immigration whether the 
federal government was investigating their situation.
127
 The dentists from Czechoslovakia were 
qualified to practice their profession in their homeland, but were now being prevented from 
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opening a practice in Ontario for a period of eighteen months in order to attend a mandatory 
retraining program.
128
 MacEachen replied in the House of Commons that he was aware of the 
situation and the provinces and provincial associations maintained the right to set health care 
standards according to the Canadian Constitution. Thompson wondered whether the 
Czechoslovakian dentists were told of the situation in Canada prior to immigrating. MacEachen 
replied that Canadian immigration officials overseas “attempt to explain to all immigrants the 
conditions that will prevail in their new country.”129 Following the media coverage of Question 
Period in the House of Commons, officials within the Department of Manpower and Immigration 
requested Canadian immigration offices overseas to provide Ottawa with any information 
available concerning the counselling of Czech and Slovak professionals and any advice given to 
dentists as to any retraining they may need to complete after arriving in Canada.
130
 
The Canadian government accepted Czechoslovakian nationals temporarily residing in 
any country for admission. Similarly, Czechoslovakian nationals who were already in Canada as 
visitors and asked to remain permanently in the country were also accepted and would be joined 
by Czechoslovakian refugees overseas in beginning new lives in Canada. In October 1968, 
twenty-two Czechoslovakian refugees were admitted from India “on the same basis as other 
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Czech[oslovakian] refugees such as those who have come here via Vienna.”131 The 
aforementioned refugees were Czechoslovakian nationals who, while working on an aid project 
in Ranchi, India, decided they could not return home after the Warsaw Pact invasion. The 
Czechoslovakian aid workers sought refugee status and visas from the Canadian immigration 
team in New Delhi.
132
 Immigration officials in Ottawa were concerned that the Canadian public 
would believe that Czechoslovakian technicians in India or any other country were “induced…to 
abandon their employment and come here.” Refugees who fled the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia were to be accepted “without any geographic distinctions” regarding the country 
from which they placed their applications to permanently resettle in Canada.
133
 A day later, the 
group of twenty-two Czechoslovakian refugees arrived from India.  
 In mid-October, Canadian immigration officials informed Ottawa that each 
Czechoslovakian refugee received a standard twenty minute interview and was counseled on 
what to expect after arriving in Canada. Officials assessed an applicant‟s personal background 
and indicated any difficulties they might have upon arriving in Canada. Each applicant signed a 
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statement of preparedness to undertake alternate employment. Professionals such as medical 
doctors and dentists signed the following statement:  
 
I fully understand that my acceptance in the medical profession in CDA 
[Canada] is at the sole discretion of the licencing authority in the province in 
which I wish to work or practise. I further understand that acceptance by the 
licencing authority in any province or provinces in CDA [Canada] is not / 
not an assurance of acceptance in other provinces.
134
 
 
Canadian officials in Vienna informed Ottawa that the above statement was written in the Czech 
language to avoid any confusion on the part of the applicant. Furthermore, the immigration team 
in Vienna replied that they had in their possession Jan Vávra‟s signed statement. The team 
advised Vávra that as a dentist he would be expected to be a dental technician in the coming 
weeks and months prior to meeting the professional requirements in his province of residence. 
Canada‟s European Regional Director of Immigration in Geneva wrote to Ottawa indicating that 
every Czechoslovakian professional was carefully informed of the difficulties they might 
encounter in Canada and the fact that they may not be able to practice their profession or trade 
and must be willing to accept alternative employment until they were able to return to their 
industry through re-certification.
135
     
As of 14 October, Canadian immigration authorities in Europe received 8,207 enquires 
for immigration to Canada of which 6,344 or 77.3 percent resulted in applications. The largest 
number of applications was filed with Canadian immigration officials in Vienna. However, 38 
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percent of all refugee applicants in Vienna did not attend their scheduled immigration interview 
and cancelled their flights, thus forcing the Canadian immigration team to find other successful 
applicants to keep each chartered aircraft full of refugees on their way to Canada.
136
 The 
Department of Manpower and Immigration initially sought to resettle between 500-1,000 
individuals from refugee camps in Austria and Yugoslavia.  
The Canadian government continued to charter flights to meet the demand. In the first 
eight weeks since the Soviet-led invasion, fourteen flights arrived in Canada spreading refugees 
without a preference to every region of Canada. The federal government established a fund with 
a value of over $2 million to support the charter flights. Many of the 1968ers were enrolled in 
language courses, temporary and permanent employment, and special courses designed to teach 
the newcomer about Canadian customs and lifestyle. More than 1,900 of these same individuals 
were receiving government assistance to support daily costs until they received their first pay 
cheque.
137
 
In late October, it became clear to the Ontario government that the federal Department of 
Manpower and Immigration was adequately handling the resettlement of Czechoslovakian 
refugees. Federal authorities agreed to provide refugees with a six-month English-language 
course at local Adult Training Centres for refugees entering universities or new employment.
138
 
The Provincial Secretary and Minister of Citizenship, Robert Welch, informed Premier John P. 
Robarts that departmental representatives met with Ervin Sypták, President of MMI, Jiří Corn 
and Alex Havrlant of the CNAC, and Rudolf V. Fraštacký of the PCSDE to determine the extent 
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of the problems that Czech and Slovak doctors, dentists, engineers, lawyers, accountants, and 
skilled tradesman were encountering in acquiring English-language training and recognition of 
their foreign credentials. Provincial officials later recommended to Ottawa that it expand its 
programs to include professionals as opposed to limiting them to unskilled and semi-skilled 
refugees.
139
 
In addition to the linguistic difficulties that the newcomers faced, many of them were 
professionally certified in their chosen fields, but faced challenges in having their credentials 
approved in Canada. Amongst the recent arrivals were a group of dentists who sought to 
commence their practices in Canada. In the province of Ontario, the Federation of Labour 
lobbied the provincial government to assess each incoming dentist‟s skills and knowledge with a 
practical examination under the auspices of the Royal College of Dental Surgeons instead of 
forcing them to enter a university dentistry program for more schooling.
140
 The Globe and Mail 
indicated that David Archer, president of the Ontario Federation of Labour sent Premier Robarts 
a letter criticizing the college‟s insistence on Canadian training for the Czechoslovakian dentists 
prior to being fully licenced. Archer suggested that the college was “engaged in discriminatory 
practices because of country of origin.”141 Similar to the Czechoslovak dentists, a group of thirty 
medical doctors were to sit through special examinations administered by the Ontario College of 
Physicians and Surgeons. For the refugee doctors whose English-language abilities were good 
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and were able to pass the examination, the college indicated that they be permitted to undertake 
one or two-year internships at hospitals across the province.
142
 
Incidentally, officials in Ottawa could only locate the name of one of the dentists, Jan 
Vávra residing in Hearst, Ontario.
143
 Vávra was offered employment as a dentist, but could not 
accept the position because he had yet to complete his Canadian training. The newly arrived 
Czechoslovakian refugee claimed he would only need one year to improve his English-language 
capabilities and become acquainted with the types of drugs, medical instruments and materials, 
and terms used in North America. Similar to other newcomer dentists from Czechoslovakia, 
Vávra did not understand why he should be forced to attend university dentistry courses for a 
period of two years.
144
 
By the end of October, Canadian Czechoslovak organizations were in the process of 
raising funds for the Prague Spring refugees. The MMI raised several thousand dollars, while the 
CFCR recently re-established due to the refugee crisis raised over $10,000 to assist individuals 
arriving in Canada. The Bata Corporation issued 500 vouchers to the CFCR. Each voucher was 
worth seven dollars and was to be used to purchase footwear and other items from the company. 
In cooperation with the CNAC, the fund distributed the vouchers to local branches across the 
country.
145
 For example in Winnipeg, 100 vouchers from the Bata Corporation with a value of 
$700 dollars were allocated to newly arrived refugees in the city. Similarly, the Star Slipper 
Company managed by Czech immigrant Vojtěch Škubal donated forty-five pairs of men‟s winter 
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boots, and the Fortune Shoes Company donated 60 pairs of women‟s boots, twenty-two 
bathroom towels, and eight wool blankets.
146
 In Edmonton, forty-eight pairs of men‟s boots, 60 
pairs of women‟s boots, and 55 vouchers were delivered to the most deserving newcomers.147 In 
all, the CFCR received $8,600 in footwear vouchers from the Bata Corporation, $5,000 from 
Antonín Ronza of Susan Shoe Industry Limited of Hamilton for footwear, towels, blankets, and 
bedding, $5,000 from J. Škubal of Fortune Footwear Limited, and $1,000 each from Joza Weider 
of Collingwood, Ontario and lumber magnate Leon Koerner of Vancouver.
148
 
As Canadian Czechoslovak organizations continued to raise funds for the Prague Spring 
refugees, members of the Canadian Czechoslovak community held celebrations across the 
country to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of Czechoslovakia on 28 
October 1918. The celebrations were held a day early and were attended by prominent members 
of local, provincial, and federal government and ethnocultural associations. Even though Liberal 
Senator Andrew Thompson did not attend the festivities, he sent MMI a telegram congratulating 
the organization on its work in resettling Czechoslovakian refugees.
149
 Former Mayor of Toronto 
Nathan Phillips and his wife were in attendance along with representatives of the Canadian 
Polish Congress, the Court of Canadian Citizenship, Immigrant Settlement Services within the 
Canada Manpower Centre, and the City of Toronto.
150
 In Hamilton, Ontario which initially 
                                                 
146
 LAC, CNAC Fonds, MG 28 V111, volume 2, file 16 “Minutes – Head Office and Branches, 1969-1974,” letter, 
Sestry a bratři, from CNAC Branch Winnipeg to unknown, n.d. 
147
 LAC, CNAC Fonds, MG 28 V111, volume 2, file 16 “Minutes – Head Office and Branches, 1969-1974,” letter, 
Zpráva o činnosti odbočky Edmonton, from Eric Z. Schoengut, president, CNAC Branch Edmonton to unknown, 
n.d. 
148
 LAC, CNAC Fonds, MG 28 V111, volume 4, file 2 “Reports, n.d., 1968-1973,” report, Canadian Fund for 
Czechoslovak Refugees in Canada, n.d. 
149
 LAC, MMI Fonds, MG 28 V110, volume 4, file “Correspondence, 1968,” telegram from Senator Andy 
Thompson to Masaryk Memorial Institute, 26 October 1968. 
150
 LAC, MMI Fonds, MG 28 V110, volume 4, file “Correspondence, 1968,” letter from Ervin Sypták, MMI 
President and Jan Stríček, MMI Secretary to Mr. and Mrs. Nathan Phillips, 29 October 1968; LAC, MMI Fonds, 
MG 28 V110, volume 4, file “Correspondence, 1968,” letter from Ervin Sypták, MMI President and Jan Stríček, 
MMI Secretary to Charles White, Supervisor of Immigrant Settlement Services, Canada Manpower Centre, Toronto, 
 
 280 
received approximately 270 refugees, mayor Victor Copps proclaimed 28 October as 
„Czechoslovak Day‟ in the city and the national flag of Czechoslovakia was raised at city hall for 
one week.
151
 
By 1 November, over 3,000 Czechoslovakian refugees were already resettled in Canada. 
Fifteen charter flights organized by the Canadian government brought over 2,625 of these 
refugees. In the same period, 1,534 refugees reported to the Canada Manpower Centres across 
the country. In the ten weeks since the Warsaw Pact invasion, 600 refugees from Czechoslovakia 
secured employment with less than half in the profession of their choice. All refugees who 
reported to the Canada Manpower Centres were eligible to receive resettlement assistance from 
the federal government.
152
 In mid-November, Ontario‟s College of Dental Surgeons bowed to 
public pressure and agreed to allow Czechoslovakian refugee dentists to practice in the province 
if they successfully passed a licencing examination to be held the following May.
153
 The 
college‟s decision directly impacted the five Czechoslovak dentists who were already living in 
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Ontario and any others who applied for a licence to practice in the province before 1969. The 
college succumbed to public pressure due to its previous decision to force incoming dentists to 
return to school for two years which appeared to discriminate against newcomers from 
Czechoslovakia. As a result, the refugee dentists were placed in the same category as dentists 
from Commonwealth states and Scandinavia and had their qualifications and experience 
accepted. As a result, they were only required to pass a licencing examination. The college 
encouraged the five dentists – three in Toronto and two in Windsor – along with Jan Vávra to 
increase their English-language proficiency and to shadow local dentists at their offices.
154
 
Canadian authorities were aware that the flow of applications from Czechoslovakian 
refugees overseas was in gradual decline since the middle of October when approximately 1,500 
individuals arrived in a single week. A month later only 472 refugees arrived in Canada. The 
special program for Czechoslovakian refugees remained in effect long enough for the refugees to 
decide whether they should resettle in Canada or remain in Europe. By the end of 1968, 
approximately 8,000 refugees arrived in Canada while another 2,000 resettled in Canada before 
the special program for Czechoslovakian refugees ended in January 1969. The Canadian 
government spent over $4.7 million on the program by 31 December 1968. Czechoslovak 
refugees owed $1.3 million in transportation loans to the Canadian government. The Globe and 
Mail noted that Ontario was the principal destination for more than half of all refugees. The 
province of Quebec was the second most-preferred choice after Ontario followed by Alberta, 
Manitoba, and British Columbia. A majority of the refugees resettled in urban centres within the 
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aforementioned provinces.
155
 In all, the federal government‟s special program cost between $8-
10 million to ultimately repatriate close to 12,000 refugees.
156
 
 
Termination of the Special Program and the Resettlement of Czechoslovakian Refugees 
When the special program for Czechoslovakian refugees was terminated on 10 January 
1969, Czechoslovakian refugees who applied to enter Canada were considered under normal 
immigration regulations. Refugees continued to be eligible for governmental assistance if they 
could meet the required conditions. For example, in order to participate in the Department of 
Manpower and Immigration‟s Occupational Training Program for Adults, individuals had to be 
members of the workforce for an uninterrupted period of three years.
157
 In late October 1968, 
Vladimír Malík and his parents arrived in Malton, Ontario. They were permitted entry to Canada 
as visitors for a period of six months. Less than two months later, Vladimír and his parents 
applied to permanently stay in Canada. Although his parents decided to return to 
Czechoslovakia, Malík was successfully granted landed immigrant status on 6 March 1969. Due 
to the fact that Vladimír was sponsored after the end of the special program for Czechoslovakian 
refugees, Malík was not eligible for financial, residential, and language training assistance.
158
 
While some Czechoslovak refugees missed the special program deadline or could not 
satisfy the required conditions to enter a training program, they also balked at the lack of 
choice in language training. In February, a group of 120 refugees wrote to Prime Minister 
Trudeau to complain over the lack of choice between English and French-language courses in 
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Montreal. The refugees who arrived in the city received an unwelcome introduction to the 
politics of bilingualism. Forced to deal with the complaint, officials within the Department of 
Manpower and Immigration investigated the grievance that refugees were being prevented 
from taking English-language classes. The group initially agreed to enrol in a five-week 
French-language course to be followed by fifteen weeks of English-language instruction. The 
refugees were frustrated that they were only being offered a twenty-six week course equally 
divided between English and French.
159
 The group of refugees argued that “in spite of the 
many proclamations about free choice of either of your two languages spoken in Canada, this 
choice has been unequivocally denied to us.” They went on to note in their letter that “we 
entertain doubts whether we shall be granted the opportunity to obtain English instruction at 
all.” The Quebec Ministry of Education denied claims that they refused to permit the teaching 
of English to the refugees. The ministry argued that the newcomers should acquire a “sufficient 
knowledge” of the French language prior to learning English in order to live and work in the 
province.
160
 In essence, Czechoslovakian refugees in Quebec were caught in the middle of a 
simmering language conflict.  
For over two centuries, the language of business and social integration in the province 
of Quebec remained predominantly English. In 1965, the Royal Commission on Biculturalism 
and Bilingualism recommended that English and French become Canada‟s official languages, 
bilingual districts be created in areas where 10 percent or more of the population is either 
English or French, and that parents have the right to send their children to schools in the 
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language of their choice in regions where sufficient demand existed.
161
 As a result of the Royal 
Commission‟s findings, Francophones in Quebec began to further assert their language rights 
in the public sphere of society. On 27 June 1968, Francophone residents of the Montreal 
suburb of Saint-Léonard successfully lobbied the local school board to recognize French as the 
sole language of education. Forty percent of the residents of the Montreal suburb were Italian 
immigrants who preferred to have their children educated in English. Following a series of 
school occupations and protests, the language debate forced the Quebec government to act. On 
3 September 1969, the Union Nationale government of Jean-Jacques Bertrand passed Bill 63 – 
Quebec‟s first language law. Bill 63 entrenched parents‟ right to choose their children‟s 
language of instruction. The newly passed law was seen as heavily favouring Anglophone and 
Allophone (neither English nor French speaking) groups. 
With the termination of the special program for Czechoslovakian refugees, six Canadian 
Czechoslovak organizations based in Ontario distributed a report entitled “Suggested Provincial 
Action and Programs designed to Ease the Adjustment Problems of Czechoslovak Refugees,” to 
the Department of the Provincial Secretary and Citizenship in Toronto. Since more than half of 
the admitted refugees from Czechoslovakia resettled in Ontario, the CNAC, CFCR, MMI, 
PCSDE, Women‟s Council of the CNAC, and the Czechoslovak Branch No. 601 of the Royal 
Canadian Legion sought to raise awareness of the “special problems” involved in their 
integration. The report argued that existing programs were designed for sponsored or open-
placement immigrants and that “refugees cannot be easily fitted into the two above categories as 
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they have had hardly any time to consider immigration to a new country. Their decision to leave 
their own country is a move to[wards] survival and not a plan to settle in another country.”162 
Existing provincial and municipal agencies and services dealing with the resettlement of 
newcomers were more diverse than those which existed during the movement of Hungarian 
refugees in 1956.
163
 In one instance, the Ontario government issued a cheque in the amount of 
$1,000 to support the International Services of London, Incorporated and its work in the field of 
newcomer integration.
164
 
The report applauded existing social services and immigrant aid services in their ability 
to aid refugees in making a smooth transition to Canadian life. The six Canadian Czechoslovak 
organizations recognized the work of the federal Department of Manpower and Immigration for 
implementing a special program which provided for the reception, financial assistance, and 
counselling of refugees from Czechoslovakia. In cooperation with provincial and municipal 
authorities, “every possible means of assistance” was given to newly arrived refugees. The 
formation of an intergovernmental and interdepartmental committee was instrumental in 
facilitating the exchange of information necessary for the aforementioned resettlement program. 
The six Czechoslovak organizations indicated that in their opinion “the effectiveness of settling 
refugees is to a large extent due to interest, initiative and hard work on the part of many 
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voluntary agencies, ethnic groups, professional associations and individual citizens.”165 For 
example, the community of Cornwall, Ontario received twenty refugees and supported their 
resettlement by providing employment and housing. Local agencies realized that the refugees 
from Czechoslovakia were professionals and tradesmen, but lacked winter clothing and 
footwear. Similarly, a small number of refugees were settled in summer cottages in Northern 
Ontario where women‟s organizations outfitted the newcomers with winter clothing and other 
necessities.
166
 
Throughout 1969, refugees from Czechoslovakia continued to arrive in Canada. With the 
termination of the special program, Canadian officials treated these refugees under existing 
immigration regulations. After receiving their visas from Canadian immigration officials 
overseas, a group of seventeen Czechoslovakian doctors arrived in Canada from France, 
Germany, and Italy in the latter half of 1969. Unlike their professional colleagues who arrived 
prior to 10 January 1969 and were required to complete a screening test prior to assuming 
internships at various hospitals across Ontario, the newly arrived doctors were required to also 
complete a foreign medical graduate exam. Although the aforementioned doctors were 
specialists in their fields including anaesthesia, epidemiology, gynecology, pathology, pediatrics, 
surgery and tuberculosis, their level of English comprehension was minimal. As a result, 
provincial authorities did not permit these medical professionals to assume internships. A 
Toronto Life article published in March 1969 entitled, “Toronto‟s Czechs: How Successfully 
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They Have Settled In,” showcased the newcomer experience of an established surgeon with 
twenty-three years of professional experience. Anton Haninec was one of approximately 100 
doctors who were interviewed in Toronto by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario. 
Haninec passed an oral clinical knowledge examination and was permitted to apply for a junior 
internship at a local hospital. The experienced surgeon found an internship at the Lakeshore 
Psychiatric Hospital as a clinical clerk, a position normally filled by a fourth-year medical 
student. Haninec indicated that “you see, at 48, a man has a decision to make...I have another 20 
or 25 years of good work to do and I did not want to do it under Communism. That was my 
decision and now it is my responsibility to make it the right decision.”167 Similar to Haninec, a 
majority of the doctors were in their forties and resettled in Canada with their families. On their 
behalf, Ruth Petříček, president of the Women‟s Council of CNAC informed provincial officials 
that these individuals were informed that Canada needed medical professionals and that they 
were encouraged to come to Canada. Petříček hoped that health officials in Ontario would afford 
the same privileges to the seventeen medical professionals as those doctors and dentists who 
arrived a year earlier.
168
 
By late spring 1969, over 12,000 Czechoslovakian refugees had successfully settled 
across Canada. The Czechoslovakian refugees relocated throughout the country including 
western Canada; Winnipeg received approximately 1,000 refugees and Calgary gained 700 
individuals.
169
 Traditionally strong centres of immigration such as Toronto, Hamilton, and 
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Montreal – where sizeable Czech and Slovak populations resided – received the bulk of the 
newcomers with Toronto receiving approximately half of all recently arrived refugees.
170
 With 
an influx of Czechoslovakian refugees to Canada, Czechoslovak organizations such as MMI and 
CNAC benefitted greatly as their memberships increased. In 1968, the CNAC comprised 825 
members with 214 in Toronto and 182 in Montreal. These two branches accounted for 48 percent 
of all members. In March 1969, the CNAC boasted a membership of 1,303 individuals. New 
CNAC branches were established in Halifax, Nova Scotia and St. Catharines, Ontario.
171
 In 
Kingston, Ontario the arrival of 170 refugees also brought about the establishment of a new 
branch.
172
 Many of the 1968ers chose to join a local CNAC branch in their city of settlement for 
assistance in finding employment, accommodations, and for a sense of community.
173
 
With the culmination of the special program for Czechoslovakian refugees in January 
1969, Canadian-born Czechs and Slovaks including those who fled fascism in 1938-1939 and 
Communism in 1948 fundraised and assisted the resettlement of the newly arrived refugees in 
Canada. In Toronto, the Women‟s Council of the CNAC raised $2,700 and assisted refugees 
with finding employment, housing, clothing, and any issues pertaining to resettlement. The 
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council continued to assist elderly and infirm Czechoslovakian refugees who remained in camps 
in Austria, Italy, and West Germany. In Ottawa, the local CNAC branch acquired winter clothing 
for refugees and assured that they were enrolled in twenty-four week English-language classes. 
The Montreal Branch furnished refugees with blankets, bed sheets, utensils, kitchenware, 
furniture, footwear, and children‟s accessories. The branch also organized an information service 
for newcomers, aided in translating their documentation, and local Canadian Czech and Slovak 
doctors provided medical assistance and medication. In Edmonton, the local CNAC Branch sent 
$50 dollars to refugees in Austria. Prior to the Christmas season, presents were also distributed to 
fifty Czech and Slovak children. In Winnipeg, a Christmas pavilion for newcomers was held in 
which 380 individuals attended and the branch paid $620 for the event. Throughout the year, 389 
individuals received new clothing and bedding.
174
 
 On 27 May 1969, the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia announced a general 
amnesty for individuals who fled the state illegally in the aftermath of the Warsaw Pact invasion 
or whose travel permits had expired. Czechoslovakian citizens had until 15 September to return 
home or normalize their status at a Czechoslovakian embassy or consulate.
175
 A few days after 
Prague‟s announcement, Canada became a signatory to the United Nations Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees on 4 June 1969, eighteen years after its establishment in Geneva. Prior 
to formally accepting the United Nations Convention, Canada maintained a stance of non-
commitment when it came to providing the world‟s refugees with sanctuary. The Canadian 
government did not wish to be forced by international law to accept all convention refugees into 
the country. Instead it chose to use the convention as a framework for the selection and 
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resettlement of refugees.
176
 Two weeks later, on 19 June 1969, Paul Martin, Leader of the 
Government in the Senate reported to the upper chamber regarding the recent visit by a Canadian 
senatorial delegation to Czechoslovakia. The Canadian senators spent three and a half days in 
discussions with Czechoslovakian government ministers, members of the National Assembly, 
and the heads of the governments of the Czech and Slovak states.
177
 In Martin‟s view, 
Czechoslovakians were forced to address a change in the sociopolitical climate of their country 
after August 1968. A “new modus vivendi” was required which could allow the people to save 
their liberalizing reforms without threatening their partnerships within the Warsaw Pact and with 
the Soviet Union.
178
 The delegation condemned the Soviet-led aggression and refused to accept 
the notion that a state or a group of states had the right to intervene in the domestic affairs of 
another state. The senatorial delegation recognized Czechoslovakia‟s delicate position and 
attempted to express its views without worsening the situation.
179
 
On 6 July, the twentieth celebration of Czechoslovak Day was held at Masaryktown. 
Approximately 5,000 Czechs and Slovaks attended the festivities including the annual Sokol Slet 
in which over 200 individuals participated. The gathering included an address from Mitchell 
Sharp. In his speech, the Secretary of State for External Affairs claimed that the Czech and 
Slovak peoples “…stand as an example to all nations of the indomitable spirit of man that 
enables him to maintain the ideas of freedom and individual dignity in the face of overwhelming 
force.”180 Sharp argued that the Prague Spring movement and its slogan of „Socialism with a 
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Human Face‟ was a direct result of twenty years of Stalinization and the brutal repression of 
freedoms. The liberalization of Czechoslovakian communism was “…not the work of Western 
so-called imperialist infiltrators, it was a genuine outpouring of the very soul of the people of 
Czechoslovakia.”181 
In the fall of 1969, the Canada Manpower Centre informed the Ontario Department of the 
Provincial Secretary and Citizenship that refugees from Czechoslovakia were encountering 
difficulties in securing employment in their chosen fields. In particular, nurses and medical 
professionals struggled due to long delays in having their qualifications certified. In many 
instances, clearances were dependent on reports from Czechoslovakia whereby the Communist 
authorities often replied that the applicant did not exist in their files. The Canada Manpower 
Centre expressed concerns that Canadian federal and provincial authorities were sending 
confidential information to Prague to which the Communist authorities could “use for their own 
perhaps questionable purposes.”182 
 Standing before the House of Commons on 4 November, Minister of Manpower and 
Immigration Allan MacEachen informed his fellow Members of Parliament that the federal 
government resettled more than 11,200 individuals during the special program for 
Czechoslovakian refugees costing Canada over $11 million. Of this total, approximately $3 
million was spent on English and French-language training for over 7,000 refugees. As a result, 
over 80 percent of the refugees were placed in “gainful employment” resulting in what the 
minister identified as a “happy combination of compassion and good economics.” MacEachen 
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went on to note that Czech and Slovak refugees were successfully contributing to the country‟s 
economy and culture.
183
 
In the mid-1970s, the Department of Manpower and Immigration conducted a study on 
the economic and social adaptation of refugees from Czechoslovakia. The study included 813 
Czech and Slovak refugees who were identified as “slightly older, better educated, more 
frequently married and more predominantly comprised of professionals and craftsmen.”184 An 
overwhelming majority – 85 percent – of the respondents were enrolled in language courses 
since their arrival in Canada in comparison with only 50 percent of all immigrants in the same 
period. Four-fifths of respondents indicated that they took English-language training, whereas 41 
percent of individuals took French-language classes primarily in Quebec.
185
 Only twenty-nine 
percent of Czechs and Slovaks participated in social clubs and service groups. For those 
individuals who did participate, 67 percent of them were members of groups patronized by 
Canadians from all backgrounds. The study concluded that Czech and Slovak refugees were 
beginning to identify more with being Canadians and were relinquishing their European identity. 
Two-thirds of the 813 respondents indicated that they felt more attached to Canada than their 
homeland of Czechoslovakia.
186
 In terms of economic adaptation, many of respondents from 
Czechoslovakia required extensive language training and fought a public perception that they 
lacked the proper qualifications for employment in their chosen fields. Over the three year period 
of the study, Czech and Slovak refugees were able to increase their monthly earnings by forty 
percent from $518 in 1968-1969 to $726 per month in 1971-1972. The average yearly income 
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also increased from $6,620 to $10,349, and their rate of unemployment remained at only ten 
percent.
187
  
Individuals who entered Canada during the special program for Czechoslovakian 
refugees were able to attain a higher level of employment duration and income than the average 
immigrant. Over 70 percent of the households were in the 15-44 years of age range with more 
than twelve years of formal education and one-third were in the skilled or professional fields. 
With the inclusion of less than 10 percent of all Czechoslovakian refugees from the special 
program in the study sample, its conclusions remained incomplete. The study illustrated that 
Czechoslovakian refugees openly identified with Canadian identity and Canada as their new 
home more than the average immigrant who settled in the country in the same period. 
Consequently, the Czechoslovakian refugees or 1968ers were more readily incorporated into the 
socioeconomic structure of their local community.
188
 
 
Conclusion 
The Canadian special program remained the most generous of all non-European countries 
since its intake was approximately 11,200 refugees of the more than 14,000 individuals who 
were permitted to resettle in the country from Czechoslovakia in 1968-1969. The Australian 
government also waived its immigration regulations, but refugees were met with a ten-week 
delay whereby the authorities only offered assisted passage. The American government did not 
relax its immigration procedures, but allowed refugees to secure a conditional visa after a 
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waiting period of three to five months.
189
 In total, Canada permitted 14,374 individuals who 
claimed Czechoslovakia as their country of citizenship to enter the country during 1968-1969.
190
 
Of this total, the largest groups of Czechoslovakians came from Austria, 7,902; Czechoslovakia, 
2,595; West Germany, 1,635; Switzerland, 744; France, 599; Great Britain, 235; and Italy, 
204.
191
 Many Czechoslovakian refugees arrived in Canada having never returned home prior to 
the Soviet invasion of August 1968. 
The Prague Spring refugees were admitted to Canada due to their university education, 
technical skills training, and professional experience – and were seen as a large pool of talent for 
Canada‟s economy. Mired in an economic downturn, the Canadian government did not hesitate 
to select individual refugees fleeing Communism from Canadian offices across Europe or from 
the Czechoslovakian citizens already in Canada as visitors who later applied to remain 
permanently in the country. The Canadian government treated the refugees equally. Public 
pressure from newspaper editorials and ethnic organizations including the Czechoslovak 
National Association of Canada (CNAC) and Masaryk Memorial Institute (MMI) for a 
compassionate humanitarian response to the plight of the 1968ers forced the federal government 
to act. As a member of NATO, Ottawa was aware that the reception of the 1968ers – similar to 
the 1956ers from Hungary – would embarrass the Soviet Union. A combination of altruism, 
duty, and public pressure dictated Canada‟s response. Even as Canadian authorities were vigilant 
to the possibility of Communist agents arriving in the country, federal officials were keen to 
resettle anti-communist refugees from Czechoslovakia who would further legitimize the state‟s 
                                                 
189
 Ibid., 13. 
190
 Canada, Department of Manpower and Immigration, Immigration Statistics 1969 (Ottawa: Queen‟s Printer for 
Canada, 1970), 22. 
191
 Ibid., 10-11; Canada, Department of Manpower and Immigration, Immigration Statistics 1968 (Ottawa: Queen‟s 
Printer for Canada, 1969), 10-11. 
 295 
opposition towards Communism and Soviet espionage during the Cold War. As Czechoslovakia 
lost an entire generation of intellectuals and professionals, Canada gained well-educated and 
experienced individuals who would make a significant social and economic contribution to the 
country far outweighing the $11 million spent to resettle them in Canada.
192
 
 Over the next two decades, many 1968ers who supported a Czechoslovak identity 
followed earlier refugees from Czechoslovakia and joined Canadian Czechoslovak institutions. 
In the case of the CNAC and MMI, both organizations were revitalized with new members, 
many of whom supported the 1948ers‟ anti-communist and anti-Soviet agenda. The Warsaw Pact 
invasion of Czechoslovakia strengthened the anti-communist identity of many 1948ers and 
Canadian-born members of the Czechoslovak community. The events of August 1968 also 
heightened anti-Soviet sentiment as witnessed by the post-invasion demonstrations held at the 
Soviet Embassy in Ottawa and in major cities across Canada. The arrival of the 1968 wave of 
refugees from Czechoslovakia also helped to reinforce the 1948ers‟ efforts to influence Canadian 
foreign policy towards the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. In the years after the arrival of the 
1968ers, Canadian Czechoslovak institutions continued to advocate for family reunification, the 
return of democracy, human rights, and the elimination of censorship in their old homeland. 
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Chapter Six: 
 
Strengthening the Community: 
Continuing the Struggle against Communism and Preserving Ethnocultural Heritage 
 
During the turbulent months after the Warsaw Pact invasion in August 1968, Czechs and 
Slovaks were presented with an opportunity to seek freedom in the West. For some, the desire to 
leave would have to wait. In 1969, Ladislav Šolc and his wife wanted to visit Austria, but the 
borders closed before they could leave. In the fall of that year, Communist authorities in 
Czechoslovakia closed the country‟s borders. With a newborn child, the Šolcs were left to wait 
nearly a decade before they were able to leave the country. In choosing to leave family and 
friends behind, Iva Rousová faced scrutiny from her loved ones over her decision to immigrate to 
the West. Rousová was told by those most important to her that in the West, she would be treated 
as a foreigner and ostracized for not speaking English. In separate circumstances, the Šolcs and 
Rouses packed their belongings and left by car for Hungary and later Yugoslavia in 1978. After 
reaching Yugoslavia, both couples requested asylum as refugees from Czechoslovakia. Under an 
agreement between Belgrade and Prague, Czechoslovakian citizens were to have their travel 
passports seized by Yugoslavian officials. In the case of Rouses, they were forced to sign a 
document stating that they would return to Zagreb in Croatia by a certain date and time and their 
passports would be returned. They never saw their passports again.
1
  
In order to be properly recognized as refugees in accordance with international law, the 
Rouses claimed asylum in Yugoslavia before attempting to enter Austria as their safe third 
country. Iva and her husband hid their savings in their clothes and feared for their lives as they 
knew they would be sent back to Czechoslovakia if their savings were found in their luggage. 
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During a long weekend, the family spent a night in prison as visa offices were closed and they 
could not be relocated in time to a refugee camp. The family was later visited by a Yugoslavian 
Interior Ministry official who photographed them and demanded their signatures. The Rouses 
were given twenty-four hours to report to the Traiskirchen refugee camp on the outskirts of 
Vienna. With little money left, the family crossed the border into Austria and stayed in 
Traiskirchen for two weeks where they were assisted by Catholic organizations. Eventually, Iva 
and her husband were granted work permits while Austrian authorities provided them with basic 
accommodations, food, clothing, and funds of $100 per month. After a waiting period of over 
four months in early 1978, the Rouses were accepted to Canada. The Šolcs also reached Austria 
and stayed at the Badkirchen refugee camp where Austrian authorities provided the family with 
accommodations and food. Since Canada was their first choice for permanent settlement in the 
West, the Šolcs were later flown to Canada once the refugee camp was full to capacity.2  
In the spring of 1978, the Šolcs arrived in Montreal and spent the night in a government 
provided hotel. The following day, the family flew to Hamilton where a Canada Manpower 
official brought them to a local hotel and assisted in the family‟s initial settlement by providing 
funds for food, rent, and household items. The Canadian government provided the Šolcs with 
funding for their first five months in Canada, while Ladislav enrolled in English language 
classes. Meanwhile, the local Canadian Czechoslovak community found employment for 
Ladislav‟s wife. Several months later in November 1978, Iva Rousová and her family arrived in 
Montreal from Vienna via Brussels. Once in Canada, the family was medically examined and 
cleared to work. The Rouses were accepted by the Canadian government much sooner because 
Iva‟s husband knew English and German, and had guaranteed employment with Havlik – a 
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machine parts company in Preston, Ontario. The Canadian government furnished the family with 
hotel accommodations and food in Toronto prior to their relocation to Preston.
3
 
In recalling his immigration experience, Ladislav Šolc claimed that Canada did not 
appear to be a comfortable place as everything seemed foreign. He found everything hard at first 
and wanted to leave Canada, but the thought of learning a new language or culture elsewhere 
seemed daunting. Šolc‟s immigration experience was difficult at first. In the months following 
his immigration to Canada, Šolc found adequate employment for himself and accommodations 
for his family. As a result, he believed that Canadians were humble and hard-working. 
According to him, they did not boast about themselves as did nationalists in Europe.
4
 After a few 
years in Canada, the Šolcs considered themselves to be Canadians.  
Iva Rousová recalled that many refugees waited upwards of eight months to come to 
Canada due to a lack of guaranteed employment or a sponsor. Much to her surprise, Rousová 
found that Canadians were more helpful than her compatriots back home whom she identified as 
“envious, dishonest, and distrusting in public.” Local residents in Preston assisted the family in 
finding an apartment and furniture. After two years in Canada, Rousová quickly learned to live 
in freedom and recalled that she earned everything she wanted, whereas back home in 
Czechoslovakia, she would have gotten nowhere in the same period. The Rouses saved $30 per 
month to pay Canadian authorities for their resettlement. In reminiscing about their immigration 
experience, Iva believed that Canada did not owe the couple anything and they were thankful for 
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being granted admission. According to her, the couple owed Canada.
5
 Similar to the Šolcs, the 
Rouses quickly became Canadians.
6
 
This chapter examines how the Canadian Czechoslovak community responded to 
political developments in their homeland, its continued reception of Czechoslovakian refugees, 
its anti-communist lobbying efforts, and the preservation of its democratic identity and 
ethnocultural heritage in the 1970s and 1980s. During this period, the Czechoslovak National 
Association of Canada (CNAC) became increasingly concerned as a significant portion of the 
Canadian public actively demonstrated against American foreign policy in Vietnam which many 
Canadian Czechoslovaks believed was combatting Communism. The CNAC protested against 
the Communist authorities‟ elimination of individual freedoms and human rights, and the Soviet 
occupation of Czechoslovakia. The association lobbied the Canadian government and members 
of parliament continued to oppose the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. The CNAC was 
concerned that Ottawa‟s expanding relationship with the Soviet Union could give the Canadian 
public the perception that Communist states contained acceptable political systems and 
safeguarded human rights and individual freedoms. Although many Canadian Czechoslovaks 
retained vivid memories of life under fascism and later communism, the international 
community‟s promotion of détente troubled many anti-communist Czechs and Slovaks who 
believed that Canada would be pressured into legitimizing Moscow‟s intervention in 
Czechoslovakia. The CNAC pressed the Canadian government to expedite family reunification 
cases, lobbied for the removal of restrictions on the visits of relatives, and demanded that Prague 
remove Czechoslovakian citizenship from individuals who later received Canadian citizenship to 
prevent their detention when visiting Czechoslovakia. Whereas a majority of 1948ers refused to 
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„normalize relations‟ with the Communist authorities, many 1968ers who spent upwards of two 
decades under communism believed they were “apolitical.” Many 1968ers wanted to regularize 
their status as „illegal émigrés‟ who fled the country „without permission.‟  
During the 1970s and 1980s, Czechoslovakians who fled from the Communist regime 
to the West were later referred to by the Communist government press as having se vypařily or 
„self-evaporated.‟ Unlike the 1948ers and 1968ers, these newcomers did not leave 
Czechoslovakia after a specific crisis, but rather left Czechoslovakia during a period of 
„normalization.‟7 This wave of immigration from Czechoslovakia included academics, 
professionals, and skilled tradesmen in construction, manufacturing, and the service industries. 
Canadian Czechoslovak organizations including the CNAC and Masaryk Memorial Institute 
(MMI) were revitalized by the arrival of a third wave of Cold War refugees who strengthened 
the anti-communist and democratic identity of these prominent organizations. 
As the relationship between Canadian Czechoslovaks and the Communist government in 
Prague remained strained, community members began to discuss the need to preserve their ethnic 
heritage and democratic identity for successive generations. During the Cold War, the Canadian 
Czechoslovak community‟s identity was directly tied to its struggle against communism. Many 
individuals within the community were removed from their homeland for decades and continued 
to support the liberation of Czechoslovakia. After the Warsaw Pact invasion, many 1948ers and 
1968ers feared that they would never see the return of democracy in their old homeland and 
supported the preservation of the Czechoslovak community‟s ethnocultural heritage in Canada. 
The arrival of Czechoslovakian refugees from the Warsaw Pact invasion galvanized the 
Canadian Czechoslovak community and breathed new life into community groups across the 
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country. In the immediate years after the events of 1968, organizations including the CNAC and 
MMI continued to struggle with a lack of financial security. With the Canadian government‟s 
introduction of an official multiculturalism policy in 1971, ethnocultural groups were able to 
support their activities and institutions with grants and subsidies under the aegis of 
multiculturalism which promoted the country‟s diverse ethnic cultures and identities. With 
federal and provincial support, the Canadian Czechoslovak organizations successfully funded 
projects including Czech and Slovak supplementary schools, and community radio and television 
broadcasts that preserved Czechoslovak ethnic heritage and democratic identity, but also 
promoted Canadian multiculturalism. These ethnocultural activities assisted in contesting public 
apathy among community members and improved good citizenship. The Department of the 
Secretary of State which was responsible for citizenship and multiculturalism programs believed 
that its funding program would allow the Canadian Czechoslovak community to move from a 
less known position to greater public visibility whereby its contribution to Canadian 
multiculturalism could be better appreciated. Many Canadian Czechs and Slovaks were 
increasingly concerned with how immigrants from Czechoslovakia were integrating in Canadian 
society. 
 
Continuing the Struggle against Communism and Settling Refugees in the 1970s and 1980s 
 
Founded during the Prague Spring movement, the Sociální sdružení bývalych Čsl. 
Politickych věznů (Kanada) (Welfare Association of Former Czechoslovak Political Prisoners in 
Canada – WAFCPP) brought together Czech and Slovak victims of Communist persecution who 
resettled in Canada. The arrival of the 1968ers energized the association which immediately 
sought cooperation with compatriot organizations in Canada. On 4 January 1970, the association 
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formed a working committee in order for decision-making to be a collective effort.
8
 Thirteen 
days later, the WAFCPP elected members into a provisional committee which directed the 
association‟s agenda.9 As the largest and most influential Czechoslovak organizations in Canada, 
the CNAC and MMI led advocacy and resettlement efforts on behalf of the 1968ers. With the 
arrival of many refugees who were victims of political persecution in Czechoslovakia, the 
WAFCPP engaged both organizations to promote its agenda of supporting former political 
prisoners and commemorating the victims of the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia. With the 
immigration of over 14,000 individuals from Czechoslovakia in 1968-1969, Canadian 
Czechoslovak organizations were bolstered with new members.  
In the spring of 1970, the CNAC held its twenty-second annual congress in Winnipeg. A 
resolution was adopted by delegates in attendance demanding that all foreign troops withdraw 
from Czechoslovakia, and free elections be held under international supervision. The congress 
also declared that the Soviet Union‟s Brezhnev Doctrine was incompatible with international law 
since it permitted Moscow to intervene in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia.
10
 Similarly, the 
aforementioned resolution demonstrated the association‟s concern with public reaction over 
events in Czechoslovakia and the Communist world. As an anti-communist organization, CNAC 
members in Winnipeg were concerned that a significant portion of the Canadian public actively 
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demonstrated against American imperialism and carried anti-American slogans in protests across 
the country. Although the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia did not draw the same amount of 
outrage in comparison to events in Vietnam, the CNAC later argued that these protests against 
American imperialism were not a reaction to the endangerment of democracy, but were planned 
actions aimed at disrupting democratic society. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the escalation of the Vietnam War led many Canadians who 
opposed American intervention in southeast Asia and elsewhere to demonstrate across the 
country. In an era of increasing social protest, marches, peace conferences, and university sit-ins, 
many Canadians voiced their concerns over Western imperialism and Canada‟s involvement.11 
Between 1965 and 1974, approximately 50,000 to 125,000 American war resisters arrived in 
Canada seeking refuge from American authorities. Many of these individuals and their family 
members were skilled and university educated, and joined efforts to oppose American 
involvement in Vietnam and elsewhere.
12
 Canadian authorities permitted American war resisters 
and their families to enter Canada, but remained concerned how this wave of newcomers would 
influence relations between Ottawa and Washington. In an effort to defend the country against 
Communist sympathizers and individuals engaged in anti-American social protest, Canadian 
officials tasked the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) with gathering information and 
surveilling influential war resisters.
13
   
As former citizens of a country under Communist domination, CNAC members remained 
supportive of American-led attempts to defend democracy in their homeland and elsewhere.
14
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Disturbed by misleading reports on the Vietnam War published in Canadian newspapers, 
Vladimír Krajina, a CNAC member and professor of Botany at the University of British 
Columbia wrote to Prime Minister Trudeau suggesting that these media reports carried a 
“deliberate overemphasis of antiwar protests mostly organized under the influence of Communist 
or pro-Communist elements either in Europe or in North America.”15 On behalf of CNAC 
members in Vancouver, Krajina indicated that Czechs and Slovaks in the city were worried over 
the “continuous brain-washing of the Canadian public” as public opposition to American foreign 
policy grew and sympathy for the Soviet cause led Moscow to continue to support the Vietnam 
War, and hamper any attempts at peace. Krajina requested that the Canadian government 
pressure media outlets to insure that a balance in news coverage be maintained. The professor of 
botany feared that a rise in anti-American press coverage could lead to a Communist victory in 
the Cold War. Along with Krajina, CNAC members could not understand why so many 
individuals opposed the American presence in Vietnam – which they viewed as temporary – as 
opposed to the permanent Soviet occupation of Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.
16
  
As political prisoners who witnessed Communist brutality, members of the WAFCPP 
joined the CNAC in supporting Western efforts to defend democratic and human rights in 
Czechoslovakia and the Communist world. Several months after the annual congress in 
Winnipeg, WAFCPP requested the use of MMI‟s facilities to host its own national congress. The 
event coincided with the annual Czechoslovak Day held on the grounds at Masaryktown. The 
group of former political prisoners was permitted to officially participate as a member 
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compatriot organization and laid a wreath to the memory of tortured, executed, and deceased 
political prisoners of the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia.
17
 Three months later on the 
second anniversary of the Soviet-led invasion, the organization released a proclamation 
demanding the immediate withdrawal of Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces from Czechoslovakia, 
and that a democratic election be held to elect a new government.
18
 
In 1960, Jean Lesage and the Quebec Liberals were elected after nearly two decades of 
governance under Maurice Duplessis and his staunchly anti-communist and conservative Union 
Nationale. The election of the provincial Liberals was followed by a rapid process of 
modernization and secularization known as the Quiet Revolution. Until the 1960s, Quebec was 
dominated by conservative political elites and the Catholic Church who played a vital part in 
Canada‟s Cold War consensus. The Quiet Revolution led many Quebecers to question the role of 
the Catholic Church in society and the federal government in the province. By the end of the 
decade, many Quebecers became increasingly critical of American-led intervention overseas and 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons. While the Quebec government called on Ottawa for greater 
control over the province‟s affairs, separatists demanding independence were divided into two 
factions: those who sought to use the existing democratic system to achieve their aims joined the 
Parti Québécois, and nationalists who turned to armed struggle.
19
  
In the fall of 1970, the CNAC turned its anti-communist lobbying efforts towards events 
in Canada due to a fear that democracy was under attack. In October, the kidnapping of British 
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Trade Commissioner James Cross and the assassination of Quebec‟s Minister of Transportation 
Pierre Laporte by members of the Marxist and nationalist Front de libération du Québec forced 
the Canadian government to implement the War Measures Act and suspend habeus corpus – 
giving police far reaching powers of arrest. In its correspondence with the Prime Minister‟s 
Office, the CNAC indicated its support of the federal government‟s position towards domestic 
terrorism. The organization supported Ottawa‟s temporary powers to protect democracy under 
the War Measures Act, but demanded that it remain vigilant of citizens‟ rights. The CNAC 
further advocated for the enactment of legislation that would “…deal with actions of any radical 
groups in Canada whose aim is to create chaos, destroy democracy and introduce dictatorship.”20 
Heavily influenced by past events in Czechoslovakia, the CNAC argued that “…the destruction 
of a democratic society can be achieved by small, usually well-organized minority groups. These 
groups, using intimidation, accusations and terror are usually assisted by professional 
revolutionaries and supported from abroad.” As a result, the Canadian Czechoslovak 
organization viewed the Front de libération du Québec as a movement that used violence to 
attack democratically elected governments under the guise of Marxist revolution.
21
 
 A month later, the Free Central European News Agency (FCENA) based in London, 
England reported that Communist authorities in Prague were in the midst of blackmailing 70,000 
émigrés. In citing an official Czechoslovakian government document in the possession of the 
British government, the FCENA claimed that Prague established a Legal Advisory Centre to 
address the departure of these émigrés to the West since an overwhelming majority of the 
1968ers resettled in Australia, Canada, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Switzerland, and 
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West Germany. The news article indicated that Prague officially admitted to the departure of 
approximately 51,000 individuals after the Warsaw Pact invasion. Similarly, FCENA argued that 
Soviet KGB (Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti – Committee for State Security) advisers 
were behind a plan to raise foreign currency for Eastern Europe.
22
 The Communist scheme to 
blackmail refugees from Czechoslovakia consisted of letters sent by post indicating that 
“prosecution has been initiated against you for the criminal act of abandoning the Republic 
according to…the Criminal Code.” In addition, the letters sent to unsuspecting refugees by 
lawyers representing a Legal Advisory Centre stated “that established facts do sufficiently justify 
the conclusion that you have been…staying abroad illegitimately with the intention to take up 
permanent residence there.”23 In the letter, state appointed “legal counsels” subsequently noted 
that the costs of the legal proceedings and those of a “defence in court” were the sole 
responsibility of the defendant who was required to send a deposit of 700 Czechoslovakian 
Crowns in Canadian funds within fifteen days. Should the defendant fail to send the required 
deposit, the letter warned that a lawyer was “entitled to accept payments by your close relatives 
in Czechoslovakia.” Although the in-absentia trials were a farce, they were continually followed 
by threats and pressure.
24
 
On 1 December 1970, the Toronto Area Co-Ordinating Committee of Czech and Slovak 
Democratic Organizations, representing twelve separate Czechoslovak groups in the city, issued 
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a letter calling on fellow compatriots not to become victims of the “Communist scheme” and to 
“leave letters from state-appointed Czechoslovak lawyers unanswered.” The committee 
recognized that a small minority of recent arrivals could succumb to communist pressure out of 
fear that a close relative in Czechoslovakia would be persecuted.
25
 Similar measures against 
those who fled after February 1948 were never instituted, and FCENA believed that the plan by 
Moscow and Prague to obtain foreign currency was devised to seek “political justice” in a 
Czechoslovakia that was undergoing “normalization” after the Warsaw Pact invasion.26  
The committee hoped that with the federal government‟s involvement the situation could 
be remedied. The twelve Canadian Czechoslovak organizations believed that two issues justified 
Canadian governmental involvement. First, the committee argued that refugees from 
Czechoslovakia were being subjected to “moral as well as economic pressure” at the hands of the 
Communist authorities which made their resettlement in Canada difficult. Second, Prague‟s 
“scheme” to blackmail these newcomers could potentially remove several million dollars from 
the Canadian economy. While the second issue was unrealistic, it may have been meant as a 
pressure tactic by these twelve groups to force Ottawa‟s involvement. The coordinating 
committee hoped that its demands would prevent further moves by Prague against the Canadian 
Czechoslovak community and recently arrived refugees from Czechoslovakia.
27
 A month later 
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the CNAC branch in Vancouver sent a letter to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mitchell 
Sharp requesting assistance against Prague‟s blackmailing scheme.28 
Amid Prague‟s attempts to pressure its compatriots, the CNAC held its twenty-third 
annual congress on 8-9 May 1971 in Niagara Falls, Ontario. During the congress, delegates 
resolved to defend the identity and sovereignty of the Czech and Slovak peoples. Similarly, 
members in attendance agreed to continue to protest Communism‟s elimination of individual 
freedoms and human rights, the Soviet military domination of Czechoslovakia and its 
controversial Brezhnev Doctrine – which permitted Moscow to intervene in the internal affairs of 
its Communist satellite-states. Delegates demanded that the Canadian government and members 
of Parliament continue to oppose the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. Delegates were 
concerned that Ottawa‟s expanding relationship with the Soviet Union could give the Canadian 
public the perception that Communist states contained acceptable political systems that also 
safeguarded human rights and individual freedoms. The CNAC pressed Canadian 
parliamentarians to continue to “expose the propaganda tactics of totalitarian regimes” and 
preserve democracy in the world. Fearing that many student groups and labour organizations 
held pro-communist sympathies, the Niagara Falls congress called on the federal government to 
limit the amount of press given to labour and university groups who attempted to raise awareness 
of social justice issues only to “spread social unrest, thereby weakening Canadian unity and our 
democratic institutions.” Similarly, the congress concluded by demanding that Ottawa terminate 
access to postal services on the part of Communist states who attempt to blackmail Czech and 
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Slovak refugees. The CNAC concluded by arguing that any Communist diplomat found to be 
harassing refugees in Canada should lose their accreditation and be removed from the country.
29
 
In May 1971, Pierre Elliott Trudeau became the first Canadian Prime Minister to 
officially visit the Soviet Union. On 19 May, Trudeau and Soviet premier Alexei Kosygin signed 
a protocol obligating both countries to hold annual meetings on sociocultural, economic, and 
political developments. Much to the dismay of Eastern European communities in Canada, the 
Liberal government sought greater cooperation between both countries. Fearing Soviet demands 
and opposed to any rapprochement between Ottawa and Moscow, the CNAC called on the 
Canadian government to demand full reciprocity in its dealings with the Soviets. The 
organization reminded the Canadian Prime Minister that it would be a mistake to assume that 
Soviet leaders would ignore communist doctrine, permanent revolution, and world domination. 
The association argued that détente could not occur until Moscow acknowledged that the 
Warsaw Pact invasion in 1968 was in violation of the United Nations Charter.
30
 The CNAC also 
demanded that the Brezhnev Doctrine promoting Soviet intervention in the internal affairs of 
other states be repudiated. In talks between Moscow and Ottawa, the CNAC‟s membership stood 
with Ukrainian Canadians who sought the release of intellectuals whom the Soviets viewed as 
terrorists. Although they were dismayed by Trudeau‟s friendly relations with the Soviet Union, 
many members of the Canadian Czechoslovak community supported the Canadian Prime 
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Minister‟s wish not to compare Ukrainian intellectuals with Front de libération du Québec 
terrorists.
31
 
The Canadian Czechoslovak community was deeply concerned with Trudeau‟s official 
visit to the Soviet Union. Many individuals within the community believed that Canada‟s 
rapprochement with the Soviets could lead to an appeasement of Moscow‟s occupation of 
Czechoslovakia and suppression of individual freedoms and human rights. In an attempt to 
reassure the community, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Albert Edgar Ritchie 
informed the CNAC that Ottawa would not renounce its condemnation of the Warsaw Pact 
invasion.
32
 Upon learning that Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin would officially visit Ottawa in 
mid-October 1971 to hold talks with Canadian officials, the CNAC lobbied the Prime Minister‟s 
Office and Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp to never recognize the Soviet 
occupation of Czechoslovakia and to advocate for the Soviet withdrawal from Czechoslovakia.
33
 
In addition to its lobbying efforts in Ottawa, the CNAC initiated a postcard campaign to remind 
officials and prominent Canadians of the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. Approximately, 
16,000 postcards containing the words: “21 August, Invasion of Czechoslovakia, Day of Soviet 
Shame” were sent to all Canadian parliamentarians, senators, provincial premiers, Supreme 
Court justices, national press outlets, television and radio stations, and members of the United 
Nations Security Council. Individual CNAC branches were instructed to send postcards to their 
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locally elected officials and media outlets by 15 August 1971 to ensure they reached their 
destinations prior to the anniversary of the Soviet-led invasion. All remaining postcards were 
sent to politicians and officials in Communist Czechoslovakia and across the world.
34
 
Similar to previous years, the CNAC published a proclamation on the anniversary of the 
Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. On behalf of its members, the organization demanded 
that all Canadians condemn the Brezhnev doctrine as it was dangerous to international peace and 
promoted the intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. The CNAC subsequently 
demanded that any understanding between Ottawa and Moscow could not be based on the 
acceptance of the 1968 Soviet-led invasion. As a result, the organization argued that Canada 
should not negotiate with the Soviets unless full reciprocity was assured. As part of its struggle 
against communism, the CNAC continued to promote free elections and the immediate 
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia before the Canadian government.
35
 On 23 
October, approximately 2,000 individuals representing Canadians of Czechoslovakian, Estonian, 
Hungarian, Polish, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Ukrainian origin held a demonstration in Vancouver 
against Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin‟s official visit to Canada. Approximately, 300 Canadian 
Czechs and Slovaks participated. The following day, representatives from the CNAC‟s 
Vancouver Branch visited the University of British Columbia and participated in a discussion 
with students on the implications of Kosygin‟s visit to Canada.36  
In the fall of 1971, the CNAC became concerned with how Canadian citizens of Czech 
and Slovak origin were being treated by Czechoslovakian representatives. At Czechoslovakia‟s 
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embassy in Ottawa and Consulate General in Montreal, Canadian Czechs and Slovaks were 
harassed by Czechoslovakian diplomats with supplementary questioning. The CNAC appealed to 
Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp to intervene in order to prevent further 
harassment of Canadian Czechs and Slovaks who simply wished to acquire tourist visas in order 
to visit their relatives and friends in Czechoslovakia. In January 1972, Sharp informed the CNAC 
that the DEA discussed the issue with Czechoslovakian representatives in Ottawa and received 
assurances that in the case of Czechoslovakian refugees who were now Canadian citizens, only 
one visa application form was necessary. Czechoslovakian diplomats claimed that 
“supplementary questions” were asked in only specific cases and were not considered a normal 
routine. Since Communist authorities did not recognize dual citizenship, legation officials 
aggressively interviewed visa applicants who never officially rescinded their Czechoslovakian 
citizenship after settling in Canada. Sharp argued that CNAC members should ascertain their 
status in their old country in light of the fact that many 1948ers and 1968ers were found guilty of 
leaving the country without permission and were thus considered „illegal émigrés.‟37 The 
Secretary of State for External Affairs went on to argue that any 1948er or 1968er wishing to 
visit the old country would come under a certain amount of risk since the Communist authorities 
no longer recognized their Canadian citizenship or residency. In his letter to the CNAC, Sharp 
believed that:  
 
Any person of Czechoslovak birth who has not obtained a release from his 
Czechoslovak citizenship, or otherwise obtained the blessing of the 
Czechoslovak authorities for his emigration abroad, is at least theoretically 
vulnerable, should he choose to visit his homeland since Czechoslovak law 
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does not recognize the concept of dual nationality. In other words, the simple 
possession of a Canadian passport is not enough.
38
   
 
In the immediate years after the Warsaw Pact invasion, many 1968ers became permanent 
residents who later attained Canadian citizenship. Much to their disbelief, Communist authorities 
during the period of normalization refused to recognize their new citizenship and treated 
Canadian Czechs and Slovaks as individuals who left the state illegally and without permission. 
Communist diplomats viewed Canadian Czechs and Slovaks as fellow Czechoslovakian citizens 
who were subject to their laws and prosecution.
39
  
 Members of the CNAC‟s western Canadian branches held a Congress of Western 
Provinces in Edmonton on 8-9 April 1972. The delegates from Calgary, Edmonton, and 
Vancouver were joined by representatives of the Alberta Department of Culture, Youth, and 
Recreation and the Canadian Department of the Secretary of State to discuss relations between 
the West and Communist Eastern Europe. The delegates resolved that any negotiations between 
Canada and the Soviet Union should not recognize any “spheres of influence” as permanent. The 
delegates resolved that independence and liberty were guaranteed to even the smallest states and 
Czechoslovakia‟s independence and human rights had to be safeguarded from Soviet 
intervention. The CNAC members demanded that the international community help to restore 
these values. The congress‟ resolution noted that Czechoslovakia‟s struggle for liberty was 
shared with other Eastern European countries.
40
 A month later, the CNAC held its twenty-fourth 
annual national congress in Kitchener, Ontario where delegates accepted the western Canadian 
branches‟ conclusions.  
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Although events in Eastern Europe preoccupied congress delegates, they were also 
concerned with the preservation of democracy in Canada. Eighteen months after the October 
Crisis in Quebec, the CNAC continued to believe that Marxist and separatist radicals including 
the Front de libération du Québec still posed a threat to Canadian democracy. In using 
Czechoslovakia as an example, CNAC president Jiří Corn drafted a letter to the editors of 
Quebec newspapers arguing for the preservation of democracy, social progress, and cultural 
diversity in Canada. Corn observed that recent “revolutionary elements” attempted to destroy the 
country‟s sociopolitical system while a majority of Canadians remained silent. The CNAC 
president argued that a majority of Quebec society was also apathetic and warned them to remain 
“vigilant, not to let themselves be mislead [sic.] or threatened by an organized minority.” 
According to Corn, recent events in Quebec indicated that a “recognizable pattern” appeared 
similar to Czechoslovakia where outside agitation removed freedom and democracy. Corn 
concluded by urging Quebecers to safeguard Canadian democracy and hoped that Francophone 
Quebec would one day attain its national and socioeconomic goals in peace as part of a united 
Canada.
41
   
In partnership with eleven other ethnic organizations, the CNAC‟s Montreal Branch sent 
a Mémoire de la communauté éthnique de la province de Québec to Premier Robert Bourassa. In 
their memorandum, the eleven organizations illustrated their concerns over the events of the 
October Crisis and the anarchy created by “subversive elements.” The ethnic organizations 
representing Estonian, Hungarian, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish, Romanian, and 
Ukrainians in Quebec argued that the province was in danger of being toppled by revolutionaries 
who would destroy the political institutions of the province before assuming power for 
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themselves. In promoting an anti-communist agenda, the twelve groups called on Bourassa to re-
establish public order to prevent an undemocratic seizure of power and impede the rising 
influence of labour unions and leftist politics.
42
 Similarly, the ethnic organizations proposed that 
the Government of Quebec bring to justice all individuals who commit crimes against the state, 
individuals, property, and the press; illustrate before Quebecers new threats and expose their 
ultimate goals; revoke the right to strike for all civil servants under provincial jurisdiction; ban 
all unions from partisan politics and force union leaders who seek a political life to resign from 
their union; ban unions from funding political parties; inform Quebecers of the salaries of union 
executives; bluntly inform Quebecers when legislation supported by unions is not in the best 
interest of union members; educate the population on our democratic system of governance; and 
for members of the national assembly to take part in public consultations to explain the results of 
negotiations with unions.
43
 
The lobbying efforts of many individuals within the Canadian Czechoslovak community 
to see democracy return to their old homeland were further galvanized by the fifth anniversary of 
the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. The anniversary illustrated to many community 
members that Communism in Czechoslovakia would not be easily defeated as the Soviet 
occupation continued for the foreseeable future. In 1973, the CNAC issued a letter to 
international leaders convened in Ottawa for the Commonwealth Heads of Government 
Conference. The organization viewed the Commonwealth as a “coherent family, each member 
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seeking its own quality of life for all people in its own way” as it promoted democracy against 
communism. In the letter, CNAC president Jiří Corn indicated that the process of Soviet-led 
“normalization” after the Warsaw Pact invasion was successfully completed since 
Czechoslovakia was now a “twentieth century Soviet colony.” Corn called on the 
Commonwealth leaders meeting in the Canadian capital to use their influence in world affairs to 
aid millions of Eastern Europeans to regain their democratic rights, and for each Communist 
satellite state to become independent of the Soviet Union.
44
 In its efforts to raise awareness for 
the struggle for democracy and human rights in Czechoslovakia, the CNAC printed postal seals 
to inform Canadians that “the efforts of the Czech and Slovak people to gain personal freedom 
and more political independence were crushed. Five years later, the people of this unfortunate 
country are still suffering under Soviet domination.”45 Canadians could purchase a set of eight 
seals for one dollar. The association hoped that the seals would promote international solidarity.  
In addition to the seal campaign, Czechs and Slovaks across Canada held vigils on the 
fifth anniversary of the Warsaw Pact invasion. In St. Catharines, Ontario, a motorcade involving 
62 automobiles and 100 individuals protested the invasion, and culminated with a half-hour 
ceremony at the city‟s cenotaph. Local residents representing Czech, Slovak, Estonian, 
Hungarian, Latvian, Polish, and Ukrainian communities were led in a prayer “for all captive 
peoples behind the Iron Curtain” by the Very Reverend Mykola Komar of Saints Cyril and 
Methodius Ukrainian Catholic Church.
46
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In Ottawa, a holy mass was celebrated at the Church of the Dominican Fathers to 
remember all Czechoslovakians who died in resisting the Soviet-led invasion and those who 
continued to be persecuted by the Communist regime for their political and religious beliefs. 
Later that morning, the CNAC‟s central council held an emergency meeting with representatives 
of other Eastern European nations to draft a resolution that was later presented to the federal 
government. The resolution called on Canadian parliamentarians to consider the consequences of 
the Soviet Union‟s Brezhnev Doctrine which permitted Moscow to defend socialism against 
democratization and capitalism by intervening in the internal affairs of its Communist satellite 
states. In previous years, the branch demanded that Ottawa attempt to obtain a Soviet withdrawal 
of this new doctrine and the restoration of independence and personal freedoms in 
Czechoslovakia. Canadians of Czechoslovakian, Estonian, Hungarian, Latvian, Lithuanian, 
Polish, and Ukrainian descent demanded that the Soviets withdraw from Czechoslovakia, respect 
the concept of self-determination for the nations of Eastern Europe, the free movement of people, 
and that Moscow adhere to reciprocal agreements pertaining to cultural, legal, financial, and 
trade exchanges between the international community. On the evening of 21 August, individuals 
representing Ottawa‟s Eastern European communities joined a motorcade-led procession towards 
the Soviet Embassy.
47
  
As Czechs and Slovaks in Canada observed the fifth anniversary of the Soviet-led 
invasion of their homeland, the Canadian Czech-language monthly Kanadské listy (Canadian 
Papers) published details surrounding the death of a young 1968er in Melbourne, Australia. A 
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twenty-seven year-old J. Kulstrunková jumped from the sixth floor of an apartment building after 
throwing her five year-old son and three-year old daughter from the same location. The 
Czechoslovakian Consul General in Montreal, Dr. Andruš – who retained jurisdiction across 
Canada for the issuance of travel visas for Czechoslovakia – antagonized the local Czechoslovak 
community by suggesting that community organizations and the ethnic press were responsible 
for émigré suicides. Andruš went on to controversially argue that the ethnic press “scares 
everyone with nonsensical threats, who then persuade themselves that in their exit to Canada 
they committed a mistake, and that is why they want to return to Czechoslovakia.”48 As president 
of the CNAC‟s Montreal branch, Victor Ţícha replied to Andruš‟ assertions stating that the 
statutes of the CNAC called for the promotion of goodwill, understanding, and tolerance among 
compatriots.  Ţícha also argued that the CNAC protected the rights of Canadians of 
Czechoslovak origin and recent arrivals, advanced the social, economic, and cultural conditions 
of Canadians of Czechoslovak origin, and cooperated with fellow organizations that assisted 
newcomers.
49
 Ţícha claimed that the CNAC was a non-partisan organization, and as a result, was 
above politics. Accordingly, the Montreal branch president noted that newcomer suicides were 
indeed a tragedy, but they were not the result of compatriot organizations or politics since 
Czechoslovak organizations in Canada assisted newcomers in adjusting successfully to life in 
Canada.
50
 In Montreal, the local CNAC branch provided assistance in finding accommodations, 
employment, and basic necessities. Additionally, the branch held weekly citizenship courses in 
its cultural centre where newcomers learned about Canadian geography, history, and citizens‟ 
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rights. For those who desired to become Canadian citizens, the branch offered advice on how to 
proceed.
51
 
In the summer of 1974, a twenty-five year old cook from Czechoslovakia made national 
headlines when he jumped ship and later declared asylum in Canada on 4 July. Jan Morcinek 
served as a cook aboard the Bratislava which regularly crossed the Atlantic Ocean arriving at 
various American ports prior to its final stop in Port-Cartier, Quebec before heading for 
Leningrad in the Soviet Union. In realizing that this was his last chance to obtain freedom, 
Morcinek jumped into the St. Lawrence River and swam ashore. After arriving in Montreal, the 
young cook requested political asylum. However, Canadian authorities did not recognize his 
situation and argued that since he arrived abroad the Bratislava – from Czechoslovakian territory 
– he should be duly deported. On Morcinek‟s behalf, the CNAC appealed his case to the 
Supreme Court of Canada. The organization sought donations from Czech and Slovak Canadians 
to cover his daily expenses and legal costs which were in excess of $5,000. The CNAC branches 
in Toronto, Montreal, and Hamilton were able to raise $2,000. In assisting Morcinek, CNAC 
president Louis Urban informed members that if they could not support the young refugee, he 
would certainly face time in a Communist prison back in Czechoslovakia. Czechs and Slovaks 
were asked to assist a fellow refugee who similar to them had made a sacrifice not to live under 
the Communist regime.
52
 The Toronto Sun illustrated that Morcinek‟s family was blacklisted for 
supporting Alexander Dubček‟s reforms during the ill-fated Prague Spring movement. On 24 
March 1975, Canadian authorities ordered Morcinek‟s deportation from the country. In an 
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attempt to prevent his own return to Czechoslovakia, Morcinek requested political asylum in 
West Germany which delayed his deportation home.
53
 Canadian Czechs and Slovaks continued 
to raise awareness of Morcinek‟s plight in the hopes that the Canadian government would alter 
its decision to deport the young cook to certain imprisonment in Czechoslovakia. 
The following spring, delegates attending the CNAC‟s twenty-seventh annual congress in 
Toronto resolved that Canadian policies were increasingly susceptible to communist infiltration 
under the guise of détente – which delegates argued supported Soviet imperialism and 
totalitarianism. Delegates were also disturbed by the Western desire to decrease political tensions 
in Europe which they believed would lead countries such as Canada to recognize the status quo 
in Eastern Europe. Similarly, CNAC members attending the annual congress condemned all 
opposition to the United States‟ role in safeguarding democracy in Eastern Europe and other 
parts of the world. Although the CNAC was opposed to violence as a means to achieve the 
independence of Czechoslovakia, the organization argued for continuous support for NATO to 
counterbalance the Warsaw Pact and its increasing military capability. Delegates at the annual 
congress in Toronto also agreed to promote an immigration policy that permitted entry to 
individuals who would strengthen Canadian democracy as opponents of communism against 
individuals who agitated against Canada‟s democratic political system.54 The delegates 
concluded their congress by resolving that the CNAC was concerned with the “downfall of the 
world‟s political morals and by indifference to our devotion to defend freedom and democracy.” 
                                                 
53
 LAC, CNAC Fonds, MG 28 V111, volume 33, file 14 “Ottawa Branch No. 89 – Miscellaneous, 1970-1976,” 
article, Peter Worthington, “Deportation to Certain Jail,” Toronto Sun, 11 December 1975, 11. 
54
 LAC, CNAC Fonds, MG 28 V111, volume 4, file “Proposals and Resolutions, n.d., 1968-1975,” Resolution of the 
Czechoslovak National Association of Canada, XXVII Congress of the Czechoslovak National Association of 
Canada, Toronto, 25 May 1975, 1-2. 
 322 
According to the association‟s members, faith in democracy would ultimately maintain each 
individual‟s rights and freedoms.55     
Many Canadian Czechs and Slovaks retained vivid memories of life under fascism and 
later communism. After immigrating to Canada, many Czechs and Slovaks considered it their 
duty to assist Czechoslovakia in regaining its independence. Although CNAC members were 
opposed to the use of military force to achieve political sovereignty for their old country, détente 
remained a controversial issue. In fearing that the Canadian government would be pressured by 
the Soviets to accept Moscow‟s right to interfere in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia, the 
CNAC proclaimed that it supported the Canadian government‟s policy of détente with the Soviet 
Union if the agreement represented the mutual coexistence of peoples, nations, political 
ideologies, and cultures in a spirit of equal reciprocity.
56
 The CNAC pressed the Canadian 
government to expedite family reunification cases, lobby for the removal of restrictions on visits 
of relatives, and demand that Prague automatically remove Czechoslovakian citizenship from 
individuals who later received Canadian citizenship to prevent their detention when visiting 
Czechoslovakia. On behalf of Canadian Czechs and Slovaks, the CNAC requested that Ottawa 
pressure the Communist authorities in Prague in order for material reciprocity with regards to 
government benefits, pensions, and inheritances at exchange rates beneficial to the 1948ers and 
the 1968ers.
57
 Communist authorities in Prague agreed to pay $3.25 million to settle claims 
against the state from Canadian Czechs and Slovaks whose properties were nationalized by the 
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Communists after February 1948. In 1975, the funds were deposited with the Foreign Claims 
Commission in Ottawa which agreed to hold an initial amount of $1 million in compensation. 
Prague agreed to forward yearly payments of $500,000 until the aforementioned amount was 
reached. Once all claims from Canadian Czechs and Slovaks were received and processed, 
repayments were first made to individuals with claims below $1 million.
58
 
In July-August 1975, thirty-five states including Canada and Czechoslovakia signed a 
declaration to formalize détente and improve relations between the West and Communist Eastern 
Europe. The resulting Helsinki Accords indicated that state sovereignty, non-intervention in a 
state‟s internal affairs, and respect for human rights were formally agreed to by all signatories. 
With the signing of the Helsinki Accords on 1 August 1975, the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
came into force on 23 March 1976.
59
 Six months later, the Helsinki Accords were legalized in 
Czechoslovakia.
60
 Throughout the 1970s, the issue of human rights in Czechoslovakia was 
increasingly discussed by opponents of the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia, and by Czech 
and Slovak compatriots and journalists in the West.
61
 In drawing attention to International 
Human Rights Day held every 10 December, Toronto Sun columnist Peter Worthington drew 
further attention to Jan Morcinek‟s plight. Worthington argued that because of the Morcinek 
family‟s support for the Prague Spring movement, the young cook was guaranteed to be 
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incarcerated in his homeland if deportation proceedings were allowed to go forward.
62
 The 
journalist concluded that it was wrong for the Canadian government to “…send those who 
request humanitarian asylum back to certain prison and punishment. Yet that is what our 
government is doing to Jan Morcinek, and Lord knows how many other cases. And no one raises 
a voice in protest…”63 In the spring of 1976, the Toronto Star noted that the Canadian 
government and courts did not find the young Czechoslovakian to be “a genuine refugee because 
he‟s not threatened with “persecution”” back in his homeland. The Toronto Star argued that 
Morcinek did not possess a criminal record, was physically healthy, and gainfully employed. 
Although the Canadian press attempted to demonstrate that repression in Communist Eastern 
Europe forced many individuals to seek political asylum in the West out of a genuine fear of 
persecution if returned home, Canadian authorities viewed Morcinek as inadmissible because he 
entered the country illegally. Morcinek was to be sent to a third country whereby he could apply 
to legally enter Canada.
64
 
Increasingly, the harassment of opponents of the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia, 
the abuse of political prisoners, and the intimidation and blackmail of Czechs and Slovaks in the 
West was documented in light of these abuses at the hands of the Communists. On 6 January 
1977, a charter was publicly released in Czechoslovakia criticizing the Communist authorities 
for their human rights abuses and for failing to enforce human rights conditions found in the 
Helsinki Accords and two aforementioned international covenants. With 242 signatories ranging 
from former reformist Communist Party members to dissident artists and intellectuals including 
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reformist Communist Ludvík Vaculík, playwright Václav Havel, and actor Pavel Landovský. 
The informal Charta 77 (Charter 77) movement was a loose collection of predominantly Czech 
individuals who defended individual human rights in Czechoslovakia. In Slovakia, the Slovenska 
organizácia na ochranu ľudských práv (Slovak Organization for the Protection of Human 
Rights) was established to defend the human rights of the local population.
65
 On 6 January, 
Vaculík, Havel, Landovský were arrested by the Communist secret police for attempting to 
present their document to the Federal Assembly in Prague. A day later, the charter appeared in 
the Western press with West Germany‟s Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Great Britain‟s The 
Times, France‟s Le Monde, and Italy‟s Corriere della Sera publishing the opposition document.66 
While the Communist authorities viewed Charta 77 and Slovenska organizácia na ochranu 
ľudských práv as illegal movements that were hostile to state-sponsored socialism, Czechs and 
Slovaks outside of the country and Western media outlets followed the human rights movements 
closely helping to increase public opinion in support of human rights in Czechoslovakia.
67
 
Throughout the 1970s, the Canadian government remained vigilant to attempts by 
Communist authorities in Prague to intimidate former citizens who resided in Canada. The 
federal government expressed its opposition to the Czechoslovakian Legation in Ottawa over 
allegations from Canadian Czechs and Slovaks who claimed Prague offered amnesty to 
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individuals who chose to return to Czechoslovakia. Prague‟s amnesty plan amounted to 
blackmail since most Canadian Czechs and Slovaks declined the offer to return whereby the 
Communist authorities sought retribution against relatives and friends in Czechoslovakia.   
Prime Minister Trudeau attempted to reassure Czechoslovakian refugees by stating that they 
could not be forced to act against their will as “the Czech[oslovakian] embassy has no power 
over Canadians.” In responding to the amnesty plan, Trudeau stated: “I think this is unacceptable 
treatment of Canadian citizens. I don‟t think they should be subject to blackmail.”68 In the mid-
1970s, the Communist government in Czechoslovakia reversed its policy preventing émigrés 
from visiting the country to see relatives and friends. Including the 1948ers, many of those who 
came after the events of 1968 were now Canadian citizens and were under the legal jurisdiction 
of Canadian representatives overseas. Many of the 1948ers and 1968ers increasingly suffered 
from psychological stress involved in not having seen their loved ones for years and in some 
cases decades. As the 1948ers and 1968ers successfully settled in Canada, many individuals 
became divided over their willingness to seek legalization for their immigration to the West from 
the Communist authorities in Prague. A majority of 1948ers refused to cooperate with Prague 
because any relations would strengthen the Communists‟ political legitimacy and authority. 
Conversely, many 1968ers considered themselves apolitical and were willing to pay the 
Communist government‟s fees to have their names „normalized‟ under Czechoslovakian law for 
“leaving the country without permission.”69 
Under the Communist plan called „normalization of relations,‟ Canadian citizens paid 
between $300-2,500 to be able to travel to Czechoslovakia without the threat of prosecution. In 
normalizing their relations with Prague, refugees officially requested a presidential pardon for 
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their „crime‟ and permission to permanently reside abroad. In some cases, many 1948ers and 
1968ers in the West were pressured to pay for their earlier education which was initially funded 
by the state.
70
 Accordingly, the refugee could then receive “emigration passports” permitting 
them to visit Czechoslovakia legally. The Communist scheme amounted to an extortive drive for 
much-needed foreign currency for a faltering national economy.
71
 Similarly, Communist 
authorities also sent StB agents to visit compatriots in Canada in order to maliciously inform 
them that a close relative was ill and required their return to the old homeland. The StB agent 
would produce a form to „normalize relations‟ which the compatriot who was under pressure 
would then sign. Unbeknownst to the Canadian, the StB agent would return to Czechoslovakia 
with „proof‟ that the refugee was a Communist spy. The StB pressured Czech and Slovak 
refugees in the West to become spies, information gatherers, and even extorted money from 
them.
72
 Communist officials in Prague continued their attempts to repatriate former citizens who 
they believed left the state illegally without permission. In an effort to suppress the negative 
portrayals of the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia on the part of many 1948ers and 1968ers, 
StB agents and Czechoslovakian diplomats were sent to the West to engage in propaganda and 
„normalization of relations‟ campaigns through the use of blackmail. 
In Canada, many individuals within the Canadian Czechoslovak community continued 
their anti-communist activities in spite of Prague‟s efforts to pressure their compatriots in the 
West to regularize their standing with the Communist authorities. A major initiative was the 
continued resettlement of refugees residing outside of Czechoslovakia. In 1979, the Canadian 
government established three designated classes of refugees for the Indochinese, Latin 
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Americans, and Eastern Europeans. Individuals who did not fit the United Nations (UN) 
Convention‟s definition of a refugee could still be admitted into Canada through one of the three 
classes. The most open criteria applied to the Eastern European Self-Exiled Persons class which 
dictated that individuals only had to prove that they were outside their country of citizenship and 
wanted to permanently settle in Canada.
73
 In the summer of 1980, the CNAC and the Minister of 
Employment and Immigration, Lloyd Axworthy signed an agreement establishing a quota for all 
Czechoslovakian refugees outside of the Iron Curtain who wanted to resettle in Canada. The 
Canadian government agreed to set the quota at 3,400 individuals per year. The basis of the 
agreement permitted the CNAC to sponsor political refugees with the assistance and cooperation 
of the department. Subsequently, Ottawa guaranteed that the sponsorships would be accepted.
74
 
During the 1970s, 2,172 individuals claimed Czechoslovakia as their country of last permanent 
residence upon entering Canada. A majority of these newcomers – 1,189 or 54.7 percent chose to 
resettle in the province of Ontario, followed by Quebec, British Columbia, and Alberta.
75
 
In the early 1980s, Canadian immigration officials in Europe witnessed an increase in the 
number of Czechoslovakian refugees residing in Austria, France, Italy, and West Germany. The 
Canadian government maintained an annual quota of 500 immigration visas for all refugees in 
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West Germany. As a result, a majority of Czechoslovakian refugees were left to ponder their 
fate. Individuals who could prove that they had close relatives living in Canada, or had an ability 
to speak English or French and had secured employment would become the fortunate few who 
were admitted to Canada. From July 1982 to June 1983, Canada offered 750 visas to refugees in 
West Germany. Eastern European refugees who initially requested political asylum in West 
Germany were not eligible to resettle in Canada.
76
  
In the mid-1980s, the Canadian press increasingly highlighted the many defections that 
were occurring during routine flight stopovers in Canada. Once on Canadian soil, 
Czechoslovakian citizens requested political asylum after leaving their planes at Montreal‟s 
Mirabel International Airport and Gander‟s International Airport in Newfoundland. In quoting 
Canadian immigration officials, the Montreal Gazette claimed that one defection occurred 
every week. Czechoslovak State Airlines (Československé státní aerolinie) offered „direct‟ 
flights to Cuba from Prague. The aircraft used on these flights had a maximum range of 4,900 
miles, short of the necessary 5,300 miles for a direct flight between Prague and Havana. If poor 
weather occurred, Czechoslovak State Airlines often landed in Gander.
77
 Given the distance 
between Havana and Prague, the fact that no Communist country existed in North America, 
and that the American government prohibited direct flights to Cuba, aircraft originating in 
Czechoslovakia were forced to refuel in Canada. Czechoslovak State Airlines used the Mirabel 
or Gander International Airports for its stopovers. In order for Czechoslovakian citizens to be 
permitted to board a plane to Cuba for a „vacation,‟ they were often individuals who were 
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vetted by the Communist authorities. Many of those permitted to leave the country on 
„vacation‟ were ordinary members or apparatchiks who were pressured to show their allegiance 
to the state and joined the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.
78
  
During the 1980s, the number of defections between Gander and Mirabel was virtually 
identical. According to the Toronto Star, Canadian immigration officials and RCMP officers at 
Mirabel were so used to weekly defections from Czechoslovak State Airlines Flight 576 that 
they walked through the transit area searching for passengers seeking to defect. The local 
Czechoslovak community affectionately referred to the defectors as the Kubanci (Cubans).
79
 
As president of the CNAC‟s Montreal branch, Victor Ţícha met defectors at Mirabel 
International Airport to offer immediate assistance including translation, Canadian currency, 
and transportation to a local hotel where other defectors were temporarily residing. Upon 
arriving in Canada, Ţícha and the branch aided newcomers in securing housing, employment, 
and language classes.  
In the mid-1980s, Czechoslovakians in Quebec numbered approximately 6,605 
individuals. Czech Quebecers accounted for 1,525 persons, Slovak Quebecers 1,395 
individuals, with 1,160 identifying themselves as “Czechoslovaks.” The remaining 2,520 
persons were counted as having multiple origins. A majority of these individuals (88.7 percent) 
resided in Montreal.
80
 Approximately, 68.8 percent of the population was foreign born. In its 
study of the Czechs and Slovaks in the province, the Quebec Ministry of Cultural Communities 
and Immigration noted that prewar immigration from Czechoslovakia was characterized by 
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young adult farmers, specialized workers, and entrepreneurs. Subsequently, the 1948er 
generation was comprised of educated urbanites that were qualified in liberal arts professions. 
The 1968ers were also primarily professional urbanites in the professions of engineering, 
health, and teaching. Meanwhile, the recent immigrants of the 1970s and 1980s were more 
diverse in their backgrounds including professionals in teaching and the natural sciences, while 
others were skilled in the construction, manufacturing, and service industries. Many of these 
recent newcomers arrived in Canada as immigrants in the independent class or as refugees.
81
 
The CNAC maintained a special fund to assist resettlement efforts. Czech Canadian shoe 
magnate, Tomáš Baťa assisted the CNAC and newcomers by providing funds, winter clothing, 
and footwear. The CNAC continued its efforts to resettle Czechs and Slovaks throughout the 
decade. Relatives wishing to bring their family members to Canada had to agree to a 
sponsorship with the CNAC for a period of one year. The organization was also willing to 
assist the community in resettling entire families if a ten-year sponsorship agreement was 
concluded.
82
 
In 1985, Prague celebrated the fortieth anniversary of the Soviet liberation of 
Czechoslovakia to end the Second World War. In their continued efforts to entice émigrés back 
to Czechoslovakia, Communist authorities declared a general amnesty for all refugees in the 
West to return home “without prejudice.” The Canadian Czech-language newspaper, Kanadské 
listy argued that Czechs and Slovaks in the West could foreseeably return home as citizens of 
Western states since they were protected by their adoptive countries‟ diplomatic 
representatives. Controversially, the newspaper argued that: 
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It is a lie that the tens of thousands now in refugee camps in West Germany 
and Austria will even blink an eye over the decision to return for they never 
faired worse than their neighbours. Those that left in the 1940s and 1950s 
were sought out by the government, pressured, or could not coexist in 
Communist Czechoslovakia. Those that have recently left Czechoslovakia do 
not even warrant asylum or emigration anywhere. They did not leave a 
desperate situation and often fell into desperate situations in the West.
83
 
 
 Very few individuals returned to Czechoslovakia for ideological reasons. Among the 
main reasons why they chose to return home were a sense of nostalgia, poor health, lack of 
employment or economic success, and personal or family reasons.
84
 Czechoslovakians, young 
and old continued to flee the Communist regime. For many individuals and families leaving their 
homes for the West, absolute secrecy was a vital part of their preparation. Often times, close 
relatives were not informed of a family member‟s emigration in order that they could truthfully 
deny any knowledge of the event before the Communist authorities. Many Czechoslovakians 
continued to struggle with the moral ramifications of leaving behind siblings, parents, and even 
children. In the case of young families, many applied for exit visas because crossing the border 
illegally with a child in tow was too risky. In the summer of 1985, Marta Procházka decided to 
leave Czechoslovakia with her young family. Communist authorities approved exit visas for the 
family to take a „vacation‟ in Yugoslavia. On 23 July, the Procházkas crossed the border into 
Hungary and then Yugoslavia.
85
 In their attempt to reach Austria, the family was turned away 
and forced to visit the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) office in 
Belgrade in the hopes that they could be legally accepted as Convention Refugees. After several 
weeks of waiting in Yugoslavia, the Procházkas received their UN documentation and were able 
to reach the Traiskirchen Refugee Camp south of Vienna, Austria. Once in the West, Marta 
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recalled that fellow Czechs and Slovaks in the camp were not helpful, but Canadian Embassy 
officials remained accommodating as the Procházkas sought to begin new lives in Canada.
86
 
Similarly, Czech refugee Ivo Moravec wondered how many individuals would be admitted into 
Canada from the refugee camps in Austria. Initially, Moravec was issued a grey passport by the 
Communist authorities in Prague and remained valid only for travel to Yugoslavia. After making 
his way to a refugee camp across the border in Austria, Moravec pondered an important 
question: how selective would Canadian immigration officials be?  
 
They prefer families and decent people. What professions do they favour? 
None. We‟re disadvantaged my friend. They don‟t seem to care about higher 
education too much. If you were a tradesmen, carpenter, welder, locksmith, 
plumber, technician, perhaps the door would be open wider. It‟s tougher with 
a university degree in Canada.
87
 
 
 On 23 August 1986, demonstrations were held across the Western World to 
commemorate victims of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, and in particular to raise 
awareness of Soviet crimes and human rights violations. Commonly referred to as “Black 
Ribbon Day,” the CNAC participated in the popular movement to illustrate that millions of 
Eastern Europeans were subjugated behind the Iron Curtain.
88
 Canadian Czechoslovaks 
actively promoted awareness of Czechoslovakia‟s abuse of human rights and suppression of 
democratic values.
89
 As a major component of its struggle against communism, the CNAC 
continued efforts to resettle Czechoslovakian citizens in Canada in order to further embarrass 
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the Communist authorities in Prague, and to provide safe haven to individuals and families. In 
bringing attention to Czechoslovakian defections in Canada, the Christian Science Monitor 
claimed that from 1982 to 1986, approximately 350 Czechoslovakians defected on Canadian 
soil.
90
 In its official Věstník (bulletin), the CNAC sought assistance from the Canadian 
Czechoslovak community to further sponsor refugee families and single adults. In a March 
1987 issue, the organization solicited sponsors to help resettle a 24 year-old seamstress, 28 
year-old electrician, and a 33 year-old jeweller-watchmaker, all residing in refugee camps in 
Italy. Additionally, the Věstník sought sponsors for a young couple: a 23 year-old electrician-
mechanic, and a 22 year-old laundry maid. The Věstník claimed that the aforementioned 
Czechoslovakian refugees in Italy were willing to take any employment offered to them in 
Canada. The CNAC added that “without our collective help they may all remain in European 
refugee camps for several years.”91 By the end of 1988, CNAC branches across the country 
answered the request and sponsored 182 Czechoslovakian refugees. A portion of the 182 
refugees sponsored were due to arrive in the new year.
92
 
In the summer of 1989, Canadian immigration authorities at Montreal‟s Mirabel 
International Airport intervened to prevent further Czechoslovakian defections. In the first six 
months of the year, 251 Czechoslovakians requested refugee status in Canada, an increase of 
80 individuals from the same period a year before. Sensing that the number of cases was rising 
substantially, the Canadian government sought to curb the number of defections in an effort to 
prevent any political controversy arising from what appeared to be an uncontrolled 
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immigration system. The Montreal office of the Immigration and Refugee Board granted 
refugee status to approximately two-thirds of all cases permitting newcomers including the 
Czechoslovakians to stay in Canada.
93
 During the 1980s, 9,855 individuals from 
Czechoslovakia permanently resettled in Canada. Nearly half – 47.6 percent or 4,690 persons 
chose to relocate to Ontario. From 1983 to 1989, 5,660 Czechoslovakians were admitted to 
Canada as refugees. During the same period, 558 individuals were admitted as independents, 
472 under the Family Class, 105 under the Assisted Relative Class, and three under the 
Entrepreneur Class. Persons admitted under the Refugee Class represented 83.3 percent of all 
newcomers from Czechoslovakia.
94
  
With the efforts of the CNAC and the MMI, Canadian Czechoslovaks continued to 
actively resettle fellow compatriots in Canada. For others within the community, the promotion 
and commemoration of the victims of Communist persecution remained a priority. Within the 
WAFCPP, an internal rift occurred between former political prisoners. Several of the 
association‟s members established their own group, K-231 in Exile to continue their agenda of 
honouring and preserving the memory of political prisoners and victims of the Communist 
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regime in Czechoslovakia.
95
 As members of K-231 in Exile, former Czechoslovakian political 
prisoners in Canada commissioned the creation of a monument to honour the victims of 
Communist persecution in their old homeland and to also commemorate victims of 
Communism throughout the world. On 2 July 1989, a statue of a tortured man crucified on a 
sickle and hammer and symbolizing Soviet oppression was unveiled. The monument, Crucified 
Again, was created by Czech Canadian artist, Josef Randa of Winnipeg and erected on a 
donated piece of “free Czechoslovak land” at Masaryktown. Over $32,000 was raised from 
Czechs and Slovaks in the West to commission the statue in Toronto.
96
 
On 17 November 1989, Communist riot police suppressed a student-led demonstration 
protesting against the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia. Two days later, a broad spectrum 
of Czechoslovakian society joined in a series of popular demonstrations against one-party rule. 
Initially, a crowd of approximately 200,000 individuals in Prague swelled to half-million only 
twenty-four hours later. The popular demonstrations that swept the country were led by students 
and dissidents who formed Občanské forum (Civic Forum) in the Czech lands and Verejnosť 
proti násiliu (Public against Violence) in Slovakia. On 27 November, a two-hour general strike 
was held across the country followed a day later with the Communist government‟s 
announcement that it would formally dismantle the one-party state. During the protests that were 
sweeping across Czechoslovakia, members of the CNA returned to their old homeland in an 
effort to assist the reform movement.
97
 Three representatives including John Hašek – a 1948er 
who fled Communist imprisonment with his family to the West – arrived with approximately 
$25,000 raised by Canadian Czechs and Slovaks to assist Czechoslovakia in its transition to 
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democracy.
98
 Only a few weeks later, on 10 December, President Gustáv Husák appointed the 
first non-Communist government since February 1948 and resigned from office three days later. 
Shortly thereafter, Civic Forum and Public against Violence announced that Václav Havel would 
be their candidate for President of Czechoslovakia.
99
 On 28 December, Alexander Dubček was 
elected speaker of the federal parliament and a day later, Václav Havel became the first 
democratic president of Czechoslovakia since 1948. The sweeping changes in Czechoslovakia in 
the fall of 1989 were referred to in the Czech lands as the Sametová revoluce (Velvet 
Revolution) and in Slovakia as the Nežná revolúcia (Gentle Revolution).100 The events of 
November and December 1989 ultimately returned parliamentary democracy to Czechoslovakia 
after four decades of Communist one-party rule. 
 
Marking the Mosaic: Preserving Ethnic Heritage and Identity in the 1970s and 1980s  
In November 1970, representatives of the Masaryk Memorial Institute (MMI) enquired 
with the Department of the Secretary of State‟s Citizenship Branch if any federal funding was 
available to support its sociocultural programs. As president of MMI, Bedřich Čecha informed 
Canadian officials that his organization desired to expand its activities even as operating costs 
continued to increase significantly.
101
 Citizenship Branch officials informed MMI that previous 
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funding of cultural organizations was conducted on an experimental basis as a pilot project. The 
branch indicated that future funding of ethnocultural groups and their projects would depend on 
the federal cabinet‟s response to the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism 
and Biculturalism. Financial assistance remained limited to individually assessed projects and 
their respective merits.
102
 Although MMI was initially unsuccessful in attaining federal funding 
to support and expand its services for the Canadian Czechoslovak community, the organization‟s 
sponsorship of the Czechoslovak Studies program at the University of Toronto no longer 
required a subsidy as the program became self-sufficient.
103
 
As MMI continued to secure funding for its programs and services including issuing 
short-term loans and scholarships, maintaining Masaryktown, and finding accommodations and 
employment for newly arrived refugees, many smaller Czechoslovak organizations perceived the 
institute to be withholding funds from the community as a strict “money supplier to other 
“Czechoslovak” organizations.”  This perception within the community hampered MMI‟s ability 
to secure its own financial future. Groups that sought to use the organization‟s facilities believed 
the organization was stealing from them by asking for rental fees. However, these fees were used 
to pay for the organization‟s taxes and renovations. In his Executive Member‟s Report to the 
MMI community for 1970, W. Bartánus declared that it was “time to realize that we all have to 
work together, forget our political disputes and rather cultivate the great supply of Czech and 
Slovak talents, respect one another and most of all work together as a unit to elevate Czech and 
Slovak culture.” Bartánus controversially argued that Masaryktown should be sold in order to 
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establish a financially self-sustaining Czechoslovak centre. Since many Czechs and Slovaks in 
Toronto and southern Ontario only attended the annual Czechoslovak Day, Bartánus believed 
that Masaryktown cost the community in excess of $12,000 annually for one occasion. Bartánus 
claimed that Masaryktown remained a symbol of a “rather expensive sentimentalism” and that 
selling Masaryktown and the old Masaryk Hall would permit the organization to establish a new 
community centre that reflected the needs of the community.
104
 
Beginning in early 1971, the Citizenship Branch of the Ontario Department of the 
Provincial Secretary and Citizenship published a monthly newspaper, Newcomer News with the 
goal of assisting adult immigrants in English-language classes acquire the necessary reading 
skills. The monthly government newspaper also informed newcomers of recent events that could 
assist them in their resettlement in the province. As the Provincial Secretary and Minister of 
Citizenship, John Yaremko informed MMI that English-language teachers and newcomers to the 
province found the Newcomer News useful as demand for the publication steadily increased. The 
minister requested MMI to include copies of the monthly newspaper in its own weekly, Nový 
domov.  In cooperating with the ethnocultural communities in Ontario, the popular bonus 
supplement was delivered to thousands of new Canadians across the province on a regular basis. 
Yaremko argued that Ontario‟s ethnic press – of which Nový domov was a member – provided “a 
bridge of understanding between the cultures of their readers and that of our way of life, and 
could be a very effective means for this wider distribution of Newcomer News.”105 As the editor 
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of Nový domov, Henry Zoder later informed Yaremko that he accepted his proposal and could 
include 1,000 copies of Newcomer News in his weekly.
106
 
As Ontario‟s provincial government sought the cooperation of its ethnocultural 
communities in the hopes of assisting immigrants and recently arrivals with their integration, the 
CNAC focused its attention on the size of its membership. In the spring of 1971, the organization 
requested its local branches to determine the age of its membership and how many of them were 
active. In Ottawa, the local CNAC branch consisted of only 57 members of which only one 
person came to Canada prior to 1939. Another ten individuals arrived during the Second World 
War and before the Communist takeover in 1948, another thirty-one members resettled in 
Canada from Czechoslovakia during the Communist period, and fifteen individuals arrived 
following the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia. A majority of the branch‟s membership 
was between thirty and fifty-five years of age.
107
 Although a large number of 1968ers joined 
Canadian Czechoslovak organizations including the CNAC and MMI, a significant portion of 
Czechoslovaks remained outside of community life. Older and more recently established 
branches suffered from a lack of newcomer involvement. In Batawa, where a significant portion 
of its membership arrived prior to the Second World War, many community members no longer 
frequented scheduled CNAC meetings, while newcomers largely ignored the CNAC‟s activities. 
Similarly, a newly established Halifax branch suffered from a lack of members and financial 
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support. Although the branch held events such as a cookout in Point Pleasant Park, it suffered 
from the frequent relocation of its members to other parts of Canada.
108
 
Even as the Czechoslovak community‟s preeminent organizations struggled to remain 
financially viable, Canadian Czechs and Slovaks actively lobbied their municipal and provincial 
governments for grants and subsidies for their community activities under the aegis of 
multiculturalism in Canada. On 8 October 1971, Prime Minister Trudeau declared before the 
House of Commons that multiculturalism was an official government policy. The political 
directive affirmed that all Canadian citizens were equal regardless of their ethnic origin and 
religious or linguistic background. The Multiculturalism Policy confirmed that the country had 
no official culture, and that English and French remained the country‟s two official languages. 
Canadian citizens of all ethnic, religious, and linguistic backgrounds were considered equal.
109
 In 
the summer of 1972, the CNAC‟s Calgary branch participated in the Alberta Cultural Heritage 
Conference at the University of Alberta in Edmonton. The conference dealt with the 
acculturation of cultural groups in the province. In its brief to the conference, the Calgary branch 
argued that no cultural group “should have any privileges which could not be given to all groups, 
regardless of their numerical strength or length of their establishment in Canada or Alberta.” The 
branch sought to promote tolerance, understanding, and cooperation between ethnic groups and 
pressured the provincial government to enact legislation that embodied the aforementioned 
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ideals.
110
 The brief suggested that two proposals be implemented. First, the branch argued for the 
establishment of a multicultural centre in Calgary as a “keystone” of efforts to support ethnic 
groups in the region. The branch believed that such a centre could lease space to diverse ethnic 
organizations in order for them to possess the necessary facilities for an ethnic library, dining 
room, theatre, and physical activity space. In return, ethnic groups would be able to hold regular 
meetings and schedule cultural events promoting diversity in Calgary and throughout Alberta. 
The CNAC branch hoped that the provincial and municipal authorities would work with the 
Canadian government to build the proposed centre.
111
 Second, the branch maintained that 
evening classes for every language spoken in Alberta be equally funded in order to promote 
fairness and equality between large and financially stable ethnic groups and those such as the 
CNAC branch which could not cover the costs of the language classes. During the conference, 
the branch representatives concluded that “we feel that the basic right to be taught one‟s parental 
language should be extended to all Albertans, regardless of [the] numerical strength of their 
cultural group. This move would strengthen the feeling of equality among all Albertans.”112 
As Canadian Czechoslovaks in western Canada lobbied for further government funding 
of ethnocultural activities, the Czechoslovak community in Toronto also suffered from a lack of 
funds for its activities. In his annual report to the MMI community, treasurer Jaroslav Forest 
argued that the institute‟s membership demonstrated a “lack of involvement” in the affairs of the 
organization. Forest noted that while MMI may not have been able to provide the facilities that 
members desired, the amenities that did exist including Masaryktown were underused. It was 
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Forest‟s contention that “if the club was to survive, we must alter our thinking and establish new 
goals, goals which are better suited to the attitudes and requirements of today.” The institute also 
suffered from a lack of funds.
113
 In November 1972, the institute‟s board of directors established 
the Masaryk Old Age Fund. The fund was financed through community donations and 
fundraising activities including bingo evenings.
114
 On a Saturday afternoon in November, the 
Women‟s Council of the CNAC in Toronto held its annual charity bazaar and Christmas Fair at 
Masaryk Hall. The bazaar was open to the public and consisted of Czech and Slovak pastries and 
refreshments including goulash and soup, delicatessen hors d‟oeuvres, jams, jellies, handicrafts, 
and cooking books. A new edition of the council‟s Czechoslovak Recipes originally published in 
1963 was also available for purchase.
115
 
In a speech before guests at the Manitoba Legislature in Winnipeg in the spring of 1974, 
CNAC president Jiří Corn requested individuals in attendance to cast their vote in the upcoming 
federal election and to remain proud of their newly received Canadian citizenship. The CNAC 
executive noted that new citizens had a duty to cherish their mother tongues and the culture of 
their old homeland. Corn argued that Canada‟s ethnocultural mosaic “encourages you to 
maintain the best from your culture and habits while being a good and honest Canadian citizen. 
You should integrate into the Canadian society and way of life by maintaining the best from your 
past and adopting the best from your present Canadian society.”116 The CNAC president 
concluded his remarks by suggesting that the new Canadian citizens in attendance should 
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participate in all aspects of Canadian society, and value the freedom and democracy available to 
all in Canada.
117
 
That same month, the CNAC held its twenty-sixth annual congress in Hamilton, Ontario. 
Delegates in attendance at McMaster University were informed that their organization‟s 
membership was rapidly aging with an average age for members of sixty years. The average age 
of Batawa‟s 88 members was 63 years. Conversely, the smallest branch of Kingston, Ontario 
which comprised thirteen members held an average age of forty years. The CNAC‟s fourteen 
branches included 1,485 individuals with an average age of fifty years. Branches with smaller 
memberships included Calgary, Halifax, Kingston, and Windsor – each with less than fifty 
members and an average age in the late forties. In larger metropolitan centres of Toronto, 
Montreal, and Hamilton, the average age of CNAC members remained in the mid-fifties. These 
statistics illustrated that a majority of the association‟s members were ageing. The association 
was confronted with the necessity of finding new and young members who would assist in 
renewing the CNAC.
118
 
Although the CNAC‟s aging membership concerned branch leaders and its executive in 
Toronto, the organization continued to promote ethnic heritage and worked to preserve 
Czechoslovak identity in Canada. In attempting to meet a public demand for Czech and Slovak-
language materials, the CNAC corresponded with Zdena Škvorecký – who along with her 
husband Josef Škvorecký established the Czech émigré publishing house, Sixty-Eight Publishers 
– to determine the financial viability of producing a Czech language text. Škvorecký informed 
the CNAC that the dissident publishing house‟s readership would be interested in the publication 
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of a Czech-English dictionary. In her view, 2,000 copies could be printed and Sixty-Eight 
Publishers would act as a distributor to its established clients and all interested Czechs and 
Slovaks in the West.
119
 The project was later titled Dictionary of Stereotyped, Metaphorical and 
Idiomatic Expressions. Under the authorship of Nový domov editor Břetislav Kroulík, the 
dictionary‟s purpose was to list commonly used English-language expressions and to convey 
their Czech equivalent. The CNAC argued that the dictionary was necessary because many 
newcomers from Czechoslovakia struggled to understand English idioms that were widely used 
in the Canadian workforce. In seeking support for the project from the federal Citizenship 
Branch, CNAC member and Brock University professor Victor Fic argued that understanding 
these idioms prepared immigrants to secure employment in their chosen fields and eliminated the 
“anxiety and emotional trauma of the people who are technically competent but whose 
competitiveness on the job market is badly handicapped by [a] lack of idiomatic English will be 
greatly reduced.”120 
The CNAC applied to the federal government for funding since the dictionary project fell 
under the Third Language Teaching Aid classification within the Multicultural Grants Program. 
Grants from the program were available for projects that promoted diversity in Canada through 
the dissemination of cultural heritage. Similarly, activities that assisted in an ethnocultural 
group‟s development were also considered. Prospective projects were required to secure 
financial support from the local community and to assist immigrants in fully participating in 
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Canadian society.
121
 In its grant application, the CNAC indicated that it was comprised of over 
8,000 members between eighteen and seventeen years of age. The association received 
approximately $2,702 in membership dues, $5,206 in private donations, $4,880 from federal 
departments and agencies, and $31,386 from other activities for a total of $44,174. Conversely, 
the CNAC claimed $37,825 in expenditures.
122
 As a small and financially sound organization, 
the CNAC indicated in its submission to the Citizenship Branch that its proposed dictionary 
would consist of approximately 300 pages of idioms, phrases, and metaphorical expressions in 
the Czech and English languages.
123
 The objective of the dictionary project was to improve each 
Canadian Czech and Slovak‟s knowledge of the English language and benefit professionals 
including translators and writers who required a consistent source for terminology.
124
 The total 
cost for the publication of the Czech-English dictionary was $18,100. The CNAC allocated 
$9,500 to the project and requested that the Citizenship Branch approve $8,600 in federal 
funding.
125
 In April, the Citizenship Branch informed the CNAC that it could only financially 
support the publication and distribution of books that were of interest to a significant portion of 
Canadians. Citizenship Branch officials believed that the dictionary project was limited in terms 
of how many Canadians would benefit from its publication and the branch withheld funds. 
Alternately, officials in Ottawa informed the CNAC that funding for a publication pertaining to 
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an ethnocultural group‟s history in Canada was readily accepted.126 Without federal funding, the 
CNAC project lay dormant for almost a decade. In 1985, the Czech-English dictionary was 
finally published. 
Czechoslovak groups and CNAC branches across Canada continued to attract grants from 
the Canadian government under its strategy of promoting multiculturalism through the 
preservation of ethnic culture and identity. On 3 October 1974, the CNAC‟s Montreal Branch 
with a $1,000 federal grant from the Department of the Secretary of State began a regular weekly 
radio broadcast in the Czech and Slovak languages. The purpose of the radio program was to 
provide a public service to the approximately 8,000 Czech and Slovak residents in Montreal.
127
 
The program offered important news of concern to the Czechoslovak community in Quebec 
including new laws and regulations in an effort to “fight public apathy and to improve good 
citizenship.” Broadcasts also contained interviews with prominent Czechs and Slovaks including 
Czech American film director Miloš Forman. The weekly radio broadcast over CFMB 1410‟s 
airwaves became popular with members of the community and led many Czechs and Slovaks in 
Montreal to organize public events including lectures, exhibits, and shows for the Czechoslovak 
community. Eventually, the broadcast introduced its listeners to twenty-four one-minute 
announcements on multiculturalism in Canada.
128
 In the spring of 1979, the CNAC‟s Montreal 
branch conducted a survey involving a random sample of 350 Czech and Slovak Canadian 
families. Approximately, 176 households indicated that the radio broadcasts were beneficial to 
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them. A smaller number of negative replies indicated that the program‟s 23:30 broadcasts were 
too late in the evening and left many listeners advocating for an earlier timeslot. Approximately, 
75 percent of respondents indicated that they tuned-in regularly. Younger listeners desired 
“modern Slovak or Czech music,” while older members of the community preferred classical or 
folklore music. When it came to preference of news, many 1968ers confirmed that they listened 
attentively to the news from Czechoslovakia rather than domestic events, whereas members of 
the older 1948er generation maintained a preference for Canadian news information.
129
 The 
Montreal branch concluded that approximately 2,000-2,500 individuals listened regularly to its 
radio broadcasts. Since a majority of the Czechs and Slovaks in Montreal consisted of 
intellectuals and skilled workers, the Czechoslovak community lacked small business owners 
who could financially sponsor the thirty minute radio program. Unable to find sponsors for the 
radio program, the CNAC turned to the Department of the Secretary of State for funding: 
 
As ardent Federalists we see that our new home – Canada – is in grave 
danger. We are shocked with the political orientation of our provincial 
government and with articles appearing in some French newspapers 
advocating elimination of Multiculturalism. Thus, as it is our fervent desire 
to keep Canada together, we must intensify our efforts to convince every 
member of our community to work as [an] ambassador of good will [sic.], 
informing his French friends and acquaintances about the immense pitfalls 
that will be the inevitable consequence of separation of Quebec from the rest 
of Canada.
130
 
 
In its assessment of the CNAC radio broadcast, Canadian officials concluded that the Montreal 
branch was active and responded to the needs of the local Czechoslovak community. The 
program comprised of twenty-five broadcasts per year and discussed the cultural heritage of 
Czechoslovaks in Quebec in the areas of literature, music, and theatre. Canadian officials 
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believed that funding the “Ethnic Broadcast in Czech and Slovak Language” project would 
promote further understanding of Czechs and Slovaks in Canada, national unity, and 
multiculturalism in the province of Quebec at a time when the separatist Parti Québécois was 
firmly in power.
131
 
 In Ottawa, the local CNAC branch sponsored a television program, Czechoslovak 
Television Kaleidoscope – Life of Ethnic Czech and Slovaks in their New Homeland. The 
program was broadcast once a month and focused on Czechoslovak culture, community news, 
and Canadian adaptation and multiculturalism. The community television show collected 
material on the immigration and settlement experience of Czechs and Slovaks in Canada to raise 
awareness of their past historical and political circumstances for future generations, and 
showcased how these individuals integrated into Canadian society. Included in the interviews 
were representatives of the Multiculturalism section of the Department of the Secretary of State 
who also assisted in funding the program with an annual grant of $1,200 for necessary supplies. 
Similar to other broadcast installments, the recorded interviews were preserved for future 
generations. For children in the local Czech and Slovak language school in Ottawa, the television 
show included information on Czechoslovakia‟s geography and history. Community members 
also televised discussions with individuals from other ethnic communities to illustrate their 
shared experiences in Canada. In their evaluation of the television program, Canadian officials 
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concluded that Czechoslovak Television Kaleidoscope was of outstanding quality and served as 
an example for other ethnocultural groups in Canada.
132
 
With a grant from the Canadian government, Toronto‟s MMI established a community 
library on the grounds of Masaryktown which became a popular destination for individuals and 
families searching for Czech and Slovak-language history books and traditional literature.
133
 The 
federal grant of $800 assisted the institute in repairing old books and purchasing newer Czech 
and Slovak-language manuscripts.
134
 In 1974, the institute applied for federal funding from the 
Immigrant Settlement Programme under the auspices of the Department of Manpower and 
Immigration to establish an information office for the Czechoslovak community in Canada. The 
institute later joined other Czechoslovak community groups in Toronto and created a cultural 
pavilion for the Metro Toronto Caravan festival. Initially, established in 1968 as a festival 
celebrating different cultures throughout Toronto, the international caravan brought the world to 
Toronto‟s Canadian-born Anglo-Saxon community. Located at different sites in various ethnic 
neighbourhoods and presided over by a “mayor,” pavilions were often located in church 
basements and community halls that displayed ethnic foods, crafts, clothing, and music. As the 
chosen site of the Czechoslovak community‟s cultural pavilion, Masaryktown opened its Golden 
Prague restaurant and garnered praise from Torontonians.
135
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In the late 1970s, MMI received $1,000 per year in federal funding from the Department 
of the Secretary of State‟s Supplementary School Assistance Program. Canadian officials used 
the program to enhance the learning of diverse languages and to promote multiculturalism.
136
 
The institute informed federal officials that any acquired funds were to subsidize its Czech and 
Slovak language schools in an effort to preserve Czech and Slovak cultural and linguistic 
heritage in younger generations. During the 1978-1979 school year, four separate classes of 
students were organized with a total enrolment of forty-five students. Similarly, each student 
received 64 hours of annual instruction.
137
 The institute‟s Czech and Slovak Supplementary 
School also instructed students in Czech and Slovak grammar, literature and drama, 
Czechoslovakia‟s geography and history, music and choir, dance, religious studies, and 
gymnastics.
138
 As part of the Sokol movement, the school concentrated its efforts on the 
instruction of Czech and Slovak language, grammar, and gymnastics. Classes were held every 
Saturday for five hours for a period of thirty-five weeks. Similarly, in Ottawa, the supplementary 
school comprised of some thirty children in three different grades. Classes were held at a 
Lutheran church in the Meadowlands area of the city.
139
 
                                                 
136
 LAC, DSS Fonds, RG 6, accession 1989-90/157 GAD, box 47, file 0760-C, “Citizenship Sector – Masaryk 
Memorial Institute Inc. – Teaching Czech,” letter from Jim Fleming, Minister of State for Multiculturalism to Karel 
Jeřábek, MMI president, 13 February 1981. 
137
 LAC, DSS Fonds, RG 6, accession 1989-90/157 GAD, box 6, file 9887-C, “Masaryk Memorial Institute Inc. 
Czechoslovak Supplementary School,” Grant Assessment Form, 24 December 1979; LAC, DSS Fonds, RG 6, 
accession 1989-90/157 GAD, box 6, file 9887-C, “Masaryk Memorial Institute Inc. Czechoslovak Supplementary 
School,” letter from Steve E. Paproski, Minister of State for Multiculturalism to Jaroslav Forest, MMI, 
Czechoslovak Supplementary School, Toronto, 6 February 1980. For the 1979-1980 school year, the Minister of 
State for Multiculturalism approved a grant of $713.  
138
 LAC, DSS Fonds, RG 6, accession 1989-90/157 GAD, box 47, file 0760-C, “Citizenship Sector – Masaryk 
Memorial Institute Inc. – Teaching Czech,” Grant Application Form – Multicultural Program – Secretary of State, 
22 October 1980. The Czechoslovak Supplementary School allocated one hour per week to language instruction, 0.5 
to literature and drama, 0.5 to geography and history, 0.25 hours to music and choir, one hour to dance, 1.5 hours to 
religious studies, and 4.25 hours to gymnastics. 
139
 LAC, CNAC Fonds, MG 28 V111, volume 32, file 2 “Ottawa Branch – Minutes, 1970-1977,” Pozvánka na 
valnou hromadu ottawské odbočky Československé národního sdruţení v Kanadě, 1977, 6; LAC, DSS Fonds, RG 6, 
accession 1989-90/157 GAD, box 47, file 0760-C, “Citizenship Sector – Masaryk Memorial Institute Inc. – 
 
 352 
The Supplementary School Assistance Program also assisted smaller and less urban 
Czechoslovak groups. On 9 January 1980, officials from the Department of the Secretary of State 
informed the Czechoslovak Canadian Cultural Society of Southern Alberta that the 
organization‟s new Czech [and Slovak] Language School received $260 for the year. As a local 
instructor of Russian at the University of Lethbridge and a graduate of Slavic languages from the 
University of Alberta, Libby Jonas served as the school‟s Czech and Slovak teacher. The 
society‟s language school held weekly evening classes in which two hours were allocated to 
language and grammar instruction and one hour to music.
140
 The school offered separate Czech 
and Slovak language classes with Czech students outnumbering their Slovak counterparts, three-
to-one. Canadian officials noted that the recently established language school was “well 
organized and offering an excellent opportunity for Czech heritage language retention.”141 A 
month later, the department granted the CNAC‟s Kitchener-Waterloo branch $348 for its 
language school due to the group‟s status as a “very small struggling community which greatly 
appreciates the support…” Funds were allocated for supplies and to supplement a teacher‟s 
income that was received from the local school board. Students enrolled in weekly classes and 
spent one hour on language instruction, thirty minutes on literature and drama, fifteen minutes on 
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geography and history, fifteen minutes on music, and thirty minutes on language orientation 
games.
142
 
The CNAC and MMI were not the only influential organizations to promote awareness of 
Czechoslovakia. In seeking to raise knowledge of Czechoslovak culture and history, the Ottawa 
chapter of the Czechoslovak Society of Arts and Sciences proposed a project entitled “Cultural 
Integration of Czechoslovak Immigrants to Canadian Cultural Atmosphere and Role of Ethnic 
Organization” to officials in the Department of the Secretary of State. Founded in Washington in 
1958 as an international cultural organization with chapters throughout the Western world, the 
society promoted the dissemination of knowledge pertaining to Czechoslovakia, and Czechs and 
Slovaks in the world. In Ottawa, the local chapter comprised of intellectuals and professionals 
many of whom were 1948ers and 1968ers. The Ottawa chapter received a grant of $935 from the 
Department of the Secretary of State and established a resource library for Czechoslovak studies. 
The local chapter also created an informative public program comprised of guest lectures, films, 
and panel discussions on various topics pertaining to Czechoslovakia and Czechoslovak studies. 
In assessing the validity of sponsoring the society‟s project, Canadian officials noted that the 
society was a “well respected and established group of Czechoslovak scholars” whose public 
lectures, literary evenings, and panel discussions were “usually well attended.”143 The 
department hoped that its grant would permit the society to move “from a less parochial and 
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isolated stance into a more public and accessible position” whereby its contribution to 
multiculturalism and Canadian society could be better appreciated.
144
 
In a similar fashion, the CNAC branch in Winnipeg applied for federal funding for its 
project, “Presentation of Czechoslovak Literary Heritage to [the] Canadian Public.” In 
November 1980, the Department of the Secretary of State approved a grant of $2,250 which 
permitted the branch to organize a lecture and panel discussions at the Winnipeg Public Library. 
The discussions examined the role of exiled writers, the status of Czech and Slovak Canadian 
literature, and public awareness of the field in Canada. The lecture coincided with a display of 
Czech and Slovak books and their English translations published in Canada by Czech and Slovak 
Canadian authors.
145
 
Members of the Canadian Czechoslovak community actively engaged in promoting 
multiculturalism and the preservation of Czech and Slovak languages and culture for its 
members and for future generations. With funding from the Canadian government, local groups 
established radio and television programs, community libraries, Czech and Slovak language 
classes, public exhibitions and lectures, and panel discussions. Many Czech and Slovak 
Canadians were increasingly concerned with how immigrants from Czechoslovakia were 
integrating in Canadian society. On 18 May 1983, the CNAC hosted a conference on the 
“cultural and social integration of immigrants from Czechoslovakia” in Toronto. The conference 
brought together community leaders, private citizens, and Canadian Czech and Slovak 
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professionals and scholars. Among the many participants, sociologist Jarmila Horná presented 
her findings from a survey of Czech and Slovak immigrants in Alberta. 
 
Horná concluded that a 
majority of the respondents to her survey indicated that they felt a “distinctive and undeniable 
dual ethnicity” of being Canadian and Czech or Slovak. Respondents also indicated that they 
compartmentalized their identity by identifying with being Canadian in the public sphere – 
including employment, church, social gatherings, and as Czechs or Slovaks in the private sphere 
at home and with family and friends.
146
 
Postwar Czechoslovakian immigrants in Canada including the 1948ers and the 1968ers 
preferred the urban and middle-class background of English Canada. Horná‟s study asserted that 
a majority of Czechoslovakian immigrants in Alberta preferred participating in the arts and 
purchasing literature and music, while their desire to provide an education in the Czech or 
Slovak languages to successive generations diminished.
147
 Once in Canada, Czechoslovakian 
adults were preoccupied with English language courses and college or university studies in order 
to improve their socioeconomic position. As a result, less time was spent by a majority of 
respondents in the home. Czech and Slovak immigrants rarely attended public meetings or ethnic 
association events because they were not formally invited.
148
 Horná‟s study of Czech and Slovak 
immigrants in Alberta indicates that many newcomers from Czechoslovakia were primarily 
concerned with their own socioeconomic status in Canada. As a result, many immigrants did not 
participate in ethnic associations or civic organizations because they felt uninvited and also 
placed an emphasis on improving their language skills and level of employment through further 
studies. 
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Conclusion 
 
Canadian Czechoslovak organizations opposed the period of normalization that followed 
the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Similar to the outrage caused by 
the Soviet-led invasion, normalization continued to heighten anti-Soviet sentiment among the 
1948ers and the 1968ers in the years that followed. As two prominent Canadian Czechoslovak 
institutions, the Czechoslovak National Association of Canada (CNAC) and Masaryk Memorial 
Institute (MMI) were joined by other groups including the Canadian Czechoslovak Benevolent 
Association (CCBA) in condemning the return of hardline Communist rule in Czechoslovakia.  
In the 1970s and 1980s, Czechoslovakian citizens continued to arrive in Canada from 
Communist Eastern Europe. Czech and Slovak newcomers who supported a Czechoslovak 
identity joined the CNAC, MMI, and CCBA and supported attempts by these organizations to 
raise awareness and defend individual freedoms, human rights, and democracy in 
Czechoslovakia. The CNAC continued to lobby the federal government for the removal of 
restrictions on the visits of relatives, and demanded that Prague remove Czechoslovakian 
citizenship from individuals who later received Canadian citizenship to prevent their detention 
when visiting the old country. When the 1948 and 1968 waves of refugees refused to normalize 
relations with Prague after having left the country „without permission,‟ Czechoslovakian 
diplomats and StB agents increasingly used pressure tactics including propaganda, coercion, and 
blackmail to force an outcome favourable to the Communist regime. As new members of the 
CNAC and MMI, refugees who arrived in Canada during the period of normalization in 
Czechoslovakia supported the 1948ers agenda of defending democracy and rights in 
Czechoslovakia and defending democratic values against a vocal minority of Canadians who 
opposed what they perceived as Western imperialism towards the Communist world. 
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In the immediate years after the events of 1968, the CNAC and MMI continued to 
struggle with a lack of financial security as memberships fluctuated. Both institutions 
increasingly recognized that the preservation of Czechoslovak heritage for future generations 
was of vital importance. As a result, many members within the CNAC and MMI continued to 
turn towards domestic issues. With the Canadian government‟s introduction of an official 
multiculturalism policy in 1971, Canadian Czechoslovak institutions were able to support their 
activities with federal grants and subsidies under the aegis of multiculturalism which promoted 
the country‟s diverse ethnic cultures and identities. Canadian Czechoslovak groups successfully 
funded projects including Czech and Slovak supplementary schools, and community radio and 
televisions broadcasts that preserved Czechoslovak heritage and identity, and also promoted 
Canadian multiculturalism. These government supported ethnocultural activities assisted in 
contesting public apathy among community members and improved Canadian citizenship. 
Similarly, government funding allowed for the Canadian Czechoslovak community to move 
from a less known position to greater public visibility whereby its contribution to Canadian 
multiculturalism could be better appreciated. 
The arrival of over 11,200 individuals during the special program for Czechoslovak 
refugees in 1968-1969 galvanized the Czechoslovak community in Canada. The newcomers 
helped to revitalize the CNAC and MMI‟s ageing membership. The Czechs and Slovaks who 
arrived in Canada in the 1970s and 1980s were considerably more diverse in their backgrounds 
when compared with the 1948ers and 1968ers who were predominantly educated and skilled 
professionals. The third wave of Cold War refugees from Czechoslovakia were professionals 
including academics and scientists, but were also skilled in the trades including the construction, 
manufacturing, and service industries. From 1983 to 1989, 83.3 percent of Czechoslovakians 
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were admitted into Canada as refugees. Approximately half of all Czechoslovakian newcomers 
resettled in Ontario followed by Quebec, British Columbia, and Alberta. The immigration of 
Czechs and Slovaks from the Warsaw Pact invasion to the fall of communism was directly a 
consequence of Cold War politics. Czechs and Slovaks who supported Czechoslovakism 
transplanted their old world ethnic ideological identities to Canada where they joined prewar 
immigrants and the 1948ers in entrenching their anti-communist and democratic agenda into 
Canadian Czechoslovak organizations including the CNAC and MMI. As a result, both the 
CNAC and MMI maintained an anti-communist Cold War identity which continued to support 
Canada‟s Cold War agenda. As Canadian Czechoslovak organizations, the CNAC and MMI 
actively lobbied the federal government in an attempt to influence Canadian foreign policy 
towards their old homeland and domestic politics in Canada. Ultimately, the CNAC and MMI 
were ethnic organizations that influenced Canada‟s democratic culture during the Cold War. 
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Conclusion 
 
In early 1990, officials within the Czechoslovakian President‟s office held discussions 
with Canadian diplomats in the hopes that former compatriots in Canada could play a decisive 
role in Czechoslovakia‟s reorientation from Communism to Western democracy. Both groups 
agreed that as Czechoslovakia‟s first democratic head of state since 1948, Václav Havel had to 
spend at least one night in Canada. On 18 February 1990, the recently elected Czechoslovakian 
president arrived in Canada for a two-day visit – with an evening in Ottawa before departing 
for Toronto. Havel‟s objective was to encourage the special relationship between Canada and 
Czechoslovakia before departing for Washington.
1
 Vital to this relationship were the Czechs 
and Slovaks who permanently settled in Canada during four decades of Communist rule. 
Canadian diplomats asserted that these individuals were an “important human bridge” between 
both countries.
2
 In the case of the 1968ers who spent two decades under Communist 
domination, a Canadian diplomat stationed in Prague during the Velvet Revolution stated:  
 
These people had sought asylum from political persecution. They had left 
family and friends behind from scratch in a faraway country about which 
they knew little. What made these immigrants different from most was the 
fact that they were practically barred from any contact with their homeland. 
Virtually all had assumed that this break was final. These people were 
among the most surprised at the suddenness of the change.
3
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After meeting the local Czechoslovak community in Ottawa, Havel flew to Toronto 
where he received a honourary doctorate of law. Before a capacity crowd of approximately 
2,000 Canadian Czechs and Slovaks at the University of Toronto‟s Convocation Hall, the 
dissident now turned Czechoslovakian president declared that a “democratic federation” would 
exist between Czech and Slovak nations in a democratic Czechoslovakia. Havel argued that 
Czech statehood had to be separated from Czechoslovak statehood in order for an equal 
federative union to take hold between the Czech and Slovak nations.
4
 During Havel‟s official 
visit in Toronto, individuals within the Canadian Slovak community voiced their aspirations 
for greater autonomy for Slovaks in Czechoslovakia. Among jeers and whistles from a capacity 
crowd of Canadian Czechs and Slovaks, Revered Dušan Toth – who represented the World 
Slovak League – argued for Slovak equality and minority rights in Czechoslovakia. Many of 
the individuals in attendance were also members of the Czechoslovak community and were 
annoyed by Toth‟s comments. They simply wished to hear their „hero of hope‟ and new 
Czechoslovakian president address the crowd. The Globe and Mail concluded rather astutely 
that the Czech[oslovak] and nationalist Slovak communities remained “disputatious” compared 
to their brethren in Czechoslovakia who were consumed by a new found democracy.
5
  
Several months later in June 1990, Czechoslovakia held its first parliamentary election 
in forty-four years. During the summer of 1992, Czech and Slovak politicians negotiated the 
future of Czechoslovakia. Czech politicians favoured a continued federation between the Czech 
lands and Slovakia, while Slovak leaders sought greater sovereignty over Slovakia‟s affairs. 
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Although a majority of Czechoslovakia‟s citizenry initially disapproved of any breakup of the 
state, Czech and Slovak politicians mutually agreed to a Velvet Divorce in the fall of 1992. On 
1 January 1993, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic became independent states. That 
same year, the Czechoslovak National Association of Canada (CNAC) recognized this political 
shift in Central Europe and was renamed the Czech and Slovak Association of Canada.
6
  
From the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia in February 1948 to the fall of the 
Communist regime in December 1989, approximately 550,000 individuals or 3.5 percent of the 
total population emigrated from Czechoslovakia.
7
 During the Cold War, events in 
Czechoslovakia led to three distinct waves of emigration to the West. The Communist takeover 
of Czechoslovakia in February 1948 caused approximately 55,000-80,000 individuals to flee 
their homeland in the two years after the Communist seizure of power.
8
 Communist authorities 
in Prague introduced a new class of criminal who they deemed was disloyal to the state: the 
„illegal emigrant‟ or “an individual who left the country without permission.” Prague refused to 
accept that individuals who left Czechoslovakia during and after the Communist takeover could 
refer to themselves as „exiles‟ – because it implied they were forced to leave on political 
grounds. As a result, Prague viewed those who left their homeland as „émigrés‟ because their 
immigration to the West was to improve their socioeconomic position.
9
 Similarly, relatives and 
friends of the „illegal émigré‟ were often blacklisted for their ties to „criminals‟ and „enemies of 
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the state,‟ and were prevented from attending university studies, gaining employment in their 
field of expertise, and lived with family due to their bourgeois or democratic backgrounds.
10
 
Referred to as the utíkali or those who „ran away‟ by the Communist press in 
Czechoslovakia, the 1948 wave of immigration to the West was comprised of former 
government ministers, members of parliament, state bureaucrats, local officials, military 
officers, clergy, professionals, artists, students, workers, and agriculturalists. Although this 
wave of immigration included persons from all facets of society and class, a majority of these 
individuals were from urban areas, well-educated, and held upper or middle-class 
socioeconomic status.
11
 The existing Czechoslovak community in Canada referred to these 
émigrés as the 1948ers for their immigration to Canada was a direct result of the Communist 
takeover. The 1948ers arrived in Canada after spending weeks, months, and years in refugee 
camps in Austria, Italy, Occupied Germany, and later West Germany. They firmly believed 
that their resettlement in Canada would be temporary. With the assistance of the Czechoslovak 
National Alliance (CNA), Masaryk Hall (MH), and the Canadian Fund for Czechoslovak 
Refugees (CFCR), many Czech and Slovak refugees were admitted into Canada after signing 
one-year manual farm labour contracts. Initially, they struggled to have their European 
university degrees and professional qualifications recognized before Canadian federal and 
provincial authorities. As a result, many 1948ers found work, but were underemployed in their 
first few years in Canada.
12
 In reestablishing themselves in the West, many 1948ers found a 
sympathetic public and a Czechoslovak community waiting to assist them in their resettlement. 
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In Canada, many 1948ers joined Czechoslovak organizations including the CNA and MH in an 
attempt to defend Czechoslovak democracy, and hoped their return home would come in a few 
short years. The 1948ers referred to members of the existing Canadian Czechoslovak 
community as “oldtimers” or “old-fashioned” since they promoted Canadian citizenship and 
the maintenance of a Czechoslovak cultural heritage above the newcomers‟ agenda of returning 
democracy to Czechoslovakia. Relations between the 1948ers and the oldtimers were heavily 
influenced by ideological and personality clashes.
13
 
Scholars have held to a dominant view of the period involving the Communist takeover 
and the 1948ers – arguing that this wave of emigration from Czechoslovakia to the West left 
their homeland in an attempt to defend postwar Czechoslovak democracy by re-establishing 
their anti-communist agenda in the West. Similarly, the 1948ers are predominantly viewed as 
heroic anti-communist fighters and defenders of the “…inherent democracy of the 
Czech[oslovakian] people and their institutions...”14 With a sense of alienation from the 
Communist regime, many 1948ers were able to continue their efforts to defend democracy 
against their homeland‟s oppressive form of government through the creation of an “émigré 
subculture” which could be found in the postwar Canadian Czechoslovak community.15 
In Czechoslovakia, many of the 1948ers were members of democratic political parties 
representing centre-left, moderate, and conservative ideologies prior to the Communist takeover. 
In coming to Canada, political refugees from Czechoslovakia re-established their political groups 
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in exile while envisioning a return to their old homeland after its successful liberation from 
Communism. Those who came after the February 1948 Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia, 
joined existing groups – including the Czechoslovak National Alliance and the Masaryk 
Memorial Hall – that could promote their nationalistic and democratic political ideologies while 
remaining patriotic to the old country. These organizations became mechanisms by which 
political refugees from Czechoslovakia could fight to liberate their homeland from communism. 
Similarly, many Czech 1948ers represented Czechs and Slovaks in Canada as their 
“Czechoslovak” constituents thereby fusing Czech nationalism with Czechoslovak identity 
against the opposition of nationalist Canadian Slovaks and the Canadian Slovak League (CSL). 
The Canadian government was well aware of the ethnic and political cleavages between 
Czechs and Slovaks.
16
Although it is questionable as to what impact political refugees had on the 
formulation of Canadian foreign policy, their organizations promoted democratic ideals and the 
maintenance of ethnic identity through cultural activities such as Czechoslovak Day or the Sokol 
Slet. Following the brutal suppression of the Hungarian Revolution by the Soviet forces in the 
fall of 1956, many Czech and Slovak political refugees who were proponents of a Czechoslovak 
identity and ideology began to turn their focus towards humanitarianism and the promotion of 
Canadian citizenship within the Canadian Czechoslovak community. Nationalist Slovaks 
represented by the CSL and a minority of conservative Czechs opposed the latter group‟s agenda 
of representing all Czechs and Slovaks as “Czechoslovaks.”17 Moderate and conservative 
political refugees largely influenced the demise of the homegrown ethnic left during the Cold 
War period. With support from the federal government, Communist adherents and socialist 
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sympathizers were labelled as national security risks and agents of Moscow, and were not 
permitted to enter Canada.
18
 For the 1948ers who successfully settled in Canada, their early 
immigrant experience was heavily influenced by their lobbying efforts before the Canadian 
government which they hoped would assist in returning a parliamentary democracy to 
Czechoslovakia. These anti-communist political refugees refused to become victims of events in 
their homeland and retained their own agency by actively denouncing the Communist regime in 
Prague and continued to assist fellow refugees in their resettlement in Canada.
19
 
Two decades later, a more sizeable wave of refugees left Czechoslovakia in the wake of 
the failed Prague Spring reforms, the Warsaw Pact invasion, and the subsequent Soviet 
occupation of Czechoslovakia. Referred to as the vycestovali or those who „travelled out,‟ by 
the Communist Czechoslovakian press, approximately 150,000 individuals resettled in the 
West. Until the early 1970s, approximately 225,000 Czechoslovakians permanently resettled in 
the West in the months following the Soviet-led invasion.
20
 In Canada, these same refugees 
came to be known in the local Czechoslovak community as the 1968ers. These newcomers to 
Canada largely viewed their resettlement in the West as permanent since they believed that the 
failed Prague Spring movement and the normalization of Czechoslovakia were also permanent. 
Three factors influenced Czechoslovakian immigration to the West after the Warsaw Pact 
invasion: dismay over the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia and the crushing of the 
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Prague Spring reforms; concern over the future of the country under Soviet occupation; and 
improvement of an individual‟s socioeconomic situation.21  Many 1968ers who were outside of 
their homeland prior to the invasion initially wavered on permanent immigration in the West 
and waited to see what would happen in Czechoslovakia before making a final decision. 
In Canada, refugee advocates criticized the federal government for playing into Cold 
War politics as Ottawa ignored the plight of refugees from right-wing regimes and 
implemented a special program for Czechoslovakian refugees that permanently resettled close 
to 12,000 individuals.
22
 Scholars argued that Ottawa believed it had to intervene on 
humanitarian grounds after the Warsaw Pact invasion, bringing well-educated refugees to 
Canada who did not pose a security threat to Canadian society. Similarly, Ottawa desired not to 
embarrass the Soviet Union and unnecessarily heighten Cold War tensions.
23
 However, 
Ottawa‟s self-interest also played a major role in the resettlement of Czechoslovakians.  
Public pressure from the Canadian public, newspaper editorials, and the Canadian 
Czechoslovak community for a response to the Warsaw Pact invasion forced Canadian officials 
to act. During the special program for Czechoslovakian refugees, implemented from September 
1968 to January 1969, the Canadian government sponsored chartered flights, and provided funds 
for immigrant expenses. Under the auspices of the Canada Manpower Training Program, 
newcomers were assisted in finding accommodations and employment, and received English and 
French language training. The Canadian special program remained one of the most generous 
responses to the plight of the Warsaw Pact refugees in the West. The special program for 
Czechoslovakian refugees admitted a large group of educated and skilled refugees to Canada. 
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Many of the 1968ers were multilingual with some knowledge of English, French, German, or 
Russian. Similar to the 1948ers, the 1968 wave of refugees consisted of professionals and skilled 
tradesmen including academics, clergy, doctors, engineers, journalists, lawyers, scientists, 
students, and tradespeople. Contrary to the 1948ers, these newcomers spent approximately two 
decades under communism and experienced first-hand the daily effects of totalitarianism 
including harassment and imprisonment.
24
 
Both the 1948 and 1968 waves of Czech and Slovak immigration to Canada were 
directly tied to events in Eastern Europe. Many 1948ers believed that the 1968ers were more 
readily assisted in their initial settlement and even given an “easier path” to full integration by 
the federal and provincial governments, and local organizations.
25
 Individuals who arrived in 
Canada due to the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia in February 1948 were accepted and 
were employed due to their acceptance of a one-year farm labour contract. Beginning with the 
mass influx of over 37,500 Hungarians in 1956-1957, the Canadian government was better 
equipped to accept and resettle close to 12,000 Czechoslovakians during the special program 
from September 1968 to January 1969. The 1948ers‟ negative perceptions of successive waves 
of immigration from Czechoslovakia were inaccurate as many newcomers initially struggled to 
find accommodations and employment. In the immediate years after their arrival, the 1968ers 
were also underemployed in their respective fields, but were more readily able to attain the 
necessary additional certifications and training in order to qualify as professionals in their 
respective professions.  
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During the 1970s and 1980s, a third wave of émigrés left Czechoslovakia for the West. 
The Communist press in Czechoslovakia referred to these individuals as having se vypařily or 
„self-evaporated.‟ The reasons behind this wave of academics, professionals, and skilled 
tradesmen leaving their homeland were not directly tied to a specific event. Individuals and 
families fled their homeland during the period of normalization which stemmed from the failed 
Prague Spring reform movement.
26
 A relatively common experience for Czechs and Slovaks 
who fled Czechoslovakia in the 1970s and 1980s was to acquire a travel passport from the 
Communist authorities in Prague and take a „vacation‟ to Yugoslavia via Hungary. 
Czechoslovakians who left their homeland arrived in Yugoslavia as refugees with hopes of 
reaching the West. After requesting political asylum in Yugoslavia, their identification was 
often seized as per an agreement between Belgrade and Prague. Although many 
Czechoslovakians were made to wait before reaching the West, they eventually arrived in 
Austria where they were sent to refugee camps prior to their resettlement in Canada. 
During the Cold War period, a significant portion of 1948ers and 1968ers, and those 
who arrived in the last two decades of the Cold War refused to join Canadian Czechoslovak 
community groups and organizations out of a genuine fear of reprisal at the hands of the 
Communist regime in Prague. Canadian Czechoslovaks were aware that Czechoslovakian 
diplomats and StB (Státní bezpečnost – State Security) agents conducted espionage and 
blackmail campaigns in an effort to pressure their compatriots to return home through 
„repatriation campaigns‟ or to „normalize relations‟ with the Communist authorities. Although 
only a small minority within the Canadian Czechoslovak community regularized their status as 
„illegal émigrés‟ who left Czechoslovakia „without permission,‟ a majority of individuals did 
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not resolve this issue with Prague. Unlike the 1948ers, the 1968ers and the most recent wave of 
arrivals in Canada were more likely to be „apolitical‟ and although they supported the 1948ers‟ 
anti-communist agenda, most did not actively join efforts to influence political developments 
in Czechoslovakia or Canadian foreign policy towards their old homeland. Often, 
Czechoslovakian immigrants feared that by joining community groups that carried an anti-
communist agenda, they would further antagonize officials back home preventing them from 
seeing relatives and friends again. In some instances, Czech and Slovak immigrants refused to 
seek out their relatives and friends because they feared for their safety in Czechoslovakia as the 
Communist authorities scrutinized correspondence between „illegal émigrés‟ in the West and 
their contacts at home.
27
 
During four decades of the Cold War, the Communist regime promoted the myth that 
emigration was an act of betrayal against the state and the Czechoslovak nation. For those who 
fled from Communism, their fellow compatriots in Czechoslovakia often resented them for 
leaving their homeland due to an “…old myth which dictates that it is a sin to leave your 
country of birth.”28 Czechoslovakians who settled in Canada during the Cold War, and later 
returned to their old homeland decades later, often recalled that compatriots distrusted them 
because of a perception fueled by émigrés themselves and the Communist regime that 
suggested they lived a better life in the West. Those individuals who made the ultimate 
sacrifice to leave their friends, families, and way of life behind did so at a high cost to their 
relatives and friends. Czechoslovakians who fled communism for the West were considered to 
be traitors and their relatives and friends were denied university studies, career advancement, 
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and travel abroad.
29
 Émigrés were often individualistic and many avoided Czechoslovak 
organizations in Canada because they did not want to be told what to think and how to act. As a 
result, these same organizations found it difficult to attract Canadian Czechs and Slovaks even 
though many of them consistently read Canadian Czech and Slovak language newspapers and 
magazines for community news.
30
  
From 1946 to 1989, 26,231 persons claimed Czechoslovakia as their last permanent 
residence upon entering Canada. From 1946 to 1982 and 1985 to 1989, 36,196 persons claimed 
Czechoslovakia as their country of citizenship upon entering Canada.
31
 As a microcosm of a 
much larger movement of Eastern European refugees to Canada after 1945, the experiences of 
Czech and Slovak refugees and existing Canadian Czechoslovak institutions are an invaluable 
resource to the study of immigration history and ethnicity in Canada. Beyond this study, further 
research needs to be conducted. Additional oral histories with refugees who arrived in Canada 
during the three aforementioned periods of Cold War immigration would greatly supplement 
existing community archival records and various governmental sources. An emphasis should 
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be placed on documenting the oral histories of individuals who arrived in Canada during the 
1970s and 1980s, as their immigration experience is often over shadowed by the larger 
movement of Displaced Persons and political refugees of the first three decades of the Cold 
War. The scope of espionage activities by Czechoslovakia‟s StB in Canada also requires further 
study since very little is known about the extent of StB operations, forms of espionage, and 
Communist infiltration in Czechoslovak organizations in Canada. An assessment of how 
cultural markers including holidays, food, folklore, music, and religion have influenced Czech 
and Slovak refugees‟ identity in Canada would contribute to our understanding of Czech, 
Slovak, and Czechoslovak identity during the Cold War. An examination of the archival 
records held in the Czech Republic and Slovakia with a particular emphasis on files pertaining 
to Canada and its Czechoslovak community would provide further insight into Communist 
Czechoslovakia‟s relationship with its compatriots in Canada.  
Guiding this study was the following question: what role did the immigration of anti-
communist Czechs and Slovaks play in defining Canadian Czechoslovak identity and Canadian 
foreign policy towards Czechoslovakia during the Cold War? This dissertation argued that the 
immigration of ethnic Czechs and Slovaks from Communist Czechoslovakia was directly a 
consequence of Cold War politics. The Communist takeover of February 1948, Warsaw Pact 
Invasion of 1968, and the following period of normalization observed thousands of 
Czechoslovakian citizens leave their homeland in search of safe haven from a totalitarian regime. 
In three successive waves of immigration, ethnic Czechs and Slovaks who supported a 
Czechoslovak identity transplanted their old world ethnic and ideological divisions to Canada. In 
joining existing Czechoslovak institutions such as the CNA and MH – and later renamed the 
CNAC and MMI – Czech and Slovak refugees interacted with older members of the community, 
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and the Canadian public whereby they successfully entrenched their anti-communism and 
democratic values into community organizations, and as a vital component of the Czechoslovak 
community‟s identity in Canada. The 1948ers, 1968ers, and those who arrived in Canada in the 
1970s and 1980s rapidly influenced the sociopolitical composition of the Czechoslovak 
community in Canada. As members of the CNAC and MMI among other Czechoslovak 
organizations in Canada, Cold War refugees from Czechoslovakia brought attention to political 
developments in Czechoslovakia and actively attempted to shape Canadian foreign policy 
towards their old homeland. As a part of the federal government‟s Cold War agenda, 
Czechoslovak organizations influenced Canada‟s democratic culture. 
 Several conclusions can be drawn from this study of Czech and Slovak immigration to 
Canada during the Cold War. After 1945, Canada was in the midst of profound social and 
economic change as DPs (Displaced Persons) and political refugees were resettled in the country. 
Federal authorities were well aware of the need to assist European states in alleviating postwar 
displacement. At the same time, the Canadian government was concerned with the immigration 
of Eastern Europeans who it feared might hold leftist sympathies, or were members of 
dysfunctional and immoral family units. Across Canada, public and non-governmental officials 
encouraged a moral panic which heightened the Canadian public‟s anxiety towards the Cold 
War. As the political representatives of a predominantly white, Christian, and conservative 
society during the Cold War, these officials claimed that Eastern European newcomers from 
Communist states could compromise the moral and social character of Canadian society. As a 
result, Canadian citizens became increasingly alarmed by the potential of immoral, socially 
dysfunctional, sexually deviant, and politically divergent European newcomers arriving in 
Canada.  
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Canadian authorities were instrumental in the admission, settlement, and integration of 
Czech and Slovak refugees during the Cold War. Federal officials from the Immigration Branch, 
Departments of External Affairs, National Health and Welfare, and the Solicitor General – who 
was responsible for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) – engaged these newcomers 
who adhered to anti-communist and democratic values in an attempt to solicit their political 
support which would further legitimize their Cold War agenda of securing the state against 
Communist influence from abroad, and to limit the influence of interwar Czech and Slovak 
„leftists‟ in Canada.  Federal and provincial cabinet members and government bureaucrats 
promoted Canadian citizenship and democratic values when visiting, for example, Masaryk 
Hall‟s (MH) Czechoslovak Day celebrations at Masaryktown. The interactions between 
Canadian officials and the Czechoslovak community through its institutions which included the 
Czechoslovak National Alliance (CNA) and the MH (Masaryk Hall) – both later incorporated 
and renamed to the Czechoslovak National Association of Canada (CNAC) and the Masaryk 
Memorial Institute (MMI) – helped to further legitimize the Czech and Slovak newcomers‟ anti-
communist agenda and increased their influence in community organizations. 
Many of the Cold War newcomers from Czechoslovakia joined community organizations 
such as the CNAC and MMI in an effort to establish themselves as intermediaries between the 
Czechoslovak community they hoped to represent and mainstream Canadian society. Within the 
the CNAC and MMI, many 1948ers later joined by the 1968ers maintained transnational 
identities in which they attempted to promote anti-communist and democratic values in the hopes 
of one day witnessing democracy return to their old homeland. In helping to minimize 
Communist infiltration within Canadian Czechoslovak organizations, Cold War refugees 
attempted to illustrate to Canadian officials that they were also loyal to their new country‟s Cold 
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War agenda. In essence, many of the 1948ers and 1968ers joined community institutions out of 
self-interest in the hopes of ameliorating their socioeconomic status in Canada, promote their 
political views, and firmly establish themselves as members of the Czechoslovak community 
elite. The use of their position as Cold War refugees from Czechoslovakia and their anti-
communist background ultimately bolstered many newcomers‟ position within the Czechoslovak 
community and the broader Canadian society. 
The refugees who resettled in Canada after the February 1948 Communist takeover, the 
August 1968 Warsaw Pact Invasion, and the subsequent period of normalization did not only 
influence the anti-communist and democratic agenda of Canadian Czechoslovak institutions such 
as the CNAC and MMI, but were also shaped by the ethnic organizations they joined. Cold War 
refugees from Czechoslovakia who espoused a Czechoslovak identity sought assistance from 
community institutions in the form of accommodations, employment, financial loans, language 
translation, and social activities. Newcomers joined the Czechoslovak associations out of a sense 
of community and a common ethnocultural understanding. 
At the same time, many individuals within the existing Canadian Czechoslovak 
community were influenced by the anti-communism of the newcomers and supported the return 
of democracy in Czechoslovakia. Beginning with the 1948ers, Czech and Slovak refugees who 
transplanted their democratic politics and anti-communism to Canada used persuasive language 
such as “struggle,” “liberation,” “movement,” “combat,” and “fight” to illustrate their opposition 
to the Soviets and the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia. This use of rhetoric often exceeded 
reality since the newcomers had little or no real influence over developments in Czechoslovakia 
or Canadian foreign policy towards Czechoslovakia. However, the refugees‟ anti-communist 
rhetoric did attempt to alter Canadian perceptions of the Czechoslovak community in Canada, 
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their homeland in the Eastern Bloc, and aligned them with the conservative Cold War consensus 
advocated by public and non-governmental officials in Canada. 
Over four decades of the Cold War, the publication of editorial submissions to 
mainstream news outlets and the ethnic press, letter-writing campaigns to federal, provincial, and 
municipal politicians and bureaucrats, public demonstrations before parliament, legislatures, and 
city halls across Canada, and protests before the Czechoslovakian and Soviet Embassies, all 
served to exemplify forms of self-justification on the part of many 1948ers, 1968ers, and those 
who arrived in Canada during the 1970s and 1980s. Within these three successive waves of 
immigration from Communist Czechoslovakia, Czech and Slovak refugees may have sought to 
dispel rumours and allegations of leftist sympathies or Communist involvement in the old 
homeland or in Canada. At the same, with evidence of StB infiltration of Czechoslovak 
organizations in Canada such as 55 year-old spy Rudolf Dostál‟s activities within the CNA‟s 
Toronto Branch in 1956, or that of Czech refugee Bořivoj Čelovský who spied on the 
Czechoslovak community in order to bring his mother to Canada in the 1950s, it is entirely 
possible that Czech and Slovak refugees attempted to shield their pasts or true allegiances from 
the Czechoslovak community, Canadian officials, and the broader Canadian society. Many 
prominent members within the Canadian Czechoslovak community may have hid their true 
intentions in order to craft an income from their activities opposing the Soviets and the 
Communist regime in Czechoslovakia. In some cases, individuals that could be labelled as 
„professional Czechoslovaks‟ may have benefitted financially and politically from their role as 
prominent members of an Eastern European community in Cold War Canada.  
Prewar immigrants and their Canadian-born relatives opposed attempts by the 1948ers to 
steer their organizations towards political issues in Czechoslovakia including the liberation of 
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Czechoslovakia from communism, but were sympathetic to events in Czechoslovakia. The 
Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 illustrated to Canadian Czechoslovaks that a movement for 
democracy in the Eastern Bloc could be easily suppressed. As a result, oldtimers and the 1948ers 
increasingly turned towards promoting Canadian citizenship and preserving Czechoslovak ethnic 
heritage for successive generations. Their attempts were opposed by the nationalist Canadian 
Slovak community which advocated for a distinct Slovak ethnic identity. 
A decade later, the Warsaw Pact invasion in August 1968 shocked and dismayed many 
individuals within the Canadian Czechoslovak community. The Soviet-led invasion offensive 
heightened anti-Soviet sentiment among members of the Czechoslovak community in Canada. 
The subsequent resettlement of close to 12,000 Czechoslovakians reinvigorated community 
institutions including the CNAC and MMI. The 1968ers lived through two decades of 
Communist rule and many of them eagerly joined the 1948ers and their agenda of returning 
democracy to Czechoslovakia. At the same time, the 1968ers feared for their families and in 
some cases sought to „normalize relations‟ with the Prague government. Joining Canadian 
Czechoslovak organizations gave many postwar Czech and Slovak immigrants a sense of 
purpose where they could attempt to influence developments in their homeland and Canadian 
foreign policy towards Communist Czechoslovakia by lobbying Canadian officials. The 1948ers 
and 1968ers‟ anti-communist identity may have also hid a strong anti-Soviet attitude as 
witnessed by placards and signs – expressing to the Soviets to “Go Home,” or “Soviet Murderers 
Get Out from Czechoslovakia,” – used during the post-invasion protests held across Canada in 
August 1968 and with subsequent anniversaries of the invasion. 
As normalization was implemented in Czechoslovakia after the events of 1968, Czech 
and Slovak refugees continued to arrive in the 1970s and 1980s, and were also well-received by 
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Canadian authorities, government agencies, and local Czechoslovak associations. With federal, 
provincial, and privately administered programs for newcomers, more recent Czech and Slovak 
refugees were often able to find temporary accommodations, clothing, funds, and employment 
from mainstream Canadian organizations rather than local Czechoslovak groups. These 
programs helped more recent Czech and Slovak newcomers to retain a significantly high level of 
assimilation into Canadian society.
32
 Following the introduction of a Multiculturalism Policy by 
the Canadian government in 1971, Czechoslovak organizations successfully applied for federal 
funding to support their community libraries, radio and television programs, supplementary 
language schools, publications, conferences, and community exhibitions. 
With an increase in governmental funding for refugee settlement and an increase in 
organizations and programs that served the needs of newcomers, many Czech and Slovak 
refugees turned towards public programs. As a result, newcomers were less involved in the 
1948ers and 1968ers‟ anti-communist agenda and preferred to support the preservation of 
Czechoslovak heritage in Canada for successive generations. Over time, Czech and Slovak 
refugees began to change their perceptions of themselves and Canadian society thereby 
becoming Canadians themselves. Ultimately, an adherence to democratic values, promotion of 
Canadian citizenship, and the preservation of Czechoslovak heritage accelerated Czech and 
Slovak refugees‟ socioeconomic and political integration in Cold War Canada. In 
Czechoslovakia, Communist authorities were successfully thwarted from manipulating the 
Czechoslovak community in Canada into becoming agents for their homeland. As Cold War 
newcomers in Canada, Czech and Slovak refugees played an important role in raising awareness 
of human rights abuses, censorship, lack of socioeconomic advancement, and daily life under the 
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totalitarian regime in their old homeland. Ultimately, Canadian Czechoslovak institutions held 
little influence over developments in Communist Eastern Europe or Canadian foreign policy 
towards the Eastern Bloc. However, through their efforts to promote democratic values in 
Canada and Czechoslovakia, the CNAC, MMI, and other Czechoslovak organizations in Canada, 
were instrumental in helping to shape a democratic Canadian society during the Cold War. 
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